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Marko Palokangas1 - Exploding Wilderness 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Guerrilla-type activities as an area of study in the history of the art of 
war 
 
Study of the art of war, taking all its aspects into consideration, leads us to the con-
clusion that it is a phenomenon that has emerged over hundreds of years, possibly 
even thousands. The same is true of tactics in equal measure. Guerrilla warfare and 
the use of guerrilla-type activities did not emerge in modern times or during the two 
world wars. The history of warfare demonstrates that belligerents have made good 
use of the methods of guerrilla warfare in countless wars. On occasion, guerrilla-
type activities have been less important, lending warfare a character of true guerrilla 
warfare. At other times, guerrilla-type methods have played a lesser role, principally 
providing only direct support to regular military operations. Most examples of the 
methods of guerrilla warfare addressed by military historians focus on cases in 
which the population of an occupied country has fought the occupier. The history 
of guerrilla warfare is essentially a history of a weaker party fighting a stronger ad-
versary. Thus, from the viewpoint of the art of war, guerrilla warfare has acquired its 
present form through a process of trial and error over the course of thousands of 
years. 
 
The military history of Antiquity and the Middle Ages offers several examples of 
guerrilla tactics. Gauls and Germans fighting Roman invaders, and ambushes staged 
by mountain tribesmen against Hannibal’s troops can well be likened to guerrilla-
type warfare. It is naturally debatable whether fighting at that time should be re-
garded as organised guerrilla warfare or as the only means available to the underdog 
to take on an adversary. From the viewpoint of the history of the art of war and its 
study, both interpretations can be construed equally correct or equally incorrect. 
The study of the methods and art of warfare always depends on the period in which 
is conducted and on the viewpoint taken. If the examples offered by military history 
are interpreted from the viewpoint of the victorious party with superior resources, 
the conclusion will differ in most cases from those drawn by the defeated party with 
fewer resources.2  
 
Over the course of the modern period, guerrilla warfare became more prevalent and 
assumed more organised forms. In The Thirty Years' War between 1618 and 1648 
commanders of bands formed of adventurers were called guerrillas. Such bands of-
fered their services and their military skills to both warring parties. International mil-
itary history attests to guerrillas in the 18th century in wars such as the War of the 

1Marko Palokangas (b. 1973) Lieutenant Colonel, Adjunct Professor (DScMil) works at National 
Defence University as the Head of Research Team of the Department of Warfare.
2 See, for example, Ilmola, Paavo: Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suuntaviivat (‘Guerrilla war, 
its prerequisites and guidelines’), a separate study conducted at the National General Staff College 
in 1958, Helsinki 3 April 1959, pp. 1–4, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. Adaridi, Karl: Sissitoiminta 
(‘Guerrilla-type activities’) Helsinki 1925(a), pp. 9–29. 
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Austrian Succession, fought between 1740 and 1748, in which the troops of Freder-
ick the Great had to abandon southern Bohemia due to incessant harassment by 
units of guerrillas. Military historians also refer to guerrilla units and their action on 
several occasions in the context of the late 18th century and the French Revolution-
ary Wars. Both belligerents resorted to guerrilla tactics so frequently that this 
sparked a change in French tactics and the way troops were deployed. However, it 
was not until General Napoleon Bonaparte with his tactical solutions and compe-
tence in the art of war had arrived on the scene, so argue military historians, that a 
popular uprising based on guerrilla tactics was finally put down.3 
 
The history of the art of war offers similar examples of guerrilla warfare set in a 
global context during the 19th and 20th centuries. With regard to developments in 
the art of war during the modern period, the wars that Napoleon waged in Europe 
between 1803 and 1815 stand out justifiably. These wars sparked popular uprisings 
during which the French were confronted with guerrilla warfare in Spain, Austria 
and other areas. The emergence of mass armies extended theatre of war even fur-
ther. War was also extended further to areas that were located behind front lines 
where military, political, social, economic and mental factors contributed to more 
frequent eruptions of popular resistance and occurrences of uprisings.4  
 
Studies of the contemporary writings on guerrilla warfare by notable soldiers of the 
18th and 19th centuries indicate that this kind of warfare appears to have caused 
problems to many of them. Theorists of the time found it clearly disconcerting that 
partisans and other civilians who had taken up arms and who could be juxtaposed 
with guerrillas had emerged on the scene to disrupt the regular tactics of the time, 
which basically resembled an elaborate geometrical game. Against this background it 
is no wonder that many of the contemporary generals –Napoleon included –were 
reluctant to give any credit to the achievements of guerrilla warfare or to the fighting 
skills of armed citizens and partisans. However, other interpretations of guerrilla 
warfare were also proposed. General Carl von Clausewitz, who later earned renown 
as a theorist of war, argued that the emergence of popular uprisings and the more 
frequent employment of guerrilla warfare from the 18th century onwards was a his-
torical breakthrough that pushed the boundaries of and expanded the methods of 
waging war that by the time had become artificial and outdated.5 
 
In Finland, guerrilla-like methods and guerrilla warfare itself have a long history as 
part of the art of war, and have even taken on strategic aspects –sometimes more 
visibly, other times less so. In Finnish romantic nationalism, guerrilla warfare mani-
fests itself in numerous stories, including literature. For example, in the 16th centu-
ry, Olaus Magnus Gothus wrote in his History of the Northern Peoples, among 
other things, about Finns on skis in woods, employing combat tactics that closely 

3 Ibid. Dupuy, Roger: Les Chouans, Hachette Littérature, coll. ‘La Vie Quotidienne’, Paris 1997. 
4 Seppänen, Esa: Sissisota – aikamme sota (‘Guerrilla war – the war of our time’) Tampere 1971, p. 
23. Ilmola (1958), p. 2, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. Adaridi (1925a), pp. 15–16. 
5 Clausewitz, Carl von: Vom Kriege, V. Vehr’s Verlag, Berlin und Leipzig 1918, pp. 492–499. Tarle, 
Eugene: Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia 1812, London 1942. See also Seppänen (1971), p. 22. Ada-
ridi (1925a), p. 15. 
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resembled those of guerrilla-style activities.6 Stories and writings about guerrilla unit 
leaders of the 16th and 17th century, such as Pietari Niilonpoika Kylliäinen7 and 
Juho Antinpoika Vesainen8 or guerrilla units known as ‘Kivekkäät’(so named after 
their leader, Antti Kivekäs) that operated in the Russian-occupied Finland during 
the Great Northern War, or the legendary Jacob Johan Roth, Karl Johan Spoof and 
Olli Tiainen who engaged in querilla-type activities during the Finnish War from 
1808 to 1809, have contributed to the heroic glory of guerrilla fighters.9   
 
As manifestations of the Finnish art of war as practised in the modern era and in 
more recent times, guerrilla-type operations can justifiably be said to have been part 
of military operations at least in the Finnish War between 1808 and 1809, in the 
Finnish War of Independence in 1918, and in the Winter and Continuation Wars 
between 1939 and 1944. However, all of the wars listed above have one thing in 
common: guerrilla-type operations were not systematic and followed no larger plan. 
It was not until the period between the 1950s and the 1970s, following changes to 
the Finnish defence doctrine and the lengthy development process of the territorial 
defence system, that guerrilla-type tactics became an established part of the Finnish 
art of war.  
 
Finland’s defence solution and land warfare tactics were vividly presented in a train-
ing package published in the late 1960s, tasked with the central objective of provid-
ing society at large with an understanding of the principles underpinning the territo-
rial defence system. ‘Superiority in firepower of a great power can be counterbalanced even in 
regular military operations by dispersing troops and by enabling them to take advantage of the cover 
offered by the terrain, thereby denying the enemy advantageous targets, and by bringing the enemy 
under our own fire through the deployment of land mines and guerrilla-type tactics. With regard to 
movement, we must take the maximum advantage of the opportunities offered by our terrain in or-
der to slow down the enemy and to speed up our own movement. Our battle disposition must be 
deep along the enemy’s probable routes of advance and flexible and active on his flanks. There must 
be hedgehogs lying in the enemy’s way and Karelian bear dogs must be biting into his sides! In order 
to enable mobile military operations, aimed to actively slow down the enemy’s advance and to deliver 
decisive strikes, mobile general forces with a maximum firepower must be formed of the younger age 
classes, while older age classes can be armed and kitted out to form local forces for local defence pur-
poses. The local forces are tasked with containing landings of airborne troops, slowing down advanc-
ing enemy attack formations, protecting targets in the rear, and tying up enemy forces by waiting un-

6 Magnus, Olaus: Suomalaiset Pohjoisten kansojen historiassa, Osa 1 (‘Finns in the History of the North-
ern Peoples, Part I’), Jyväskylä 2002, pp. 30, 131, 137–138, 144–145, 201 and 257.  
7 Pietari Niilonpoika Kylliäinen († approx. 1510), was the first known castellan of Olavinlinna Cas-
tle who, with the castle’s garrison and by enlisting the aid of common people was able to repel a 
Russian attack in 1495. 
8 According to Finnish folklore, Juho Antinpoika Vesainen, or Juho Pekka Antinpoika Vesainen 
(ca. 1540 – ca. 1627), was a Finnish freedom fighter and guerrilla leader who, during the Great 
Northern War, fought with his troops for the sovereignty of the Finnish people. See for example 
Ivalo, Santeri: Juho Vesainen, Porvoo 1925. 
9 See for example Kuosa, Tauno: Jokamiehen Suomen historia, osa III, Ruotsin vallan viimeinen kausi, 
(‘Everyman’s Finnish history, part III, the last years of the Swedish rule’), 3rd editions, 1963 pp. 
986–987. Lappalainen, Jussi T. – Ericson-Wolke, Lars – Pylkkänen, Ali: Sota Suomesta – Suomen sota 
1808–1809 (‘The war of Finland – the Finnish War’), Helsinki 2007. 
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til they have passed over and then launching guerrilla-type operations in the enemy’s rear. Every-
where the enemy must be forced to face ‘the exploding wilderness.’10 
 
The preceding paragraph sums up the functional core of the territorial defence sys-
tem as well as the key principles of using guerrilla-type tactics. But how did the 
methods of guerrilla warfare become incorporated into the Finnish art of war? In 
what ways have such tactics been developed and formulated into a theory that 
makes use of tactical methods and means available to the operational level of war? 
Of what elements have guerrilla-type tactics with a decidedly Finnish character been 
constructed over time; and what key components does the Finnish guerrilla tactics 
consist of? This study will discuss the evolution and historical trajectory of guerrilla-
type tactics from the viewpoint of the art of war, placing the emphasis on the Finn-
ish territorial defence system put in place during the Cold War. If I am looking for 
an inspiration for this study, I might find it in the pseudonym ‘Viljami Korpi’, or 
Veikko Koppinen, who completed a manuscript for a novel entitled Räjähtävä tyhjyys 
(‘Exploding Wilderness’) in the mid-1950s. ‘Räjähtävä tyhjyys – exploding wilder-
ness’ is also a concept launched by Veikko Koppinen. It denotes Finnish guerrilla-
type tactics, intended to be employed in the enemy’s rear as part of regular military 
operations or conducted alongside such operations. Although these two words are 
rather abstract, when regarded in a broader sense they capture the objectives of 
guerrilla-type tactics, which form part of the principal deterrent that the territorial 
defence system, introduced in the 1950s, seeks to provide.11 
 
What makes this context and subject particularly interesting is Veikko Koppinen’s 
personal profile and strongly felt convictions about guerrilla warfare, which are re-
vealed in his writings via his two alter egos, author Viljami Korpi and the protagonist 
of his novel, Colonel Savukorpi. His manuscript12 that was completed in the late 
1950s but never saw publication describes the exploding wilderness in Chapter 17, 
‘Tyhjyyttä vastaan ei voi taistella ’(‘It is impossible to fight a void’), as follows: ‘The ex-
ploding wilderness was Colonel Savukorpi’s favourite phrase, which he used with great success when 
giving tactical instructions to his subordinate guerrilla district commanders at the time when leaders 
of guerrilla warfare, ranging from patrol leaders to regional commanders, were receiving refresher 
training. It is impossible to fight a void; you cannot shell it with artillery fire; you cannot fire at it 
using automatic weapons; and you cannot rake it with rockets launched from the air. To the enemy, 
the exploding wilderness spells deception and playing by the wrong rules…’13 
 

10 Maaanpuolustuksen perusteet, Puolustusvoimain tehtävät ja mahdollisuudet rauhan ja turvallisuuden ylläpitä-
miseksi, puolueettomuuden suojaamiseksi ja aseellisen hyökkäyksen torjumiseksi (‘The foundations of national 
defence, The tasks of the Defence Forces and the opportunities available to them in the main-
tenance of peace and security, protection of neutrality and repulsion of an armed attack’), Helsinki 
1968, Part: Reserviupseerikoulutus (‘Reserve officer training’), p. 11. 
11 Korpi, Viljami (Koppinen, Veikko): Räjähtävä tyhjyys (‘Exploding wilderness’), an unpublished 
manuscript from the 1950s, kept at the National Defence University. 882417. See also Koppinen, 
Veikko: Räjähtävä tyhjyys (‘Exploding wilderness’), edited by Marko Palokangas from an unpub-
lished manuscript dating back to the 1950s, Tampere 2012. 
12 At the time, the manuscript was left unpublished due to its politically sensitive nature. See, for 
example, Visuri, Pekka: Idän ja lännen välissä (‘Between east and west’), Saarijärvi 2010, p. 53. 
13 Koppinen (2012), pp. 120–121.  
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The wilderness may or may not be exploding, but guerrilla-type tactics forming part 
of the Finnish art of war are a topic worth studying. The study of guerrilla-type tac-
tics and their development over time can explain several changes that have occurred 
in the Finnish art of war and provide grounds for many decisions that were taken. 
There has clearly been a demand for this research topic in the Finnish Defence 
Forces for a long time.14  
 
While studies have increasingly focused on the history of and developments in Fin-
land’s defensive capabilities during the Cold War, operative military plans and tac-
tical principles with associated contemporary concepts have almost exclusively re-
mained confined to archives, being kept there untouched. It was not until the early 
2000s, by which time the regulations governing the publicity of information enabled 
the release of certain material related to the Finnish military history, that the Opera-
tions Division of the General Headquarters and other departments released a large 
body of information, making it available to researchers, finally providing an oppor-
tunity to form an exhaustive picture of the operative and tactical elements of the ter-
ritorial defence system, at least to a certain degree.15 The principal objective of this 
study is to achieve an overall picture of and provide an analysis of the development 
of guerrilla-type methods as they were intended to be used as part of the Finnish art 
of war.  
 
 
1.2. On concepts 
 
The concepts used in the Finnish language related to guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-
type operations are many in number, ambiguous in meaning and difficult to under-
stand. The intelligibility of the concepts is hampered by numerous changes to their 
content and explanations that have occurred over the course of time, as well as by 
their varying definitions. From an international perspective, they appear inconsistent 
in many cases, or may even have completely opposite meanings. When comparing 
concepts related to guerrilla warfare in an international context, it is impossible to 

14 In the autumn of 1999, Vesa Tynkkynen, then head of a research group at the Department of 
Tactics of the National Defence University proposed to Suomen Marsalkka Mannerheimin Sotatieteel-
linen Rahasto (‘Marshall Mannerheim´s Foundation for the Promotion of Study of Military Science’) 
that a research project be launched to study tactics used in Finnish land warfare, the third subpro-
ject of which in the order of priority was entitled ‘Guerrilla-style tactics in the Finnish art of war.’ This 
large and exhaustive study of the development of tactics was never begun due to lack of support 
and policy adopted by the Foundation. Karjalainen, Mikko: Marskin salattu rahasto – Suomen Marsalk-
ka Mannerheimin Sotatieteellinen Rahasto 1937–2012 (‘Mannerheim’s secret foundation – Marshall 
Mannerheim´s Foundation for the promotion of study of Military Science 1937–2012’), Porvoo 
2012, pp. 90–91. 
15 After the Operations Division of the General Headquarters released, between 2000 and 2002, a 
large portion of their original post-WWII documents for archival at the Military Archives (known 
under the name ‘the National Archives’after 2008), it became possible for researches to undertake 
comprehensive research on the subject matter of this study. Jouko, Petteri: a presentation on 23 
November 2005. Tynkkynen, Vesa: Puolustusjärjestelyt (‘Defence arrangements’), an article in a work 
entiled Suomen puolustusvoimat 1944–1974, Puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan historia, osa 2 2006 (‘The Finnish 
Defence Forces 1944–1974, The History of the Defence Forces in Peacetime, Part 2’), 2006, pp. 
434–465. 
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reach a complete and unambiguous consensus. During the Cold War era, the con-
tent of such concepts and their definitions were changed on several occasions.  
 
The root words lying behind the concepts play an important role in many languages. 
Particularly the meanings of root words, denoting the word that in Finnish is sissi 
(not to be confused with ‘sissy’!), in languages other than Finnish, may in part ex-
plain the conceptual changes that were made to military terminology during the 
Cold War, and clarify the national nuances in meanings regarding guerrilla-type op-
erations. The origin of the word sissi, with a definition that would be understandable 
in an international context, is woven deeply into the fabric of the research topic of 
this study when viewed from the perspective of actions made legal or illegal by the 
rules of war.  
 
Sissi, the key term of the study area in Finnish, has become an established word in 
Finnish by the 18th or 19th century. The available sources indicate that this word 
emerged in Finnish as early as in the 17th century, at which time it denoted one who 
commits petty theft. However, we know with certainty that the word also denoted at 
least a snooper, a spy, a bandit, or a patrolman in the 18th century literature.16  
 
Today, many languages have the word guerrilla, which both in standard language and 
in military parlance refers to a soldier operating in the enemy’s rear. The concepts 
used in the various languages clearly have one thing on common: the influence exer-
cised by Latin. The Latin word pars, in plural, partis, denotes ‘side, direction, party, 
role of an actor, office, function, duty’. The word gerere refers to warfare and com-
bat.17 
 
The German language translates sissi as Partisan and Guerrilla. Partisan is defined as a 
combatant of an armed group that operates in the rear18 and fights an enemy that 
has invaded a country or, in the case of an internal conflict, against the legal gov-
ernment of a country. Guerrilla, in turn, is defined as a member of group engaged in 

16 The word ‘sissi’ occurred in spoken Finnish in the lore of the Forest Finns in Sweden’s Värm-
land, denoting ‘one who commits petty theft.’ Forest Finns (in Swedish, skogsfinnar or svedje-
finnar, and in Finnish, kaskisuomalaiset) were Finns who emigrated, from the late 1580s onwards, 
from the Finnish provinces Savo and North Häme to various parts of Sweden and other areas, to 
start a life as homesteaders. Russians referred to Finnish peasants prowling in forests using the 
word ‘šiši’ (snooper); according to Elias Lönnrot, in Finland ‘sissi’ also denoted a ‘snooper’ work-
ing for the customs officials. According to linguist Jalo Kalima, Forest Finns living in Östmark in 
Värmland used the word ‘sissi’, as early as in the early 17th century, to refer to an individual who 
stole game or fish from traps. See, among other things: Kalima, Jalo: Uudelleen Sisso ja sissi (oikaisu) 
(‘Sisso and sissi revisted (a rectification’), Virittäjä 47/1943, pp. 108–109. In literary Finnish, ‘sissi’ 
is first attested, as far as is known, in the manuscript for Kristfrid Ganander’s dictionary dated 
1787, denoting both a bandit and a patrolman. Ganander, Kristfrid: Nytt Finskt Lexicon, edited by 
Liisa Nuutinen, 1997, p. 884. See also Häkkinen, Kaisa: Nykysuomen etymologinen sanakirja (‘Ety-
mological dictionary of modern Finnish’), WSOY, Helsinki 2004 (3. painos, Juva 2005), subvoce 
sissi, p. 1163. 
17 Heikel, Ivar A.: Latinalais-suomalainen sanakirja (‘Latino-Finnish dictionary’), Helsinki 1935. See al-
so Sodan historia (‘A history of war’), edited by Janne Malkki et.al., Keuruu 2008, p. 241. 
18 In this connection, ‘rear’ denotes hidden, camouflaged, invisible. 
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guerrilla warfare. In connection with this, the various dictionaries also refer to the 
definition of the word Partisan.19 
 
The English language also explains the concept of sissi using the words partisan and 
guer(r)illa. Guer(r)illa refers to a member of a small military unit that is not part of the 
regular army and that, in fact, fights the regular army in most cases to instigate a 
revolution. The word partisan in turn, may have two meanings. The first meaning re-
fers to an individual who is an ardent supporter of a particular leader, group or idea. 
The second meaning has more to do with guerrilla warfare and refers to a member 
of an armed group that remains in hiding while fighting the solders of an enemy that 
has invaded the country. In Swedish, the words partisan and gerilla have taken on 
meanings that are very similar to those of the English and German languages.20  
 
From the perspective of scholarly study, the relevant point is that the meaning of 
‘sissi ’ in literary Finnish changed as the 18th century gave way to the 19th century, 
with the new meaning taking on predominantly military aspects. The written Finnish 
history of war attest to guerrilla units being formed at least in a war known as the 
Finnish War which was fought between 1808 and 1809. Among others, Paavo Ilmo-
la write in his study Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suuntaviivat (‘Guerrilla war-
fare, its prerequisites and the outline of warfare’) that guerrilla-type activities played 
a major role in the Finnish War. In 1808, guerrilla bands were formed of peasants 
included in the Swedish army deployed in Finland; such bands fought the Russians 
with success in some places although it was recognised that such guerrilla operations 
were extremely uncoordinated.21 By the early 1900s, ‘sissi ’units were incorporated 
into Finland’s legal armed forces, of which an example is provided by the fact that 
the General Headquarters of independent Finland renamed a guerrilla unit in 1918, 
designating it as22 an honourable military unit with no references made to an outlaw 
status. In modern Finnish, sissi refers to a soldier who belongs to regular army and 
operates in the enemy’s rear, bearing legal insignia.23  
 
In Finnish, the word sissi has been associated over the course of time with several 
additional concepts; all of them had association with action or war. This word has a 
national meaning in Finnish which differs from the universally used concept. In the 
military parlance of independent Finland, sissi is defined, as a general rule, as a legal 
soldier of the regular armed forces who operates in enemy-occupied territory car-

19 DUDEN, Deutsches Universalwörterbuch A–Z, 3, Mannheim 1996. 
20 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Oxford University Press, China 2000. 
21 Ilmola (1958), pp. 5–6, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. 
22 For example, Jaeger Battalion 3 (Jääkäripataljoona 3) was renamed Kajaani Guerrilla Battalion 
(Kajaanin Sissipataljoona) on 23 August 1918. Renaming was motivated by the fact that Civil Guard 
members in Kainuu formed a unit called ‘Kajaani Guerrilla Regiment’ (Kajaanin-Sissi-Rykmentti) in 
January – thereby making a reference to the province’s history. This unit was known under this 
name until May 1918, although it, by then, had already been incorporated into a Civil Guard regi-
ment. Suomen puolustuslaitos 1918–1939, Puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan historia osa 1, (‘The Finnish De-
fence Forces 1918–1939, the peacetime history of the Defence Forces, part 1’), edited by. Jarl 
Kronlund, Porvoo 1988, Chapter Puolustusjärjestelmä luodaan (‘A defence system is created’), p. 143.  
23 Seppänen (1971), p. 221. Kanninen, Ermei: Development and role of guerrilla warfare and opera-
tions as part of the territorial defence system in Finland from the 1950s till the 1980s; an article in-
cluded in a book entitled Guerrilla Warfare An Asymmetric Option, Helsinki 2002(a), p. 151. 
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rying out a wide range of tasks. On occasion, the long-range patrolmen of the Con-
tinuation War, who operated behind the enemy lines, wore a uniform and carried 
out reconnaissance and demolition tasks, were also called a ‘sissi’.24 
 
The word sissi, which is now an establish word in Finnish, is difficult to translate in-
to other languages while retaining its unambiguous meaning. The translations that 
perhaps come closest in meaning to the Finnish word ‘sissi’and provide the most 
descriptive definition, are the English ranger or guerrilla jaeger. Ranger, however, refers 
more clearly to long-range patrol or long-range reconnaissance activities, being de-
rived from the American root word range. Long range patrol, the translation of the 
Finnish ‘kaukopartio’, has also been derived from ‘range’.25 Althouth guerrilla jaeger is 
better equated with a jaeger that has been trained in guerrilla-type operations, it is al-
so a poor translation for the Finnish ‘sissi’. It should be pointed out that in lan-
guages other than Finnish, guerrilla does not always denote a ‘sissi’; rather, it is asso-
ciated almost as often with a revolutionary combatant or even with an individual 
who commits crimes against the state and does not belong to the armed forces. 
Even the Finnish phrase guerrilla-type activity may be received with some scepticism in 
modern society, due to a certain lack of terminology which hampers Finnish military 
parlance, leading to linguistic problems with regard to the translations of numerous 
concepts used outside the Finnish language. Although the military community 
would perceive the root word sissi as a conventional combatant of the armed forces, 
the Finnish language is lacking in the means of expression in this respect. For this 
reason, the key concepts of the study area, ‘guerrilla war’, ‘guerrilla warfare’ and 
‘guerrilla-type activities’will be analysed in the conclusion of this study.26 
 
Guerrilla-type activities in Finnish military parlance refer to the employment of uncon-
ventional methods by troops generally limited in number and normally carrying light 
equipment, operating in enemy-held territory and fighting as part of a conventional 
military operation or battle. The ability of troops to supply themselves inde-
pendently and their capability to engage in prolonged independent combat as part of 
a larger military operation constitute the basic requisites for guerrilla-type opera-
tions. Finnish guerrilla-type activities are characterised by unconventional warfare, 
the avoidance of decisive battles, keeping in hiding, and preparedness for surprise. 
However, the major difference between Finnish guerrilla tactics and guerrilla war-
fare as it is understood in the international context is the Finnish practice of asso-

24 Paakkinen, Juhani: Sissitoiminnan peruskysymyksiä, (‘Basic questions of guerrilla-type activities’), 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 2/1977, pp. 101–106. 
25 See, for example, Ahokanto, Hannu: Laskuvarjo ja sotilas, Punabaretit – Laskuvarjojääkärikoulu 1962–
1996, 2. uudistettu painos, (‘The parachute and the soldier, the Red Berets – the Parachute Jaeger 
School 1962–1996’), 2nd revised edition, Hämeenlinna 2004, p. 13. 
26 Turunen, Ismo: Correspondence by e-mail between September and October of 2010; a more 
comprehensive presentation of the general concepts of military defence can be found in the con-
temporary manuals / regulations, guidebooks and handbooks of the various periods. The Cold War 
era military terminology can be found in a summarised form in ‘Strategian käsikirja’ (‘Strategy Hand-
book’), edited by Pekka Uutaniemi, Helsinki 1983. 
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ciating guerrilla-type activities with battles and operations conducted by convention-
al forces.27 
 
In this study, the phrase guerrilla-type activities refer, with a somewhat sweeping gene-
ralisation, to all regular military operations in the course of which almost all wartime 
troops engage in guerrilla-type activities, supplementing and intensifying the combat 
carried out by general forces. The key objective of such activities is to wear down, 
hinder and harass the enemy, and to tie up enemy troops in continued combat. In 
order to achieve such objectives, guerrilla-type activities normally comprise demoli-
tion and harassment, holding of a target or a swath of territory for a specified length 
of time, and continuous reconnaissance. In army regulations, guerrilla-type activities 
normally refer to combat operations conducted in the enemy’s rear or in enemy-
held territory, relying on preparations made in advance and continuing them over 
long periods of time. A more detailed analysis of guerrilla-type activities associated 
with specific periods, including a conceptual analysis, will provided in every chapter 
of this study.  
 
Guerrilla warfare refers to military or paramilitary operations carried out by uncon-
ventional, mostly local troops in enemy-held or hostile territory. In the United States 
of the 1960s, for example, guerrilla warfare was defined as a subcategory of uncon-
ventional warfare. Terrorism is also characterised as a prestage of guerrilla warfare 
by many commentators.28 In the terminology of the 2000s that is used universally, 
guerrilla warfare refers to combat operations carried out by small separate units in 
the enemy’s rear or in enemy-occupied territory using unconventional means such 
as strikes and surprise raids. Units engaged in guerrilla warfare operate in a highly 
independent way under a command structure that is often dispersed.29 
 
The definition given above differs from the Finnish concept of guerrilla warfare, 
which refers to operations carried out by regular army units alongside other military 
operations or extending the scope of such operation while observing the laws of war 
and legal norms.30 In a 1971 draft for the Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Sec-
tion of the 1971 Field Regulation’), guerrilla warfare was defined as ‘warfare conducted 
in order to continue regular military operations or carried out alongside such operations in enemy-
held territory. To continue military operations in the form of guerrilla warfare is a viable solution in 

27 Kanninen, Ermei: Sissisodankäynnin ja -toiminnan kehittyminen ja rooli osana alueellista puolustusta Suo-
messa 1950–1980-luvuilla, artikkeli kirjassa Ajatuksia suomalaisesta sissisodankäynnistä, (‘Developments in 
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities and their role in territorial defence in Finland, from the 
1950s to the 1980s, an article in the book Reflections on Finnish guerrilla warfare‘) edited by. Jor-
ma Saarelainen, Helsinki 2003, pp. 2–4. Turunen, Ismo: Correspondence by e-mail between Sep-
tember and October of 2010. See also Seppänen (1971), p. 221. Eronen, Arto: 1960- ja 1970-luvun 
tärkeimmät sissisodat ja niistä meidän oloihimme sovellettavissa olevat kokemukset, (‘Major guerrilla wars 
waged in the 1960s and 1970s and the experiences gained from them that can be applied to our 
conditions’), a study written on a staff officer course in 1978, T 26077/Hi 83, KA. Puolustuslaitoksen 
kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the Defence Forces in the 1960s’), Helsinki 1962, p. 
47.  
28 Dictionary of United States Military Terms, Washington, D.C. 1963, p. 223. FM 100–20, Military 
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Washington 1990, p. 4. 
29 Sodan historia (‘A history of war’), edited by Janne Malkki et.al., Keuruu 2008, p. 241. 
30 Seppänen (1971), p. 221 and Kanninen (2002a), p. 151. 
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situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military operations have been lost in some 
part or a major section of the Finnish territory.’The draft for the Field Regulation defined 
the objectives of guerrilla warfare to be the creation of prerequisites for defeating 
the enemy and achieving a political solution that would ensure the continued exis-
tence of the Finnish nation and to seek to find an overall solution. It is highly inter-
esting that the Field Regulation did not specifically define guerrilla-type activities or 
discuss the concept in any detail.31 The chapter on definitions in Kenttäohjesäännön 
yleinen osa, confirmed in 1972 and adopted in 1973, defines guerrilla warfare in terms 
that were largely similar to those in the draft. Only the word order has been slightly 
changed.32 
 
On the other hand, guerrilla warfare could be viewed in the Finnish art of war as an 
all-out state, one to which Finland was prepared to resort as a last-ditch effort or as 
the last option in order to preserve the nation’s independence. This notwith-
standing, it can be argued with justification, that guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla 
warfare were equated, to a degree at least, in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the para-
dox lies exactly in the fact that the definition of Finnish guerrilla-type activities covers 
almost all means available to guerrilla warfare including its basic tactics, constituting, 
from the national point of view, the key concept in tactical thinking and in the art of 
war. 
 
In situations where the means of guerrilla warfare are used to topple a social order, 
it refers to revolutionary warfare. However, revolutionary warfare is a broader concept 
than guerrilla warfare as it normally covers aspects such as political indoctrination, 
terrorism and sabotage and other ‘low-profile activities’,33 in addition to incor-
porating the methods of guerrilla warfare. Thus, revolutionary warfare can be defi-
ned as an organised movement seeking to oust a legal government by means of sub-
versive activities and an armed conflict.34 As early as in the 19th century, Carl von 
Clausewitz touched upon popular war in his texts which have clear points of resem-
blance to guerrilla warfare.35 
 
 

31 Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa, luonnos (KO yl) (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), 1971, p. 71 
and Attachment 1, p. 1. 
32 Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa (KO yl) (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), Mikkeli 1973, p. 74 
and 168. 
33 Low profile may refer to overlapping aspects of covert and secret operations. 
34 Kumouksellinen ja vastakumouksellinen sota (‘Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary war’), edited by 
Pasi Kesseli, Saarijärvi 1998, pp. 25–26 and FM 100–20 (1990), p. 4. 
35 Texts by von Clausewitz have also been translated in Finland; in some cases, the translators have 
resorted to simplifications that are, in fact, errors of interpretation. As an example of such, a trans-
lation and abridgement, completed by the German translation group of the National General Staff 
College, of the chapter Volksbewaffnung in Carl von Clausewitz’s work Vom Kriege can be men-
tioned: ‘Ellei siis haluta rakennella tuulentupia, on sissisotaaٝ  ajateltava liittyneenä säännöllisiin sotatoimiin ja 
molemmat sodankäynnin muodot on yhdistettävä kokonaissuunnitelmalla.’ A translation and abridgement, 
completed by the German translation group of the National General Staff College, of the chapter 
Volksbewaffnung (guerrilla war) in Carl von Clausewitz’ work Vom Kriege, document page 2. The 
research database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, ID 
Tak008, folder 158. See also von Clausewitz (1918), pp. 492–499. 
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1.3. International historical background and the legal status of guerrilla war-
fare 
 
From the viewpoint of the methods of warfare, the roots of guerrilla warfare run 
deep in history. Making use of simple methods, its characteristics go back in time 
hundreds and possibly thousands of years. As it is understood today, and as it is fre-
quently portrayed in publicity, guerrilla warfare with its subcategories makes use of 
ancient methods but resorts to tactics and equipment that are considerably more 
sophisticated. The art of war closely follows developments in military technology, 
and this is something that can be perceived in changes to guerrilla warfare. Traps 
have been replaced with land mines, and scattered sabotage has given way to opera-
tions that are conducted under a more organised command structure.  
 
The emergence of guerrilla warfare, as it is understood in modern terms, can rough-
ly be dated to the post-WWII era and its gradual dismantling of colonial rule. Entire 
empires fell following both bloodless revolutions as and savage colonial wars. In the 
latter case, many nations aspiring to independent nationhood employed all possible 
manifestations of the art of war while attempting to obtain freedom. As the capa-
bilities of the various colonial liberation movements to wage conventional war 
against colonial powers was, as a rule, limited, they frequently resorted to the uncon-
ventional and indirect methods of warfare, ranging from the strategic level to tactical 
principles. Many colonies chose guerrilla warfare as their method of waging war, or 
even total guerrilla war, which could be successfully waged under varying conditions 
using simple and cost-efficient methods.36 
 
In the post-WWII era, the methods and tactics of guerrilla warfare underwent signi-
ficant developments. The backdrop for such developments was provided by a tri-
partite view of the world, prevalent during the Cold War era37. The opposing ideo-
logies were represented by the East and the West. However, the mutual balance of 
terror, a product of a conscious construction process, and the threat presented by 
nuclear weapons, never escalated to a third world war. The struggle for influence 
was also conducted through indirect means. The great powers began to provide sys-
tematic support to each others’enemies, particularly in the former colonies and in 
developing countries. Nations aspiring to achieve independence were provided with 

36 Saarenheimo, Klaus: Siirtyminen sissitoimintaan yllättävissä tapauksissa, tavanomaisten sotatoimien epäonnis-
tuessa, prikaatin ja armeijakunnan puitteissa (‘Transition to guerrilla-type activities in unexpected situa-
tions when conventional military operations fail, within the framework provided by a brigade or an 
army corps’), a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1962, SKK 1/785, KA. Kes-
seli, Pasi: Sissisodankäynnistä tuli osa kumouksellista sodankäyntiä (‘Guerrilla warfare turned into a form 
of revolutionary warfare’) an article in a book entitled Suursotien vuosisata, (‘The century of large-
scale wars’), Helsinki 2002, p. 72. International Military and Defence Encyclopedia, Part 6, Trevor 
N. Dupuy (ed.), Washington 1993, p. 2874. See also Sodan historia (‘A history of war’), edited by 
Janne Malkki et.al., Keuruu 2008, pp. 159, 161 and 180–182. 
37 The tripartite view of the world refers to a setup in which two super powers – the United States 
of America and Soviet Union – dominated the world politics, and exerted influence, either directly 
or indirectly, on developments that led to numerous wars in third countries. Due to the nuclear 
threat, the great powers were engaged in continuous combat in several unstable developing states, 
in which the East and West, as ideological opponents, provided support to the objectives of their 
adversaries, enabling a subversive guerrilla war through the provision of, for example, armed assis-
tance. See also Kesseli (2002), p. 72. 
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armed assistance and military advice, thereby promoting armed operations by 
groups that employed the methods of guerrilla warfare harmful to the adversary.38 
 
In civilised countries, governed by the rule of law, the laws of war have exerted in-
fluenced over the use of the methods of warfare, particularly in modern times. Ac-
cording to the humanitarian concept of justice, the key objective lying behind the 
laws of war seeks to limit the means available to the warring parties, with the pur-
pose of avoiding excessive human suffering. Laws, however, were not adopted to 
ease warfare but, rather, to mitigate collateral damage and to avoid arbitrary vio-
lence. This is why guerrilla warfare and its methods have presented, over more than 
two centuries, a considerable problem to the Western principles governing the laws 
of war and to the rights that combatants can be expected to have. The unilateral ad-
vantage that guerrilla fighters enjoyed by virtue of regulations protecting civilian 
populations was well understood by the time the French revolution was followed by 
an eruption of wars in the early 19th century. Consequently, there was a desire to 
classify guerrilla combatants as outlaws who did not necessarily deserve to be treated 
in accordance with the laws of war when encountered in combat. This view gained 
strength from the nature of guerrilla warfare, understood as a means available to the 
weaker party, which threatened to narrow the military might of the leading colonial 
powers.39 
 
In the next century, guerrilla warfare became more frequent in Western countries, to 
an extent that led the participants of the Hague Peace Conferences held in 1899 and 
1907 to sign a treaty, albeit reluctantly, that conceded guerrillas combatants the sta-
tus of an official belligerent. However, the states that ratified the treaty ensured that 
‘justified guerrilla warfare’became burdened with restrictions that guerrilla combat-
ants found impossible to follow in practice. Guerrilla combatants had to be clearly 
distinguishable as a belligerent party by wearing clear, external military insignia and 
by openly carrying their arms. Both requirements constricted the opportunities 
available to guerrilla fighters to hide, in other words, to avoid a direct confrontation 
with a superior enemy.40  
 
In an annex to the General Convention of the Hague Peace Conference, Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed in 1907, an article on the bel-
ligerents and their characteristic was formulated. According to this Article, ‘the laws, 
rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps if they ful-
fil the following conditions: that they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
that they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; that they carry arms openly; 
and that they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In countries 
where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the 

38 Seppänen (1971), pp. 38–39 and 41. O’Neill, Bard E.: Insurgency & Terrorism – Inside Modern 
Revolutionary Warfare, USA 1990, pp. 2–3. Kumouksellinen ja vastakumouksellinen sota, edited by 
Pasi Kesseli, Saarijärvi 1998, pp. 13–16. 
39 Marjomaa, Risto: Sissisodasta terrorismiin, (‘From guerrilla warfare to terrorism’), an article in the 
journal Ennen & Nyt, Historian tietosanomat, 2004, pp. 2–3. See also Rosén, Gunnar – Parkkari, 
Juhani: Sodan lait, käsikirja (‘The laws of war’), Helsinki 2004, pp. 269–270 and 412–413. 
40 Ibid. 
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denomination ‘army.’41 It should be mentioned that he above-mentioned extracts of 
laws governing land warfare were annexed to Finnish Field Regulations from the 
1920s onwards.42  
 
The legal status of guerrillas and guerrilla warfare was taken up at The Hague IV In-
ternational Convention, according to which a population may take up arms if they 
meet the following stipulations:re that the population is commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates; that they have a fixed distinctive emblem recogni-
sable at a distance; that they carry arms openly; and that they conduct their opera-
tions in accordance with the laws and customs of war.43  
 
The rules of war and the status of guerrillas was discussed again in the late 20th cen-
tury, in a period when the great powers heated up by the Cold War encountered 
guerrilla fighters with their allies in local wars waged in various parts of the world. 
Both for ideological reasons and for the sake of being able to secure a wider sphere 
of influence, local guerrilla wars in third countries were particularly taxing for the 
United States. As the Soviet Union took advantage of the situation, assuming a posi-
tive attitude towards guerrilla movements, the United States was ultimately com-
pelled to give in to international pressure and to accept the strengthening of guerrilla 
fighters’rights.44 
 
In the Additional Protocols to the 1977 Geneva Convention, which amended the 
rules governing warfare encoded in the Charter of the United Nations, guerrilla 
combatants were equated, with certain restrictions, with legal combatants, and were 
conceded largely similar rights to those that legal combatants enjoyed. Part III of the 
first Additional Protocol to the Convention, signed on 8 June in 1977 in Geneva, 
addressed the methods of waging war and the status of combatants and prisoners of 
war. Article 43 of this document defines the armed forces as follows: ‘The armed forces 
of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is repre-
sented by a government or an authority not recognised by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall 
be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules 
of international law applicable in armed conflict. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a con-
flict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) 
are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. Whenever a 

41 Compared with the 1899 Peace Conference, more states participated in the 1907 Peace Confe-
rence, which signed a total of general conventions and one declaration with a character of a general 
convention. These treaties superseded the three treaties signed in the first peace conference (1899). 
See, among other things, the international treaty drafted at the Hague Second Peace Conference 
and signed on 18 October, Section I: On belligerents, Chapter 1. The qualifications of belligerents, 
Article 1, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1924/19240011, read on 29 January 
2013. 
42 Kenttäohjesääntö I, (K.O. I) (‘Field Regulation, Part I’), Helsinki 1927, pp. 224–251. Kenttäohjesääntö 
Yleinen osa (K.O.) (‘General Section of the Field Regulation, Helsinki 1931, pp. 94–137. 
43 Nurmi, Niilo: Sissitoiminta talvisodassa ja sen kehitys vv. 1941–44 sodan loppuun mennessä (‘Guerrilla-
type activities in the Winter War and their development in 1941–44, until the end of the war’) Soti-
lasaikakauslehti 4/1949, pp. 19–26. 
44 Marjomaa (2004), pp. 2–3. See also Rosén – Parkkari (2004), pp. 269–270 and 412–413. 
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Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces 
it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.’45  
 
The most significant change to the previous interpretation of the status of comba-
tants related to guerrilla combatants, who were now required to carry their weapons 
openly only in combat. The supporters of guerrilla movements interpreted this to 
mean that arms could be carried concealed until fire was opened with them. Thus, 
guerrilla fighters would have been given the right to mingle with the civilian popula-
tion until the last moment, thereby making it impossible to distinguish them from 
civilians or to target them in advance. The United States was opposed to this inter-
pretation, declining to ratify the Additional 1977 Protocol to the Convention. In 
practice, the authority and rights of guerrilla fighters received increased global 
recognition.46  
 
As the international legal status of guerrilla combatants improved, military ope-
rations became ever more difficult. After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Armed Forces 
embarked on a process to make their doctrine of guerrilla warfare, which had 
proved insufficient, more effective. Improved intelligence, provision of special train-
ing to soldiers, and highlighting the political and social dimensions enabled effective 
counter-guerrilla operations using fewer personnel but not necessarily a a lesser fi-
nancial cost. On the other hand, towards the end of the Cold War era, the United 
States increasingly began to arm and train guerrilla movements operating in the ad-
versary’s territory.47 
 
Guerrilla warfare and the ensuing counter-guerrilla tactics developed interactively 
through a process of trial and error within the art of war. The methods of counter-
guerrilla warfare often developed to be similar to those employed by the opposing 
guerrilla fighters. The methods of counter-revolutionary warfare developed along 
similar lines, assuming a principal objective of preserving the social order of the 
country involved in a war. As experiences accumulated, political, economic and psy-
chological methods were introduced, including those used in civilian crisis manage-
ment, to supplement military and paramilitary counter operations. Thus, since 1945, 
the various forms of guerrilla warfare have led to a whole range of reactions, which, 

45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of In-
ternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1980/ 
19800082/19800082_2, read on 29 January 2013. 
46 Ibid. The fourth Geneva Convention, held in 1949, sought to improve the status of the sick and 
wounded belonging to land forces (Convention I, the status of the sick, wounded or shipwrecked 
belonging to the navy (Convention II), the status of war prisoner (Convention III), and the status 
of civilians in wartime (Convention IV). To extend the protection offered by the Conventions, two 
supplementary instruments were approved of in 1977; an Additional Protocol relating to the pro-
tection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), and another Protocol relating to the 
protection of victims of non-International armed conflicts (Protocol II). Combined, these Conven-
tions and Protocols constitute the framework for written international humanitarian justice. Finland 
has ratified all six Conventions. See also Marjomaa, (2004), pp. 2–3. Sodan historia (‘A history of 
war’), edited by Janne Malkki et.al., Keuruu 2008, p. 241. 
47 Marjomaa (2004), pp. 2–3. 
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however, often failed to recognise the associated wider social and military implica-
tions.48  
 

48 Seppänen (1971), pp. 8–9 and 142–144. FM 100–20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Con-
flict, Washington 1990, p. 2. Rekkedal, Nils Marius: Nykyaikainen sotataito (‘The modern art of 
war’), Helsinki 2006, pp. 364–374. Cf. also Palokangas (2009). Palokangas, Marko: Räjähtävää tyhjyyt-
tä – Sissisodankäynnin menetelmät ja käsitteet osana Suomen sotilaallista puolustusta toisen maailmansodan jä-
lkeen (‘Exploding wilderness – the methods and concepts of guerilla warfare in Finland’s defence 
after the Second World War’), in Tiede ja Ase 68, 2010, pp. 148–173. Halila, Mikael: Sissejä ja 
symmetriaa (‘Guerrillas and symmetry’), Suomen Sotilas 3/2008, pp. 28–32. Jouko, Petteri – 
Palokangas, Marko: Uusi vastaan vanha – Maanpuolustuksen kehittämisen vaikutukset ja haasteet (‘Some-
thing new and something old – the effects and challenges of the development of the national 
defence’), Ammattisotilas 6/2010, pp. 4–9. 
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2. GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITES AS A FOURTH METHOD OF 
COMBAT 
 
 
2.1. Development of the Finnish military system and the art of war during 
the early years of independent Finland 
 
The history of the defence forces of independent Finland dates back to the events 
of 1918 following Finland’s declaration of independence, to a period when the 
Committee of Internal Affairs of the Senate declared, on 25 January 1918, the Civil 
Guards to be the troops of the legal government. The newly founded military im-
mediately saw action in the War of Independence, which had just started. With the 
war still underway from January to May 1918, plans were already being drafting for 
the consolidation of the military’s position and its composition. After the war, the 
White Army was demobilised, and work was begun to establish a military orga-
nisation for the country.49  
 
Outlines for the establishment of a peacetime army and its units were issued in June 
1918. The first army order made no reference to the areas of responsibility of the 
various divisions, only to their locations.50 In connection with the units being es-
tablished, some of them were given historical names that dated back to the 18th and 
19th centuries, with regional connections being part of the name in some cases. The 
Uusimaa Dragoon Regiment and the Karelia Guard Regiment are examples of such 
names. By late 1918, the military organisation had found its form, being modelled 
on the German system. The organisation was built around a framework of three di-
visions and one brigade, including the units under them, as well as of military 
schools, various military establishments, conscription districts, frontier guard dis-
tricts and the aviation force. The navy and coastal defences were placed directly un-
der the Finnish High Command.51 Despite the fact that the military had an organisa-
tion, the chain of command was initially confusing, clearly lacking defined areas of 
responsibility. 
 
In March 1919, changes were made to the organisation and chain of command of 
the military, including the division of the country into 29 conscription districts, as 
the temporary conscription act was being put into effect. In the same year, the posi-

49 Terä, Martti V. – Tervasmäki, Vilho: Puolustushallinnon perustamis- ja rakentamisvuodet 1918–1939 – 
Puolustusministeriön historia I (‘1918–1939, the years when the defensive administration was estab-
lished and built up 1939 – History of the history of the Ministry of Defence, Part I’), Helsinki 1973, 
pp. 47–48. Mannerheim, C. G. E.: Muistelmat, I osa (‘Memoirs, Part I’), Helsinki 1951, p. 287. See 
also Puolustusvoimat – Joukko-osastoperinteet (‘The Defence Forces – the traditions of the various 
military units’), edited by. Marko Palokangas, Jyväskylä 2008, pp. 21–25. 
50 Armeijakäsky (‘Army order’) no. 1/8.6.1918, päiväkäskysarja (in the series of orders of the day), 
KA. 
51 Terä – Tervasmäki (1973), pp. 47–51. Suomen puolustuslaitos 1918–1939 – Puolustusvoimien rauhan 
ajan historia, (‘The Finnish Defence Forces 1918–1939, the peacetime history of the Defence 
Forces’), edited Jarl Kronlund, Porvoo 1998, pp. 86–275. Suomen puolustusvoimat ennen ja nyt (‘The 
Finnish Defence Forces before and now’), edited by Keijo Juhani Mikola inter alia., Porvoo 1959, 
p. 31. Kronlund (1993), pp. 10–15.  
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tion and powers of the military authorities were established in legislation, and new 
units were founded. Most peacetime units were located in population centres, where 
garrison structures and buildings dating back to period of the Russian rule were 
available. The first formative years of the Finnish military were a period of change 
and unestablished practices. The organisation and operations of the Finnish military 
slowly matured in the period between 1919 and 1924, when the Finnish military sys-
tem was being created. The name of the Finnish military system was changed by a 
law passed in 1922; military system (‘military system’- the literal translation from 
Finnish is ‘war system’–was replaced by ‘defence system’.) In practice, it was this 
reform that gave an established form to the arrangements of the defence of Finland 
by military means.52  
 
With regard to the inception period of the Finnish army, closely following Finland 
becoming an independent nation, it can be safely said that the newly formed armed 
forces had few tactical traditions, let alone a homogeneous approach to the art of 
war. After all, prior to her independence, Finland had not had any military force be-
tween 1904 and 1917. Following the issuance of the declaration of independence, 
the country needed credible defence forces. While the army was being formed, a 
great deal of conflicts occurred. Disagreement between the military and political 
leadership, as well as internal conflicts among the army officer corps, hampered, in 
part, the development of the armed forces. The fact that the Finnish officer corps 
were split into three fractions, reflecting their background and training, was one of 
the principal factors hampering the development of the Finnish art of war. Officers 
trained at the military academies of Russia, Germany and Finland found it extremely 
difficult to reach a consensus with regard to tactics or the art of war.53  
 
During the first years of independent Finland, society at large and, consequently, the 
newly founded army, focused on the stabilisation of the country. Under such cir-
cumstances, it is quite understandable that the foundation process of the army was 
based on foreign models and on experiences gained from past wars. In this respect, 
the prevalent theories concerning the art of war, experiences gained from the First 
World War, and lessons learned from military history provided the foundation for 
the teaching of tactics and its development. On one hand, the experiences gained 
from the First World War provided the general grounds for the development of tac-
tics as part of the art of war. On the other hand, officers who had participated in the 
War of Independence provided views founded on personal experience of the signif-
icance of Finnish conditions and on the characteristics of Finnish terrain in the de-
velopment of the Finnish art of war.   
 
However, Vesa Tynkkynen states in his doctoral dissertation that the War of Inde-
pendence can be regarded as an inconsistent event with regard to experiences that 
might have proven useful for the development of tactics. The tactics employed in 
the War of Independence were, after all, more or less subject to individual decisions, 

52 Puolustusvoimat – Joukko-osastoperinteet (‘The Defence Forces – the traditions of the various military 
units’), edited by Marko Palokangas, Jyväskylä 2008, pp. 21–25. 
53 Tynkkynen, Vesa: Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen (diss.) (‘From the offensive to the defensive’) Joutsa 
1996, pp. 22–23. Kemppi, Jarkko: Suomalaisen sotataidon kehittyminen vuosina 1918–1924 (‘The devel-
opment of the Finnish art of war between 1918 and 1924’), Helsinki 2006, p. 23. 
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caused by the lack of previous battlefield experience, by the diverse background of 
the officer corps, and by the poor training of the troops. The brief duration of the 
war also left little time for tactical reflection. The War of Independence left only a 
superficial mark on the Finnish art of war in the 1920s, due to the fact that the tacti-
cal lessons learned from this war were not recoded as a result of its short duration. 
Although a great number of books were published of the war, they mostly focused 
on some of the individual events of the conflict. It was not until the 1930s that re-
search reports on tactics and the art of war, based on the experiences gained from 
the War of Independence, began to be published.54 
 
However, various theories and texts focusing on the art of war published by theo-
rists were used as inspiration for national thinking. Of the foreign theorists, the 
views of Englishmen J. F. C. Fuller55 and B. H. Liddell Hart56 on the use of mecha-
nised troops were particularly subjected to study. It should be noted that, at the 
time, their views found no widespread resonance in Britain and France. In Germany 
and the Soviet Union, in contrast, Fuller’s and Liddel Hart’s ideas found an atten-
tive audience. Despite Finland’s strong pro-German orientation, Fuller’s and Liddel 
Hart’s ideas arouse little interest here, as the mechanisation of troops hinted at the 
introduction of a professional army, which conflicted with the deeply-rooted Finn-
ish idea of having the army founded on universal conscription and the traditions of 
using infantry. The views put forth by Fuller and Liddell Hart were regarded in Fin-
land as worthy of further refinement, although they, as such, were unsuited to the 
Finnish terrain which, with its multitude of small-scale geographical features, clearly 
deviated from the terrain prevalent in Central Europe.57  
 
During the early years of independent Finland, the development of the Army was 
led by officers who had received their training in Russia. Starting from the mid-
1920s, Jaeger officers, trained in Germany, were appointed to positions of influence, 
strengthening the German orientation even further. According to Vesa Tynkkynen, 
the First World War, the experiences gained from it, and the German orientation es-
tablished two main methods of combat in Finnish tactics. The principal methods of 
combat –attack and defence –constituted the framework of tactical thinking that 
was observed until the wars waged between 1939 and 1944. Rather than focusing on 
the wide-spread theatres of war of the First World War, characterised by the defen-
sive war of attrition, Finnish tacticians set their sights on more mobile means of 
waging war, leading to a situation where the offensive tactics, brought to Finland by 
the Jaegers, came to dominate tactical thinking, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The reasons behind avoiding a defensive war of attrition were chiefly related to ef-
forts to minimise materiel and human losses. Thus, the tactics and the art of war of 
the period were characterised by efforts to make use of offensive tactics and opera-
tions that were expected to bring with them a solution, as opposed to lengthy, de-

54 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 22. 
55 John Frederick Charles Fuller (1878–1966) was an English officer, military historian and military 
theorist. Trythall, A. J.: ’Boney’ Fuller – The Intellectual General, London 1977. 
56 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970) was an English officer, military historian and military 
theorist. Danchev, Alex: Alchemist of War – The Life of Basil Liddell Hart, London 1998. 
57 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 23. See also Talvela, Paavo: Konearmeija, a presentation held at the General 
Headquarers in an English book entitled ‘The Remarking of modern Armies’, Sotilasaikakauslehti 
1928, pp. 96–102 and 181–187. 
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fensive battles of attrition. The enemy’s freedom of action was to be denied by em-
ploying ruthless, mobile and rapid attacks. The existence of delaying tactics was also 
recognised, and such tactics were perceived as being at their most successful when 
used a part of an offensive or a defensive operation, adapted to the local situations 
and circumstances. However, it was only shortly before the outbreak of the Winter 
War that they achieved the status of a full-blown tactical combat method in Finnish 
tactics. Vesa Tynkkynen also states in his dissertation, albeit with some exaggeration, 
that in the period between the two world wars guerrilla-type activities became, in a 
way, the fourth form of fighting in Finnish tactics.58  
 
Finnish tactical thinking in the 1920s was based on two-pronged thinking –formal 
and applied tactics. In line with theorists, on a more general level, tactics were un-
derstood to be a doctrine on how to win battles. Formal tactics were based on the 
regulations of each branch of the army, defining the forms of movement and com-
bat that each branch was to use in war. Formal tactics, therefore, can be regarded as 
synonymous with the tactics employed by the various Army branches. Applied tac-
tics differed from formal tactics in that they referred to the collaboration between 
two or more Army branches in combat or preparing for combat. Contemporary 
sources suggest that applied tactics were also referred to as ‘tactics of combined 
branches.’59 
 
The significance of and opportunities for guerrilla-type activities arose in discussions 
shortly after Finland became independent. Ideas for and discussions about opportu-
nities offered by guerrilla-type activities were largely founded on examples sourced 
from military history as well as on experiences obtained from the Finnish condi-
tions. For centuries, Finland had been a stage for a struggle between East and West, 
providing a wealth of examples of war in which untouched swaths of wilderness had 
proved, almost without exception, advantageous for guerrillas.60 National founda-
tions of guerrilla-type activities clearly existed, there was an awareness of them, and 
they were already known by the early years of Finnish independence. 
 
Russian Lieutenant General Karl Adaridi61 highlights the importance of guerrilla-
type activities in a book entitled Suomi sotanäyttämönä (‘Finland as a theatre of war’), 
published in 1923, emphasising the point that Finnish conditions favour the defend-
er. While the experiences gained during the First World War provided a valuable 
addition to the art of war, they were unsuitable for Finnish conditions as such. Tac-

58 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 52–64. 
59 Olkkonen, Hannes: Taktiikan perusteet (‘The basics of tactics’), Helsinki 1928, p. 29. 
60 Guerrilla-type activities occur in many folktales. For example, Juho Vesainen and Stefan Löfving 
occurred in the Finnish folklore by the end of the 19th century. See, among others, Ivalo (1925). 
Karl XII:s spion – Stefan Löfvings Dagbok, Margareta Beckman (bearbetad av), Tyskland 2010. 
61 Avgust Karl Mihajloviÿ Adaridi, Russian Lieutenant General, lived between 1859 and 1940. After 
retiring from the Russian Army in 1915 and relocating to Finland in 1919, Adaridi, theorised on the 
various forms of warfare and the history of the art of war in several texts, taking a Finnish point of 
view. His texts were also translated into Finnish, particularly during the early years of independent 
Finland, of which an example is provided in the books on the history of the art of war and guerrilla 
activities. 
 
20 
tical experiments conducted in the 1920s and 1930s and adapted to Finnish condi-
tions and terrain provided additional support to this view.62  
 
In 1923, the army units were requested to submit statements on the opportunities 
available to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare. In order to be able to res-
pond to this request, the units organised several tests in connection with their ma-
noeuvres in the winter, spring and summer of 1924, focusing on guerrilla warfare 
and its methods, seen from the viewpoint of forming a special form of warfare and 
providing an opportunity to the Finnish art of warfare. ‘With regard to the general pre-
requisites for guerrilla warfare in Finland, they conditions must be assessed to be rather good; after 
all, our terrain and sparse road network create advantageous conditions for waging guerrilla war-
fare, with the added benefit offered by winter, which greatly improves the rapid mobility of troops. 
The experiences gained last winter of the enhancement of the mobility of such troops is to be regard-
ed to be of high value, providing us with valuable opportunities if developed further.’63 Such ex-
periments led to discussions on the suitability of guerrilla-type activities for the vari-
ous branches of the Army. ‘Based on the experiences gained from manoeuvres, the importance 
of guerrilla warfare for Finland is highlighted, with the cavalry and ski troops being those branches 
of the Army that will engage in guerrilla-type activities, due to the fact that they are the only 
branches with sufficient mobility, even in terrain with no roads.’64 Such statements provided 
by the units represent not only an interesting but also important indication of the 
fact the true potential of guerrilla-type activities was being mapped and evaluated. 
Although the statements submitted by the various units indicated weaknesses relat-
ing to the competence of troops with regard to guerrilla-type activities and realistic 
experimentation with them, such experiments were clearly important as fuel for 
theoretical thinking.  
 
After the First World War, tactical thinking related to guerrilla-type activities and a 
serious attitude regarding it made significant progress, particularly in the 1930s. 
Guerrilla-type activities were seen as being well suited for the Finnish terrain and 
conditions. This theory provides a strong background for the analysis of the deve-
lopment of Finnish tactics in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as for the application of 
guerrilla-type activities to operations in the wars fought between 1939 and 1944. 
Theorising and experimentation regarding the fourth form of fighting, guerrilla-type 
activities, were established in Finnish thinking regarding the art of war in the early 
decades of Finnish independence.65  

62 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 42–43 and 62–64. Adaridi, Karl: Suomi sotanäyttämönä (‘Finland as a theatre 
of war’), Helsinki 1923(b), pp. 44–45 and 172–173. 
63 All of the statements submitted by the units on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type acti-
vities and guerrilla warfare are available in the archives of the General Headquarters. See, for exam-
ple, a statement on guerrilla-type activities, JPr no. 319/461/1.sal./30.9.1924, R 70/72 (86), KA. 
64 A statement on guerrilla warfare, K-SR no. 2901/5593/24/19.9.1924, R 70/72 (86), KA. Note. 
In the original document, the following note had been added in the margin at the General Head-
quarters: ‘infantry and troops on bicycles, yes!’. According to the General Headquarters, cavalry was be-
lieved to be tied to the road network, particularly in winters with a heavy snowfall. Therefore, guer-
rilla-type activities were seen to be more suitable for the infantry than for the cavalry.  
65 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 62–64. See also Palokangas, Marko: Sissisodasta sissitoimintaan – Sodankäynti- 
ja taistelumenetelmien kansallinen käsiteanalyysi, (‘From guerrilla war to guerrilla-type activities – a natio-
nal concept analysis of the methods of warfare and forms of fighting’), a study written on a staff of-
ficer course in 2009, pp. 25–28. 
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Guerrilla-type activities in the army regulations in the early years of Finland’s 
independence 
 
Initially, the training instructions and regulations applied by the army of inde-
pendent Finland were based on foreign models. German influences, brought largely 
by the Jaegers, manifested themselves in the manuals Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja 
(‘Finnish military handbook’), Harjoituskirja, (‘Training manual ’), Voima-opas (‘Power 
manual’) and Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö (‘Regulation for irregular troops’), which 
made up the body of key regulations. Furthermore, a three-volume work by Swedish 
Lieutenant General Lars Tingsten, Taktikens grunder (‘Basics of tactics’), achieved an 
influential position, particularly in teaching tactics.66 Although an extensive pro-
duction of regulations and guidebooks was started after the War of Independence, 
their numbers remained insufficient to cover the needs of the troops. This lack of 
instructions was compensated by circular orders issued by the Ministry of War and 
other instructions regulating the functioning of the defence system.67  
 
The compilation of Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja was a collaborative effort accomp-
lished by the Jaegers in Germany. This work was originally published in Berlin in 
1917, comprising five volumes, and in Finland between 1918 and 1920, consisting 
of eight volumes. The work was largely based on German field regulations, and was 
designed for use by Finnish officers, NCOs and men as a handbook. Although this 
multi-volume guidebook was the most extensive work in Finnish available at the 
time, and was officially approved for use as a regulation, it was, on the whole, une-
ven with regard to quality.68 Voima-opas, modest in size and content, was published 
by a number of Jaegers and businessmen in the autumn of 1917. As far as is known, 
‘Voima-opas ’was based on Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja I osa and on Handbok för land-
stormbefäl, printed in Sweden. It should be noted that ‘Voima-opas ’ included a sepa-
rate chapter that discussed guerrilla-type activities, albeit superficially.69 Vapaajoukko-
jen ohjesääntö, published in early 1918, was also a compilation of a number of Ger-
man regulations, physically the size of a notebook. This regulation, drafted and 
compiled by Paul von Gerich, also included a chapter on guerrilla warfare and guer-
rilla-type activities. In contrast to other guidebooks, Harjoituskirja was modelled on 

66 Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja, 5. osa – VIII, Kenttäpalvelus ja taktiikka (‘Finnish Military Handbook, 
Part 5, VIII Field Service and Tactics’), Helsinki 1920. Fabritius, John Chr.: Harjoituskirja (‘Training 
manual’), 1918. Voima-opas (‘Power manual’), 1917. Gerich, Paul von: Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö (‘A 
regulation for irregular troops’), Turku 1918(b). Tingsten, L. H.: Taktikens grunder I–II, Stockholm 
1921. Tingsten, L. H.: Taktikens grunder III, Stockholm 1924.  
67 Pylkkänen, Ali: Suojeluskuntajärjestö sotilaskouluttajana (‘The Civil Guard organisaiton as a provider 
of military training’), an article in a book by Kari Selén and Ali Pylkkänen, Sarkatakkien armeija – Suo-
jeluskunnat ja suojeluskuntalaiset 1918–1944 (‘An army of frieze-coated men – the Civil Guards and 
guardists 1918–1944’), Juva 2004, p. 243. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 27. 
68 Pylkkänen (2004), p. 243. See also Lauerma, Matti: Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 27 – 
vaiheet ja vaikutus (‘The Royal Prussian 27th Jaeger Battalion, its history and impact’), Porvoo 1966, 
pp. 601–611. 
69 Voima-opas (‘Power manual’), 1917, chapter 4. See also Kaila, E. E.: Vapaussodan valmistelut koti-
maassa, Suomen vapaussota, Jyväskylä (‘Preparations for the War of Independence in Finland; the Finn-
ish War of Independence’), 1921, pp. 336–337. 
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Russian regulations. The above-mentioned guide and instruction books contained 
several references to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.70  
 
However, the concepts of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare used in the 
manuals were not entirely unambiguous in the Finnish context. In the translations 
of German field manuals and the first Finnish military manuals of the early years of 
Finnish independence, published from 1917 onwards, guerrilla-type activities were 
defined as falling under the concept of the ‘little war ’. ‘Little war’, in turn, was de-
fined as warfare conducted by small, independent units or, alternatively, as a method 
of combat resorted to by a party with inferior resources, aimed to harass and cause 
damage to the enemy, possibly supported by a popular rising in order to enhance its 
chances of success. Irrespective of whether combat involved small units of the regu-
lar army or a full-scale popular uprising, ‘little war’had to follow a coherent plan.71   
 
Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja described guerrilla-type activities as part of ‘little war’. 
From the tactical viewpoint, this form or warfare provided a highly advantageous 
basis for guerrilla-type activities. ‘Being waged behind the invader’s lines, “little war ’offers a 
number of advantageous opportunities for guerrilla-type activities, including cutting off railway lines, 
waterways and telegraph lines, destroying railway stations and bridges, and launching attacks on 
baggage trains, control posts, small units and sentries. Constant and rapid mobility, the sudden ap-
pearance and disappearance of guerrillas, taking advantage of spies and trusted helpers, cunning 
and courage are the prerequisites for success.’According to the instructions put forth in this 
handbook, support given by the population and a landscape characterised by forests, 
swamplands, a multitude of lakes and varied soils created a powerful deterrent 
against the enemy.72 
 
The tactical descriptions of ‘little war’emphasised the offensive. According to Soti-
laskäsikirja, zest and a strong hatred towards the adversary were the key elements for 
success. Attacks were based on a surprise element and rapid action in the enemy’s 
rear and on its flanks. ‘When the target is specifically set on the liberation of a country, success 
absolutely requires rapid offensive operations; remaining on the defensive results in nothing and only 
provides the adversary with an opportunity to regroup its troops for the suppression of the insurgen-
cy. ’According to this handbook, attacks should be carried out at night whenever 
possible, in a landscape that the defenders were familiar with and had reconnoitred 
before they launched any operations. Within the scope of ‘little war’, Sotilaskäsikirja 
equates attack, as a method of waging war, with ambush. Guerrillas had to seek loca-
tions and situations suitable for ambush, taking advantage of them in such a manner 
that the enemy could be encircled.73  
 
The description of the success of ‘little war’presented in Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja, 
when supported by a popular rising, is particularly interesting. ‘When combined, a well 
organised popular uprising and a “little war ’have the chances of pushing the enemy into a highly 

70 Fabritius (1918). Gerich (1918b). 
71 Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja, 5. osa (VIII, Kenttäpalvelus ja taktiikka) (‘Finnish Military Handbook, 
Part 5, VIII Field Service and Tactics’), Helsinki 1920, pp. 529–530. 
72 Ibid, pp. 530–531. 
73 Ibid, pp. 532–533. 
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precarious and even desperate position. The preparation and organisation of a popular uprising, so 
that it really leads to success, requires great skill and ability.’Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja jus-
tifies the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities and ‘little war’with examples taken 
from military history, putting forth cases in which querilla-type activities had proven 
successful. The historical examples highlight guerrilla-type activities conducted by 
Roth and Spoof, the combat operations on the Åland islands, and the operations 
carried out by irregulars led by peasant leader Olli Tiainen during the Finnish War, 
fought between 1808 and 1809.74 As far as is known, the chapter on ‘little war’was 
written by Erkki Hannula. These examples and descriptions of ‘little war’also show 
that the committee working on the manuscript had access to more than just Ger-
man military literature. It is quite evident that the committee also resorted to works 
on military history published in Sweden.75 
 
There are also many similarities between the descriptions of ‘little war’, found in 
Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö (‘A regulation for irregular troops’), drafted in the autumn 
of 1917 and published in early 1918. The fourth chapter of this regulation, Sotatoimet 
(‘Military operations’), opens with a general description of guerrilla warfare, accord-
ing to which guerrilla warfare aims to disturb enemy communications and hamper 
its operations. It can therefore be concluded that the key principles of guerrilla war-
fare, with regard to both dispersed and concerted operations, were available to the 
officer corps of the Civil Guards for study before the start of the War of Independ-
ence. Paralleling Sotilaskäsikirja, Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö argues that guerrilla warfare 
tactics must be based on offensive operations against the enemy’s rear communica-
tions. ‘Cunning and surprise are among the key aids in guerrilla warfare. ’ Attacks aimed at 
encircling the enemy, concentrating the forces committed to an attack in a surprise 
operation against the enemy launched from several directions. Using ambushes and 
traps, the enemy could be tied up, engaging it in fighting in such areas that were dis-
advantageous to it and ushering it to the terrain that the irregular troops had pre-
pared for combat in advance. The importance of intelligence, patrolling and the as-
sistance offered by the general population was also highlighted. ‘In guerrilla warfare, 
the assistance of the country’s citizens is normally of great importance with regard to obtaining intel-
ligence, delivering official notices, providing guidance, throwing the enemy off the scent and similar 
operations.’76 It is noteworthy that guerrilla warfare was construed to be waged in the 
defender’s own area, behind the lines, not in the rear of the enemy’s support area in 
a foreign country. 
 
Guerrilla warfare was also discussed in writings published outside the military 
sphere, in publications with a content that resembled that of army regulations. Su-
omalaisen Kommunistisen Puolueen Sotilasjärjestö (‘The military organisation of the Finnish 
Communist Party ’) published a series of publications entitled Sotilaskirjasia (‘Military 
booklets’) between 1918 and 1919. A total of 12 booklets in this series, discussing 
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74 Ibid, pp. 533–537.  
75 Lauerma (1966), p. 610. An interpretation running along similar lines of the use of Swedish mili-
tary literature was also presented by E.E. Kaila in his book entitled ‘Suomen vapaussota.’ (‘The Finn-
ish War of Independence’) Kaila (1921), pp. 336–337. 
76 Gerich (1918b), pp. 46–54. As far as is known, this regulation is an extended version of the 1906 
‘Voima’ booklet, drafted by Paul von Gerich in the autumn of 1917. Kemppi (2006), pp. 26–27.  
Pylkkänen (2004), p. 244 and 275. 
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various topics, were printed in St. Petersburg, of which Number 3, ohjeita sissiso-
dankäynnistä (‘instructions on guerrilla warfare’), provided Finnish communists and 
the fighting proletariat with guidelines on guerrilla warfare. According to this book-
let, ‘The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to undermine the enemy's war movements and its opera-
tions in general, by specifically disrupting its communications including railway connections, tele-
graph lines, telephones lines and baggage trains. ‘Cunning and surprise are among the key elements 
in guerrilla warfare. Small mobile units, which can appear suddenly and disappear just as quickly, 
are best suited for such operations.’77 This guidebook, intended for communists, defined 
guerrilla warfare in almost identical terms to those presented in Suomalainen Soti-
laskäsikirja and Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö.78 This is a good indication of the principles 
of the art of war prevalent at the time, which were not always linked to nationality 
or ideology. 
 
On the basis of the regulations and military manuals in use at the time it can be con-
cluded that guerrilla tactics as a form of warfare were well known in Finland as early 
as in the formative years of the country’s independence. However, to find guerrilla-
type activities included in key military regulations was more of an exception than a 
rule. In spite of this, guerrilla-type activities were taught both to the regular army 
and to civil gard units, but the extent of such training can be regarded rather super-
ficial or, at the least, fairly formal. From the viewpoint of the art of war, the charac-
teristics of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities presented in the regulations 
were based on German and Russian tactics, and adapted to Finnish conditions.79 
Reflection on the art of war and the drafting of regulations were complemented by 
experiences taken from military history, which highlighted the importance of charac-
teristically Finnish guerrilla-type activities. 
 
 
Reflection on guerrilla-type activities from the viewpoint of the art of war 
complementing the prevalent Jaeger tactics 
 
The examination of the Finnish art of war reveals that there is evidence supporting 
the view that guerrilla tactics and guerrilla-type activities were nothing new to the 
Finns after the end of the First World War. The effectiveness of guerrilla-type ac-
tivities in particular was discussed among the officer corps as early as in the early 
1920s, when it was found to be the age-old way by which the weaker party defends 
itself against a stronger adversary. Of those who reflected and wrote on the Finnish 
art of war and guerrilla-type activities, the most influential were Major General Paul 
von Gerich and Lieutenant General Karl Adaridi, both of whom had served in the 
Imperial Russian Army. 
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77 Ohjeita sissisodankäynnissä, sotilaskirjasia no. 3, (‘Instructions on guerrilla warfare, military booklet 
no. 3’) St. Petersburg 1918. 
78 Cf. Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja, 5. osa (VIII, Kenttäpalvelus ja taktiikka), (‘Finnish Military Hand-
book, Part 5, VIII Field Service and Tactics’), Helsinki 1920, pp. 530–531. 
Gerich (1918b), pp. 46–54. 
79 Pylkkänen (2004), pp. 275–281. 
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Major General Paul Bruno von Gerich80, who was a descendant of a Baltic German 
noble family, served as a divisional commander in the Finnish War of Independence 
and who is also credited with the foundation of the Military School of Vimpeli. He 
was also one of the most renowned military writers of independent Finland. Paul 
von Gerich graduated from Hamina Cadet School in 1895. During his military ca-
reer, he served in the Russian Guards units as a company and battalion commander. 
The key military regulations used in the training of Russian troops in the early 1900s 
were written by Paul von Gerich. In the First World War, Paul von Gerich served 
on the Eastern Front in Poland, Lithuania and Belarus, holding battalion command-
er posts and similar and being wounded on several occasions. After the February 
Revolution, von Gerich resigned from the Russian Army, having been found unfit 
for military service, and relocated permanently to Finland in late 1917.81  
 
After settling in Finland, Paul von Gerich was involved in the founding of civil 
guards in South Ostrobothnia, leading the disarming of the Russian troops in Lapua, 
Seinäjoki and other locations during the early phases of the War of Independence. 
During the War of Independence, von Gerich was entered, on 18 February 1918, in 
the roll of senior military officers of the Finnish Army. After the War of Inde-
pendence, he served as the commander of f 2nd Division, holding other posts as 
well, and, after resigning from military service on 19 April 1921, he continued his 
career as commander of the Helsinki Civil Guard District.82 Paul von Gerich was a 
prolific writer. His literary production focused particularly on the art of war and mil-
itary tactics. His most well-known works include Tre år i fält I–II (‘Three years in the 
field I–II’), Päätä ja toimi (‘Make a decision and act’), Komppanian taistelukouluutus (‘A 
company in combat training’), Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö (‘A regulation for iregular 
troops’), and Taktiikan oppikirja I–II (‘A textbook in tactics I–II’), which was pub-
lished both in Finnish and Swedish. The three latter books in particular discuss 
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.83 
 
For Komppanian taistelukouluutus, which was part of the Upseerin käsikirjasto series (‘An 
officer’s reference library’), Paul von Gerich wrote a chapter on guerrilla warfare. 
According to von Gerich, ‘guerrilla warfare can either be waged independently, in which case it 
will replace more extensive manoeuvres, or, alternatively, it can be combined with such manoeuvres, 
providing support to them.’84 A similar description of guerrilla warfare, almost to the 
word, can be found in the second volume of Taktiikan oppikirja. In that manual, Paul 
von Gerich describes guerrilla warfare as an independent form of warfare that ‘super-
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80 Paul Bruno von Gerich (1873–1951). Itsenäisen Suomen Kenraalikunta 1918–1996, (‘Officers with 
the rank of General of independent Finland between 1918 and 1995’), bibliographies, edited by 
Rauno Lipponen, pp. 74–76. 
81 Ibid. See also the extract from Paul von Gerich’s personal file, curriculum vitae and personal de-
tails, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence 
University, ID Kä032, folder 126. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Gerich, Paul von: Tre år i fält I–II, Helsingfors 1918(a). Gerich, Paul von: Päätä ja toimi (‘Make a 
decision and act’), Helsinki 1923. Gerich (1918b). Gerich, Paul von: Lärobok i taktik I–II, Helsing-
fors 1919. Gerich, Paul von: Taktiikan oppikirjat I–II (‘A textbook in tactics I–II’), Helsinki 1922.  
84 Gerich, Paul von: Komppanian taistelukouluutus II (‘A company in combat training II’), Helsinki 
1921, pp. 192–195. 
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sedes larger manoeuvres, or is related to them in a supportive role.’Thus, von Gerich un-
derlines that guerrilla warfare is just one of the methods of combat in which regular 
troops may engage.85 
 
With regard to the concepts, it is interesting to note that Chapter 9 of the Swedish 
version is entitled Lilla kriget (‘Little war’), while in the Finnish version this chapter 
bears the title Sissisota (‘Guerrilla warfare’.) On the basis of this, it can be concluded 
that while the military literature published in the early years of Finnish independence 
treated the phrases little war and guerrilla war as synonymous, the way these phrases 
were used varied from one writer to another. In any case, von Gerich argues that 
guerrilla warfare has a chance of success when waged in large swaths of forest and 
swampland in the defender’s own territory. In his textbook on tactics, von Gerich 
refers to units engaged in guerrilla war as flying columns and as patrol, guerrilla and irreg-
ular troops. Flying columns were in most cases units formed of regular units for tem-
porary tasks and guerrilla-type activities. Patrol, guerrilla and irregular troops were 
permanent troops or combinations of troops, engaged in a long-term guerrilla war-
fare with a joint task of inflicting harm to the enemy. Both works refer to surprise 
attacks and staging ambushes in connection with guerrilla-type activities. The prin-
cipal method of combat was the offensive, in accordance with the military philoso-
phy of the period, combined with guerrilla-type activities.86 
 
Born into a noble family in the Vyborg province, Karl Adaridi87 served for the 
whole of his military career in the Imperial Russian Army, achieving the rank of 
Lieutenant General. During his career, Adaridi held several command and staff po-
sitions, which gave him a thorough knowledge of the art and history of war. He 
gained war and frontline experience in campaigns such as the Russo-Japanese War 
and World War I. Karl Adaridi resigned from the Russian Army in 1915, and relo-
cated to Finland in 1919. Adaridi’s sojourn in Finland was short-lived, as in late 
1926 he relocated permanently to France, where he died in 1940. However, after his 
resignation from active service, he continued to be a prolific writer, publishing texts 
on the art of war and military history. Karl Adaridi was a prolific writer, translator 
and visionary who studied the art of war with a critical eye.88  
 
Adaridi’s theoretical thinking led him to conclude that guerrilla-type activities were 
particularly well suited for the Finnish terrain and the resolute national character. 
Karl Adaridi’s texts treat guerrilla-type activities as part of military history, starting 
from the early Middle Ages. The examination of Karl Adaridi’s literary production 
reveals that he was well versed in the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities and, in 
particular, its applicability to the Finnish terrain, conditions and art of war. Of Ada-
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85 Ibid, pp. 192–194. Gerich, Paul von: Taktiikan oppikirja II (‘A company in combat training II’), 
Helsinki 1922, pp. 510–513. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Avgust Karl Mihail Mihajloviÿ Adaridi (ǍǯǰȀǾǿ-ǗǭǽǸ-ǙǵȂǭǵǸ ǙǵȂǭǵǸǻǯǵȄ ǍǱǭǽǵǱǵ, 1859–
1940). Personal details: ǞǼǵǾǻǷ ǐǲǺǲǽǭǸȉǺǻǰǻ ȅǿǭǮǭ (A list of officers promoted to the rank of 
general staff officer) 1911, 1914, 1916, 1917. ǞǼǵǾǻǷ ǰǲǺǲǽǭǸǭǹ Ǽǻ ǾǿǭǽȅǵǺǾǿǯȀ (Generals in the 
order of seniority) 1908–1914. See also ǏǻǸǷǻǯ, Ǟ. Ǐ.: ǛȁǵȃǲǽȈ ǽǻǾǾǵǶǾǷǻǶ ǰǯǭǽǱǵǵ: ǛǼȈǿ 
ǹǭǽǿǵǽǻǸǻǰǭ (translated into Finnish under the title. The officers of the Russian Guard: a preli-
minary martyrology), ǝȀǾǾǷǵǶ ǼȀǿȉ, 2002. Pylkkänen (2004), p. 275. 
88 Ibid. 
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ridi’s large literary production, those works and articles in which he discussed guer-
rilla-type activities as a mode of combat especially suitable tor the Finnish art of war 
are worth highlighting. 
 
Between 1919 and 1921, Adaridi wrote a four-volume Sotataidon historia (‘A history 
of warfare’) which, as its title suggests, discusses the development of the art of war 
using examples taken from military history.89 Adaridi’s experience and views on the 
art of war were held in high esteem in Finland, particularly by those officers who 
had served in the Imperial Russian Army. After relocating to Finland Adaridi was 
encouraged and provided with practical help by his émigré colleague Paul von 
Gerich, among others. The work of this military writer did indeed require a great 
deal of practical support, as Adaridi had spent his entire military career in Russia be-
fore settling in Finland, and as he apparently wrote either in Russian or German, 
from which languages his works were translated either into Finnish or Swedish for 
publication.90   
 
In a work published in 1923, Suomi sotanäyttämönä (‘Finland as a theatre of war’), 
Adaridi gave an extensive discussion of Finland’s special conditions and terrain. 
Taking an overall view of Finland’s military geography, Adaridi draws a weighty 
conclusion: ‘The Finnish conditions generally favour the defender and disfavour the invader. It is 
as if the Finnish terrain was created for guerrilla warfare. What poorly organised or even unorgan-
ised guerrilla troops with no single command structure can accomplish was demonstrated by the 
1808–1809 war. Undoubtedly guerrilla-type activities would have been a great deal more effective 
if the troops had been properly trained and had fought under a single command. This is how it 
should be in the future.’91 In the final words of his book, Adaridi repeats his message, 
emphasising that guerrilla-type activities should be developed further and incorpo-
rated into the Finnish art of war. ‘Taking advantage of Finnish geography, it is possible to 
hold off even a greatly superior enemy, in particular as the terrain offers the best conditions for wag-
ing guerrilla warfare. The above-mentioned tactics are all the more valuable for the defence of the 
country, as they can be used in a similar manner in few other countries. The evaluation and deter-
mined use of such means of defence are the most important aspects of Finland’s effective defence.’92 
According to contemporary assessment, Finland was extremely well suited for guer-
rilla-type activities with regard to its terrain and conditions.  
 
Karl Adaridi’s writings provide many interesting and significant details of guerrilla-
type activities, as well as references to directions in which guerrilla-type activities 
should be developed. All the evidence suggests that as a military historian, Adaridi 
was well versed in the history of a great number of wars and guerrilla-type activities 
applied in them. He examined wars, attempting to find characteristics of guerrilla 
tactics seen both from the viewpoint of failed and successful operations. It was per-
haps due to his broad knowledge of military history and his own experiences that 
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89 Adaridi, Karl: Sotataidon historia, osat I–IV (‘A history of the art of war, parts I–IV’), Helsinki 
1920–1922.  
90 The original annotated manuscript of ‘Sotataidon historia’ in German, Geschichte der Kriegs-
kunst I–IV, from which Oiva Linturi has translated it into Finnish, is available in the National Ar-
chives. Karl Adaridi’s private collection Pk 534, KA. 
91 Adaridi (1923b), p. 44. 
92 Ibid, pp. 172–173. 
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Adaridi was encouraged to examine such forms of warfare in which the defender 
with fewer resources would stand a good chance of opposing an adversary with su-
perior resources. According to Adaridi, scrutiny of military history shows that guer-
rilla-type activities have proved particularly effective when combined with a popular 
rising.93 In spite of this, guerrilla units could, and should, according to Adaridi’s 
conclusions, be formed as part of the regular armed forces and combat, in other 
words, without the direct support of the civilian population. The most apt descrip-
tion of guerrilla tactics, as applied by a weaker party against a stronger adversary, can 
be found in Adaridi’s book Sissitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type activities’), published in 
1925: ‘This method can be likened to mosquito bites which, according to the famous folk tale, 
weakened and harassed the animal king to the point where it finally died. The easiest way for guer-
rillas to achieve their objectives is to coordinate their operations with those of the army; of this, mili-
tary history provides ample evidence.’94 
 
Guerrilla-type activities played a particularly important role as a deterrent. Adaridi 
describes how the materiel losses inflicted by guerrilla fighters on the enemy will be 
smaller in size when compared with psychological damage, provided that the guerril-
las manage to arouse alarm and insecurity among the adversary by their action and 
exaggerated rumours. ‘Rumours of losses, even if proven wrong, will deteriorate an army’s mo-
rale, to a degree at least.’The operational opportunities available to guerrillas were, ac-
cording to Adaridi, always to be seen in relation to ‘the attitude assumed by the population 
in a particular area towards the guerrillas, the type of local terrain, the directions in which the ene-
my’s army was advancing, the condition of the army and the order behind the lines, as well as to the 
weather and season.’95 
 
On account of Finland’s special features regarding the terrain and conditions, Ada-
ridi saw Finland as if created for guerrilla-type activities. ‘Thus, there are two fundamen-
tal factors present in Finland that facilitate the operations of the guerrillas: the terrain that is as if 
created for guerrillas, and a patriotic population. Therefore, guerrilla-type activities must be devel-
oped to their full potential. When organising Finland’s defence, the operations of guerrilla units 
should receive serious attention, to the degree that such attention would result in guerrilla war. Such 
activities would be a powerful weapon in the hands of the weaker party in combat against a superior 
adversary. It would be unforgivable if the weaker party did not resort to these means when the ad-
vantageous conditions favoured it.’96  
 
At about the same time as Sissitoiminta was published, Karl Adaridi published a book 
in Germany, entitled Freischaren und Freikorps, which discusses irregular troops and 
the ‘little war’. In practice, this book introduces Finnish guerrilla-type activities to a 
German readership. The book includes several parallels with the content of Sissitoi-
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93 Adaridi, Karl: 53 esimerkkiä sotahistoriasta (‘53 examples of the history of war’), Helsinki 1923, pp. 
265–281.  
94 Adaridi (1925a), p. 25 and 45. It should be mentioned that this book was published as early as in 
1924 in Swedish, and the foreword of the book indicates that it was written in 1923. Adaridi, Karl: 
Partigängarverksamhet, Helsingfors 1924, p. 5. 
95 Ibid, p. 47 and 61. 
96 Ibid, pp. 242–246. 
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minta and Adaridi’s thinking on the art of war.97 Adaridi’s mark on the international 
stage is represented by an article published by Russian émigrés in a Yugoslavian 
journal of military science in 1930, entitled Partisaanit ja tuleva sota (‘Partisans and the 
next war’). In this article, Adaridi gives reasons for emphasising the effectiveness of 
partisan warfare in light of war experiences and by providing examples taken from 
military history, arguing that guerrilla-type activities will have a great deal of oppor-
tunities, even in future wars.98 
 
With regard to the Finnish art of war and, in particular, guerrilla-type activities, the 
texts published by Paul von Gerich and Karl Adaridi were extremely influential dur-
ing the early years of Finland’s independence. This is even more so because while 
the credibility of the ‘ryssänupseerit  ’ (‘Russian officers’) was usually downplayed99, (in 
Finnish, the word ‘ryssä’–Russian –has a pejorative meaning), von Gerich and 
Adaridia were somehow understood to be exceptions. The works of these two au-
thors were used as textbooks in military schools, and, as far as is known, they were 
also studied. For example, Taktiikan oppikirjat I–II (‘Textbooks on tactics I–II’) by 
Paul von Gerich remained the only textbooks on tactics available in Finnish for a 
long time, used at military schools, although they were criticised for paying too little 
attention to Finnish conditions and too much attention to German military regula-
tions.100 The question of which individual or individuals chose works von Gerich 
and Adaridi to be used as textbooks at military schools and to be included in the of-
ficer’s reference library cannot be satisfactorily answered on the basis of the availa-
ble source material.  
 
Despite their Russian background, the texts by von Gerich and Adaridi were held in 
high esteem, perhaps due to the fact that both writers had gained war experience 
and had made first-hand observations of the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities 
in warfare. Von Gerich and Adaridi also cooperated with each other, proposing ini-
tiatives on the study of military history.101 In this way, their writings provided the 
development of the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities with grounds that 
were better than nothing. Lieutenant General Karl Adaridi in particular, due to his 
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97 The subtitle of the book, ‘Auf Grund von Kriegserfahrungen’ (‘Based on War Experiences’), is an indi-
cation of Adaridi’s method of discussing ideas through the lens of the history of the art of war. 
Adaridi, Karl: Freischaren und Freikorps, Berlin 1925(b), pp. 5–21. 
98 ǍǱǭǽǵǱǵ, Ǘ (Adaridi): ǜǭǽǿǵǴǭǺȈ ǵ ǮȀǱȀȆǭȌ ǯǻǶǺǭ, Ǐ࣎ǾǿǺǵǷȇ ǯǻǲǺǺȈȂȇ ǴǺǭǺȒǶ 6/1930, 
Ǟǭǽǭǲǯǻ, ǫǰǻǾǸǭǯȒȌ 1930, pp. 17–22. The publication in question was a journal of military science, 
published by Russian émigrés in Sarajevo (‘Sotatiedon aikakauskirja – sotatieteellisen ajattelun äänen-
kannattaja’ in a Finnish translation); Adaridi was a member of the editorial staff of this journal. 
99 For more information on the different roles of the Jaeger officers and those who had received 
their training in Russia, see, for example, Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 27–31. 
100 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 30–31. Seea also Oesch, K. L.: Taktiikan perusteet (‘The basics of tacics’), 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/1928, pp. 481–482. 
101 Adaridi, Karl: 53 esimerkkiä sotahistoriasta (‘53 examples of the history of war’), Helsinki 1923(a). 
In the foreword to this book, Adaridi writes as follows: ‘This collection of examples, taken from military 
history, is published on the initiative of General Paul v. Gerich, and is intended to be appended to a textbook on tac-
tics authored by him.’ Paul von Gerich thanks Adaridi in the foreword to the four-volume ‘Sotataidon 
historia’ (‘A history of the art of war’) for encouragement and assistance, using almost identical 
words. Adaridi, Karl: Sotataidon historia, osa I, (‘A history of the art of war, part I’), Helsinki 1920, 
pp. 5–6. 
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weighty message, can be said to have been something of a visionary and a trailblazer 
of tactical thinking when regarded from the viewpoint of decisions taken in Finland 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Regarding how important Karl Adaridi’s reflections were in 
the development of the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities, they cannot 
be dismissed. It can be concluded, therefore, that in the development of the Finnish 
art of war and in serious thinking about Finnish tactics in the 1920s and the 1930s, 
guerrilla-type activities had not been forgotten –quite the contrary.   
 
 
Guerrilla warfare and irregular troops in the basics of tactics 
 
In the late 1920s, with the publication of a textbook entitled Taktiikan perusteet (‘The 
basics of tactics’) in 1928, in which the methods of guerrilla warfare were discussed 
in one chapter, the methods of guerrilla warfare were officially incorporated into the 
basics of Finnish tactics.102 This textbook on tactics was written by Lieutenant Colo-
nel Hannes Olkkonen, who was a Jaeger officer trained in Germany. In the First 
World War, Olkkonen saw action in the ranks of the German army, and in the War 
of Independence, he served as the adjutant of the VIII Jaeger Battalion which was 
part of Jaeger Regiment 4. After the War of Independence, Olkkonen participated 
in the work of the Regulation Committee from 1918 to 1919. Hannes Olkkonen re-
ceived his general staff training in Berlin between 1923 and 1925, after which he 
served as a teacher of tactics and military history at the Finnish Military Academy 
and as a teacher of military history on a special course arranged at the National 
General Staff College between 1925 and 1927. While he was writing the book Tak-
tiikan perusteet (‘The basics of tactics’), Olkkonen acted as the director of the newly 
founded the Army Combat School, between 1927 and 1931.103  
 
According to the foreword to the book Taktiikan perusteet that Olkkosen wrote, this 
work was based on existing regulations and experiences. The book aimed principally 
to clarify difficult-to-understand regulations and to fill in the gaps found in them. 
According to Oikkonen, his textbook addressed, above all, changes that had oc-
curred in military terminology and ‘…the rapid developments in tactics following experiences 
obtained from the various wars waged in the world.’104 The sixteenth chapter of the book 
was entitled ‘Vapaajoukot ja sissisota ’(‘Irregular troops and guerrilla warfare’), which 
discussed the character of guerrilla warfare and the compositions of guerrilla troops 
as part of the basics of Finnish tactics. This work describes guerrilla warfare as har-
assing in character, thus avoiding a decisive battle, carried out by irregular troops 
through guerrilla-type activities.105  
 
While from the perspective of the contemporary art of war, the prerequisite was the 
commitment of the armed forces to combat, the tactical thinking also saw, in theory 
at least, a possibility of engaging a patriotic population in military operations. The 
principal rule was that the troops to be engaged in guerrilla warfare should be largely 
formed of the regular army. On the basis of the book it can be stated that Finnish 
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102 Olkkonen (1928), p. 320. 
103 Olkkonen, Matti Juho (Hannes), an extract from personal details no. 40651, KA. 
104 Olkkonen (1928), pp. 5–6. 
105 Olkkonen (1928), pp. 320–328. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 62. 
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guerrilla-type activities in the late 1920s were not solely based on the use of military 
force in a possible guerrilla war. It was also possible to engage Finnish citizens in 
guerrilla warfare by using ‘voluntary elements with a will to defend the country’; that is, ir-
regular troops. Lieutenant Colonel Hannes Olkkonen states in the book that combat 
carried out in the enemy’s rear by a military force should be supported, where pos-
sible, by guerrilla-type activities by irregular troops, aimed to support the manoeu-
vres by the regular army seeking to achieve a decisive outcome, instead of waging a 
guerrilla war supported by a large-scale popular rising. Olkkonen sums up his point 
as follows: ‘…if the will of the nation to defend its country remains unbroken, defeated and dis-
persed units, joined by volunteers and irregular troops, will start a desperate guerrilla war in order 
to hamper the operations of the enemy that is possibly adding new territory to that already under its 
occupation. However, in an era such as ours, with its roads, firearms and opportunities for mobility, 
the chances of a material success of such a popular rising will be practically nil, although it must be 
regarded as a manifestation of a nation’s strong will to defend its country. Therefore, this book will 
principally discuss such guerrilla-type activities that aim at providing support for the manoeuvres by 
the regular army seeking to achieve a decisive outcome.’106  
 
According to Olkkonen, guerrilla warfare was ideally suited for contemporary theo-
retical thinking, which emphasised the offensive and maintained that ‘surprise and 
misleading the enemy were at the core of the tactics applied by a guerrilla unit. Guerrillas use the 
former method when attacking the enemy, and the latter when creating opportunities for an attack 
which, in the form of an ambush, might immediately follow the attack.’107 Attacks were to be 
carried out in the form of rapid attacks, followed by equally rapid detachment from 
combat, without engaging guerrilla units in prolonged fighting A prerequisite was an 
absolute concealment of the battle plan, without divulging any unnecessary details 
of it to their own troops or the local population. Evidently, the idea was to take ad-
vantage of the confusion reigning on the battle field and mislead the enemy by re-
vealing disinformation to the local population. Criteria were also set for troops en-
gaged in guerrilla-type activities with regard to their competence. ‘Generally speaking, 
guerrilla warfare can be regarded to require courageous and determined leaders who are familiar 
with the wilderness, and troops that have a strong will to defend their country, even to the point 
where they are willing to sacrifice themselves and who follow their leaders voluntarily rather than be-
cause they are ordered to do so.’108 
 
In a similar way to Adaridi and many of his contemporaries, Olkkonen emphasises 
the importance of taking advantage of the Finnish conditions and terrain. The re-
sults of guerrilla-type activities could be intensified by staging nocturnal attacks. The 
conditions imposed by winter and the deep swaths of the Finnish wilderness also 
played a role in Finnish guerrilla-type activities. ‘In addition to this, the counter measures 
resorted to by the enemy that is unprepared for surprises are further hampered by the cold, the lack 
of roads and the difficulties of finding accommodation for the troops.’109 As a novel feature to 
the contemporary art of war, Olkkonen introduces anti-aircraft capability as a means 
to protect the Finnish rear and to provide cover for the guerrilla-type activities. ‘Pre-
venting enemy aerial operations which harass rear communications is becoming increasingly im-
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106 Olkkonen (1928), pp. 320–321. 
107 Ibid, p. 321. 
108 Ibid, pp. 321–322. 
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portant today. That will require having peacetime preparations in place and a well organised system 
for spotting enemy aircraft and for communication.’110  
 
The book Taktiikan perusteet (‘Basics of tactics’), published by Lieutenant Colonel 
Olkkonen, in 1928, was regarded as a well thought-out and comprehensive work on 
Finnish tactics. After its publication, this book superseded Taktiikan oppikirjat I–II 
(‘Textbooks on tactics I–II’), written by Paul von Gerich. This textbook by Olkko-
nen was distributed to the Finnish units and military schools, to be used in teaching. 
As a textbook, it was regarded as being especially well suited for tthe National Gen-
eral Staff College, Reserve Officer School and Finnish Military Academy.111 On the 
whole, Taktiikan perusteet is a contemporary testimony to the fact that changes in 
warfare, tactics and the art of war had been taken into account in Finland. One of 
the principal objectives of the book was to put into practice, via the teaching pro-
vided by military schools, new developments in the art of war that had reached Fin-
land from abroad.  
 
 
Instructions for guerrilla-type activities and the guerrilla manual before the 
Winter War 
 
The publication of regulations that had begun in the early years of Finland’s inde-
pendence continued in the 1920s, becoming more extensive in scope. In particular, 
a series of field regulations, published from 1927 onwards, filled a wide gap, pre-
senting the principles of Finnish military doctrine in a form that was more organised 
than the existing presentations. These field regulations also provided guidelines for 
the training given at military schools and units.112 The first reference to guerrilla-
type activities can be found in Kenttäohjesääntö II (‘Field regulation II’), published in 
1929, which stated that combat in wilderness areas and in rugged terrain in particu-
lar force the defender to assume active and flexible tactics. ‘Attacks against enemy 
flanks and guerrilla-type activities targeting the enemy’s rear communications characterise such op-
erations. Combat operations in wilderness areas require that leaders and troops are highly active 
and keep their nerves under control.113 In addition to the field regulations, officers repre-
senting the various arms and branches compiled manuals and regulations modelled 
on the field regulations, with the purpose of supplementing these regulations.114 
From the viewpoint of guerrilla-type activities, the most important manuals were in-
fantry regulations. Instructions that supplemented infantry tactics and touched on 
guerrilla-type activities, included a number of confidential special manuals, such as 
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110 Ibid, pp. 325–326. 
111 This book was favourably reviewed by the Directors of the National Defence College, Finnish 
Military Academy and the Reserve Officer School, among others. The General Staff placed an ad-
vance order of 500 copies of Olkkonen’s book before it was published. TaistK no. 209/Ia/ 
21.3.1928, liitteineen, T 14792/22, KA. YE no. 384/X/28./13.4.1928, T 14792/22, KA. See also 
Tynkkynen (1996), p. 31. 
112 Arimo, Reino: Suomen puolustussuunnitelmat 1918–1939, III osa, (‘Finland’s defensive plans, part 
III’) Helsinki 1987, p. 276. 
113 Kenttäohjesääntö II (K.O.) (‘Field Regulation II (KO II)’), Helsinki 1929, pp. 15–16.  
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Talvisotakäsikirja (‘Winter warfare manual’), Talvitaktiikkaa (‘Winter warfare tactics’) 
and Talvisotaopas (‘Winter warfare guidebook’).115  
 
Conceptually, in the 1920s, guerrilla-type activities developed into a combat method 
intended for areas with a dense tree and shrub cover, a sparse road network and a 
multitude of lakes and rivers. At the time, combat by guerrillas was regarded as con-
certed operations whereby a guerrilla unit, while still on the friendly side of the front 
line, would be assigned a task to destroy a hostile target. After being issued orders, it 
would move over into enemy territory in a unified unit, carrying out its task there 
before detaching from engagement and returning to friendly territory. In the 1920s, 
conceptual reflection on Finnish tactics, including military regulations, made no 
clear distinction between guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities; instead, both 
were seen as sharing a common theoretical objective of harassing enemy traffic and 
supply lines, as well as tying up enemy troops in the enemy’s rear areas.116 
 
It should be borne in mind that one guerrilla jaeger battalion was added to the pea-
cetime composition of the Finnish armed forces soon after the country’s declaration 
of independence. An order issued by the General Headquarters on 28 August 1918 
renamed Jaeger Battalion 3 as the Kajaani Guerrilla Battalion. The Kajaani Guerrilla 
Battalion can be found in the army composition in the late 1920s, but an exami-
nation of its composition reveals that it was fully identical to any other jaeger bat-
talion.117  
 
Theoretical thinking on guerrilla-type activities and their practicability took on a new 
aspect over the course of the 1930s. While initially, in the 1920s, guerrilla-type activ-
ities were understood to refer to the destruction of individual targets, carried out by 
troops holding a section of a front line on their own initiative, this view changed 
somewhat over the course of the 1930s. The concepts of guerrilla-type activities and 
guerrilla warfare took on new, more comprehensive forms that sought to achieve 
greater efficiency. Forays and guerrilla raids that had characterised the period fol-
lowing the War of Independence waned in theoretical thinking. Guerrilla-type activi-
ties which had by now become more systematic in character were seen to be combat 
conduct in the enemy’s rear rather than guerrilla raids. The aim was to disrupt the 
enemy in its own rear areas and along its flanks, forcing it to commit troops to tasks 
that were secondary from the viewpoint of the combat and inflicting maximum 
losses to it. Guerrilla-type activities were also conceptually linked to operational 
plans in which operations in the enemy’s rear areas took on increasingly systematic 
forms. The area assigned to a guerrilla unit was divided into an operational area, in 
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115 Talvisotakäsikirja (T.S.S.K.) (‘Winter warfare manual’), Helsinki 1928. Tapola, K. A.: Talvitaktiik-
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1939. 
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which the unit carried out its combat operations, and a support area, in which the 
unit rested and resupplied, preparing for the next operation.118  
 
By the end of the 1930s, in theory at least, guerrilla-type activities as a method of 
combat took on a clearly systematic and established form north of Lake Ladoga 
where they were supposed to be closely linked to the operations of the troops hold-
ing the front line. In addition, there were signs of developments indicating that it 
could have been possible to make guerrilla-type activities a more integral part of ar-
my corps operations. On these topics, two theses were written at the National Gen-
eral Staff College in 1935 and 1937.119 In spite of planning and pondering, prepara-
tions for guerrilla-type activities were not made in any real sense before the Winter 
War. Measures seeking to take advantage of guerrilla-type activities and to provide 
guidelines for them were taken only a few weeks before the war broke out.120  
 
Detailed orders on guerrilla-type activities were issued to the army corps of the field 
army, established in mid-October in 1939, and to the various Frontier Guard units. 
These directives consisted of a seven-page document that discussed guerrilla-type 
activities rather superficially but provided, nevertheless, practical examples. Al-
though the document was written in the form of an instruction, it directly ordered 
all troops to take account of the requirements of guerrilla-type activities in their 
training and operations. The commanders of army corps, separate divisions and 
similar leaders were obligated, ‘for a possible outbreak of war’; to plan and organise guer-
rilla-type activities in those areas for which they were responsible. As a solution, it 
was proposed that a specific commander for guerrilla-type activities be appointed to 
the army staffs of army formations, charged with the responsibility for presenting is-
sues related to guerrilla-type activities and for organising guerrilla units, providing 
them with arms, communicating with them and ensuring that they were well-
supplied. The directives for guerrilla-type activities were, evidently, intended to be 
used as guidelines not only by the commanders for guerrilla-type activities but also 
as general guidelines for the army troops.121  
 
According to the directions, guerrilla-type activities should ‘disrupt the enemy’s opera-
tions in its rear and along its flanks, thereby tying up as much as possible of its combat strength in 
guard, escort and similar secondary duties while wreaking maximum material havoc on the enemy.’
A prerequisite for successful guerrilla-type activities was the ability of a guerrilla unit 
to remain in hiding and to engage in organised and controlled operations as part of 
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118 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 63–64. See also Karanko, Väinö: Meikäläisen sissitoiminnan edellytykset ja teh-
tävät Laatokan ja Saaristomeren välillä (‘Prerequisites for and the tasks of Finnish-style guerrilla-type 
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al General Staff College in 1937, SKK 1/250, KA. 
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other combat operations. The major topics addressed by the directions were the fol-
lowing: the purpose of guerrilla-type activities and the tasks assigned to guerrilla 
units; the composition, strength, armament and other equipment of guerrilla units; 
the commitment of guerrilla units to operations and the nature or such operations; 
the communications, supplies and return of a guerrilla unit from an operation; guer-
rilla-type activities under exceptional conditions and anti-guerrilla operations target-
ing enemy guerrilla operations.122  
 
According to the direction, guerrilla-type activities were to be used under excep-
tional conditions in particular. After local breakthroughs by enemy tanks, the en-
circled troops were expected to be overcome by hopelessness. As such situations 
were more than likely, troops, after having been encircled, were expected to engage 
in guerrilla-type activities, taking advantage of the terrain, in the view that enemy 
tanks avoided wooded areas. Directives emphasised the importance of rapid action 
when forming guerrilla jaeger units operating under leadership, as well as the need 
to train troops for guerrilla-type activities even in the face of being encircled. ‘Troops 
must be absolutely trained not to be afraid of being encircled by tanks. The most senior officer on 
the scene shall take command, assembling the scattered troops irrespective of their original units, and 
forms a guerrilla jaeger unit from them.’123 The tasks and mode of operation of the units 
that are formed as a result of the circumstances are similar to the guerrilla jaeger 
units formed in advance. 
 
Directions on guerrilla-type activities were issued to the units of the field army on 
16 October 1939, after the extra refresher training of the reservists124 was already 
under way (in Finnish history, ‘extra refresher training’ refers to the partial mo-
bilisation of the field army in the autumn of 1939, disguised as refresher training.) 
However, the directives were delivered to the army formations in the form of doc-
uments, which were then forwarded to the lower echelons of command. The first 
directives on guerrilla-type activities, more official in nature than the documents is-
sued in October and intended for use by troops, were only issued in mid-November 
1939, as the a batch of 1,000 copies of Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’) was distribut-
ed to the troops. Military operations conducted in the enemy’s rear area were evi-
dently considered important, because as soon as by early December, a new batch of 
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Kollaa section of the front during the Winter War’), a pro gradu thesis, Joensuun yliopisto 2000, p. 
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5,000 copies of the manual was printed.125 This handbook refers to guerrilla warfare 
as a higher level concept in the art of war, although the manual is best described as a 
cursory tactical directive, issued to the troops with the purpose of encouraging them 
to employ unconventional methods in combat against the enemy. ‘In guerrilla warfare, 
situations and conditions are manifold and the action is highly varied and eventful. Therefore, quer-
rillas must possess nerves of steel, they must be quick in thought, they must be physically hardy, 
and, above all, they must be highly courageous and brave.’126 
 
A comparison of Sissitoimintaohjeet (‘Directives for guerrilla-type activities’), issued to 
troops in October 1939, with Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’), published by the 
Training Division of the Ministry of Defence in November 1939 and declared to be 
confidential, reveals that their contents were practically identical. The only dif-
ference between the content of the two documents lies in Section ‘A. Yleistä ’ (‘A. 
General’.) This section in Sissitoimintaohjeet highlighted the opportunities available to 
guerrilla-type activities and their effectiveness, particularly in the Karelian operation-
al theatre and in the areas to its north, as well as the need for appointing a com-
mander to coordinate guerrilla-type activities. The ‘General’ section in Sissiopas, 
which was published around one month later, no longer focused on particular oper-
ational areas; rather, in it the applicability of guerrilla-type activities was expanded to 
include all areas covered by woods and broken by numerous swamps –in practice, 
to all sections of the front. With regard to officers leading guerrilla-type activities, 
Sissiopas assumes a more commanding tone, stating that the headquarters forming 
part of the high command must include a specific commander for guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, one who would organise guerrilla-type activities in the operational area of 
the formation in question.127  
 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the field army formations had provi-
ded feedback on Sissitoimintaohjeet during the extra refresher training of the troops or, 
alternatively, incomplete directions were supplemented in Sissiopas in such a manner 
that this manual set no practical restrictions for the formations that were preparing 
for a war. After all, the troops were insufficiently prepared and trained and field for-
tifications were still incomplete, as were many other aspects of military preparations, 
when the Winter War broke out on 30 November 1939.  
 
 
The Soviet partisan movement and its ability to counter Finnish guerrilla-
type activities  
 
The threat assessment conducted by the Finns regarding their potential enemy had 
become clearer over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet Russia was regarded 
as the real threat during the whole of the interwar period. As the Bolsheviks, who 
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had gained power in the Soviet Union, strengthened their position, the power of the 
assumed enemy also increased. Finland’s defensive plans for the period 1920 to 
1939 proved to be fundamentally correct when the Winter War broke out, although 
the offensive power of the Soviet Union and the number of Soviet troops for one, 
particularly in the area north of Lake Ladoga, caught the Finns by surprise. Detailed 
information on the enemy’s capabilities was missing in many areas of the art of war. 
For example, the capability of the Soviet Union to carry out partisan and anti-
guerrilla operations was quite obviously unknown.128  
 
In the 1920s, the Russians were almost as familiar with partisan activities as the 
Finns were with guerrilla-type activities. New thoughts and aspects of the pos-
sibilities available to partisan warfare were put forth at the inception stage of the So-
viet state, at a time when the Bolsheviks were seeking the roots of their ideology in 
the various theories regarding revolution. Carl von Clausewitz’s writings and theo-
ries on war129 from the 19th century encouraged renowned theorists of the working 
class, including Friedrich Engels, to familiarise themselves with questions relating to 
guerrilla warfare. Along with another social philosopher, Karl Marx, Engels studied 
the practicability of guerrilla warfare as a means of revolution.130 Engels in particular 
saw the strategic importance of guerrilla warfare as being greater than that put forth 
by von Clausewitz in his theories. References to guerrilla warfare in Marx’s and En-
gels’writings were closely related to 19th century wars which exhibited features of 
guerrilla warfare. Apparently, both Marx and Engels were familiar with examples of 
guerrilla warfare, ranging from Napoleon’s Spanish campaign to the American Civil 
War and the events of the Franco-Prussian War. However, despite their revolution-
ary writings, they did not formulate an actual theory for partisan warfare, although 
this interpretation has been proposed later.131 
 
In Russia, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin132, who had emerged as the central character of the 
revolution, took interest in Marx’s Engels’and von Clausewitz’s thought. According 
to him, military factors played a key role in the revolution of the proletariat. Lenin 
studied military questions both in theory and in practice. During the first Russian 
revolution, Lenin wrote a work, published in 1906 and entitled Partizanskaja 
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Vojna133, in which he argued that partisan warfare had potential in Russian condi-
tions.134 Despite the various theories, guerrilla warfare took a backseat in Russia dur-
ing the First World War. It was not until the Russian Revolution had broken out 
that partisan and guerrilla warfare developed into a significant method; after all, the 
armed forces the parties involved in the revolution were still undergoing a formation 
process. Exceptionally large theatres of war and unstable front lines also favoured 
the use of partisans. Partisan warfare also presented problems. Poorly led irregular 
troops could turn against theirs masters, leading to situations in which the course of 
battles was no longer under control.135  
 
Despite reservations, the development of the partisan movement was continued af-
ter the Russian Civil War in the 1920s, with partisan warfare being incorporated into 
the military doctrine of the Red Army under the leadership of the leading military 
theorists, Mikhail Frunze, Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Felix Dzerzhinsky.136 This is-
sue was put into practice by establishing partisan schools in Moscow, in which the 
tactics and methods of partisan warfare were taught. Preparations for partisan war-
fare were led by the political governing bodies of the Red Army and the various mil-
itary districts. At least part of the Red Army and Frontier Guard cadres of com-
manders were trained over the course of the 1930s to conduct partisan activities, vi-
olent reconnaissance and harassment raids. A number of works on partisan warfare 
were also published in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.137  
 
Apparently, as late as in the mid-1930s, the Soviet armed forces were exceptionally 
well prepared to conduct guerrilla and partisan war in the enemy’s rear areas, but, 
following Stalin’s purges, significant changes took place in this capability. Stalin’s 
scepticism towards partisans and his regarding partisan warfare as being in conflict 
with the new Soviet military doctrine ultimately lead to the discontinuation of the 
partisan training system, the destocking of storages and the liquidation of the lead-
ers. Few developers and leaders of partisan activities survived Stalin’s purges.138 The 
rapid development of the Red Army and its material growth and mechanisation led 
to the underestimation of guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union.   
  
While the developments in the Russian art of war were well known in Finland, de-
tailed plans or opportunities for partisan activities in the future war were quite evi-
dently not regarded as a major threat when compared with a conventional invasion. 
Although the preparations and plans required by guerrilla warfare had been neglect-
ed and discontinued in part in the Soviet Union, the country possessed theoretical 
capability to conduct partisan war even at the onset of the Winter War. However, in 
the Winter War, partisan operations were restricted to sending individual desants –a 
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ǟǻǹ 14, ǞǲǺǿȌǮǽ 1906 ~ ǡǲǯǽǭǸȉ 1907, ǙǻǾǷǯǭ 1972, pp. 1–12. 
134 Grenkevich (1999), pp. 45–59. 
135 Seppälä (1971), pp. 14–16. Turjanmaa (2013), pp. 30–32. 
136 Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze (1885–1925), Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893–1937) and 
Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky (1877–1926). Grenkevich (1999), pp. 45–59. 
137 Turjanmaa (2013), p. 36. 
138 Grenkevich (1999), pp. 45–59. Savunen, A.: Sissisota Neuvostoliitossa 2. maailmansodan aikana 
(‘Guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union during the Second World War’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 
8/1955, pp. 325–328. 
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Russian word denoting spies and saboteurs dropped by parachute –behind Finnish 
lines.139 The interesting thing is that the contents of the Finnish directives for guer-
rilla-type activities, Sissiopas, were quite evidently known in the Soviet Union by the 
onset of the Winter War. The archives of Voroshilov, People's Commissar for De-
fence, include a document dated 1 January 1940, in which a certain G. Rylkin anal-
yses the Finnish partisan handbook, Sissiopas, labelling it ‘banditology, or a handbook for 
bandits.’140 This indicates that attempts by Finns to keep Sissiopas confidential had 
failed, as the enemy gained possession of the book in the early stages of the war, in 
December 1939. No information on how and where the Finnish guerrilla handbook 
came into the hands of the Soviets is available. 
 
 
2.2. Summary of the development of guerrilla-type activities from 1918 to 
1939 
 
Finland’s independence and the following decades were a period during which the 
Finnish military was looking for new models and best practices to apply to national 
needs. The country had practically no tactical traditions; instead, tactics needed to be 
created from scratch or, alternatively, by taking advantage of the basics of the exist-
ing art of war. Although modern literature may present a synthesis suggesting that 
the War of Independence played a major role in the development of a characteristi-
cally Finnish art of war, that war can be said, with justification, to have been lacking 
in tactical variation with the tactics employed being rather outdated. In spite of this, 
the First World War, experiences gained from it and the strong German orientations 
assumed by the newly founded Finnish Army contributed to the fact that three ma-
jor forms of fighting were established in Finnish tactics, in which offensive tactics 
were particularly pronounced in the 1920s and 1930s following the influences 
brought to Finland by the Jaegers. For many reasons, guerrilla-type activities be-
came, in a way, the ’fourth method of combat’in Finnish tactics during the interwar 
years. 
 
These forms of fighting were, in a way, the keystone of Finnish tactics in the 1920s. 
Although military thinking in this period favoured the offensive, the defensive and 
delaying tactics were also important, reflecting the doctrines applied in the world 
war. There was also room for thinking based on experience, as guerrilla-type activi-
ties as applied to the Finnish conditions were regarded, in a way, as equal to the 
classic form of fighting. There might have been several reasons for this but, from 
the viewpoint of the Finnish art of war, guerrilla-type activities had shown their 
mettle in the Finnish context over the centuries. Thus, while developing the Finnish 
art of war in the early years of independent Finland, the military found it, in a way, 
easy to rely on guerrilla-type activities. Not only were theories formed on guerrilla-
type activities; they was also studied. Writings by Adaridi and many other contem-
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139 See for example Haapanen, Atso: Viholliset keskellämme – desantit Suomessa 1939–1944 (‘The ene-
mies in our midst – desants in Finland 1939–1944’), Helsinki 2012. 
140 Fondi 33987 (‘The archives of Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defence’), opis 3 delo 1301 
ll, 1–4, G. The document drafted by Rylkin is dated 1 January 1940, the Russian State Military Ar-
chive, RGVA Cf. Sissiopas (1939). 
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porary writers on the possibilities and practicability of guerrilla-type activities pro-
vided the impetus for research and experimentation. Experiments targeting condi-
tions and operational areas were conducted from the early 1920s onwards as exper-
iments on winter warfare and similar topics. The Finnish terrain in particular with its 
varied characteristics and conditions created the potential for guerrilla-type activities. 
It was considered worthwhile to examine and experiment with the possibilities that 
areas with a dense tree and shrub cover, broken by swamps, offered small guerrilla 
units, enabling them to infiltrate into the enemy’s rear area. 
 
In the early decades of the Finnish independence, guerrilla-type activities developed 
in forested areas broken up by lakes and rivers and having few roads into a form of 
fighting worth consideration from the viewpoint of tactics and operational art. 
However, at that time, combat by guerrilla units was considered as something that 
should be conducted in a concerted form. Theoretical thinking on the concept of 
guerrilla-type activities took on new aspects over the course of the 1930s. The focus 
shifted from the destruction of individual targets and voluntary operations carried 
out by troops to more comprehensive forms seeking greater effectiveness. The era 
known as the period of guerrilla raids was over in tactical thinking. By the end of the 
1930s, guerrilla-type activities as a method of combat, took –at least in theory –on 
an evidently systematic and established shape, forming part of the operations of 
troops holding a particular section of the front line. In addition, there were signs of 
developments indicating that it could have been possible to make guerrilla-type ac-
tivities a more integral part of army corps operations. Guerrilla-type activities were 
principally developed by the Defence Forces and the Civil Guards, which also pro-
vided training guerrilla tactics which were fairly minimal in their extent. No unam-
biguous evidence is available of the role of the Frontier Guard in the development 
of guerrilla-type activities or in the provision of training over the course of the 
1920s and 1930s, indicating that the Frontier Guard played a very minor role during 
this period. 
 
In the 1930s in particular, guerrilla-type activities were regarded as being well suited 
for the Finnish terrain and conditions. It was because of their potential for applica-
tion to Finnish conditions that guerrilla-type activities gained weight in Finnish mili-
tary thinking. While guerrilla-type activities can be said to have several theorists in 
the 1920s and 1930s, the most influential of them by far was Karl Adaridi. Com-
pared with his contemporaries, he was something of a visionary and a trailblazer in 
the development in tactical thinking. Due to Adaridi, guerrilla-type activities gained 
added importance in serious thinking and in the development of a characteristically 
Finnish art of war. This pattern is clearly discernible in the analysis of the develop-
ment of Finnish tactics in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as in the application of guer-
rilla-type activities to operations in the wars that Finland fought between 1939 and 
1944. 
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3. GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES AND RECONNAISSANCE 
IN THE ENEMY’S REAR 
 
 
3.1. Guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War and during the Interim Peace 
in 1939–1941 
 
The tactical guidelines adopted by the Finnish Field Army before the 1939–1944 
wars had been defined in the field regulations and infantry regulations, published in 
most cases between 1927–1932. The tactical training of the troops formed for war-
time operations was normally carried out in line these regulations. In the Winter 
War, the qualities required for a leader emphasised his ability to take flexible action 
adapted to individual situations – in other words, mission-type tactics. This was a 
factor that, in part, helped Finnish tactics to develop in a direction where it could 
depart from rigidity and excessive theory and become an art based on common 
sense. Regulations were therefore used in the 1939–1944 wars principally as a mne-
monic device that standardised concepts and definitions and promoted collabora-
tion between the various army branches.  
 
In the absence of peacetime special training and confirmed wartime organisations, 
guerrilla-type activities were not implemented in practice, and troops were not sys-
tematically trained by the end of the 1930s. However, guerrilla-type activities had 
become widely accepted as an efficient method of combat that was ideally suited to 
Finnish conditions. The principles and the concept of guerrilla-type activities had es-
tablished in the Finnish art of war before the Winter War, although the training had 
remained mainly on the formal level. Initiatives to organise special training had been 
taken, as during the extra refresher training of the reservists, at least one ‘guerrilla 
leader course’was arranged in Rautakorpi, in Vyborg province. A course disguised 
as a winter sports course was aimed at giving guerrilla jaeger unit leaders a crash course 
on guerrilla-type activities and tactics. The fact that this course was arranged reflects 
the directive on guerrilla-type activities issued during the extra refresher training of 
the reservists which stated that leaders in particular must be trained in guerrilla-type 
activities.141 
 
 
Miscellaneous guerrilla troops and directives for guerrilla-type activities at 
the onset of the Winter War 
 
The composition of the army prescribed by the 1933 Decree on the Armed Forces 
remained practically unchanged until 1939, with the exceptions of certain alterations 
to the chain of command. The armed forces were transformed into a wartime or-
ganisation during the extra refresher training of the reservists in October 1939, 
when the functions of the territorial organisation were also wound down in practice. 
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141 Järvinen, Y. A.: Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa (‘Finnish and Russian tactics in the 
Winter War’), Porvoo 1948, p. 19 and 242. Sissitoimintaohjeet (‘Directives for guerrilla-type active-
ties’), issued by P-KRE (without any document number) on 16 October 1939, P 1727/8, KA. 
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At the onset of the Winter War, the covering force (that is, troops intended to win 
time and to provide protection for the deployment of the field army along the de-
fensive line), formed from troops of the standing army – conscripts performing 
their military service –and the field army units formed from reservists were in most 
cases assigned numbers; for example. 1st Brigade. In connection with this, unit des-
ignations with a reference to Finnish province names were abandoned. Only a few 
units remained without a numeric designations; such units were given names with a 
reference to a province or their arm.142  
 
At the onset of the Winter War, the Finnish field army possessed no real compe-
tence in guerrilla-type activities, although instructions had been issued and formal 
training –on some level at least –had been provided in the years preceding the war. 
No proper guerrilla organisation existed, although plans for founding one had been 
drafted. While the mobilisation plans of the general staff listed five wartime guerrilla 
jaeger battalions, it was only after the Winter Ware was under way that they were 
formed.143  
 
The first battles of the war in December 1939 showed the Finns that the Russian 
operations in all sections of the front were heavily dependent on the road network 
and, in particular, the trunk roads. The thoughts on the practicability of guerrilla-
type activities put forth by Väinö Karanko in his thesis in 1959 were now seen in a 
new light: ‘In view of the disruptions and disturbances in traffic which, particularly in winter, will 
be common in East Karelia, it is easy to see the extent of disruption that active guerrilla-type activi-
ties may cause in the enemy’s supply lines.’144 Following the first experiences gained from 
battles, the General Headquarters took measures to put theories on guerrilla-type 
activities into practice. As early as on 3 December, the Tactical Office of the Gen-
eral Headquarters issued an order to establish ’squad of expert skiers’in each infan-
try battalion, capable of undertaking nocturnal guerrilla and harassment raids.145  
 
Lieutenant Colonel Valo Nihtilä Chief of the Ground Forces Office of the Opera-
tions Division at the General Headquarters, sent, a circular on 8 December in his 
own name with a limited number of recipients on the intensification of guerrilla-
type activities. Nihtilä’s confidential message encouraged troops in combat to en-
gage in guerrilla-type activities: ‘Is it now time to put guerrilla-type activities on the right track 
by extending them to enemy supply lines deep in the enemy-held territory, causing hunger and feel-
ings of insecurity among the Russians (Nihtilä used the pejorative word ‘ryssä ’for Russians). In 
addition to this, Russian flanks should be constantly harassed with bold patrol activity. Such raids 
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142 Puolustusvoimat – Joukko-osastoperinteet (‘The Defence Forces – the traditions of the various milita-
ry units’), edited by Marko Palokangas, Jyväskylä 2008, pp. 21–25. 
143 Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johtopäätökset sissitoiminnasta viime sotien kokemuksen mukaan (‘Conclusions from 
guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no. North Karelia 
Frontier Guard, refresher training/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis. 
144 Karanko (1935), p. 9, SKK 1/223, KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 233. Cf. also the conclu-
sions drawn by Karanko with those of Simelius, Sakari: Venäläinen taktiikka sovellettuna suoma-
laiseen maastoon ja olosuhteisiin – arvosteleva tarkastelu sovellusesimerkein valaistuna, ‘Russian tactics as 
applied to the Finnish terrain and conditions – a critical analysis illuminated by examples of the ap-
plication of such tactics’), a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1939, SKK 
1/298, KA. 
145 Order by the General Headquarters no. 253/Koul.2/39.sal/3.12.1939, P 1727/7, KA. 
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would be our artillery barrage. After carrying on such operations for a time, it would be time to go 
to attack as the Russian should be ripe after such softening. Operations should naturally be concen-
trating on the most important directions. These are my personal opinions; I have not obtained my 
superior’s approval for them.’146 On one hand, this circular was an indication of Valo 
Nihtilä’s familiarity with Soviet tactics and with the chances of the Finnish troops to 
engage in delaying action, particularly in the sections of the front lying north of Lake 
Ladoga. On the other hand, such an unofficial exhortation in the midst of the Win-
ter War, with its already chaotic situation, shows that Nihtilä had the courage to by-
pass his superiors for the good of greater objectives.147 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned directions, General Headquarters issued separa-
te directions for the implementation of guerrilla-type activities and patrolling on the 
Karelian Isthmus and on the sections of the front lying north of Lake Ladoga. As 
there was no time to establish troops intended for guerrilla-type activities during the 
extra refresher training of the reservists, units responsible for holding specific sec-
tions of the front line formed troops, intended for guerrilla-type activities and for 
the harassment of the enemy, as best they could, depending on the activity of their 
commanders. ‘Divisions have been issued orders to form units in each battalion from the troops 
under their command, comprising 40–50 expert skiers, intended for future guerrilla operations.’148 
In some operational formations, guerrilla jaeger units were mostly formed of volun-
teer men who were skilled in skiing.149 Due to the lack of training in guerrilla-type 
activities and the shortage of special materiel, the effects of guerrilla-type activities 
in the early phases of the war were highly varied. Consequently, General Headquar-
ters began to establish gerrilla units listed in the mobilisation plans, issuing orders 
for the establishment of five guerrilla jaeger battalions (Guerrilla Battalions 1 and 2) 
on 10 December 1939 and (Guerrilla Battalions 3, 4 and 5) on 23 December 
1939.150  
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146 According to the distribution list, Nihtilä’s circular was sent to the Chiefs of Staff of North Fin-
land Group, Group Talvela, and the IV Army Corps but, based on the receipt markings, it was also 
sent to the Frontier Guard Headquarters. An exhortation to take up guerrilla-type activities, a per-
sonal circular by Lieutenant Colonel Valo Nihtilä, PM:n no. 675/Op.1 S/8.12.1939, SArk 
1588/2(6), KA. 
147 It should be mentioned that Valo Nihtilä had written a comparative study in 1929 on the opera-
tional opportunities available to Russians on the Karelian Isthmus and in the areas north of Lake 
Ladoga and on the chances open to the Finns to engage in delaying action. Valo Nihtilä’s private 
collection Pk 1969/1, KA. 
148 A Creed discussion between Colonel Nihtilä and Major Teno on 16 December 1939 ca. 13:00, 
the General Headquarters war diary, 30 November–31 January 1940, pp. 86–88, Department of 
Military History, National Defence University. 
149 For example, for the area falling under the responsibility of Talvela Group, a guerrilla jaeger 
company designated as Sissikomppania Pössi, or 1.Er.SissiK, was formed from Er.P 10 (‘Separate 
Battalion 10’), tasked with carrying operations guerrilla operations in the enemy’s rear. For infor-
mation on the operations of Guerrilla Company Pössi, see RTE:n no. 18/III/2/40/L.47/ 5.1.1940, 
P 1719/2, KA. 
150 PM:n no. 273/39.Järj.1.sal./10.12.1939. PM:n no. 474/39.Järj.1.sal/23.12.1939, the war diary of 
General Headquarters, 30 November 1939–31 January 1940, p. 48 and 126, Department of Military 
History at the National Defence University. See also Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 233–234. 
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Guerrilla Battalion 1 (Sissipataljoona 1) was formed in Riihimäki soon after General 
Headquarters had issued its first order, after which it was subordinated to North 
Finland Group. Similarly, Guerrilla Battalion 2 (Sissipataljoona 2) was quickly 
formed in Mikkeli, after which it was subordinated to Group Talvela, to be sent for 
deployment in the Tolvajärvi area north of Lake Ladoga.151  
 
Guerrilla Battalions 3 and 4 (Sissipataljoona 3 and 4) of Detachment Wahren were 
formed in Lappeenranta from the reservists of the cavalry, but due to numerous 
shortcomings in their equipment, their subordination to the divisions and army 
corps was delayed from the original order. It was not until mid-January that the 3rd 
and 4th Battalions were fully formed, after which Guerrilla Battalion 3 was subordi-
nated to Group Talvela and Guerrilla Battalion to IV Army Corps. The founding of 
Guerrilla Battalion 5 in Kemi did not go according to the plans either. It was only 
not until on 5 February 1940 that Guerrilla Battalion 5, formed from the Karelian 
volunteers of Hämälainen Detachment, was subordinated to the 9. Division, on ac-
count of a training period that took longer than planned.152 The organisation of the 
Winter War field army includes at least one separate guerrilla jaeger company. The 
guerrilla jaeger battalions were approximately 520 men in strength, while a separate 
guerrilla jaeger company comprised around 200 men.153 
 
Despite their name, the training of the guerrilla jaeger battalions was similar to that 
of infantry battalions. However, with regard to their compositions and planned spe-
cial equipment, guerrilla jaeger battalions deviated markedly from ordinary infantry 
battalions. A guerrilla jaeger battalion, for one thing, had a larger staff than an infan-
try battalion, but it mostly resembled the composition of an infantry battalion staff. 
The staff was made up by a command, and supply offices, as well as of the signal 
and supportive platoon. The striking power of a guerrilla jaeger battalion comprised 
three rifle companies or squadrons, the composition and equipment of which was 
tailored for guerrilla-type activities where possible. In addition to the three-way 
composition, each rifle company also included a pulk squad. To meet the require-
ments of guerrilla-type activities, each rifle company or squadron also included a 
light machine gun, a signal and a supportive platoon. Otherwise, the weaponry was 
similar to that used by an infantry battalion. The planned composition and the spe-
cial equipment of guerrilla jaeger battalions, such as pulks and communication 
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151 PM:n no. 237/39.Järj.1.sal/10.12.1939, SArk 1587/18(39), KA. PM:n no. 976/Op.1.sal/ 
23.12.1939, SArk 1587/18(39), KA. RTE:n no. 60/III/2/39/L.63./18.12.1939, SArk 1587/18(39), 
KA. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 234. 
152 PM:n no. 474/39.Järj.1.sal/23.12.1939, SArk 1587/18(39), KA. PM:n no. 976/Op.1.sal/ 
23.12.1939, SArk 1587/18(39), KA. PM:n no. 55/Op.1/6.1.1940, T 2865/4, KA. PM:n no. 
136/Op.1/13.1.1940, T 2865/4, KA. PM:n no. 146/Op.1/SE2/13.1.1940, T 2865/4, KA. PM:n 
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153 Guerrilla Company Pössi, the official abbreviation of which was 1.Er.SissiK. See, for example, 
Timonen (2000), Liite 1. 
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equipment, emphasised their capability to engage in independent operations over 
large areas in the enemy’s rear.154  
 
Based on existing sources, many interpretations can be presented on the deploy-
ment of guerrilla jaeger battalions specifically in guerrilla-type activities in the Winter 
War, harassing the enemy’s rear. For example, the guerrilla jaeger battalions opera-
ting north of Lake Ladoga during the Winter War were assigned tasks that were in 
line with guerrilla-type activities. Individual platoons detached from battalions, and 
even larger units, were dispatched to the enemy’s rear area to harass and destroy. 
The most important tasks assigned to guerrilla jaeger battalions were related to the 
protection of the Finnish troops’open flanks north of Lake Ladoga in Northern 
Finland. The IV Army Corps and Group Talvela were the most active in engaging 
guerrilla-type activities in their areas, in which the borderline between the guerrilla 
jaeger units and their points of contact were agreed in collaboration between the 
various formations.155  
 
The General Headquarters war diary refers to guerrilla and patrol activities dozens 
of times. Both Finnish and Russian troops were engaged in guerrilla-type activities 
in all sections of the front. Perhaps the most frequent entries related to guerrilla-
type activities in the situational reports sent to General Headquarters by the troops 
were the following: ‘high level of patrol and guerrilla activity ’or ‘intense cold hampers patrol 
and guerrilla activity ’.156 The General Headquarters war diary made 35 references to 
guerrilla-type operations carried out by front line troops between 31 November 
1939 and 13 March 1940. Similarly, the war diaries made 50 references to patrol ac-
tivity.157 This is an indication of the fact that guerrilla and patrol activity was quite 
frequent, conducted almost on a daily basis. However, the actual guerrilla-type activ-
ities was characterised by disconnected operations by carried out by individual units 
or patrols in order to harass the enemy.158  
 
It is evident that General Headquarters quickly realised that the guerrilla jaeger bat-
talions at the front were not used in ways that their names suggested. These guerrilla 
jaeger units had not received any kind of basic or advanced training in guerrilla-type 
activities. Apparently, although the plan had been to train guerrilla jaeger battalions 
specifically for guerrilla-type activities before the war, they were mostly used during 
the Winter War, after they had been rapidly formed, just like any other infantry 
troops, to repel enemy attacks and to carry out limited counter-attack operations. 
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guerrilla jaeger company, P 2126/3, KA. The composition of Guerrilla Battalion 4 (SissiP 4), P 
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Pennanen – General in Petsamo, Lapland and along the border’), Keuruu 2003, pp. 118–125. 
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Thus, the only training that these battalions had for war was the training that the 
soldiers had received during their military service and refresher training.159 On these 
grounds, it can be said that the troops received their training for guerrilla-type acti-
vities and their knowledge of guerrilla tactics by engaging in combat during the Win-
ter War.  
 
 
General instructions concerning guerrilla-type activities issued by the Gen-
eral Headquarters during the Winter War 
 
Over the course of the Winter War, the Tactical Office of the Training Division of 
the General Headquarters gathered information and published booklets entitled 
Taktillinen opas (‘Tactical Guidebook’), aimed to provide the troops with instructions 
based on tactical experiences gained during the war. While these guidebooks were 
confidential, the General Headquarters instructed them to be delivered to the troops 
as soon as possible, ‘to be taken into consideration in combat and training ’. During the war, 
a total of 11 tactical guidebooks were published, three of which addressed guerrilla-
type activities.160 Starting with the second Taktinen opas, a note was added to the end 
of each booklet, encouraging the troops to gather and submit their war experiences 
for the benefit of the entire army. ‘Promptly send any information on the experiences you 
have gained from battles, on combat methods you have found to be effective, on enemy tactics and 
weapons, as well as on any innovations in combat materials you have made, to the Tactical Office of 
the Training Division at the General Headquarters, to enable such information to be forwarded to 
all our troops.’161 
 
Taktillinen opas II, published on 16 December 1939, emphasised the importance of 
guerrilla-type and patrol activities in areas where the enemy supply lines were long. 
Enemy supply lines should be disturbed by sending units formed of expert skiers, 
acting under detailed orders issued by experienced front-line commanders, to harass 
them. Advantage should also be taken of nocturnal conditions, especially when the 
enemy were forced to find accommodation in the open due to the lack of suitable 
equipment. According to the instruction, patrols formed for guerrilla-type activities 
should be equipped with submachine guns, hand grenades and necessary demolition 
material. According the guidebook, guerrilla jaeger units assigned to demolition 
tasks should receive material termed ‘sissikipinä ’in Finnish wartime jargon –literally, 
‘guerrilla sparks’. They referred to lumps of thermite explosives, 300g in weight, 
which, when burning, created sufficient heat in order to burn through the armour of 
enemy tanks. The guidebook also encourages troops to instill the fear of guerrillas in 
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PvPE:n koulutusosaston sal. kirjeistöä 1941 (‘Confiedential correspondence of the Training Division of 
the General Headquarters from 1941’), T 17651/6, KA. See also Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johtopäätökset sissi-
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the enemy: ‘In addition to direct casualties, patrols will cause feelings of insecurity among the en-
emy, leading to unnecessary action.’162  
 
Taktillinen opas V, published only two weeks later, states that guerrilla-type activities 
by Finnish troops had led to excellent results: ‘As the accumulating snow cover constantly 
adds to the enemy’s difficulties with mobility, opportunities for our guerrilla-type activities improve.’
The guidebook instructed troops to pay particular attention to ensuring a safe return 
of guerrilla jaeger units sent to the enemy’s rear. The troops holding a particular sec-
tion of the front line had to agree carefully with the commander of a guerrilla jaeger 
unit on the signals that the commander would use to signal his intention to cross 
over to the enemy-held territory. The signals to be used upon a patrol’s return were 
also be agreed upon and communicated to the front-line posts, so as to prevent 
them from firing at returning patrols. Quite evidently, small guerrilla jaeger units had 
been subjected to friendly fire at the front on occasion. The same guidebook also 
provided instructions for preparing and putting together a daily ration for a guerrilla 
soldier.163 
 
Taktillinen opas VI, published on the last day of December 1939, also contained 
guidelines for guerrilla-type activities. According to this guidebook, guerrilla-type ac-
tivities had proved effective as the war unfolded, particularly in the operational areas 
north of Lake Ladoga. In the more northerly areas, guerrilla jaeger units were ad-
vised to reserve reindeer for the transport of demolition and other material. This 
guidebook also emphasises the importance of making careful preparations, especial-
ly regarding longer patrols and demolition raids. ‘Guerrilla-type activities have proved high-
ly effective everywhere. Well-prepared longer patrols will make such activities even more effective. 
However, organising longer patrols (50 to 60km), feasible mostly north of Lake Ladoga, should 
not prevent carrying out guerrilla raids and patrols in areas closer to the front line.’164 
 
Taktillinen opas IX, published in mid-January 1940, put forth information obtained 
from anti-guerrilla activities conducted by the enemy. ‘On account of the activities carried 
out by our guerrilla troops, the Chief Directorate of Border Troops of the People's Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs has issued instructions on anti-guerrilla (‘anti-diversant  ’) activities (in Russian, 
‘diversant ’refers to an enemy agent or saboteur).’According to the intelligence received by 
the General Headquarters, the Russian anti-guerrilla instructions described the tac-
tics used by Finnish guerrillas and the composition of Finnish guerrilla jaeger units. 
Russian Border Troops regiments were ordered to form ’destruction groups’, 
around one company in strength, and set them against Finnish guerrilla jaeger units. 
Taktillinen opas IX described the Russian anti-guerrilla instructions as verbose, vague 
and theoretical. Russian instructions made repeated references to the swift move-
ment of Finnish guerrillas, their ambush tactics and the annoyance they caused. 
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162 Ibid, kohta B. Sissi- ja partiotoiminta (‘section B. Guerrilla and patrol activities’), pp. 3–4. 
163 Taktillinen opas V, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook V’, General Headquarters Training Divi-
sion). 2/39, 25.12.1939, kohdat G. Sissitoiminta ja H. Sissimuona, (‘items G. Guerrilla-type activities 
and H. Guerrilla provisions’), pp. 12–14. 
164 Taktillinen opas VI, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook VI’, General Headquarters Training Divi-
sion). 2/39, 31.12.1939, kohta E. Sissitoiminta (‘item E. Guerrilla-type activities’), pp. 10–12. 
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‘Everything gives the impression that our enemy finds the activities of our guerrillas to be extremely 
annoying, requiring systematic covering and clearing of large areas.’165  
 
After the onset of the Winter War, the results of the guerrilla-type activities by Finns 
proved promising, even according to the information obtained from Russian pris-
oners of war. The experiences gained from the Winter War proved beyond doubt 
that guerrilla-type activities, although quite limited in scope, carried out under winter 
conditions and in a difficult terrain, had proved their tactical efficiency in some op-
erational formations. Although the Red Army invasion in the winter of 1939–1940 
was highly dependent on the road network, thereby enabling guerrilla and patrol op-
erations in a substantially larger scale, systematic guerrilla-type activities, as carried 
out by the Finnish front-line formations, remained relatively modest in scope. In 
spite of the directives and encouragement issued by the General Headquarters, guer-
rilla-type activities remained improvised to a high degree, depending on the activity 
of local front-line commanders. While there were probably several reasons behind 
this, the small number of Finnish troops and their lack of training in guerrilla-type 
activities must be mentioned in this context. 
 
The lack of systematic training in guerrilla-type activities was also evident in the 
guidebooks drafted by the Tactical Office of the Training Division of the General 
Headquarters. According to these guidebooks, more active measures must be taken 
to train troops in guerrilla-type activities. The course of the war, the shortage of 
equipment and the continuous casualties provided no opportunity for training the 
troops further while battles were being fought, let alone training them in guerrilla-
type activities. Repelling enemy attacks under harsh conditions while only an insuffi-
cient number of troops was available, particularly on the Karelian Isthmus, did not 
exactly contribute positively to implementing the instructions put forth in the 
guidebooks. However, it is noteworthy that guerrilla-type activities by Finnish 
troops gave rise to concern among the Russian troops, leading to counter measures. 
 
While the organisation of the Finnish Field Army included several guerrilla jaeger 
battalions, they often had to be assigned to a reserve duty or used as replacement 
troops to fill in gaps created by a war of attrition on the Finnish defences. From the 
perspective of the art of war, in the Winter War, which broke out after a relatively 
short period of time, the implementation of guerrilla-type activities was, on the 
whole, rather fragmented, despite the best efforts of the troops. During the Winter 
War, the difficult conditions such as material shortages, the fact that the Finnish 
army was reduced to fighting a defensive war, the necessity of the troops to contain 
enemy breakthroughs, the relatively short duration of the war, and the superiority in 
material and numbers of the Red Army, all contributed to the fact that the imple-
mentation of guerrilla-type activities that in themselves were theoretically sound but 
rather lame in their planning were rendered impossible in practice.  
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165 Taktillinen opas IX, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook XI’, General Headquarters Training Divi-
sion.’) 2/40, 16.1.1940, kohta B. Vihollisen ohjeet sissitoimintamme ehkäisemiseksi (‘item B. Directions is-
sued by the enemy for defeating our units engaged in guerrilla-type activities’) pp. 8–9. 
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Training in guerrilla-type activities and experiences gained during the Winter 
War 
 
The commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions during the Winter War played the key 
role both in organising training in guerrilla-type activities and in gathering ex-
periences gained from combat. From the examination of the memoranda compiled 
by the commanding officers of the Guerrilla Battalions 1 and 3 during the Winter 
War, it can be concluded that they had been tasked by the General Headquarters, 
upper command echelons, and the staffs of formations with gathering war experi-
ences, and, based on such experiences, compiling instructions for guerrilla-type ac-
tivities. General instructions on gathering experiences obtainable from combat and 
on taking advantage of them were issued by the Operations Section of the General 
Headquarters to the Army Command Finland as late as July 1940.166  
 
The content of the memoranda found in archives of the various battalions and the 
General Headquarters differed from each other considerably. Reflecting the order 
and any additional instructions issued to the commander in question, war experienc-
es were discussed either in great detail or by providing cursory statements. For ex-
ample, while the Winter War was still in progress, the commander of Guerrilla Bat-
talion 3, Captain Y. E. Saarelainen, drafted a report, evidently for use by the General 
Headquarters, on observations and experiences obtained form guerrilla-type activi-
ties. Captain Saarelainen’s report discusses guerrilla-type activities almost exclusively 
from the perspective of combat techniques. In any event, the General Headquarters 
expected to receive information on guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War in 
order to be able to draft new instructions.167  
 
In addition to instructions gathered and compiled by the Tactical Office of the 
Training Division at the General Headquarters, training in guerrilla-type activities 
was also provided by arranging a separate course for instructors in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities. While the original sources include several references to this course, its pre-
cise content and programme remain unclear due to cuts having been made to ar-
chive contents. In any event, a course aimed at instructors in guerrilla-type activities 
was arranged during the Winter War, in January 1940. The General Headquarters 
war diaries contain an order for arranging this course. ‘This is to notify the Headquarters 
of the Civil Guards that the Training Division of the General Headquarters will arrange a special 
12-day course on guerrilla-type activities in Eastern Karelia. The Home Troops HQ is ordered to 
appoint 29 individuals to participate in the course. This course will begin on 8 January 1940.’168 
As far as is known, other courses specialised in guerrilla-type activities were not or-
ganised due to the brief duration of the Winter War. 
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166 General HQ no. 1544/Op.1/IX/sal./19.7.1940, the Ground Forces Office of the General 
Headquarters, correspondence in 1940, T 2868/1, KA. 
167 Y. E. Saarelainen: Sissitoimintaan liittyviä havaintoja ja kokemuksia (‘Observations and experiences 
related to guerrilla-type activities’), RTE no. 168/III/2/40/L. 785, 7.2.1940, the Ground Forces 
Office of the General Headquarters, correspondence in 1940, T 2868/1, KA. 
A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, PvPE:n 
koulutusosaston sal. kirjeistöä 1941 (‘Confiedential correspondence of the Training Division of the 
General Headquarters from 1941’), T 17651/6, KA. 
168 PM:n no. 27/Koul.1/40.sal./3.1.1940. The General Headquarters war diary 30 November 1939–
31 January 1940, p. 170, Department of Military History, National Defence University. 
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According to documentation, Reserve Lieutenant Väinö Volanen169 who com-
manded Light Detachment 9 (Kevyt Osasto 9) during the Winter War, holding ot-
her posts as well, was one of the students who participated in the course aimed at 
instructors in guerrilla-type activities, organised by the General Headquarters be-
tween 8 and 23 January 1940. Väinö Volanen’s own notes also indicate that the 
courses on guerrilla-type activities were arranged at the initiative of the General 
Headquarters: ‘Immediately after the Winter War had broken out, the Intelligence Division of 
the General Headquarters began training guerrilla jaeger units for the purpose of reconnaissance pa-
trols and demolition raids to be carried out in the enemy’s rear in the spring, when crusty snow easi-
ly supported skiers.’170 After the instructor course,Väinö Volanen was ordered to re-
port to the General Headquarters, in order to establish a ’Guerrilla Manual Com-
mittee’, tasked with drafting a training programme for guerrilla-type activities and 
preparing a specific manual covering guerrilla-type activities.171  
 
It is quite obvious that the ’Guerrilla Manual Committee members’did not comple-
te their work –due to the outcome of the war –as it was as late as in January 1941 
that Väinö Volanen’s name reappears in the documentation, in connection with the 
objectives set for committee.172 After the Winter War, evidently during the Interim 
Peace, the commander of Guerrilla Battalion 1, Major Sulo Häkkinen, was ordered 
by Major Erkki Tara and Major Tauno Viljanen to gather all experiences gained 
from guerrilla-type activities and compile a summary for submittal to the Training 
Division of the General Headquarters.173 This is also attested by Väinö Volanen’s 
personal notes from 1942: ‘After the Winter War had ended, any experiences gained from 
guerrilla-type activities during the war were gathered and taken into account in the planning for fu-
ture operations, including the training of guerrilla troops for a future war.’174 
 
The summary compiled by Sulo Häkkinen provides an excellent overview of the ex-
periences gained from guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War, and of the ob-
servations made of the training in guerrilla warfare, the volume of which had re-
mained rather modest. In his summary, Häkkinen summed up observations made of 
guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War, on the basis of which he suggested, 
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169 Väinö Ilmari Volanen (1908–1963) acted as the intelligence officer of Siilasvuo Group and as the 
commander of Light Detachment 9 (‘Kevyt Osasto 9’), part of the organisation of the 9th Divi-
sion, during the Winter War, among other posts. Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal 
details no. 21770, KA.  
170 Ibid. See also Sissitoiminnalle asetettavat vaatimukset (‘Requirements to be set for guerrilla-type activ-
ities’), an undated memorandum and a handout used on the 1942 guerrilla course. Väinö Volanen’s 
private collection Pk 1401/2, KA. 
171 Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA. 
172 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, con-
fidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 
17651/6, KA. 
173 The importance attached to guerrilla-type activities and the experiences gained from them is 
clearly demonstrated by the fact that it was specifically from the commander of the Regulation Of-
fice of the General Headquarters (Major E. Tara) and from the commander of the Ground Forces 
Office (Major T. V. Viljanen) that Major S. Häkkinen received his further orders. See Tynkkynen 
(1996), p. 235. 
174 Sissitoiminnalle asetettavat vaatimukset (‘Requirements to be set for guerrilla-type activities’), an un-
dated memorandum and a handout used on the 1942 guerrilla course, Väinö Volanen’s private col-
lection Pk 1401/2, KA. 
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among other things, that changes be made to the composition of guerrilla troops; he 
proposed a syllabus for courses on guerrilla tactics; he drafted an organisation for 
the guerrilla handbook that was being prepared; and he also listed special equipment 
suitable for guerrilla-type activities. Häkkinen also rather openly criticised the use of 
guerrilla jaeger battalions for the wrong purposes during the Winter War. ‘The tactical 
use of guerrilla formations which had already been formed left much to be desired. Such small and 
light guerrilla jaeger units without heavy weapons were assigned to similar tasks as infantry units 
with heavy weapons in frontline combat, in which they often wore down or at least became unfit for 
their intended role in a short period of time. Considering the fact that the number of our troops were 
always insufficient when compared with the enemy, and always fatigued, commanders were forced to 
use guerrilla formations in tasks for which they were basically not intended.’175  
 
A summary addressing enemy tactics and Finnish counter measures in the war 
1939–1940, compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Valter Nordgren, represents experien-
ces of the war gathered immediately after the Winter War. The notes in this docu-
ment suggest that it was as late as in spring 1941 that Nordgren that drafted his 
summary. While Nordgren’s summary makes only one reference to guerrilla-type ac-
tivities during the Winter War, it emphasises the importance of combat recon-
naissance by small units. ‘Furthermore, they can be used to cut off road and other com-
munications between enemy units at suitable locations, thereby isolating such units from each other 
and paving way for an attack. Such preparations include continuous guerrilla-type activities against 
the enemy’s rear communications.’176 Other documents on war experiences related to 
guerrilla-type activities can also be found, but they tend to discuss experiences from 
the viewpoint of equipment or combat techniques.177  
 
A book entitled Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa (‘Finnish and Russian 
tactics in the Winter War’), published in 1948 by Colonel Yrjö Aleksis Järvinen, rep-
resents post-WWII scholarly research on the experiences gained from the Winter 
War. Y. A. Järvinen’s book presents a summary of the Finnish and Russian tactics 
before the Winter War. He describes, in realistic and substantiated terms, the 
strengths and weaknesses that characterised the belligerent parties. Colonel Järvinen 
pays particular attention to the disproportionate relative strengths of the parties: 
‘Whichever way you look at the relative strengths of the belligerents, you have to conclude that the 
Winter War was a dual between David and Goliath, one in which Russian masses and technology 
clashed with Finnish grit and perseverance.’Järvinen also raised the issue of guerrilla-type 
activities, which, according to his analysis, had been concentrated in the areas north 
of Lake Ladoga. According to Järvinen, guerrilla-type activities were feasible in large 
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175 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, con-
fidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 
17651/6, KA. 
176 Vihollisen taktiikasta ja omista vastatoimenpiteistä (‘On enemy tactics and Finnish counter measu-
res’), compiled in spring 1941 by Lieutenant Colonel Nordgren, a letter received by the Training 
Division of the General Headquarters, 1941, T 18003/3, KA. 
177 Erämaataistelu ja sissisota (‘Battle in a wilderness and guerrilla war’), an undated memeorandum 
from 1940 discussing war experiences gained from the Winter War, found in the research data base 
of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, a folder entitled ‘Talviso-
ta 1939–1940 – strategia, operaatiot, taktiikka’ (‘The Winter War 1939–1940 – strategy, operations and 
tactics’). 
 
52 
wilderness areas in which it was possible to deliver decisive strikes against the 
enemy’s rear and flanks without any risk to the flanks and rear of the Finnish forces. 
Järvinen argued that active guerrilla-type activities helped to deter enemy activity. 
‘While the divisional staff normally attempted to maintain extremely close control over patrol and 
guerrilla activities, in the boundless northern wilderness guerrilla jaeger units could operate with con-
siderable independence.’178 
 
In the closing chapter of his book, Järvinen states that the experiences gained from 
the Winter War suggest that guerrilla-type activities were extensively used in the are-
as between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic Ocean in particular, and that they became 
more frequent towards the end of the war. ‘While it is often difficult to draw a line between 
guerrilla-type activities and ordinary combat operations, it can be said that both belligerents engaged 
in clear-cut guerrilla operations and that such activities became more common towards the end of the 
war. On the part of the Finns, guerrilla operations were especially frequent, aiming principally to 
hamper enemy supply lines and forcing the enemy command to tie up forces to protect their long 
communication lines in order to lessen the pressure on the front. The most important result of guer-
rilla-type activities has been the paralysing of enemy activity.’179 Everything suggests that Jä-
rvinen was very much in line with the other officers who had made observations of 
guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War. 
 
Of other narratives on war experiences with a focus on guerrilla-type activities as 
carried out during the Winter War, a treatise written by Raimo Heiskanen in 1960, 
entitled Talvisodan taistelut Pielisjärvellä (‘Battles in Pielisjärvi during the Winter War’) 
deserves a mention. This memorandum, based on experiences gained from the war, 
is a highly detailed study of the operations carried out at a single section of the 
front, in which guerrilla-type activities played a significant role in affecting enemy 
operations. Heiskanen provides a thorough presentation of the background of guer-
rilla-type activities in the Winter War, analysing it from the viewpoint of the art of 
war and also taking account of the mental aspects. According to Heiskanen, by that 
time a sufficiently long period had passed since the end of the war, enabling the 
compilation of a satisfactorily conclusive picture of the narratives of war, instruct-
tions and war diaries representing various levels.180 
 
Raimo Heiskanen approaches the prerequisites for guerrilla-type activities in the 
Winter War from three key elements: Finnish geography favouring the defender; of-
ficers and NCOs well-versed in fieldcraft; and leaders capable of taking decisions 
which were both innovative and adapted to the requirements of the situation. 
Heiskanen also offers harsh criticism in his treatise, particularly with regard to inad-
equate training and instructions. ‘The training of the personnel did not cover actual guerrilla-
type activities. No training regarding leadership and combat practices in guerrilla-type activities was 
provided before the Winter War, either in the form of map exercises or other practical exercises. 
Quite evidently, the facts on which such activity is dependent were not recognised; neither were some 
of the means available to guerrilla-type activities. Neither did the military regulations and guide-
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178 Järvinen, Y. A.: Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa (‘Finnish and Russian tactics in the 
Winter War’), Porvoo 1948, p. 70, 188 and pp. 242–243. 
179 Ibid, pp. 248–252. 
180 Talvisodan taistelut Pielisjärvellä (‘Battles in Pielisjärvi during the Winter War’) by Major Raimo 
Heiskanen, pp. 103–126, StietNK 1/16, KA. 
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books in effect at the time require this. Regulations did not refer to guerrilla-type activities. Guerril-
la-type activities were not mentioned in guidebooks for winter conditions, other handbooks or maga-
zines. At the outset of the war, the General Headquarters did not issue any general instructtions or 
guidelines regarding guerrilla-type activities. The tactical instructions issued by the General Head-
quarters after the war had broken out were based on experiences gained from battles. The quality of 
the instructions regarding guerrilla-type activities is an indication of the scant attention paid to the 
issue before the war.’181 The criticism offered by Heiskanen regarding the defects in the 
guidebooks is understandable but somewhat contradictory. After all, the General 
Headquarters had published Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’) only two weeks before 
the Winter War broke out, although its content was rather modest and, due to the 
lack of time, had little effect on training. 
 
One other analytical text on guerrilla-type activities, a compilation of war exfiences, 
is available. In 1962, Captain Eljas-Veli Sovijärvi compiled an interesting albeit high-
ly concise narrative entitled Johtopäätökset sissitoiminnasta viime sotiemme kokemusten 
mukaan (‘Conclusions to be drawn from the guerrilla-type activities during Finland’s 
last wars’) After examining the war diaries kept and the combat and situational re-
ports submitted by the Finnish formations of the Winter War, Sovijärvi drew a criti-
cal conclusion according to which ‘…action, to a high degree, was combat patrolling in the 
enemy’s rear areas located close to the front, although there is also some evidence of pure guerrilla-
type activities.’According to Sovijärvi, the army that Finland fielded for the Winter 
War had no guerrilla organisation to speak of, let alone training in guerrilla tactics.  
 
Although the mobilisation plans of the General Headquarters included five guerrilla 
jaeger battalions, their designations reflected more historical traditions than action 
or their real use. The guerrilla jaeger battalions were used during the Winter War for 
defensive duties just like any infantry battalions. ‘At the outset of the Winter War, the 
Finnish troops had no basic training for guerrilla-type activities almost without exception, let alone 
advanced training. Completing one’s military service in the standing army and refresher training, 
service in the Frontier Guard, dexterity, cleverness and a high mental capability, physical fitness 
and an ability to improvise were passed as special training for guerrilla-type activities ’, Sovijärvi 
writtes, summing up his point.182 Criticism offered by Sovijärvi addresses, in a way, 
exactly the very same issues that the earlier authors had discussed, as his conclusions 
were quite in line with those put forth by Y. A. Järvinen and Major Sulo Häkkinen. 
 
Aside from various memoranda, experiences of the war were also gathered after the 
Second World War by conducting interviews. On a course arranged by the National 
General Staff College in 1969, students on the course interviewed, as part of their 
course work, Winter War commanders regarding their experiences of the war. The 
interviews prepared by the students included several questions on guerrilla-type ac-
tivities during the Winter War, which the officers answered from the viewpoint of 
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181 Ibid, p. 104 and 106. 
182 Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johtopäätökset sissitoiminnasta viime sotien kokemuksen mukaan (‘Conclusions from 
guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no. North Karelia 
Frontier Guard, refresher training/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis.  
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their war experiences. Of the several officers interviewed, Major A. O. Väänänen183, 
Lieutenant Colonel Y. E. Saarelainen184, Colonel V. Karanko185 and Major General 
V. Karhunen186 deserve a mention.  
 
The answers given by the interviewees were very conflicting. For example, Olli 
Väänänen relates that training in guerrilla-type activities was provided before the 
Winter War, including a great number of exercises. However, compared with other 
sources, Väänänen’s interview can be questions in part, even more so as he, as a 
source, refers to an article entitled ‘Porojen käyttö huoltotehtäviin ’ (‘Using reindeer in 
supply tasks’) that he himself had published in the 12/1967 issue of Sotilasaika-
kauslehti. In contrast, Väinö Karanko pointed out in his interview that the Frontier 
Guard paid more attention to guerrilla-type activities than the Defence Forces be-
fore the Winter War.187 It should be remembered that Karanko had written his the-
sis at the National General Staff College on the opportunities available to guerrilla-
type activities north of Lake Ladoga, making him familiar with the question before 
the Winter War.188  
 
The above-mentioned war experiences and narratives of guerrilla-type activities dur-
ing the Winter War have insufficient training and equipment of the guerrilla troops 
in common, as well as their use in secondary purposes. The instructions for guerril-
la-type activities, issued before and during the Winter War, were also perceived to be 
clearly insufficient. Such experiences and justified observations gave rise to the de-
velopment of guerrilla-type activities in a more systematic fashion after peace was 
achieved. 
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183 Akseli Olli Väänänen (1900–1987), acted as the commander of 1./Er.P 17 and the commander 
of Er.P 17 in the Winter War. See also the interview with Major (Retd) O. A. Väänänen, conducted 
on 29 March 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the 
National Defence University, identifier xe131, folder 55. 
184 Yrjö Erkki Saarelainen (1905–1987) acted as the commander of 1./Er.P 10 , II/JR 16 and SissiP 
2. See the interview with Lieutenant Colonel Y. E. Saarelainen, conducted on 10 January 1969, 
found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence 
University, identifier xe133, folder 55. 
185 Väinö Karanko (previously Savolainen, 1901–1983), acted as the chief of the Operations Office 
of the Lapland Group and as the chief of staff of Villamo Detachment Villamo during the Winter 
War. See the interview with Colonel V. Karanko, conducted on 4 April 1969, found in the research 
data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier 
xe135, folder 55. 
186 Veikko Evert Karhunen (1905–1986), acted as the adjutant of the Kainuu Group and Er.P 15, 
and as the commander of IV/KTPr and Er.P 15. Karhunen, Veikko Evert, an extract from person-
al details, no. 37447, KA. See also the interview with Major General V. Karhunen, conducted on 22 
May 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National 
Defence University, identifier xe138, folder 55.  
187 The interview with Major (Retd) A. O. Väänänen, conducted on 29 March 1969, found in the re-
search data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifi-
er xe131, folder 55. Väänänen, A. O.: Porojen käyttö huoltotehtäviin (‘Using reindeer in supply tasks’), 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/1967, pp. 523–527. Väänänen mentions in his article that in 1930 and 1936 
the Lapland Frontier Guard organised two guerrilla jeager unit exercises, involving experiments 
with a guerrilla jaeger patrol using reindeer. Two exercises do not amount to much.  
188 The interview with Colonel V. Karanko, conducted on 4 April 1969, found in the research data-
base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe135, 
folder 55. See also Karanko (1935), SKK 1/223, KA. 
 
55 
Developing guerrilla-type activities after the Winter War 
 
After the Winter War, the Defence Forces were reorganised for peacetime. The 
Ground Forces were grouped into five army corps along the eastern border; these 
were in turn divided into 13 brigades that were stationed in what were referred to as 
wilderness garrisons. The Navy comprised five coastal artillery regiments, a coastal 
fleet and a separate naval division. The Air Force consisted of four flying regiments 
and one anti-aircraft brigade. These arrangements sought to facilitate rapid readiness 
for war. Following a full-scale mobilisation, the Defence Forces returned to a war-
time organisation on 17 June 1941.189  
 
After the Winter War, the world war continued in Europe. The situation in the 
north remained tense, despite the fact that Finland had signed the Moscow Peace 
Treaty with the Soviet Union. During the Interim Peace, from the spring of 1940 to 
summer 1941, Finns were living in uncertainty. With the Soviet Union being allied 
with Germany, Finland feared an invasion by its eastern neighbour. This situation 
required prompt arrangements and changes, aimed at enhancing Finland’s national 
defence capabilities. Development were extended to the fundamentals of the art of 
war, whereby the role of guerrilla-type activities as a method of combat was sub-
jected to serious discussion against the background of experiences obtained from 
the war. Intelligence measures regarding the areas behind the border were also con-
tinued during the Interim Peace on the basis of experiences gained from the war. 
The Statistics Office (Counterintelligence Office) operating at the General Head-
quarters, including the offices under it, were principally tasked with obtaining intelli-
gence about the Soviet Union and training long-range patrolmen. During the Inter-
im Peace, secret reconnaissance patrols, including those trained for guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, were used for obtaining intelligence.190 
 
Between soldiers, experiences gained from the war were naturally discussed during 
the Interim Peace, but the surviving number of reports or memoranda of any length 
representing this short period is small. With regard to guerrilla-type activities, rec-
ords on experiences gained from the war were in most cases limited to individual 
notes or brief analyses. However, a number of documents addressing guerrilla tac-
tics can be found in päällystön kotitehtävät (‘homework for officers’ – spring and 
summer 1940), suojeluskuntapäällystön keskustelutilaisuudet (‘discussion events for Civil 
Guard officers’–1940–1941) and upseerien varuskuntaesitelmät (‘presentations given by 
officers at garrisons’–1940–1948), and similar documents.191 All the discussion fo-
rums mentioned above played an important role in developing a characteristically 
Finnish art of war, also with regard to guerrilla-type activities. As far as is known, 
there was no time to organise training specifically addressing guerrilla-type activities 

189 Puolustusvoimat – Joukko-osastoperinteet (‘The Defence Forces – the traditions of the various mili-
tary units’), edited by Marko Palokangas, Jyväskylä 2008, pp. 21–25. 
190 Saressalo, Lassi: Kaukopartiot tiedustelutehtävissä, (‘Long-range patrolmen in reconnaissance du-
ties’), an article in a book entitled Salaisen sodan sivut (‘The pages of a secret war’), edited by Mik-
ko Karjalainen, Helsinki 2003, pp. 45–60. See also Kosonen, Matti: Suomen salainen tiedustelu Neuvos-
toliitossa ennen jatkosotaa (‘Finland’s secret intelligence activities in the Soviet Union before the Con-
tinuation War’), ibid., pp. 111–127. 
191 Tuunainen, Pasi: Communication in writing, and a meeting held on 9 November 2009. 
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during the Interim Peace, although plans for arranging training courses in guerrilla-
type activities had been drafted. However, evidently one of the Frontier Guards or-
ganised a course for instructors in guerrilla tactics in early 1941; of around two 
weeks in duration.192  
 
Perhaps the most significant memorandum –referred to above –on guerrilla-type 
activities compiled during the Interim Peace is the summary drafted by Major Sulo 
Häkkinen on the experiences gained of guerrilla-type activities during the Winter 
War and on the instructions issued for the provision of training in guerrilla tactics. 
Häkkinen saw such instructions as being highly important, and he thought that par-
ticularly the grounds given for such instructions were an indication of a need for a 
more systematic development. ‘During the last winter’s war, a great deal of experiences of the 
forming and organisation, as well as of the use of guerrilla jaeger units, guerrilla jaeger companies 
and guerrilla jaeger battalions for actual guerrilla-type activities were gained; such experiences 
should be used to enhance the defensive capabilities of our country. For example, neglect during 
peacetime concerning the forming and arrangements of guerrilla jaeger battalions was found to be 
impossible to compensate for after the war had broken out.’193 
 
An interesting detail in this memorandum is the emphasis placed on the need for a 
specific guerrilla handbook, which, due to the short duration of the Interim Peace, 
was not fulfilled. When compiling his summary, Sulo Häkkinen essentially based his 
worked on his own experiences as the commander of the Guerrilla Battalion 1 du-
ring the Winter War. In compiling the experiences gained of the war and drafting 
the programme for guerrilla courses,Häkkinen was aided, as he mentions in his 
memorandum, by Major Juho Aho Väinö Volanen, captain in the reserve army, 
who, as Häkkinen suggests in his memorandum, could become the drafters of a 
possible guerrilla handbook.194 ‘When undertaking to provide training in guerrilla-type acti-
vities on a more extensive basis in the Defence Forces, the Civil Guard and the Frontier Guard, a 
’Sissiopas ’(’Guerrilla handbook’) with more detailed and versatile contents should be made avail-
able to the instructors.’This confidential handbook would naturally be modified over time, reflecting 
new experiences, necessitating its reissues. However, it is necessary to publish a new Sissiopas im-
mediately, as the one used previously does not meet the requirements to be set for such a handbook.’
Thus, it was already during the Interim Peace that criticism was directed at the guer-
rilla handbook predating the Winter War, deemed to be incomplete in content.195 

192 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, confi-
dential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 17651/6, 
KA. See also Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’), a memorandum compiled by Captain 
U. K. Korhonen, dated 18 November 1946, Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3, KA. 
193 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, con-
fidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 
17651/6, KA 
194 Ibid. Häkkinen’s memorandum also makes reference to a course for instructors in guerrilla-type 
activities which ended on 18 January 1941. In addition to a course for instructors in guerrilla-type 
activities, arranged during the Winter War (8–23 January 1940), Väinö Volanen participated as a 
student in another course for instructors in guerrilla-type activities, arranged 8–18 January 1941. In 
addition to the courses mentioned above, he acted as the head of two guerrilla courses in spring 
1942. Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA. 
195 Ibid.; note the underlined and emphasised words in the original document. Cf. also Sissiopas 
(1939). 
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This criticism can be interpreted to be directed both at the content and availability 
of the Sissiopas used during the Winter War. Of the 15-page Sissiopas handbook that 
had been issued to troops at the outset of the Winter War, 3,950 copies remained in 
the store of the Regulation Office of the General Headquarters in January 1941.196 
By June 1941, additional copies of Sissiopas had been issued to the troops, as the in-
ventory accounting indicates that the number of guidebooks in store had decreased 
by 100 copies.197 Such numbers indicate that of an edition of 6,000 copies of the 
guidebook dating back to the Winter War, a number considerably smaller than ori-
ginally intended had been issued to the troops. The reason that this guidebook had 
remained unissued must be attributable to the fact that it had been classified as con-
fidential, causing it to be distributed to the troops and used in training in a con-
siderably more limited number than other regulations.  
 
In his proposal, Heikkinen also comments on the responsibilities regarding training 
in guerrilla-type activities. According to it, the primary responsibility for providing 
training in guerrilla-type activities should be given to those infantry and light units 
that in peacetime are stationed near the eastern border. In line with their duty to 
form troops, the military provinces were tasked with ensuring that Civil Guard 
members and conscripts who reported to the military service and who were deemed 
suitable for guerrilla training were assigned to these units. Häkkinen’s plan was 
based on the notion that the army units would arrange a guerrilla course for con-
scripts suited for guerrilla duties after they had completed their basic training period. 
The guerrilla course was divided into two phases: a basic guerrilla course, which was 
supplemented by an advanced and a refresher course providing further skills in ac-
cordance with the season in question. According to the proposal, the duration of the 
basic guerrilla course was to be five weeks, comprising 225 hours of instruction, fol-
lowed by a two-week advanced course with 90 hours of instruction. According to 
Häkkinen, it was necessary that every guerrilla officer, NCO and private be provided 
with training in guerrilla-type activities both in winter and summer. In the military 
passports of officers, NCOs and privates who had received training in guerrilla-type 
activities, the word sissi (‘guerrilla jaeger’) was entered in the section indicating the 
passport holders special training. On the basis of this entry, the relevant Civil Guard 
district would assign them to guerrilla formations to be formed during mobilisa-
tion.198 
 
The Winter War had proved a reality check, providing a perspective on the number 
of troops required and the necessity of having such troops as part of the Field Ar-
my. Although several proposals for improvement regarding the principles of guerril-
la-type activities were submitted, very little was accomplished with regard to such 
principles on account of the brevity of the Interim Peace period. The most im-
portant achievements immediately following the Winter War were the drafting of a 
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196 An order for military literature placed by the V Army Corps, PvPE no. 20/I/13/9.1.1941, T 
17651/10, KA. 
197 The stock list of military literature of the Training Division of the General Headquarters of the 
Defence ´Forces, PM no. 1033/Koul.2/sal./12.6.1941, T 17651/6, KA. In the stock list, Sissiopas 
had been listed under the heading ‘II Salainen kirjallisuus’ (‘II Confidential literature’). 
198 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities, dated 29 January 1941, at-
tachment 1, (‘Confiedential correspondence of the Training Division of the General Headquarters 
from 1941’), T 17651/6, KA. 
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syllabus for guerrilla courses, the addition of details to the instructions on guerrilla-
type activities, and a proposal for the compilation of a military regulation for guerril-
la-type activities. However, gathering experiences was part of an important devel-
opment effort which was later continued and the results of which were put to good 
use during the Continuation War.  
 
On the basis of the experiences gained from the Winter War, training on long-range 
reconnaissance and actual long-range reconnaissance activity in the Soviet area were 
increased in spring 1941. Information was gathered on the disposition and move-
ments of enemy troops, particularly on the Karelian Isthmus, for the eventuality of a 
new war. Secret reconnaissance and long-range patrol activity on the Karelian Isth-
mus at the time were principally the responsibility of the Vyborg Sub-Office, De-
tachment Vehniäinen. The objective was to constantly have patrols, capable of guer-
rilla-type activities, in the field. However, such activities had to be kept secret; con-
sequently, patrolmen of the secret reconnaissance units, recruited from among those 
who, before the Winter War, had lived in the areas that Finland had ceded to the 
Soviet Union following the Moscow Peace Treaty, operated in Soviet territory wear-
ing civilian clothing.  
 
 
3.2. Guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling during the Conti-
nuation War  
 
The experiences gained from the Winter War and the reorganisation of troops dur-
ing the Interim Peace laid the foundations for guerrilla-type activities conducted 
during the Continuation War. Guerrilla-type activities and the principles governing 
them had achieved an established position in the Finnish art of war by the Interim 
Peace, when, during the spring of 1940, the five guerrilla jaeger battalions formed 
for the Winter War were reorganised to form three guerrilla jaeger battalions in the 
peacetime organisation. These guerrilla jaeger battalions were subordinated to the 
IV and V Army Corps, stationed north of Lake Ladoga, as well as to the 11th Divi-
sion.199 The plans for an eventual war also included three guerrilla jaeger battalions, 
intended to be formed for placement under the command of the Army Corps oper-
ating north of Lake Ladoga. The guerrilla-type activities conducted by individual di-
visions continued to be the responsibility of temporary guerrilla task forces formed 
separately for individual operations. On the basis of the experiences gained from the 
Winter War, and taking account of the mistakes already made once, the operational 
plans drafted for guerrilla-type activities were anticipatory to a somewhat higher de-
gree. Especially in the planning conducted by the brigades of the covering force and 
the Army Corps stationed north of Lake Ladoga for wartime operations, guerrilla-
type activities and the opportunities offered by them to the Field Army gained great-
ly increased attention.200   
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199 Guerrilla Battalion 1 (Viinijärvi) and Guerrilla Battalion 2 (Kemi–Kajaani) were assigned to the 
IV Army Corps, and Guerrilla Battalion 3 to the V Army Corps. See also MaavE:n no. 1766/ 
V/23/sal./6.6.1940, T 2868/1, KA. Talvisodan historia 4 (‘A history of the Winter War 4’), Porvoo 
1991, p. 386. 
200 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 235. 
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During the mobilisation in summer 1941, efforts were made to assign necessary per-
sonnel to Guerrilla Battalions 1, 2 and 3, in order to make their composition to meet 
the requirements set for wartime formations. The strength of each guerrilla jaeger 
battalion was around 450 men, divided into three guerrilla jaeger companies, and 
each company was divided into three guerrilla jaeger platoons. Because the guerrilla 
jaeger battalions were primarily intended for use in mobile guerrilla operations, their 
organisation did not include –sensibly enough –heavy infantry weapons and major 
supply formations. However, due to insufficient training, every guerrilla jaeger bat-
talion lacked the special skills required by guerrilla-type activities. The personnel of 
the battalions were also a motley crew, both with regard to their age and experience. 
Only the personnel of Guerrilla Battalion 3 had any familiarity with operating in a 
wilderness. With regard to guerrilla-type activities, the plans drafted during the In-
terim Peace for the guerrilla units were related in most cases to defensive military 
operations. In practice, the order to attack given to the Field Army entirely changed 
the planned use of the guerrilla jaeger battalions north of Lake Ladoga. Because of 
such factors, during the invasion phase of the Continuation War, the three guerrilla 
jaeger battalions were used in the role of ordinary infantry battalions in tasks involv-
ing attacks with limited objectives.201 
 
The mobilisation in June 1941 showed that the Interim Peace had been too short a 
period for implementing all the plans drafted for guerrilla-type activities. Although 
three guerrilla jaeger battalions were formed in the Field Army in June 1941, in line 
with the mobilisation plans, almost all other formations lacked guerrilla jaeger units, 
which they should have had as prescribed by the plans. This would indicate that the 
responsibility for guerrilla-type activities was assigned to the jaeger units of each reg-
iment, to the light troops of each division, and to the units of the Frontier Guard. 
This is why the General Headquarters issued an order, during the first weeks of the 
war, to the brigades and divisions to form guerrilla jaeger units from those troops 
under their command.202 Under several formations, following the orders issued by 
the General Headquarters, units referred to as ‘long-range units’or ‘guerrilla jaeger 
units’, were formed. This was the case, for example, in the 14th Division, which 
formed three guerrilla jaeger units of approximately 50 men. These units were sub-
ordinated to the regiments and battalions forming the divisions. However, even af-
ter their subordination to the regiments and battalions, these guerrilla jaeger units 
remained under the command of the Operations Deaprtment of the Divisional 
Headquarters. This was regarded as a flawed decision, as during the Finnish army 
invasion phase of the Continuation War, the battalions used the guerrilla jaeger units 
independently, without obtaining permission from the Divisional Headquarters. On 
those occasions when the division would have had a need to dispatch guerrilla jaeger 
units to carry out guerrilla tasks in the enemy’s rear, the units were either so fatigued 
or had suffered such a number of casualties that they were unfit for the task that the 
upper level HQ was planning. The special training of the units was also deemed to 
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201 Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’), Captain U. K. Korhonen, dated 18 November 
1946, Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3, KA. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 235. See also Penttilä, 
Eino Valfrid, an extract from personal details, no. 33097, KA. 
202 Ibid. 
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be gravely insufficient, let alone the special material that had not been issued to the 
troops.203  
 
In spring 1941, time was found to arrange a number of basic training courses in 
guerrilla-type activities for the newly formed guerrilla jaeger units, the syllabi of 
which were based on the instructions submitted by Major Sulo Häkkinen to the 
General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces in January 1941. In accordan-
ce with Häkkinen’s proposal, guerrilla courses were divided into five-week basic 
courses and two-week refresher courses. The emphasis of training in guerrilla-type 
activities during the Continuation War invasion phase was laid on refresher training, 
as detaching troops from combat for a training period for a month would have been 
practically impossible.204 Evidently, the training period prescribed by the syllabus 
was, despite good intentions, all too brief, considering the requirement set for the 
quality of training. This is why the training provided on the courses mostly focused 
on demolition task and such guerrilla operations that could be carried out during 
marches typical of the Finnish Army invasion phase of the Continuation War. How-
ever, course instructors were unable to take full advantage of the experiences of 
guerrilla-type activities gained during the Winter War, as the memoranda drafted of 
war experiences continued to be labelled as confidential information. Only some of 
the course instructors had served in guerrilla jaeger battalions or the guerrilla jaeger 
units of various formations during the Winter War. These factors contributed to the 
fact that guerrilla-type activities did not deliver the expected and planned results 
during the Continuation War invasion phase.205 
 
The rapid advancement of the Finnish Army during the Continuation War invasion 
phase alongside the Germans, including successfully fought battles and local superi-
ority in numbers, were factors that were disadvantageous for guerrilla-type activities, 
as in the Finnish art of war, guerrilla-type activities were primarily seen as an oppor-
tunity to balance the relative strengths of the belligerents. In autumn 1941, there was 
little need to balance the relative strengths. Consequently, orders seeking to step up 
guerrilla-type activities and to put the guerrilla jaeger units already formed to more 
effective use were not implemented during the Finnish army invasion phase of the 
Continuation War. While individual episodes of the effects of guerrilla-type activities 
were recorded, they remained modest compared with the Winter War. It should also 
be borne in mind that the plans drafted during the Interim Peace were based on the 
use of guerrilla-type activities in defensive battles. Because the early phases of the 
Continuation War were characterised by a large-scale offensive military operation, 
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203 Kokemuksia sotiemme aikaisesta sissitoiminnasta (‘Experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities 
during the wars that Finland waged 1939–1944’); a memorandum by Captain Eino Penttilä, dated 
30 January 1947, Eino Penttilä’s private collection, Pk 2109/3, KA. 
204 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, con-
fidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 
17651/6, KA. 
205 Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’), Captain U. K. Korhonen, dated 18 November 
1946, Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3, KA. See also Roiha, Risto: Sissi- ja kaukopartio-
toiminta Suomen sodassa 1941–1944 (‘Guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrols the wars that 
Finland waged between 1941 and 1944’); a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 
1973, pp. 39–44, SKK 1/1118, KA.  
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theories of guerrilla-type activities and their functionality from the viewpoint of the 
art of remained untested. 
 
 
Long-range patrolling and other forms of reconnaissance required training in 
guerrilla-type activities 
 
Long-range patrols, long-range reconnaissance, patrol reconnaissance, combat re-
connaissance and violent reconnaissance were closely related concepts during the 
wars between 1939 and 1944. Although these concepts were partly contradictory, 
they shared the fact that they fell into the wide field of reconnaissance. The con-
cepts mentioned above had been defined in the 1927 Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field regula-
tion’), in the 1932 Jalkaväen ohjesääntö (‘Infantry regulation’), and in the handbook 
dating to 1927 entitled Taktiikan perusteet (‘The basics of tactics’). In the 1927 Field 
regulation, violent reconnaissance refers to a limited attack, aimed at forcing the en-
emy to disclose its forces or reveal its intentions. Depending on the objectives of 
the operation and the distance to the area to be subjected to reconnaissance, this 
method was also referred to as long-range, short-range or combat reconnaissance. 
However, according to the Field regulation, ‘a clear line between them is impossible to 
draw.’206  
 
Long-range reconnaissance serves the objectives of the High Command. Through 
long-range reconnaissance, enemy plans, measures, the concentration of forces and 
troop movements can be clarified. Long-range reconnaissance referred to overland 
patrols in the enemy’s rear to areas that were further than a day’s march away from 
the Finnish front line. Short-range reconnaissance was used to find more detailed 
information on enemy activities and on the disposition of the enemy branch troops 
closer to the positions of the Finnish troops. After battle breaks out, short-range re-
connaissance transforms into combat reconnaissance, aimed at clarifying, by engag-
ing the enemy in combat, enemy activities and any surprise manoeuvres, particularly 
along the flanks. According to the 1927 Infantry Field Regulation, the reconnais-
sance conducted by infantry was primarily short-range and combat reconnaissance 
in nature. When necessary, combat reconnaissance can also be extended to the en-
emy’s rear, in order to capture a prisoner, document or other sources of infor-
mation. For ground reconnaissance, infantry patrols or reconnaissance units are 
used.207  
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206 Combat reconnaissance refers to ‘close-range reconnaissance, the nature of which changes after combat be-
gins.’ The objective is to achieve clarity, during combat, of the measures that the enemy has taken. 
Reconnaissance will still take place in the vicinity of the front. The points connecting short and 
long-range reconnaissance were related to ‘small-scale circumstances’, which, in practice, referred to 
situations in which the distances between troops became shorter. Long-range reconnaissance was 
reconnaissance that extended deep in enemy-held territory. The difference between long-range re-
connaissance, short-range reconnaissance and combat reconnaissance is specifically related to the 
distance to the sites subjected to reconnaissance. Kenttäohjesääntö I (K.O.) (‘Field regulation I’) 
(K.O.), Helsinki 1927, pp. 60–62 and 217. Jalkaväen taisteluohjesääntö II2 (J.O. II2), (‘Combat regula-
tion for the infantry II’), Helsinki 1932, p. 397. Olkkonen (1928), pp. 62–65. 
207 Kenttäohjesääntö I (K.O.) (‘Field regulation I’) (K.O.), Helsinki 1927, pp. 81–82. 
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Long-range patrols and patrol reconnaissance in the enemy’s rear were one of the 
most tightly kept secrets of the wars that Finland waged between 1939 and 1944. 
Long-range patrolling was patrolling deep in the enemy’s rear territory, led or or-
dered by the General Headquarters and supported by air transport or by material 
supplies dropped from the air. Patrols formed by the divisions and other formations 
were also used in patrolling. Long-range patrols operating in the enemy’s rear were 
mostly tasked with reconnaissance tasks, but, particularly during the Continuation 
War, patrolling was also supplemented by demolition and harassment tasks.208 From 
this perspective, such patrols in part resembled combat patrolling209. This meant 
that patrols destroyed targets important to the enemy such as supply centres, com-
mand posts and necessary communications including supply lines and communica-
tion links. Of the guerrilla-type activities associated with combat reconnaissance, lay-
ing landmines and setting up traps were used in particular. In postwar texts, long-
range patrolling was often equated with guerrilla-type activities. Although both had 
similarities, they were conceptually separate and tactically different.  
 
Training in long-range patrolling, initiated during the Interim Peace with a focus on 
guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling, produced approximately 150 to 
160 long-range patrolmen by the onset of the Continuation War. From these men, 
four units capable of long-range patrolling were formed; these units were placed un-
der the Intelligence Office of the Intelligence Division, which in turn, was placed 
under the Intelligence Section of Section 2 of the General Headquarters. It was as 
late as in 1943 that an established form was given to the long-range patrol units, 
when Separate Battalion 4 (Erillinen Pataljoona 4) –a unit divided into four sub-
units –was established. While further training was, above all, based on experienced 
gained from war, separate guerrilla courses were also arranged. In autumn 1941, a 
training centre was established in Savukoski, tasked with arranging courses in guer-
rilla-type activities and long-range patrolling for the officers and men. Tactical teach-
ing was given both in long-range patrolling and guerrilla-type activities and anti-
guerrilla activities.210 
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208 Saressalo, Lassi: Päämajan kaukopartiot jatkosodassa (‘Long-range patrols of the General Headquar-
ters in the Continuation War’), Juva 1987, pp. 11–15. 
209 Combat reconnaissance, as a concept, has recently gained new currency with reference to guer-
rilla-type activities. Vesa Tynkkynen, among others, has remarked that he would prefer to refer to 
guerrilla-type activities using the term combat patrolling, which is a more appropriate expression 
within the context of international terminology. However, it should be noted that this concept was 
already used to refer to guerrilla-type activities in the military regulations predating the Winter War, 
as well as in postwar literature on the art of war. Cf., among others, Grünn, K. V.: Kenttäpalveluksen 
opas kuvin ja sanoin I, (‘An illustrated guidebook for service in the field I’), Helsinki 1931, p. 37. 
Kenttäohjesääntö I (K.O.) (‘Field regulation I’) (K.O.), Helsinki 1929, pp. 60–62. Foertsch, Hermann: 
Nykyaikainen ja tuleva sotataito (Finnish translation) , (‘The modern and future art of war’), Porvoo 
1939, pp. 171–172. StietNK 1/16, Talvisodan taistelut Pielisjärvellä (‘Battles in Pielisjärvi during the 
Winter War’), written by Major Raimo Heiskanen, p. 106. See also Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johtopäätökset sis-
sitoiminnasta viime sotien kokemuksen mukaan (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–
1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no., North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher trai-
ning/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis. 
210 Sovijärvi, E.-V.: (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memo-
randum with no doc.no., North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher training exercise/1962, the copy 
in possession of the author of this thesis, p. 6. 
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During the period of static warfare, in 1942 and 1943, course-based training in guer-
rilla warfare was also arranged. Two guerrilla courses were arranged over the course 
of spring 1942, intended at least for the troops of the Maanselkä Group and the 
Ääninen Coastal Brigade, the content and training of which was based on the mem-
orandum drafted by Major Sulo Häkkinen in 1941. These courses were primarily in-
tended for the personnel of the guerrilla jaeger units formed by the Maanselkä 
Group and the Ääninen Coastal Brigade, but personnel stationed in long-range pa-
trol formations also participated in them.211 The syllabi of these courses comprised 
lectures and exercises in the terrain. According to the weekly programmes of the 
courses, the topics of the lectures included a review of the experiences gained from 
guerrilla-type activities, the composition of guerrilla jaeger units and their special 
equipment, reconnaissance in the enemy’s rear areas and submittal of gained infor-
mation, demolition and destruction tasks, collaboration with the Air Force units, 
and theoretical foundations of supply and medical services. The lectures also ad-
dressed up-to-date information on the organisational developments, weapons, tac-
tics and troop dispositions regarding the Red Army. The exercises focused on 
shooting, map reading, finding one’s way using a map and compass, arranging am-
bushes and setting up traps, as well as the practical implementation of the various 
combat methods of guerrilla-type activities.212  
 
On 1 July 1943, during the Continuation War, patrol reconnaissance was organised 
and put on a permanent footing by establishing a unit specialising in long-range pa-
trolling, Separate Battalion 4 (Er.P 4 –Erillinen Pataljoona 4), under the General 
Headquarters. This battalion comprised a headquarters and supportive elements, as 
well as four companies, all of which were assigned a separate operational area along 
different sections of the front. This ensured that reconnaissance directed at the en-
emy rear areas could take on more systematic and methodical forms.213  
 
The operational areas of the long-range patrols and unit were extremely wide, with 
the range of operations extending at their longest as far as 500 kilometres behind 
the front line. Operations deep in the enemy’s rear required the patrols to be able to 
supply themselves independently, had well-functioning communications and that 
they had a sufficient level of mobility. Operations also required that patrolmen were 
able to keep their nerves under control, as the risk of patrols being discovered was 
extremely high. Despite the risks, long-range patrolling played an important role in 
gathering intelligence for the General Headquarters and the troops stationed at the 
front. The reconnaissance of the directions in which the enemy was moving, its 
troop disposition and the preparations it had made, had a direct impact on the deci-
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211 The first guerrilla course was arranged at the premises of the Maanselkä Group Staff between 11 
and 24 February 1942, and the second course between 22 May and 6 June 1942. Volanen, Väinö 
Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA. See also the handouts used on the guerrilla 
course in spring 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA. A summary by Major 
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collection Pk 1401/2, KA. 
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sions that many Finnish units holding the front line took and on possible changes to 
their battle plans. Reconnaissance combined with demolition is thought to have tied 
up a substantial number of enemy troops for safeguarding their rear areas, as demo-
lition and harassment raids did cause the desired disturbance in the enemy rear are-
as.214 
 
Experiences gained from long-range patrolling, reconnaissance and guerrilla-type ac-
tivities during the early phases of the Continuation War were put to good use on 
guerrilla courses arranged in 1942–1943, the training topics of which were based on 
examples such as the patrol experiences described above. Training paid particular at-
tention to demolition and guerrilla-type activities in the enemy’s rear areas, capturing 
prisoners and obtaining interrogation information.215 
 
 
Guerrilla-type and partisan activities during the period of static warfare 
 
After the Continuation War invasion phase, completed during autumn 1941, the 
General Headquarters set out to prepare the reorganisation of the Defence Forces 
along the lines of a covering force organisation. The planned changes also concer-
ned guerrilla formations and guerrilla jaeger battalions formed within the Field Ar-
my. In early February 1942, the General Headquarters issued orders to disband 
Guerrilla Battalions 1 and 2, assigning the younger age classes released from these 
battalions to Frontier Guard companies. Personnel from the older age classes were 
intended to be placed in units that were to be discharged from the army later. The 
order issued by the General Headquarters regarding the disbanding and reor-
ganisation was not applied to Guerrilla Battalion 3, as it was attached to the III Ar-
my Corps which operated under German command. After the battles took on the 
character of static warfare during 1942, the guerrilla jaeger battalions under Finnish 
command were disbanded according to the order issued by the General Head-
quarters.216  
 
As the war gradually turned into static warfare, with the troops occupying perma-
nent positions, opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities also changed signif-
icantly. Both the Finnish and Russian troops strengthened their defences by for-
tifying their positions and improving the guarding of the front line. While long-
range patrols were regularly sent to operate in areas located further away in the en-
emy’s rear, guerrilla jaeger units were hindered in their operations in the vicinity of 
the front line. The guerrilla jaeger units of the formations occupying the front line 
found it increasingly difficult to penetrate enemy position. Furthermore, the troops 
of the Finnish Field Army –relatively few in number –had to be tied up to defend 
the rear areas, as the Russians had become more active and made considerable pro-
gress since the Winter War in enhancing their own partisan operations. By 1942, the 
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215 Cf. handouts used on the guerrilla course in spring 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 
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216 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 236. See also Karjalainen, Mikko: Ajatuksista operaatioiksi – Suomen armeijan 
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Russians had adopted the fundamentals of Finnish guerrilla-type activities, com-
mitment of guerrilla jaeger units against the enemy’s supply lines, flanks and targets 
in the rear areas. This forced the Finns to develop their guerrilla-type activities and 
to change their operational concepts which dated back to the Winter War.217 
 
The Russians had made some attempts to reorganise their partisan operations dur-
ing 1940, but it was only in summer 1941 that they managed to take real measures to 
reorganise the partisan movement. Approximately a week after the German Army 
had launched its attack in summer 1941, a crucial change took place in partisan ac-
tivities. The rapid advancement of the Germans on the western front of the Soviet 
Union made Stalin realise that all available means should be used. An order issued 
by the Council of People's Commissars in late June 1941 and a proclamation made 
by Stalin in a speech on the radio in early June rehabilitated partisan warfare. The 
central message was a call to mobilise all resources in combat against the fascists. In 
order to step up total resistance, an order was issued to form partisan units.218 
 
In accordance with an order issued by the Soviet military command, the Russians 
set to establish partisan units on the Finnish front. Work began to form units and to 
organise partisan activities in early July 1941, at the time when the Finnish army was 
only about to begin its attack. In the absence of a ready organisation and cadres, the 
work had to be started from scratch. Initially, the issuance of instructions for the es-
tablishment of partisan units was the responsibility of an executive organ with rep-
resentatives from the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Republic of Karelia 
(Politburo), the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic (SSR), and the 
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). In August, a permanent head-
quarters was established, charged with organising partisan activities, the leadership 
of which was given to the representatives of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the Republic, NKVD and the military command. Liaison with partisan units was 
coordinated via NKDV district units. The headquarters also established a special 
partisan school, tasked with training the officers and the rank and file of partisan 
units. However, in October 1941 the headquarters were disbanded, and the respon-
sibility for organising partisan activities was assigned directly to the 4th department 
of the NKVD of the Karelian Republic. The objecttives for partisan activities were 
laid down by the Red Army. The NKVD department had been tasked with estab-
lishing destruction battalions, partisan units and saboteur groups, as well as with or-
ganising reconnaissance activities in their operational areas. Destruction battalions 
were an integral part of NKVD’s organisation, and were used for defending the 
Russian rear areas.219  
 
The directions issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union 
and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 29 June 
1941 stated, among other things, the following: ‘Partisan units and saboteur groups must 
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be formed in the enemy-occupied territory to combat the enemy troops, to foment partisan warfare 
everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage telephone and telegraph lines, and to set fire to 
stores. In the occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accom-
plices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step and all their measures frustrated.’220 
 
It can be concluded from the directions that while partisans were issued fairly tradi-
tional instructions regarding guerrilla-type activities, the directions said nothing 
about the organisation of collaboration with the army. Instructions that the Russian 
issued during the early phases of the Continuation War concerning partisan war 
were also fairly cursory in other respects. In those areas of the Karelo-Finnish SSR 
that the Finnish army had occupied, no opportunities were available to organise par-
tisan activities on the basis of underground networks –in line with instructions –as 
most people had been evacuated or were under the control of the Finns. Unlike the 
German-occupied territories, the Russians had no opportunities to launch partisan 
war supported by the civilian population.221 With regard to the partisan war in Kare-
lia, this meant in practise that the Russians were forced to resort to a form of parti-
san warfare in which partisans carried out tasks of short duration, using the Russian 
rear a their support area. However, it was only in August 1942, at a conference held 
in Moscow, that partisan activities carried out in various areas were standardised and 
given detailed guidelines.222  
 
Postwar Russian studies and interpretations on partisan and guerrilla activity during 
the Continuation War on the Finnish front must be read with a critical eye, as they 
give a highly unbalanced view of the effectiveness of activities –on both sides. Al-
though the Russian archives contain a great number of records covering the activi-
ties of both Finnish and Russian guerrilla jaeger patrols, the credibility of such re-
ports is debatable at best. This is further complicated by the fact that it is difficult to 
make a distinction between the objectives set for the activities of Russian partisans 
during the Continuation War, and the actual results of such activities. Yet another 
complication for research is posed by the fact that the archives were compiled by 
numerous organisational actors, as well as by the unofficial and unconfirmed posi-
tion of the partisan organisation –which, furthermore, was in a constant state of 
change –among the troops that waged war.223 
 
According to Soviet research and archive sources, 14,000 soldiers were killed in par-
tisan strikes on the Finnish front, 100 officers and men were taken prisoners, 52 
garrisons were destroyed, 31 trains were derailed, approximately 150 bridges and 10 
kilometres of railways were blown up, and so on. The same sources argue that parti-
sans permanently tied up 18 and temporarily 27 Finnish battalions in combat during 
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the period of static warfare.224 According to the most recent research, Soviet parti-
sans suffered 1,700 casualties –either mortally wounded, lost or perished for other 
reasons –out of around 5,000 partisans who participated in fighting.225  
 
Finnish estimates and studies of casualties inflicted by the partisans are in blatant 
conflict with Russian research.226 According to calculations conducted by Veikko 
Karhunen, based on war diaries, considerably fewer Finnish troops were tied up in 
fighting. ‘Due to partisan activity along the Finnish flanks and rear areas, Finnish battalions, 
amounting to the strength of nearly one infantry division, were tied up at various sections of the front 
line.’227 With the strength of one division, Karhunen refers to nine or ten infantry 
battalions, but he does not specify the troops in his calculation in any detail. 
 
In any event, Russian partisan activity against Finnish troops and targets in the Finn-
ish rear was intensified during 1942, particularly in the areas north of Lake Ladoga. 
The nature of the period of static warfare created favourable conditions for partisan 
activity, particularly in the Finnish-occupied territory in Eastern Karelian and along 
the border regions in the north.228 While partisan raids undoubtedly also had moral 
repercussions, particularly among the home front and rear area civil population, it is 
difficult to see that such raids would have had any significant strategic importance. 
Partisans increasingly tied up Finnish troops in the defence of the rear areas, indicat-
ing that partisan activity had operational significance. Furthermore, as part of the 
Finnish troops were such that they could possibly have played an active role in 
Finnish guerrilla-type activities, something had to be done.229  
 
 
Operation Forest Felling (‘Metsähakkuut’) – guerrilla-type activities led by 
the General Headquarters 
 
The Training Office of the General Headquarters gathered information on expe-
riences gained from war and distributed it to divisions, similar to the tactical guide-
books distributed during the Winter War. The General Headquarters published its 
first tactical directions during the Continuation War on 10 July 1941, entitled Taktil-
lisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the enemy’).230 The fact that 
the Russians intensified their partisan activities during 1942 and 1942 can be con-
firmed by studying the above-mentioned directive. Separate articles on the activities 
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carried out by partisan units, on anti-partisan operations and on directives can be 
found in issues of 6, 11, 16, 33, 52, 57, 71 and 78 of the tactical directions. In addi-
tion, at least issues 32 and 37 make a reference to enemy desant and reconnaissance 
activities (‘desant’is Russian and refers to saboteurs and spies dropped by parachute 
behind the enemy’s lines).231 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta issue 57, published in November 1942, was a kind of 
expanded thematic issue on the Soviet partisan movement and on its intensified op-
erations on the Finnish front. In particular, this directive highlighted the attempt in 
June 1942 by the 1st Russian Partisan Brigade to destroy the railway between Su-
ojärvi and Äänislinna, to reconnoitre and destroy Finnish headquarters and to set 
fire to the village of Porajärvi. Although this unlucky partisan brigade was practically 
annihilated in late July, it alerted the General Headquarters to consider more active 
anti-partisan activities. The General Headquarters concluded the following: ‘As stat-
ed above, as is is evident that the enemy’s partisan activities principally aim at harassing and wear-
ing down our troops, rear echelon formations and the civilian population, it is probable that such 
patrolling will continue in its current extent, despite casualties.’232  
 
A compendium published in this directive set in motion Finnish anti-partisan acti-
vities. In connection with this, the General Headquarters assumed the leadership of 
all activities aimed at intensifying Finnish guerrilla-type activities. On 29 December 
1942, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters issued an order to the 
Aunus Group, the Maanselkä Group, as well as to the 3rd and 14th Divisions, to 
engage in intensive guerrilla-type activities on that section of the front that extended 
from the mid-section of Äänisjärvi to Tuoppajärvi. The objective was to launch a 
two-part operation, the first phase of which in February 1942 aimed at destroying 
the support areas of the Russian guerrilla-type activities. The second phase, to be 
carried out in mid-March, aimed to ‘…to destroy, as extensively and thoroughly as possible, 
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enemy command posts, supply centres and road and other communications…’. This operation 
was to extend to the Murmansk railway as far as to the section between Sorokka and 
Maanselkä.233  
 
According to this order, each division was ordered to form a unit of around 500 
men for the task, with the exception of the Aunus Group, for which a smaller force 
was deemed sufficient. In addition to the divisions ordered to engage in guerrilla-
type activities, the major part of the operations of the long-range patrols were di-
rected to the target area of the operation, following orders issued by the Intelligence 
Division of the General Headquarters. If necessary, the Finnish Air Force was also 
to be available to support the operation, based on proposals submitted by the divi-
sions. The divisions were ordered to send their proposals for the first phase of the 
guerrilla-type activities to the Operations Department of the General Headquarters 
by 31 January 1943. The operation was given the code name Forest Felling (‘Met-
sähakkuut ’).234 
 
Each division assigned to the task made their preparations in an individual manner. 
Units were formed in various ways, as the order issued by the General Headquarters 
gave the divisions a great deal of leeway. Therefore, the divisions ordered to form 
units for guerrilla-type activities did so, in practice, in two ways. Units were formed 
either from existing platoons and companies or, alternatively, completely new units 
were formed from volunteers men suitable for guerrilla-type activities. Despite 
vague instructions, the leadership of the operation was kept under tight control of 
the General Headquarters. The fact that the General Headquarters retained lea-
dership was probably founded on its desire to create optimal conditions for the op-
erations by attaching troops to the operation serving its overall goal. For this pur-
pose, the neighbouring troops of a division ordered to take up guerrilla-type activi-
ties were issued orders by General Headquarters to tie up the enemy when the oper-
ation was launched.235 
 
As an example of the operational plan and the tight control assumed by General 
Headquarters with regard to it, the solution taken by the 14th Division can be re-
viewed. In a plan submitted to the Operational Division of General Headquarters, 
entitled ‘On destruction of the bases of guerrilla-type activities in the sector of the 
14th Division’, the following detailed description of the implementation of the or-
dered task was given: ‘With the exception of the southern flank of the section held by the divi-
sion, the disposition of the enemy troops engaged in guerrilla-type activities is along the road from 
Koivuniemi to Lehto, with the principal guerrilla jaeger units units ‘Punaiset Äänisjärveläiset’ 
(‘The Reds from Äänisjärvi ’) and Eteenpäin (‘Forward ’) using the village of Lehto as their base. 
Our own guerrilla jaeger unit is tasked with attacking the main base of the enemy guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, the village of Lehto, destroying it and annihilating the enemy stationed there.' This plan 
was altered at the Operational Division of General Headquarters on 5 February 

233 PM:n no. 2360/Op.1/5.d/sal./29.12.1942, The General Headquarters war diary, 1 August –31 
December 1942, p. 872. The Department of Military History, the National Defence University. See 
also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 237.  
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1943, followed by a decision, according to which ‘This plan has been cancelled due to its 
risky nature. For example, the return of the unit might prove difficult, as the enemy would be able 
to take advantage of the Tunkua–Lehto road.’236  
 
After the plans had been completed in the divisions, and after the plans had been 
approved with modifications by General Headquarters, Operation Forest Felling 
began in February 1943 according to the original schedule. It is worth noting that 
the authorisation for this operation was personally given by the Commander-in-
Chief. ‘The divisions are to submit their presentations on limited attacks to the Operational Divi-
sion of General Headquarters, identifying the objectives, targets, time and strength committed. Such 
attacks can be carried out only under authorisation issued by the Commander-in-Chief.’237 Dur-
ing the first phase, the operation aimed at destroying guerrilla bases located around 
Seesjärvi in an area where partisan units and destruction battalions were prepared 
for their tasks. Evidently, General Headquarters did not issue a separate written or-
der for launching the second phase of the operations, and it continued in line with 
the plans that the divisions had submitted and that had been approved, targeting the 
enemy’s supply centres.238 
 
In February 1943, several attacks against targets that had been reconnoitred in ad-
vance were carried out, with mixed results. For example, in the sector of the Maan-
selkä Group, a total of five guerrilla raids were carried out against enemy bases, of 
which only two were assessed to have resulted in the desired outcome. A comment 
by the commander of the Maanselkä Group, Lieutenant General Taavetti Laa-
tikainen, provided an excellent indication of the challenges that Operation Forest 
Felling posed: ‘On the positive side, the experiences gained from mistakes and failures can be 
mentioned.’239 In other words, guerrilla-type activities resulted only in satisfactory re-
sults in some sections of the front. 
 
The partial failure of Operation Forest Felling was largely foreseeable, in spite of its 
thorough planning and objectives. The divisions planned their operations, selected 
the targets and formed the units as ordered, in 1943, but the provision of training 
for the units, necessary for guerrilla-type activities, posed great challenges from the 
very beginning. Both officers and men of the units that had been formed exhibited 
deficiencies in their training with regard to guerrilla-type activities. Vesa Tynkky-
nen’s study indicates that the experiences gained from war were taken into account 
in the guerrilla training given to the units in January, but it failed to raise the skill 
level to a level required by the operations. The attacks carried out also inflicted sub-
stantial casualties for the Finns, contributing to the poor or at best satisfactory out-
come of the operations. Mikko Karjalainen argues in his dissertation that the close 
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236 14.DE:n kirj. PM:n Op.os:lle 106/III/68/L. 1544/29.1.1943, the war diary of General Head-
quarters, 1 January–June 1943, p. 894. The Department of Military History, the National Defence 
University. 
237 PM:n no. 45/Op.1/5.d/sal./12.1.1943, the war diary of General Headquarters, 1 January –30 
June 1943, p. 878 and attachments to the war diary of General Headquarters 551–600, 26 Sep-
tember 1942–24 March 1943, the Department of Military History, the National Defence University. 
See also Karjalainen (2009), p. 246. 
238 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 238. 
239 MaaRE:n no. 717/III/5 sal./2.3.1943, T 9074/4, KA. See also Karjalainen (2009), p. 246 and 
Tynkkynen (1996), p. 239. 
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control exercised by the operational leadership of General Headquarters also played 
a role in the outcome. After all, in assuming the leadership of the operations, Gen-
eral Headquarters also assumed responsibility for their outcome.240 It is easy to 
agree with the conclusions of both Tynkkynen and Karjalainen. 
 
On these grounds, Operation Forest Felling, the only guerrilla operation led by 
General Headquarters, produced modest results. With regard to tactics, the enemy 
proved more sophisticated and a great deal more active. The basic idea – that the 
Finnish soldier is a natural born guerrilla fighter – also proved to be unfounded. 
This operation also showed that, in spite of excellent planning, guerrilla-type activi-
ties carried out on the divisional level require thorough specialised training. In any 
event, this operation provided valuable experiences that were taken into accounts in 
the decades following the Continuation War. In a similar manner to the large-scale 
divisional level guerrilla-type activities, General Headquarters also exercised tight 
control over combat reconnaissance and long-range patrolling in the enemy’s rear.  
 
 
Guerrilla-type activities and lessons learned during the Continuation War 
 
Compared with the enemy, Finnish guerrilla-type activities were more passive during 
the Continuation War. Nonetheless, experiences gained from the Continuation War 
provided support for the conclusions drawn from the Winter War, which found that 
using guerrilla-type activities, even on a modest scale and in one way or another, had 
in most cases contributed positively to the outcome of battles.241 However, there 
were other experiences, as evidenced by Operation Forest Felling. However, the key 
lesson learned during the Continuation War was the fact that officers and NCOs in 
particular must be provided with training in peacetime, without forgetting the func-
tional basic training of the men.242 Only in this way would the standardisation of 
guerrilla-type activities, their integration into all combat operations and their man-
agement be feasible. The conclusions drawn from experiences gained from guerrilla-
type activities during the Continuation War were perfectly in line with those ob-
tained from the Winter War and presented as early as spring 1941.  
 
During the period of static warfare, the purpose of guerrilla-type activities was no 
longer to defeat the enemy at an appropriate moment; rather, their objective was to 
solidify Finnish defences and to carry out anti-partisan operations. The Finns, in 
their turn, were now operating in a terrain that they were unfamiliar with, par-
ticularly in the areas lying north of Lake Ladoga. However, guerrilla-type activities, 
carried out on a modest scale as they were, clearly had an impact on the enemy. 
Over the course of the Continuation War, attempts were made to integrate guerrilla-
type activities into other military operations and to concentrate their leadership on 
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240 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 239. Karjalainen (2009), p. 246. 
241 Katso esim. Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta no.t 1–86 (‘Tactical information, etc., on the enemy, 
no. 1–86’), the General Headquarters Training Division, T 17654/14, KA. 
242 See, among others, Käynnissä olevan sodan positiivisia kokemuksia sissitoiminnasta (‘On positive expe-
riences gained from the war in progress’), an undated memorandum, Väinö Volanen’s private col-
lection, Pk 1401/2, KA. This private collection focusing on guerrilla-type activities and long-range 
patrolling also contains dozens of other reports of experiences gained from the Continuation War, 
used as training material on guerrilla courses arranged in 1942 and 1943. 
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the General Headquarters. Although the objective was to make guerrilla-type acti-
vities part of other combat operations, the measures taken by the various divisions 
were found to be incoherent, in terms of both tactics and planning.243 The reasons 
behind the change and development in thinking regarding the art of war during the 
static period of the Continuation War were the experiences gained by then, but, 
from a wider perspective, a change in the nature of the defensive battle, brought 
about by the static warfare, also played a role. 
 
During the Continuation War, guerrilla-type activities were limited mainly to opera-
tions carried out by long-range patrol units directly under the leadership of General 
Headquarters, although patrols primarily carried out long-range reconnaissance mis-
sions in the enemy rear. However, there were exceptions. They included the de-
stroying of the Petrovskij-Jam supply centre, carried out in December 1942 in ac-
cordance with the principles of guerrilla-type activities under the leadership of Ilmari 
Honkanen, attacks on Mai Guba and the Murmansk railroad, carried out in Febru-
ary 1942 by Majewski Detachment, an attack on the Jeljärvi supply centre in March 
1943 by Puustinen Detachment, and an attempt to intensify guerrilla-type activities 
in front line sections located north of Lake Ladoga in spring 1943. However, the 
impact and outcome of such attacks during the Continuation War remained rather 
insignificant when viewed from the perspective of the art of war.244 The experiences 
gained showed that only a unit specifically trained for the task could succeed in the 
challenging tasks involving guerrilla-type activities. In light of all of the above, one 
might presume that the fundamentals of guerrilla-type activities and the art of guer-
rilla war had been used to a far greater extent than was actually the case in the de-
fensive battles in summer 1944; however, this was not the case in the divisions and 
the Frontier Guard units, due to the quick pace of the retreat.245  
 
During the war, attempts were also made to gather experiences gained from battles 
and to capture lessons learned. Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Järvinen, Chief of the Op-
erations Division of the Maanselkä Group, set an example in this respect in leading 
the gathering of experiences gained from the war. In accordance with an initiative 
announced in July 1942, the Headquarters of the Maanselkä Group ordered the di-
visions and troops under its command to respond to questions presented to them 
and to submit associated reports, in order to enable the gathering of experiences of 
war as soon as they became available.246 In the summaries sent by the troops, state-
ments similar to the following can be found: ‘The statements submitted by the divisions re-
veal that the experiences gained from the same issue, even from its details, were conflicting in many 
cases. Without tackling the reasons behind this, it can be stated that this summary takes a certain 
position with regard to such issues without presenting any grounds. ’247 On the basis of this, 
Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Järvinen, the officer in charge of the summaries and their 
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243 Ibid. 
244 Roiha (1973), pp. 22-24, SKK 1/1118, KA. 
245 Ibid, pp. 26–28 and 36–38. See also Kosonen – Pohjonen (1994), p. 302. 
246 Sotakokemuksia (‘Experiences of the war’), MaaRE:n no. 3192/III/7 sal./20.7.1942, a volume 
compiled of the copies of original documents, Department of Military History, National Defence 
University. 
247 Ibid. Liite 1, Jalkaväen taistelutoiminnan alalta saatuja sotakokemuksia, (‘Attachment 1, Experiences of 
war gained from infantry combat activity’), p. 1. 
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analyses, realised that there was an inherent risk in interpreting superficial experi-
ences, easily resulting in sweeping generalisations. 
 
While the experiences gathered by the Maanselkä Group did not underline guerrilla-
type activities, they were referred to –from viewpoint of the art of war –in connec-
tion with reconnaissance activity. The summary did discuss patrolling activity con-
ducted by both the Finnish army and the enemy, but only cursorily, without making 
any connection between it and guerrilla operations. The most important observa-
tions and experiences highlighted the importance of taking advantage of the terrain 
when operating in the enemy’s rear. ‘It is most advantageous to cross over the enemy lines 
under the cover of darkness. Then, the patrol can carry out its task in daylight in the enemy posi-
tions. After the patrol has carried out its task, it may return the following night, for example. 
When coming back, the patrol must not use the same route that they used when crossing over. Vio-
lent reconnaissance conducted using a force insufficient in strength for the purpose has produced poor 
results. Apparently, this can be attributed to the fact that leaders at all levels wanted to avoid un-
necessary casualties…’248 On one hand, guerrilla and reconnaissance operations carried 
out in the enemy’s rear were regarded as an efficient way of waging war. On the 
other hand, they were also thought to entail a high risk, leading to a situation where 
units were formed of volunteers of men who understood the risks associated with 
such tasks. 
 
In addition to gathering experiences from Finnish troops, observations and lessons 
were also obtained from other theatres of war during the Continuation War. A 
summary drafted in 1942, used as training material on guerrilla courses held at least 
in spring 1942, indicates that the Finns gathered experiences of the art of war, as 
viewed from the perspective of guerrilla-type activities, at least from the German, 
Soviet and Estonian fronts. When examining guerrilla-type activities carried out out-
side Finland, this memorandum focuses –for reasons that remain unclear –on Es-
tonia, where officers and men that had fled the Russians and taken refuge in forests, 
had launched successful guerrilla raids against the occupier. ‘In forests and swampland, 
guerrilla camps emerged, which –while the Russians (the pejorative word ‘ryssä’is used here) still 
occupied the country –controlled the adjoining areas and inflicted great harm and bloody losses on 
the Bolsheviks through their repeated attacks. When viewing the operations of the Estonian guerril-
las, we must bear in mind the difficult conditions under which the operations took place. The activi-
ties of Estonian guerrillas should not be overrated –the country was liberated by the Germans after 
all –but the scope of such activities was significant enough to deserve wider recognition.’249 While 
this memorandum, used as lecture material, is steeped in a kind of guerrilla ethos 
and pronounced defiance, it is nevertheless an indication of the fact that develop-
ments in the art of war and guerrilla-type activities were followed in Finland. It can-
not be said conclusively whether this was a systematic activity, ordered by General 
Headquarters, or just the addition of information obtained via foreign intelligence 
contacts to the collection of war experiences. 
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248 Ibid, pp. 10–11. 
249 Käynnissä olevan sodan positiivisia kokemuksia sissitoiminnasta (‘On positive experiences gained from 
the war in progress’), an undated memorandum, and the daily programme for the guerrilla leader 
course, arranged between 26 May and 1 June 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection, Pk 1401/2, 
KA. 
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The various archives offered a wealth of war experiences, as did the many bodies 
that had compiled archives, but it is difficult to make a difference between records 
that had been drafted during the war and those that had been put together only after 
the war. While a portion of the records had quite evidently been gathered and writ-
ten while the war was still going on, most of them had obviously been written and 
synthesised after the war. During the Continuation War, no records were complied 
of war experiences of pure guerrilla-type activities. However, individual observations 
and memoranda of guerrilla-type activities dating back to the Continuation War can 
be found.250 Perhaps the largest collection of war experiences that were compiled af-
ter the war can be found in the archives of the Training Division of the General 
Headquarters of the Defence Forces.251 This data set is based on an initiative put 
forth by Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Järvinen Järvinen in January 1945, proposing that 
the experiences of war be gathered and synthesised by division, thereby forming a 
basis for training and the work on drafting regulations, as well as for the develop-
ment of organisations, tactics, weaponry and other equipment.252  
 
The experiences gained from the war were gathered and compiled in accordance 
with Järvinen’s initiative during spring 1945. Material submitted by all units includes 
individual documents focused solely on guerrilla-type activities.253 All the memo-
randa mentioned above were brief, only a few pages in length, and quite cursory ac-
counts of guerrilla-type activities carried out during the Continuation War.254 An ex-
amination of the material reveals the troops and staffs had left the editing and syn-
thesising of the data unfinished. The memoranda contained few comments on the 
content of the war experiences gathered and on the views put forth in them. Fur-
thermore, the war experiences also contained a great number of conflicting views. 
Therefore, as early as in spring 1945, discussion events were arranged for officers at 
garrisons, enabling commanders from the divisional level downward, who had 
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250 See, for example, Väinö Volanen’s private collection, Pk 1401/2, KA, and Eino Penttälä’s pri-
vate collection, Pk 2109/3, KA. 
251 See the collection compiled PvPE (‘the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces’) 
of the experiences of war in 1945, T 18002/8–13, KA. 
252 PvPE:n no. 256/Jv./43/22.1.1945, T 17655/13, KA. At the time Järvinen proposed his initia-
tive, he held the post of the head of the office of the inspector of the infantry. Järvinen, Y. A., an 
extract from personal details, no. 25164, KA.  
253 The collection compiled PvPE (‘the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces’) of 
the experiences of war in 1945, T 18002/8–13, KA. 
254 See, for example Sissitoiminta (by Captain Erkki Pajukoski) (‘Guerrilla-type activities’), Suuren sis-
siosaston marssilevon järjestäminen (‘Organising a rest for a large guerrilla jaeger unit on a march’), and 
Venäläisten käyttämä tapa selustassa toimivan sissiosaston paluumarssin katkaisemiseksi (‘The method that 
the Russians use to cut off the return march of a guerrilla jaeger unit operating in their rear’) (by 
Major T.J.Puustinen), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experienc-
es of the war, 1st Division, T 18002/8, KA. Sissitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type activities’) (by Lieutenant 
Matti Pentti), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the 
war, 2 Division, T 18002/9, KA. Guerrilla-type activities (Major O. Waris and Captain G. E. 
Susiaho), Vakinaiset vai tilapäisesti kokoonpannut sissiosastot? (‘Permanent or temporary guerrilla jaeger 
units?’), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the war, 
3rd Division, T 18002/10, KA. Sissitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type activities’) (Lieutenant Colonel G. 
Blomqvist), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the 
war, the Helsinki Military Province, T 18002/11, KA. The material gathered also includes several 
experiences related to long-range reconnaissance and patrolling with references to guerrilla-type ac-
tivities. 
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served on the front, to put forth and justify their views on experiences gained from 
war.255 At each event, minutes were kept in which comments on the presentation of 
the introducer, any dissenting opinions and conclusions were entered.256 
 
The benefits and lessons learned from the experiences gained from war, gathered 
immediately after the Continuation War, can be summed up by the following fun-
damental questions: should guerrilla-type activities be carried out using small or 
large units? Should guerrilla-type activities be led by General Headquarters or by the 
staff a division or a unit below it responsible for a specific area? Should guerrilla-
type activities be integrated into other combat or should they be a separate ope-
ration? Should guerrilla-type activities be geared towards reconnaissance and sec-
ondarily towards demolition, or vice versa? While these questions were given some 
thought immediately after the war, they were pondered in a more serious way in the 
early 1950s, when the groundwork for the regional defence principle was laid.  
 
 
Experiences transformed into guidebooks 
 
A wealth of experiences was accumulated of patrolling during the wars between 
1939 and 1944, but a uniform and detailed regulation on long-range patrolling was 
slow in coming. Major Paul Marttina, who had been engaged in reconnaissance and 
patrolling tasks during the Winter War, wanted to compile war experiences into a 
guidebook, in order to create a homogeneous foundation for the training of long-
range patrolmen. The first draft for the guidebook on long-range patrolling was fi-
nally completed in spring 1944, and was adopted for training on 1 June 1944. In the 
foreword, Marttina justifies the need for the guidebook as follows: ‘When we are con-
sidering a form of activity that is undergoing such a rapid transformation, certain caution must be 
exercised when issuing permanent instruction for it. On the other hand, entirely ignoring them can-
not be justified; we have gained, after all, considerable experience of this activity.’257  
 
The writer of the guidebook, Major Paul (Pauli) Marttina, was an experienced long-
range patrolman, and had proposed many of the ideas that had been put in practice. 
In addition to the ‘kinship wars’–Finnish military expeditions to Eastern Karelia 
around 1920 – he had gained war experience related to reconnaissance from the 
Winter War, during which served at the Kajaani suboffice, or Detachment Marttina, 
which was part of the intelligence organisation of General Headquarters. It was, 
therefore, no coincidence that Captain Paul Marttina had drafted a letter, addressed 
to the chief of the Intelligence Division of General Headquarters and dated 25 No-
vember 1939, in which he proposed that a unit with special training in guerrilla-type 
activities and reconnaissance be formed.258 Marttina was promoted to the rank of 
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255 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 283–284. 
256 Alustukset ja ups. keskustelutilaisuuksien pöytäkirjat 1945 (‘Introductions and minutes of the discus-
sion events arranged for the officers in 1945’), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 
T 18002/6–7, KA. 
257 Kaukopartio-opas (KapO) (‘Guidebook for long-range patrols’), ErP 4:n no. 1509/II/Sal. (Puolus-
tusvoimat, 9457), T 5973/8, KA. 
258 Janhila, Jaana: Sissisotaa kaukopartiossa – Osasto Marttinan partiokertomukset 1941–1942 (‘Guerrilla 
warfare as waged by long-range patrols – patrol reports submitted by Marttina Detachment in 
1941–1942’), Hämeenlinna 2009, pp. 45–47. 
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major in 1942. From 1943 onwards, he acted as the commander of the third com-
pany of the Separate Battalion 4 (Er.P 4). A total of 75 patrols deep into the ene-
my’s rear, organised and led during the Continuation War, are a testimony to Paul 
Marttina’s expertise in reconnaissance and demolition.259 Based on his experience, 
Major Marttina probably had the best expertise to compile and write a guide book 
on long-range patrolling. 
 
Labelled confidential and intended for use only by long-range patrol units, the 41-
page Kaukopartio-opas (KaPO) (‘Guidebook on long-range patrolling’) was organised 
into seven chapters, in addition to the foreword and introduction. Appended to the 
book was a chapter on how patrols should arrange their radio communications. 
While the guidebook is written in a simple and unpretentious style, there are some 
more prosaic passages. At the beginning of the guidebook, Marttina highlights the 
value of the book in a serious tone: ‘All new content included in this guidebook must be 
treated with respect, as it is based on experiences bought with the sweat and blood of courageous 
long-range patrolmen.’In other sections of the guidebook Marttina also underlines the 
importance of training and experience. This is well in line with his own expertise on 
long-range patrolling.260 
 
The fact that the Continuation War had ended in the late summer 1944 in victory in 
a defensive battle taught the practitioners of the Finnish art of war an important les-
son. Success factors of warfare include, as an essential part, the active control of the 
battlefield, the importance of reconnaissance, guerrilla-type activities in the enemy’s 
rear, the willingness to fight even when the enemy is superior in strength, and the 
effectiveness of unconventional methods. From this perspective, Kaukopartio-opas is 
a highly interesting contemporary document, the influence of which extended far in-
to the postwar years. The manuscript of the guidebook was supplemented, and it 
was introduced for course material on officers’ intelligence courses after the war 
under the name Näkökohtia kaukopartioinnista (‘Viewpoints on long-range patrol-
ling’).261  
 
Finnish expertise on long-range patrolling was also put to good use outside Finland 
after the war. As an example of this, it is worth mentioning the contribution to the 
development of the skills of the US army to fight under winter conditions in the 
1940s and 1950s made by Finnish officers such as Alpo Marttinen, Antero Aakkula 
and many others who had been involved in what is known as the Weapons Cache 
Case in Finnish history and who had emigrated to the United States and enrolled in 
the US armed forces. One of the ways that the U.S. Army tapped into the expertise 
of the Finnish soldiers was to take advantage of their skills in winter warfare and the 
experience that they had gained from long-range patrolling. According to docent 
Pasi Tuunanen, Staff Sergeant Alpo Marttinen drafted, together with Sergeant Ante-
ro Aakkula and Sergeant Sulo Uitto, confidential instructions for the US Army on 
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260 Kaukopartio-opas (KapO) (‘Guidebook for long-range patrols’), p.1, ErP 4:n no. 1509/II/Sal. 
(Puolustusvoimat, 9457), T 5973/8, KA.  
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long-range patrolling, based on Finnish experiences of war, naming the instructions 
Long Distance Patrolling Under Subarctic Conditions: experiences in Russo-Finnish War 1939–
1944. These instructions, drafted under Marttinen’s direction, were used in the train-
ing of US special troops in the 1950s, because the provided models were based on 
practical experience and guidelines for operating in the enemy’s rear.262 It should be 
noted that these instructions compiled by Alpo Marttinen in 1949 had several paral-
lels to Kaukopartio-opas, written by Paul Marttina in 1944.263 
 
During Finland’s wars, long-range patrolling entailed, to a large degree, reconnais-
sance carried out behind the enemy’s front line, but it also included features typical 
of guerrilla-type activities. Even before the Winter War, guerrilla-type activities had 
been regarded as an efficient fighting method, and this notion was reinforced during 
the Continuation War. Long-range reconnaissance and associated guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, as part of future wars, were also given consideration. Long-range reconnais-
sance and guerrilla-type activities gained increased appreciation as soldiers were fully 
aware that in view of postwar Finland and its shortage of materiel, the country 
would be inferior to the invader with regard to strength. Using unconventional 
methods such as long-range patrolling and systematic guerrilla-type activities, it was 
thought possible to balance the relative strengths and to create a deterrent what 
would send a message to the invader that Finland would be defended with all avail-
able means. 
 
 
3.3. Dispersed storage of weapons – the last major guerrilla operation of the 
Continuation War 
 
From a national perspective, the experiences gained from Finland’s wars exercised 
major influence later, promoting the integration of guerrilla-type activities into con-
ventional warfare. During the final days of the Continuation War, preparations initi-
ated for the worst-case scenario –an attempt by the Soviet Union to occupy Finland 
that was in the process of detaching itself from the war –led to the dispersed stor-
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262 TGGS FT. Riley, KS, no. 6B/60/1(c9)/26.4.1950, Long Distance Patrolling Under Subarctic 
Conditions: experiences in Russo-Finnish War 1939–1944, (a 17-page memorandum dating back to 
1949, written by Alpo Marttinen, Antero Aakkula and Sulo Uitto), US Army Military History Insti-
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KA. 
 
78 
age of weapons and to a train of events that today is better known by the name of 
the Weapons Cache Case.264  
 
The retreat of the Finnish army would have led to a situation where battles were 
fought in the interior of Finland or to the complete occupation of the country. In 
such circumstances, the evacuation of the civilian population, out of the way of 
combat, would have been impossible. The only option was to prepare for guerrilla-
type activities or even guerrilla war, both of which required the large-scale storage of 
materiel in the interior of Finland. Such activities would require high-quality com-
manders who were familiar with local conditions and who were to create their sup-
port areas and a force committed to resistance out of local inhabitants Usko Sakari 
Haahti told Matti Lukkari later, during an interview, that even armed support by the 
civilian population was brought up in discussions, although the officers involved ba-
sically believed in guerrilla-type activities rather than in a total guerrilla war. If the 
field army had been unable to mount a defence in fixed positions, materiel stores 
would have enabled entire units to stay behind in the enemy’s rear, continuing 
fighting by taking advantage of bases and the terrain but not attempting to hold a 
particular position.265   
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randum on the caching of weapons, Paris, 20 August 1953), and Kertomus aseiden ja sotamateriaalin 
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nel Nihtilä between 12 March and 16 May 1972, gathered by Pertti Kilkki, Valo Nihtilä’s private 
collection, Pk 1969, KA. 
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Finland’s military situation was also closely followed beyond the Finnish borders in 
summer 1944. Particularly in Sweden, the ability of the Finnish field army to fend 
off the enemy and the measures taken by General Headquarters were kept under 
close scrutiny. After having received an invitation to give a presentation on the mili-
tary developments occurring in the early summer 1944 to the Swedish government, 
Carl August Ehrensvärd, Chief of Staff of the Swedish Defence Forces, made an in-
teresting journal entry on 26 June 1944, which hints at the possibility of guerrilla 
warfare: ‘Before I set out for the government meeting, I talked to Stewen, who told me that the 
Russians had broken through a few kilometres away from Tali. He did not believe that the assis-
tance given by Germany would make any difference. Exactly so; I also thought that this would only 
prolong the course of events while achieving nothing more. Assistance from Germany and a powerful 
resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare would make sense, if a political turn for the better were in 
sight. However, nothing of the sort is in sight. Finis Finlandiae, and Sweden in a very difficult po-
sition.’266 
 
Without going into the details of the implementation, detection and failure of weap-
ons caching, it can be stated that this ‘secret operation’was proof of the wide-
ranging utilisation of the core competence of General Headquarters, the art of war. 
The complex arrangements devised by the key personnel of the Operational Divi-
sion of the wartime General Headquarters can, therefore in hindsight, be regarded 
as preparations made for guerrilla-type activities by 30–35 000 to in the face of a 
possible occupation.267 
 
In light of the facts stated above, and as the history that Finland had shared with 
Russia was looming large in the background, Finland resorted to or rather, was 
forced to resort to, the dispersed storage of weapons, and if necessary, methods of 
guerrilla warfare. When looking at the structure of this operation and the assump-
tions behind the preparations, weapons caching can be said to have aimed at taking 
up guerrilla-type activities on a large scale, or even at a limited guerrilla war. When 
the foundations of the operations are compared with theories of guerrilla warfare 
which were known at the time, the international connection becomes evident. Matti 
Lukkari also draws similar conclusions in his study on weapons caching.268  
 
The threat of imminent occupation dissipated during the winter of 1944–1945, but 
the weapons caching organisation continued its work until its operations gradually 
became public. It is crucial to recognise that the preparations made for recon-
naissance and guerrilla-type activities were kept secret. Such preparations were not 
directly prohibited by the Moscow Armistice, or even restricted by later treaties, alt-
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266 With Stewen, Ehrenssvärd refers to Martin Stewen, Finland’s military attaché in Stockholm. Eh-
rensvärd, Carl August: Dagboksanteckningar 1938–1957, Stockholm 1991, p. 219. 
267 The recollections of Colonel Nihtilä between 12 March and 16 may 1972, gathered by Pertti Kil-
kki, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969, KA. 
268 Lukkari (1984), pp. 19–20. Matti Lukkari writes as follows: ‘Although the guiding principle was based 
on Finnish starting points, it was supported by examples gained from outside Finland. While we had gained experi-
ence of Russian partisan activities on our fronts but, as there was no civilian population present, we did not obtain 
any examples of how the army and the population could collaborate. On the other hand, information from the Ger-
man eastern front indicated that the collaboration of combat troops and the population, particularly in a terrain cov-
ered by trees and shrub, produced excellent results. Information received from Yugoslavia pointed in the same direc-
tion.’ 
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hough in the same connection, work on the development of a secret military intelli-
gence network spanning the entire country began .269 The secretive nature of the 
weapons caching operation and the serious and doubtful attitude that the officers 
who participated in it harboured towards the Soviet Union, even after decades after 
the fact are well illustrated by the accompanying note that Valo Nihtilä addressed to 
his son Rainer Nihtilä and enclosed in his own notes. ‘Rainer, these notes must be kept 
for later days. At an appropriate moment, they should be made public. Such a moment would be 
when the Russians (the pejorative word ‘ryssä’ is used here) no longer have the upper hand. This 
may take a long time; in other words, I will leave discretion to you.’270  
 
The Weapons Cache Case may also have had direct consequences on the develop-
ment of guerrilla-type activities. Although the development work on guerrilla war-
fare, conducted during Finland’s wars, had produced a number of experiences, it 
had nevertheless remained quite incomplete. Therefore, the drafters of the new field 
regulation, then under revision, intended to write a chapter dedicated to guerrilla-
type activities as early as in 1945, at a time when the plans behind weapons caching 
were coming to light. An assignment, calling for the compilation of a separate 
guidebook on guerrilla-type activities, can also be dated to the same year.271 Howev-
er, this work was left unfinished when the organisation formed by those involved in 
the caching of weapons was revealed, and the officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi, 
who had been ordered to write the guidebook and who had participated in caching, 
resigned his commission.272 
 
Taken together, the Weapons Cache Case was an example of operational work con-
ducted by staff in its purest form. Preparations for the worst-case scenario were 
made, using all available means. However, it is difficult give an unambiguous as-
sessment of the caching of weapons. The personal sacrifice of the officers who par-
ticipated in the caching of weapons were significant, as many of them lost their ca-
reer, health and even their families, in addition to being sentenced to prison. How-
ever, it is evident that the caching of weapons tempered intentions to change the 
Finnish social order by violent means. If such preparations had been left undone in 
autumn 1944, the officers at General Headquarters would have neglected their du-
ties. The weapons caching operation was a warning to the enemy and, simul-
taneously, a manifestation of the art of war as applied to guerrilla-type activities. The 
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269 Kertomus aseiden ja sotamateriaalin hajavarastoinnista eli asekätkennästä ja sen loppuselvittelystä (‘An ac-
count of the dispersed storage of weapons and military materiel, in other word, the weapons cach-
ing case and its final settlement’), Helsinki 12.4.1970, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969/3–
4, KA. See also Visuri, Pekka: Suomi kylmässä sodassa (‘Finland in the Cold War’), Keuruu 2006, pp. 
61–62. 
270 A hand-written cover letter by Valo Nihtilä, addressed to his son; Valo Nihtilä’s private col-
lection Pk 1969/3–4, KA.   
271 In the preliminary content of the field regulation, guerrilla-type activities and anti-guerrilla opera-
tions were listed under headings of their own; the chief of the Operations Division of General 
Headquarters, Valo Nihtilä, appointed Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi as the author of this chapter. 
See Tiedoituksia ohjesääntötyöhön osallistuville (‘Notifications for those participating in the work on field 
regulations’), PvPE:n no. 2060/Koul.2/21/25.5.1945, and Attachments 1 and 2, T 18751, KA. 
272 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 338–339. Susi, Sulo Vilho, an extract from personal details, no. 44859, 
KA. 
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chain of events and its aftermath marked the development of and lent experiences 
to guerrilla-type activities. 
  
 
3.4. Summary of the development of guerrilla-type activities from 1939 to 
1944 
 
After theoretical thinking in literature during the first decades of independent Fin-
land had translated into guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War, such activities al-
so gained a foothold in instructions and training. Guerrilla-type activities –with 
their innovations, carried out in the early phase of the Winter War – proved that the 
opportunities they offered by such activities were assessed in the right way. Al-
though patrolling and guerrilla-type activities, viewed from the perspective of con-
temporary tactics, cannot be regarded as having had a homogeneous form, they had 
great local significance on the Winter War. The concepts regarding guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, with all its definitions, also developed along independent lines. Although the 
definitions were based on facts tested in practice, characterisations of guerrilla-type 
activities labelling them as the most efficient method of fighting in Finnish condi-
tions began to emerge during the Winter War. With regard to the terrain, guerrilla-
type activities were found to be best suited to Ladoga Karelia and the areas even 
further north. However, it should be noted that there were practically no examples 
of the impact of guerrilla-type activities on an enemy deploying armoured troops. In 
hindsight, it is also possible to find evidence of a change in the character of guerril-
la-type activities towards the end of the Winter War when guerrilla-type activities in-
creasingly took on the characteristics of patrolling. Although in light of contempo-
rary tactics patrolling did not represent a guerrilla-type activities in their purest form, 
they nevertheless had a certain significance in obtaining reconnaissance information.  
 
During the Interim Peace, the development of the capacity of the field army was ex-
tended to the reorganisation and training of the troops, whereby guerrilla-type activ-
ities as a method of fighting, in light of experiences gained from the war, were given 
increasingly serious thought. The Winter War, after all, had been a reality check, 
showing that guerrilla-type activities required a certain number of troops and that 
they needed to be part of the standing army. Although a great number of proposals 
for improvement regarding general tactical principles were made, the foundations of 
guerrilla-type activities were not changed in any appreciable manner, due to the 
short period of time. However, gathering experiences of the war in particular was 
part of an important development effort, which was later continued and the results 
of which were put to good use during the Continuation War. 
 
During the Continuation War, long-range patrolling in the rear area of the Soviet 
troops in particular became more systematic and better planned when compared 
with the Winter War. Although long-range patrolling during the Continuation War 
was efficient, it cannot be equated with the concept of guerrilla-type activities. Guer-
rilla-type activities were the responsibility of the divisions, which carried out such 
activities in varying ways, as part of their other operations. This is why the guerrilla-
type activities related to the fighting of front-line troops never assumed really organ-
ised forms during the Continuation War. An attempt by General Headquarters to 
intensify guerrilla-type activities by the divisions, under its own leadership in the 
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form of Operation Forest Felling, never produced the results set for them. In plac-
es, casualties were all too severe in regard to the objectives. The adversary learned 
lessons about the Finnish art of war, enabling the Soviets to organise and intensify 
their partisan activities, which in turn forced the Finns to change the principles of 
guerrilla-type activities. During the closing weeks of the Continuation War and dur-
ing the Lapland War, guerrilla-type activities played a very minor role. There were 
attempts to resort to guerilla tactics and there were individual instances, but, from a 
wider perspective, they remained quite insignificant. The general progress of the war 
dictated the way guerrilla-type activities could be used.  
 
Over the course of the Continuation War, perhaps the most important practical 
measure towards preparing for a guerrilla war was the gathering of experiences 
gained from the war and their systematic analysis. In calculations based on experi-
ences and theories, the effectiveness of unconventional methods and the opportuni-
ties that they offered for Finnish tactics were also recognised The attention of mili-
tary experts was focused on the results and methods of guerrilla-type activities, in-
cluding their influence on the combat against the enemy, when the defender was in-
ferior in strength. Even before the Winter War, guerrilla-type activities had been re-
garded as an efficient fighting method, and this notion was reinforced during the 
Continuation War. Guerrilla-type activities also required skills and planning. Troops 
intended for guerrilla-type activities needed to receive specialised training and un-
dergo exercises before experiencing real action. Training given to guerrilla jaeger 
units formed of volunteers after the war had already broken out proved insufficient.  
 
While the results of guerrilla-type activities during the Continuation War remained 
limited, they nevertheless provided valuable experiences. Along the sections of the 
front line north of Lake Ladoga, guerrilla-type activities carried out during the static 
period of the warfare were later assessed, to have been, a tactical viewpoint, more 
combat patrolling or combat reconnoitring than guerrilla-type activities, necessitated 
by the thin manning of the defence line. The conditions led to this change in the na-
ture or operations. In the north in particular, guerrilla jaeger patrols simply failed to 
penetrate the line that the enemy had set up to secure their positions, let alone reach 
areas located deeper to the enemy’s rear. True, the means to penetrate such secure 
lines without casualties, as the war wore on, had become available but, as the course 
of the war turned into a retreat for the Finns in summer 1944, there were no oppor-
tunities to test them in practice. As an example of such means, the use of an escort 
unit in support or a unit about to engage in combat reconnaissance can be men-
tioned.  
 
It was not until the Weapons Cache Affair, carried out in the aftermath of the Con-
tinuation War, that it became strategically and theoretically evident from the view-
point of the art of war that Finland was making preparations for guerrilla-type activ-
ities and, if necessary, for guerrilla warfare. However, from the viewpoint of the art 
of war, the focus of guerrilla-type activities during the Continuation War can be said 
have to been on long-range patrolling, conducted under the leadership of General 
Headquarters. Furthermore, the intensification of guerrilla-type activities north of 
Lake Ladoga, carried out during the static phase of warfare, known as Operation 
Forest Felling, was planned and led by General Headquarters. Long-range patrolling 
was largely confined to long-range reconnaissance activities conducted in the ene-
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my’s rear, as operations seeking to inflict destruction on the enemy were deemed, by 
the General Headquarters, to jeopardise the continuation of all the long-range pa-
trolling operations due to casualties that they could possibly inflict. Crash training 
was no substitute for replacing experienced long-range patrolmen. In hindsight, it 
can be estimated that Finnish long-range patrols tied up as many as 10,000 Soviet 
troops to secure their rear areas. In other words, training in guerrilla tactics and put-
ting such tactics to good use played a significant role in long-range patrol activities 
during the Continuation War. 
 
According to an old adage, there is no single formula for tactics, and a successful so-
lution to one tactic is no recipe for another. In view of the endlessly versatile oppor-
tunities offered by guerrilla-type activities in particular, there was no readily available 
panacea or a general solution, if the experiences of Finland’s wars are to be believed. 
Guerrilla-type activities, conducted during the wars that Finland had waged, provid-
ed important guidelines for the formulation of the general principles of the Finnish 
art of war, which were put to good use after the wars, especially when the principles 
of the territorial defence system were being devised. 
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4. GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES AND GUERRILLA         
WARFARE 
 
 
 
4.1. The difficult aftermath of the wars and the preparations made between 
1944 and 1946 for the worst-case scenario 
 
In late summer 1944 Finland had managed, but just barely, to repel a large-scale at-
tack by the Soviet Union, aimed to detach Finland from the war and to force the 
country to accept an unconditional surrender. Harsh battles on the Karelian Isth-
mus, the army’s retreat to a defensive line located further behind in the rear, the 
bending of the defensive line, and the large-scale battle waged at Tali–Ihantala had 
consumed the resources of the field army. However, from the perspective of the art 
of war, the hard experiences of the war that the Finnish army had gained had signif-
icantly improved its tactical and operational skills.273 Such experiences can justifiably 
be regarded as one of the guarantees of the quality of the Finnish art of war. How-
ever, these experiences were not commensurable as manifestations of the art of war, 
as the terrain and circumstances greatly influenced the way experiences could be 
used.274  
 
Politically, the final days of the war were difficult. As the Finnish defences were on 
the brink of collapsing in June 1944 after the Soviet Union had launched its offen-
sive, Risto Ryti, the President of Finland, signed an agreement known as the Ryti–
Ribbentrop agreement, in order to secure continued German military aid for Fin-
land. In order to secure the supplies of arms and war materiel from Germany, Ryti 
also agreed not to sign a separate peace agreement with the Soviet Union. It was on-
ly after the Soviet offensive had waned on the Karelian Isthmus that Finland’s lead-
ership saw the military situation take a turn for the better, enabling them to take the 
decision to seek peace, to detach from the war and to quit the alliance with Germa-
ny.275  
 
August 1944 saw the Finnish army carry out its last major operation during the Con-
tinuation War as it launched a major operation in Ilomantsi, resorting in part to 
guerrilla-type activities and applying the means of the Finnish art of war, that is tac-
tical theory, its practical implementation and innovative methods. This operation, 
along with the defensive victory achieved on the Karelian Isthmus, laid the founda-
tions for a better negotiating position when Finland attempted to detach itself from 
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273 Manninen, Ohto: Rintaman vakiintumisesta välirauhaan (‘From the stabilisation of the front to the 
Interim Peace’), an article in the book Jatkosodan historia, 5. osa (‘The history of the Continuation 
War, part 5’), Porvoo 1992, pp. 354–359. See also Raunio, Ari: Sotatoimet – Suomen sotien 1939–1945 
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the war. After all, the Finnish army managed to destroy almost two entire enemy di-
visions over the course of a battle waged in the wilderness of Ilomantsi, applying the 
tactics that an inferior party must apply.276 After the military situation had stabilised 
in August 1944, the Ribbentrop agreement became unnecessary, and President Ryti 
stepped down. Mannerheim was appointed president on 6 August 1944 after par-
liament had passed an emergency law regarding the issue. In his capacity as presi-
dent, Mannerheim was now in a position in which he could dissociate himself from 
an agreement that his predecessor had signed, one forbidding Finland to sign a sep-
arate peace agreement and to accept an armistice with the Soviet Union. The trust 
that Mannerheim enjoyed was also expected to ensure that the negotiations with the 
Soviet Union would not be regarded as a betrayal.277 Mannerheim’s presidency was 
also believed to guarantee that the Finnish Defence Forces would comply with the 
Peace Treaty. Ostensibly this was the case, but the dispersed storage of weapons –
the Weapons Cache Case – indicates that the safeguarding of Finland’s independ-
ence by all available means was not solely dependent on Mannerheim’s persona.278  
 
After bitter battles, the armistice that Finland desperately needed was signed on 5 
September, and hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union were officially 
terminated. Finland’s representatives were invited to the Moscow peace talks, over 
the course of which the Soviet Union in practice unilaterally dictated the terms of 
peace to Finland. The Allies had demanded that a comprehensive peace treaty be 
drafted between all the belligerents at a common peace conference, but Finland and 
the Soviet Union signed a separate Interim Peace Treaty on 19 September 1944.279 De-
spite the fact that the war had ended, the Interim Peace Treaty placed Finland’s de-
fence capabilities, compared with the battles, in a completely new and difficult situa-
tion. In addition to the internment of German forces in Finland, the claims for rep-
arations and the cession of Finnish territory to the Soviet Union, the terms of the 
Interim Peace Treaty stipulated that the Finnish Defence Forces must be demobi-
lised under an accelerated schedule by 5 December 1944. Despite proposals made 
by the Finns, the Allied Control Commission that had arrived in Finland demanded 
that the organisation and composition of the Finnish Defence Forces be returned to 
that of the Finnish army before the Winter War. According to the requirements set 
for Finland, the total strength of the Finnish Defence Force should not exceed 
37,000 men. The manpower of the army was set at 26,000 men, with the combined 
strength of the coastal defences, the navy and the air force being only 11,000 
men.280  
 
Problems and challenges abounded. Among other things, the Civil Guard orga-
nisation was disbanded on 3 November 1944, and the organisation of the Defence 
Forces was restored in a general outline to the divisional organisation they had had 
in 1939 by early 1945. The organisation of the Finnish Defence Forces, formed im-
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mediately after the war, still reflected in part the wartime organisation, consisting of 
three divisions and a reserve formation, of separate arms, and of an organisation re-
quired by mobilisation. The army comprised three divisions and a light brigade, all 
under the command of an army corps. The air force comprised four flying regi-
ments, two anti-aircraft regiments and a signal battalion. The navy consisted of the 
naval units proper, a coastal artillery regiment, three fortification areas, and two na-
val bases. For mobilisation and conscription purposes, the territorial organisation 
that had been in place in the 1930s was reintroduced.281 In a speech broadcast on 
radio on the Day of Independence in 1944, Prime Minister J.K.Paasikivi painted a 
bleak picture of Finland being at the bottom of a dark valley, in a position in which it 
had ended up as a result of a war that it had lost. This simile provides a grim snap-
shot of the predominant sentiment among the Finnish people and the Defence For-
ces alike282 
 
To ensure that Finland comply with the terms of the Interim Peace Treaty, an Allied 
Control Commission (or LVK, being the Finnish abbreviation for the Commission) 
was set up for the country.283 In addition to the terms of the Interim Peace treaty, 
the Control Commission issued numerous orders which put restrictions on the De-
fence Forces, although the Treaty did not, at the time, contain any detailed re-
strictions on the quality or number of weapons 284 From the perspective of the Fin-
nish defence capability, the execution of the terms of the Interim Peace Treaty 
brought three key issues into consideration: the dispersed storage of weapons in or-
der to ensure that a mobilisation could be carried out; the interpretation of the order 
issued by the General Headquarters in 1945, prohibiting any preparations for a mo-
bilisation; and the ultimate fate and storage of the surplus military materiel checked 
in for storage by the demobilised field army. Examining such issues now, points can 
be found that link them to the development of the territorial defence system, the 
ensuing adoption of the methods of guerrilla warfare, the development of guerrilla-
type activities, and their inclusion in Finland’s defence doctrine. 
 
The chief of the Ground Forces Office of the Operations Division of the General 
Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Usko Sakari Haahti, drafted in August 1944, by 
order of Lieutenant General A.F.Airo, a memorandum on the measures that should 
have been taken if the invasion of the Soviet Union had broken through the Finnish 
defences and the Soviet troops had advanced into the interior of Finland. The con-
clusions of the memorandum were based on an operating model under which guer-
rilla-type activities would be launched in areas occupied by the enemy. In other 
words, plans existed for organised guerrilla-type activities and preparations for mo-
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bilisation, but their details were confined to a limited circle of officers. The dis-
persed storage of weapons was part of this plan.285  
 
While the confidential weapons caching operation was still in progress, the Ope-
rations Division of the General Headquarters began to consider adapting its mobi-
lisation plans to the current situation. With regard to materiel, this plan was in part 
based on dispersed weapon and munition caches. The three-phase plan was divided 
into the covering of mobilisation, the reinforcement of troops in a training compo-
sition up to the level of light infantry brigades, and the establishment of the princi-
pal parts of the field army using materiel in the central stores. From the perspective 
of guerrilla-type activities, the important aspect of the plan was the fact that it was 
prepared to use battalions equipped with cached materiel in guerrilla-type activi-
ties.286 Although the Operations Division was just drafting plans and not making 
any practical preparations, the situation can be said to have been quite peculiar, to 
say the least. Simultaneously with the clandestine caching of weapons, the General 
Headquarters of the Defence Forces issued an order that stopped any further prepa-
rations for a mobilisation and the drafting of operational plans.287 This was partly 
due to pressure exerted by the Control Commission and the active inspections that 
it carried out at various headquarters and garrisons. 
 
After the direct threat of occupation was over in winter 1945, the General Head-
quarters of the Defence Forces began investigating possibilities for destocking the 
dispersed weapons caches and transporting the materiel to the depots of the De-
fence Forces. A decision was taken to postpone destocking to summer 1945, but, as 
the caching operation gradually became public following an information leak in Ou-
lu in May, a train of events was set in motion that sought to cover up the clandestine 
preparations and destock the caches before the entire affair came to light in full. 
However, the entire weapons caching organisation, some caches and a portion of 
the plans were revealed in investigations carried out by the Control Commission and 
the Finnish Security Police which at the time was controlled by communists. This 
train of events was liable to lead to a deteriorate of the attitude of the Soviet Union 
towards Finland and its Defence Forces. The investigation of the case, accompanied 
by high-profile detentions and officers being sentenced to prison or forced to resign 
their commission, lasted for approximately three year.288  
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287 PvPE:n no. 170/Järj.2/5/9.1.1945, T 22520/Hh 47, KA. 
288 Visuri (1994), pp. 31–34. 
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While it is difficult to estimate all the effects of the Weapons Cache Case, it can be 
said that its repercussions were felt long after the war in that it, on the one hand, la-
belled the Defence Forces as untrustworthy in the eyes of Finland’s political leader-
ship and, on the other, proved that Finland was a nation that put stock in its inde-
pendence, even in the face of the Soviet might, and was prepared to fight occupa-
tion with every available means. In any event, the case served as a reminder to the 
Soviet Union that the Finnish art of war went beyond ordinary tactics and opera-
tional skills. If necessary, Finland was prepared to resort to large-scale guerrilla-type 
activities. Finland’s transition period from war to peacetime and the difficult post-
war situation lasted several years. After the Lapland War ended in April, the De-
fence Forces were definitively detached from the war by summer 1945. However, 
the real problems were only beginning.   
 
The Defence Forces had to give in under political pressure and change their threat 
scenarios. While, as late as autumn 1944 and spring 1945, the plans drafted under 
the direction of Colonel Valo Nihtilä were geared towards repelling a Soviet inva-
sion, the defensive doctrine became almost completely reversed, as evidenced by a 
memorandum drawn up in summer 1945. The new chief of the Operations Division 
of the General Headquarters, Colonel Olavi Huhtala, drafted a detailed memoran-
dum on Finland’s military position for the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces. In his memorandum, based on the prevailing circumstances, Huhtala dis-
cussed Finland’s position as the Soviet Union’s neighbour and the requirements that 
this fact set for adapting the country’s defence to comply with the new situation. In 
order to preserve its independence, Huhtala argued, Finland had to be prepared to 
defend its territory in a way that, if necessary, took account of the interest of the 
Soviet Union. In a war between the Allied countries, Finland needed to be prepared 
to defend its territory in a way that took account of the interests of the Soviet Un-
ion. In terms of threat scenarios and Finland’s defensive doctrine, the Defence 
Forces began to see the threat in the West –ostensibly at least.289  
 
 
The Defence Revision Committee and the discussions around the perceived 
need to change the defensive doctrine  
 
In May 1945, Finland’s Council of State set up a parliamentary-military committee 
to investigate the appropriateness of national defence under the prevailing circum-
stances and to propose possible measures for its reorganisation.290 The committee, 
named the Defence Revision Committee291, began its work under difficult condi-
tions, having been tasked to investigate the premises for the Peace Treaty negotia-
tions that were about to begin, and the threat of a possible defence alliance with the 
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289 PvPE:n op-os:n muistio sotilaallisesta asemastamme ja armeijan tehtävistä nykyoloissa 14.7.1945 (‘A memo-
randum by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters on our military position and the 
tasks of the army in the current conditions, 14 July 1945’), Olavi Huhtala’s private collection, Pk 
1366/3a., KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 291 and Tynkkynen (2006), p. 435. 
290 A letter by the Ministry of Defence regarding the setting up of the committee, dated on 24 May 
1945, T 19572/376, KA. See also Visuri, Pekka: Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan (‘From a total war 
to crisis management, a diss.’), Keuruu 1989, pp. 177–181. 
291 A.k.a ´Defence Revision´. 
 
89 
Soviet Union. Over the course of the spring of 1945, the leadership of the Defence 
Forces became increasingly conscious of the fact that Finland’s defence doctrine 
needed development. Although the General Headquarters in its own work focused 
on creating a peacetime organisation for the Defence Forces and executing the re-
quirements set by the Allied Control Committee, it nevertheless set up several 
committees for the gathering of experiences gained from the war and to look into 
the development needs brought about by the changed world situation.292  
 
A committee set up on 1 November 1945 to develop the organisation drafted, un-
der the direction of Major General Heiskanen, almost all the proposals that were 
submitted to the Defence Revision Committee for the composition of the Defence 
Forces.293 Within the Defence Revision Committee, the views of the Defence Forc-
es were presented by Major General K. A. Tapola, who was a member of the Com-
mittee. Tapola also presented the memoranda drawn up by the committees that the 
Defence Forces set up. Over the course of autumn 1945, the most relevant pro-
posals for the future of the defence system were submitted to Tapola before he 
forwarded them to the Defence Revision Committee. In the views of the Defence 
Forces, Finland would continue to need a good defence capability, principally by 
maintaining a covering force. According to these views, which suggested that battles 
would break out simultaneously across large areas, the most advantageous solution 
would be the introduction of a territorial defence system, coupled with combining 
the various branches of the defence within the framework of the country’s adminis-
trative division into provinces.294 The view presented by Tapola to the Defence Re-
vision Committee was evidently based at least in part on the memorandum drafted 
by Olavi Huhtala in summer 1945, the basic premise of which was a structural 
change in Finland’s independent defence capability in the direction of acquiescence 
–ostensibly at least.  
 
The proposal drafted by Tapola and Heiskanen for the principles of a territorial de-
fence system was favourably received by the Defence Revision Committee. Howev-
er, the reassessment of the tasks that had been the responsibility of the Civil Guard 
organisation –which was disbanded in November 1945 –and, particularly, one of 
its sections, the territorial organisation –calling up conscripts for service, mobilisa-
tion and the securing of the rear areas – aroused more controversy. While the 
Committee was still engaged in active work in the spring of 1945, it received the 
first draft of the Paris Peace Treaty for review from the Paris Peace Conference that 
had begun its work. However, the General Headquarters and the Defence Revision 
Committee remained in the dark regarding the interpretation of the content of the 
Peace Treaty.295  
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292 Visuri (1989), p. 179. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 291. 
293 Visuri (1989), p. 179. 
294 The minutes of the Defence Revision Committee, 2 August 1945, 3 August 1945 and 14 Sep-
tember 1945, T 19572/376, KA. See also Visuri (1989), pp. 179–180 and Visuri (1994), pp. 60–61. 
295 The minutes of the Defence Revision Committee, 11 September 1945, T 19572/377, KA. See 
also Visuri (1989), p. 180. 
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The Paris Peace Treaty, signed in February 1947, dictated restrictions on the wea-
ponry that the Finnish Defence Forces could have, which forced Finnish defence 
thinking to assume a completely new direction. From the perspective of national de-
fence, the most problematic chapter of the Treaty was related to the total strength 
of the Finnish Defence Forces, which were limited to 41,900 men, including those 
serving in the Frontier Guard. The Treaty also required that the amount of materiel 
and weaponry be dimensioned to match the limited manpower. Finland was obligat-
ed to surrender surplus war materiel immediately to the Allies or, alternatively, to 
destroy it within a year of the signing of the Treaty.296 After relations between the 
Allies cooled, the Finnish surplus materiel and its later destination had an obvious 
effect on Finland’s defence system and on the Finnish art of war, which was being 
increasingly developed in the direction of a territorial defence system.  
 
The Defence Revision Committee submitted its report to the Counsel of State on 
10 March 1949 The key conclusion of this detailed and well-argued report summed 
up Finland’s defence capability, defining it as a pre-emptive defence capability and a 
struggle for neutrality in the face of possible proposals regarding a military alliance. 
A cadre system based on universal conscription was deemed to be the best way to 
organise the Defence Forces. According to the report, the peacetime organisation 
should enable sufficiently prompt and reliable mobilisation and other such prepara-
tions. In its proposal for the organisation, the Defence Control Committee suggest-
ed that the administrative division of the country and the military be closely con-
nected. With regard to warfare that had become increasingly total in nature, the war-
time army would have to be able to measure up to the developments challenging, in 
particular, its mobility, striking force and technical capabilities. To quote the report 
verbatim, this meant ‘the necessity of having a territorial national defence ’. In particular, the 
reports listed the requirements imposed by the nature and conditions of the modern 
war, preparations required by the national defence, and the necessity of maintaining 
defence preparedness as justifications for a territorial defence system.297 Thus, a 
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296 Rauhansopimus Suomen kanssa (Pariisin rauhansopimus) (‘Peace Treaty with Finland – the Paris Peace 
Treaty’), Finlex 20/1947, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1947/19470020/194700-
20_2, read on 22 July 2013. See also Suomen solmimien kansainvälisten sopimusten sotilaalliset velvoitteet ja oi-
keudet (‘The military obligations and rights stipulated by the international agreements that Finland 
has signed’), Defence Council, 11 October 1958, sal, UKA 21/19. 
297 Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtioneuvostolle 10.3.1949, osat 
Puolustuslaitoksen uudelleenjärjestelyyn vaikuttavat tekijät, Puolustuslaitosjärjestelmä: koulutus, Puolustusvoimain 
järjestely: yleistä, ylin johto (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set 
by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, sections entitled The Factors Affecting the Reorganisation 
of the Defence Forces, the Military System: training, the Organisation of the Defence Forces: gen-
eral, top leadership, the library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence Uni-
versity, pp. 46–66 and 146–150’) Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö 
valtioneuvostolle 10.6.1949, osat Puolustusvoimain järjestely lukuun ottamatta osia: yleistä ja ylin johto, kanta-
henkilöstö (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council 
of State on 24 May 1945, the sections entitled the Organisation of the Defence Forces with the ex-
ception of general and top leadership, professional officers and NCOs, the library of the Depart-
ment of Military History at the National Defence University, pp. 46–66 and 146–150’) See also 
Penttilä, Risto E. J.: Puolustuslinjat – Puolustuspolitiikka Suomen kansainvälisen aseman vakaut-
tamisessa 1944–67 (‘The defensive lines – the role of the defensive policy in the stabilisation of 
Finland’s international position 1944–67’), Keuruu 1988, p. 167. 
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change in the art of war towards territorial defensive thinking had been initiated and 
had received official support. 
 
 
The ultimate fate of surplus weapons laid the foundation for equipping the 
field army 
   
It was not until the Paris Peace Treaty had been signed that Finland’s position ap-
preciably clarified, after the nearly three-year Interim Peace period, which was prone 
to interpretations and was characterised by constant meddling by the Allied Control 
Commission. However, the huge supply of surplus weapons caused problems, with 
Chapters 13 and 10 of the Peace Treaty determining the fate of military materiel.298 
Despite the definitions for and lists of war materiel provided in Annex 3 to the Trea-
ty, it remained unclear to the Finns exactly what the surplus of weaponry referred to, 
and the whole issue seemed open to interpretation. Was anything beyond the weap-
ons required by the peacetime troops to be regarded as surplus? With regard to the 
difficulties in interpretation, it should be underlined that the Peace Treaty did not 
make a single reference to reserves, although they constituted the key element in a 
defence system based on universal conscription. Under a strict interpretation of the 
Peace Treaty, Finland would have been allowed to retain weaponry for equipping a 
Defence Force of only 41,900 men. While the question of why Finland was able to 
retain the surplus weaponry –war booty weapons in fact, including other materiel 
left behind by the war –has not been fully studied, a number of studies have put 
forth several hypotheses. In particular, Markku Palokangas – first a researcher at and 
then leader of the Military Museum of Finland – and Pekka Visuri, a docent special-
ising in defensive policy, have proposed interpretations of the surplus weapons 
which run along parallel lines.299 
 
Chapter 19 of the Paris Peace Treaty obligated Finland to make surplus materiel 
originating in a particular Allied country available to the Allied power in question, in 
accordance with instructions issued by the Power in question. Finland was obligated 
to make the surplus war materiel in Finland available to the governments of the So-
viet Union and the United Kingdom. Finland had to give up all its rights to this ma-
teriel. However, the Allied Control Commission did not assume responsibility for 
the supervision of the execution of the Peace Treaty, as the Commission left Fin-
land immediately after the Peace Treaty had been ratified on 29 September 1947. 
Finland dutifully awaited more detailed instructions on the ultimate fate of the sur-
plus weaponry and on similar issues from the Soviet Union and the UK.300  
 
In reality, the number of rifle-calibre weapons in Finland’s possession was around 
fifteen-fold compared to the number permitted under the Peace Treaty, which was 
the basis on which the General Headquarters was making calculations for the num-
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298 Sotamateriaalin myynnit (‘The sales of war materiel’), PvPE:n no. 1071/Stal.1/7/ 2.9.1947, T 
19222/24 b, KA. 
299 See, for example, Visuri, (1994), pp. 48–51 and 111–113 sekä Palokangas, Markku: Sotilaskäsiaseet 
Suomessa 1918–1988, I osa – yleishistoria (‘Military hand weapons in Finland 1918–1988, part I – gen-
eral history’), Vammala 1991, pp. 257–260. 
300 Ibid. 
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ber of weapons required by the peacetime army (41,900 men). The need for hand 
weapons was calculated to be 157,353 rifles, 144,313 submachine guns, 9,080 light 
machine guns and 6, 477 machine guns. This calculation was based on a formula ac-
cording to which the number of weapons required by an individual solder must be 
multiplied by two for the needs of a ten-year period: one for training, one for exer-
cises and one for combat use. While the real need was around 150,000 weapons, the 
General Headquarters doubled this number, justifying it by considerable wear and 
tear. In addition to these calculations, Finland announced that the number of rifles 
in Finnish stores was around 350,000.301 These calculations were submitted not only 
to the representatives of the UK but also to the embassy of the Soviet Union, where 
the calculations prompted the embassy to request whether they also represented the 
views of the Finnish government. However, the note and request for additional in-
formation, presented by Savonenkov, the Soviet ambassador, in a polite tone, did 
not lead to further clarifications or restrictions regarding the weapons.302  
 
On what kind of materiel, then, did the issue focus? During the years that Finland 
was waiting, the General Headquarters maintained a detailed record of the quantity 
of materiel, but it was not until August 1951 that it finally ordered a more extensive 
survey to be carried out of the number of light infantry weapons. According to this 
exceptionally accurate calculation, the various units, central depots, the Frontier 
Guard, and the police administration had a total of 557,427 rifles, 67,196 sub-
machine guns, 16,178 light machine guns, 5,162 machine guns, 1,689 anti-tank rifles, 
and 23,493 pistols.303 The above-mentioned materiel was sufficient to equip appro-
ximately 15 divisions. It should be noted that these numbers included a large num-
ber of weapons that Germany had either given to Finland during the war or that 
Finland had purchased from Germany, as well as war booty weapons from Soviet 
troops.304  
 
Initially, the surrendering to the Allies of weapons and war materiel, or destroying it, 
was not regarded as an urgent issue, but, in the autumn of 1948, the military attaché 
to the Soviet Union was requested, on several occasions, to provide instructions on 
the issue. No response was received, and the final date set by the Soviet Union itself 
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301 Sotamateriaalin luovuttamistoimenpiteitä varten laadittavat materiaalimäärävahvuudet ‘The nominal 
strengths of materiel to be drawn up for the surrendering of war materiel’), PvPE:n no. 1953/järj 
1/5.sal./10.12.1947, T 20214/F 9 sal, KA. Also cf. Aseistuksen ja vara-aseistuksen tarve verrattuna maas-
sa olevan aseistuksen määriin (‘The need for weaponry and backup weapons, compared with the num-
ber of weapons present in the country’), PvPE:n no.tta 25.5.1948, taulukko 1, T 19222/29, KA. 
302 A letter from the Soviet ambassador to Enckell, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 25 Septem-
ber, T 20362/1, KA. See also Blinnikka (1969), p. 169. 
303 PvPE tväl-os:n asetilanneilmoitus 31.8.1951 (laadittu 11.5.1951) (‘a situational report by the 
Ordnance Division of the General Headquarters on weaponry dated 31 August 1951 and drafted 
on 11 May 1951’), T 20207/F 16, KA. See also Palokangas (1991), pp. 280–285. When the calcu-
lation from 1951 is compared to the report submitted by the General Headquarters to the super-
visors of the Peace Treaty in July 1948, it can be stated that the amount of materiel had in part in-
creased. The increase in the number of weapons can be explained by the weapons returned to the 
Police Administration and, particularly, by the destocking of the weapons caches established during 
the dispersed weapons caching operation and the returning to the central depots of the cached 
weapons. See a situational report on materials by PvPE, dated 1 July 1948, unnumbered, T 
19222/29, KA. 
304 Palokangas (1991), p. 259. 
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expired. This unclear issue was even reported on in one newspaper article.305 The 
passivity exhibited by the Soviet Union in the issue –immediately following the pe-
riod of the Allied Control Commission –was something that the Finnish military 
authorities found highly peculiar and definitively being at odds with normal Soviet 
style. The Soviet Union, however, had its reasons to assume a passive stance.306  
 
In April 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement known under 
the name of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, the 
first chapter of which also obligated Finland to defend her territory against an attack 
against Finland, or against the Soviet Union through Finland, with ‘all available 
means’.307 From the Soviet perspective, therefore, it was advantageous that the means 
available to Finland included a large trained reserve, for which the number of weap-
ons in question was dimensioned. The Soviet leadership may have expected Finland 
to drift politically into its sphere of influence and to become an increasingly integral 
part of it, in which context allowing Finland to retain its weapons was a rational an-
ticipatory measure. Another obvious reason can be found in a conflict of prestige 
that had developed between the Soviet Union and the UK. With regard to the re-
quirements to surrender or destroy surplus weapons, set for Finland, the British 
were stricter than the Russians. The British military leadership evidently feared that 
the materiel that Finland was obligated to surrender to the Allies would only be used 
to further the Soviets’ambitions to expand their power further westward. So, little 
Finland, with its surplus weapons, was drawn into a game between great powers.308  
 
However, with regard to the Peace Treaty and the Agreement of Friendship, Coope-
ration, and Mutual Assistance, extensive studies into them were commissioned par-
ticularly of jurists, the most notable of whom were probably Professor Erik Castrén, 
who submitted his statement in April 1948, and Doctor Tauno Suontausta, who 
gave his report in February 1951. Both experts boldly settled on interpreting the 
treaties in Finland’s favour, referring, in particular, to the wording of ‘with all availa-
ble means ’ in the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. 
While both saw that Finland should abide by the Paris Peace Treaty, they gave an in-
terpretation of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 
that entitled the Finnish Defence Forces to make necessary preparations for a mobi-
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305 Suomen sotamateriaalin liikamäärän luovuttaminen tai tuhoaminen vielä toimittamatta, voittajavallat eivät ole 
vielä ilmoittaneet kantaansa (‘The surrendering or destroying of Finland’s surplus war materiel still un-
completed; the victorious powers have not yet communicated their view’), an article in Aamulehti 
19/1948, 30 August 1948, Pääesikunnan tiedotusosaston lehtileikkeet 1941–1989 (‘The press clips of the 
Information Division of the General Headquarters 1941–1989’), KA. 
306 Palokangas (1991), p. 257. 
307 ‘In the eventuality that Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the ob-
ject of an armed attack by Germany or any State allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its obli-
gations as an independent State, fight to repel the attack. Finland in such cases will use all its availa-
ble forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within the fron-
tiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present Agreement and, if necessary, 
with the assistance of, or jointly with the Soviet Union. In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Un-
ion will give Finland the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual agreement be-
tween the Contracting Parties.’ For the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assis-
tance between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, see Finlex 
17/1948, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1948/19480017, read on 23 July 2013. 
308 Palokangas (1991), p. 259. Visuri (1994), p. 50. 
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lisation and to take advantage of the surplus weapons as a precaution for a possible 
invasion.309 The statements unequivocally lent support to a consent granted by Pres-
ident Paasikivi on 13 March 1948 for the initiation of operational and mobilisation 
planning. The preparations embraced not only the maximum strength permitted 
under the Paris Peace Treaty (41,900) but also the field army.310  
 
The entire weaponry, defined as surplus under the Paris Peace Treaty, was stored at 
central depots and retained there practically untouched until the early 1950s, when 
the Finns began to be increasingly concerned about the ultimate fate of the weap-
ons. The storage of weapons from one year to another, with no knowledge of their 
intended use, was not only impractical but also extremely expensive, considering the 
resources available to the Defence Forces at the time. In late August 1951, the De-
fence Forces carried out a new stocktaking of the weapons in temporary storage.311 
In January 1952, the defence administration considered it necessary to take up the 
question of weapon storage; consequently, a plan on the reorganisation of the de-
pots was presented to President Paasikivi via Prime Minister Kekkonen. After dis-
cussing the issue with Kekkonen, Paasikivi announced that it was impossible to 
transfer the weapons without first obtaining consent from the Russians. It should be 
mentioned that, in connection with this, Kekkonen and Paasikivi also discussed the 
desire expressed by the leadership of the Defence Forces to execute parts of the 
mobilisation plan.312 The question of the depots and the fate of the surplus weapons 
remained unsolved. 
 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Aarne Sihvo, was requested by 
Minister of Defence, Emil Skog in early 1952 to find out the view of the Soviet Un-
ion regarding the storage and fate of the surplus weapons. The response was long in 
coming, as it was in November 1952 that the military attché to the Soviet Union, 
Colonel Rybakov announced to Sihvo that there were no obstacles to the Defence 
Force selling or scrapping the surplus materiel. According to the memorandum 
drafted by Sihvo, Rybakov had added ‘that there was no need to pay any attention to what 
the communists would write or say, as it would have absolutely no bearing.’313 After Sihvo 
communicated this information to President Paasikivi, the President said that he 
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309 The statement by Professor Castrén, given at the Constitutional Law Committee on 20 Aptil 
1948, and the statement by Doctor Tauno Suontausta, given on 15 February 1951, on the interpre-
tations of the Paris Peace Treaty and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assis-
tance, UKA 21/19. 
310 The memorandum by Aarne Sihvo, 3 March 1948, UKA 21/15. Presidential presentation on 13 
March, T 23828/Fa 12, KA. See also the memorandum presenting justification for the presentation, 
PvPE:n no. 148/Järj.2/sal/13.3.1948, T 26965/F 1 sal, KA. 
311 Palokangas (1991), p. 259. See also Ratinen, Juha: Suomen liikekannallepanokyky sodan jälkeisinä vuo-
sina (‘Finland’s capability for mobilisation during the postwar years’), a pro gradu thesis written on 
a cadet course in 2009, pp. 45–48, Department of Military History, National Defence University. 
312 J. K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944–1956, toinen osa (‘J. K. Paasikivi’s diaries 1944–1956, second 
volume 25 April 1949–10 April 1956’), Juva 1986, p. 262 (9 January 1952). 
313 A memorandum by Aarne Sihvo, dated 16 November 1952, on the discussion with Colonel 
Rybakov, the military attaché to the Soviet Union, held on 14 November 1952, Commander of the 
Defence Force 1946–1961, confidential and general memoranda etc., from the term of General 
Sihvo, T 21645/1, KA. 
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welcomed this information but that he also wished to receive written confirmation 
and to discuss the issue with Kekkonen and Skog.314  
 
Later estimates have also suggested that the 1952 Olympics held in Helsinki had 
played a role in the Soviet Union accepting that the surplus weapons remained un-
der Finnish discretion. In summer 1952, Finland, as the host of the Olympics, was 
in the spotlight of the entire world, leading to the conclusion that a disagreement on 
this level between two countries would inevitably have made headlines around the 
world. It is difficult to determine this with certainty, but forcing Finland, a country 
in the spotlight of the entire world in an Olympic year, to transfer a huge number of 
weapons to another country or to destroy them, would not necessarily have reflect-
ed well on the policies pursued by a peace-loving Soviet Union.  
 
In breach of the express terms of the 1944 Interim Peace Treaty and the Paris Peace 
Treaty, Finland, evidently as the only country of those that had fought on Ger-
many’s side in the Second World War, was able retain the war booty weapons that it 
had taken from the victor. Although other war booty such as vehicles, vessels, 
means of production, cultural artefacts and similar were returned to the Soviet Un-
ion in 1944–1946, weapons remained in Finland’s possession. In other words, this 
materiel was not surrendered to the Allies, as the relations between the great powers 
cooled, and this enabled Finland in a way to ensure the materiel performance of its 
Defence Forces. The fact that the issue was resolved was historically highly signifi-
cant for Finland’s defence, as Finland was now able to equip its reserve forces using 
the wartime weapons destocked from the stores. Although part of the light weapons 
were scrapped or sold,315 Finland retained materiel for an army of approximately 
600,000 men. Another consequence was that Russian-made weapons retained their 
dominant position during the postwar decades. Over the course of the 1950s, the 
condition of the weapons and other defence materiel, munitions in particular, dete-
riorated, reaching catastrophic proportions in some cases. Furthermore, considering 
that outdated equipment was also in active training use, the situation required 
prompt corrective measures by the end of the 1950s. The situation was largely simi-
lar to all war equipment specific to the various branches.316  
 
The Night Frost Crisis in 1958 and the note that the Soviet Union sent to Finland 
three years later alerted the country to consider questions regarding its defence solu-
tion. How should Finland defend the country using outdated materiel and what 
methods should be used? From the perspective of the Defence Forces, the Note 
Crisis also had, in a way, positive aspects, as it finally caused the Finnish leadership, 
including the president of the republic, to commit itself to the acquisition of new 
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314 J. K. Paasikivi’s diaries 1944–1956, second volume, p. 316 (20 November 1952). 
315 ‘As the military stipulations of the Peace Treaty, restricting the rights of a sovereign state if the 
normal principles for interpretation are applied, must be interpreted strictly, and, therefore, not to 
go beyond the express wording of the Treaty, it appears evident that in this respect Finland must be 
regarded to have complete freedom to determine by itself the course it shall take to execute Chap-
ter 18 of the Peace Treaty. In this respect, there should be no obstacles to changing the surplus to 
money.’ See an undated memorandum for justification by government counsellor Heikki Aarnio 
for the ownership and sale of the surplus weaponry from 1952, PLM kirjeistö, T 21402/F 119, KA.  
316 PE:n no.tta 6.5.1957, T 24727/Da 1 sal, KA. See also PlM:n no. 790/97/30.12.1957, a list of 
combat materiel to be sold, T 22220/F 254, KA. 
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defence materiel. After all, this is what the soldiers had wanted ever since the mid-
1940s.317 If Finland had been obligated to destroy the surplus of weapons stipulated 
by the Peace Treaty, or surrender it to the Soviet Union, the country would pro-
bably never have had a chance to form a territorial defence system based on uni-
versal conscription. The amount of materiel quite evidently had an impact on the 
discussions on cost-effective ways to wage guerrilla war during the 1950s.  
 
 
The beginnings of territorial defence thinking  
 
It is often said that the territorial defence system was born and developed as late as 
the 1960s, but recent studies and source materiel on the Cold War indicate that the 
groundwork for the development of this defence system was laid during the postwar 
years, in the early 1950s in particular. After the war, requirements made by the Al-
lied Control Commission set for Finland, regarding the composition of the Finnish 
Defence Forces and the restrictions set on the country’s mobilisation arrangements 
and weapons, led Finland’s defence capability to hang in the balance. The ban on 
operational preparations and the weapon caching operation that came to light in the 
spring of 1945 led to the conclusion that something needed to be done.  
 
The above-mentioned memorandum, drafted by Olavi Huhtala, on Finland’s mili-
tary position and the tasks of the army under the prevailing conditions was the first 
step towards a territorial defence system.318 K.A.Tapola, who was the inspector of 
the military schools and who, in addition to this post, acted as the head of the Na-
tional General Staff College between 1945 and 1947, drafted –in collaboration with 
K.A.Heiskanen, the head of the Command Staff –a proposal for the reorganisation 
of Finland’s national defence for submittal to the Defence Revision Committee, 
basing this proposal on a memorandum drafted by a committee chaired by 
Heiskanen. Tapola’s and Heiskanen’s proposal was based, at least in part, on the 
content of Olavi Huhtala’s memorandum, which argued that Finnish independence 
would have to be guaranteed, if necessary, by having in place a sufficient and politi-
cally correct defensive capacity. The important aspect of the background memoran-
dum presented by Tapola for the Defence Revision Committee was its wording re-
garding the principles of the defensive solution. ‘...proposes for consideration a scenario 
under which this would lead to some sort of assessment of regional importance, with a responsible 
commander being appointed for each region to make preparations and to assume responsibility for 
his area. Troops ready for each region and the regional importance must be assessed.’Tapola’s 
proposal combined the various branches of national defence within a framework of 
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317 Salminen, Pertti: In the name of neutrality (diss.), Helsinki 1995, p. 129. 
318 PvPE:n op-os:n muistio sotilaallisesta asemastamme ja armeijan tehtävistä nykyoloissa 14.7.1945 (‘A memo-
randum by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters on our military position and the 
tasks of the army under the current conditions, 14 July 1945’), Olavi Huhtala’s private collection, 
Pk 1366/3 a., KA. See also Sotalaitosmuodot (‘The forms of the military system’), a memorandum 
dated on 27 July 1945, drafted by Colonel Olavi Huhtala for the Defence Revision Committee, the 
minutes of the Defence Revision Committee for 27 July 1945 including the attachments, T 
19572/376, KA. After the memoranda had been discussed, Huhtala was ordered to take the post of 
the secretary of the Defence Revision Committee on a provisional basis between 3 August 1945 
and 1 June 1946. See, for example, Huhtala, Vilho Olavi, extract from personal details, no. 33380, 
KA. 
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provinces, for example.319 This memorandum, which quite evidently was heavily in-
fluenced by Tapola and Heiskanen, can be regarded as the first of its kind and one 
in which the territorial defence system was officially introduced.  
 
Strong-willed Kustaa Tapola, as a representative of the Defence Revision Commit-
tee, appears to have played a major role, as he was even said to have dictated some 
sections of the memorandum that the Committee prepared. As an example for a ter-
ritorial system, the principles applied by Switzerland and Sweden, among others, 
were put forth. Additional strength to Tapola’s role as an advocate and proponent 
of the territorial defence system resulted from his participation on a committee 
known as the Territorial Division Committee between 1946 and 1953. When scrutinising 
the factors that the thinking around a territorial defence system was based on, a 
clear connection between Tapola’s role and the principles of a territorial division of 
the country can be discerned after all, as he spoke on several occasions at the meet-
ings of the Defence Revision Committee in the capacity of an expert.320 Kustaa 
Tapola, while still participating in the work of the Defence Revision Committee, 
made an initiative for the standardisation of nationwide territorial arrangements. 
Following Tapola’s initiative, the Ministry of Finance set up a committee on 11 
April 1946, tasking it with conducting a study on the geographical division of the 
country under the various forms of the administration – including the defence ad-
ministration – and providing proposals for modifications in order to put in place 
more uniform arrangements. By virtue of his stature, Tapola participated in the 
work of the committee.321 The work of the Territorial Division Committee and the 
preliminary results of its survey were presented to the Defence Revision Committee, 
specifically by Tapola.322  
 
The report of the Defence Revision Committee came out in 1949 in two volumes. 
The first volume, published in March 1949, contained, among other things, assess-
ments of the factors that would have an impact on the reorganisation of the De-
fence Forces, including proposals for the arrangements for the defence system and 
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319 The minutes of the Defence Revision Committee, 3. August 1945, T 19572/376, KA. Ter-
vasmäki, Vilho: Puolustushallinto sodan ja rauhan aikana 1939–1978 – Puolustusministeriön historia II (‘The 
defence administration during war and peace 1939–1978 – the history of the Ministry of Defence, 
Part II’), Hämeenlinna 1978, p. 267. See also Visuri (1989), pp. 179–180 and Visuri (1994), pp. 60–
61. Tapola, Päivi: Ajan paino – jalkaväenkenraali K. A. Tapolan elämä (‘The weight of time – the life of 
General K.A.Tapola’), Jyväskylä 2004, pp. 291–300. Tapola, Kustaa Anders, an extract from per-
sonal details, no. 20739, KA. 
320 The minutes of the Defence Revision Committee, 3 August 1945, 17 August 1945, 14 Sep-
tember 1945, 9 October 1945, 10 October 1945, T 19572/376, KA. The minutes of the Defence 
Revision Committee, 22 March 1946, 9 April 1946, 10 April 1946, 11 April 1946, 26 April 1946, 14 
November 1946, 15 November 1946, 19 November 1946, 20 November 1946, 22 November 1946, 
26 November 1946, 27 November 1946, 6 August 1948, 5 April 1949, 20 April 1949, and 21 April 
1949, T 19572/377, KA. See also Tapola, Kustaa Anders, an extract from personal details, no. 
20739, KA. 
321 Tapola (2004), p. 293 and pp. 299–301. See also Aluejakokomitean mietintö vuodelta 1953 (‘The re-
port by the Territorial Division Committee’ from 1953’), K. A. Tapola’s private collection Pk 
1664/29, 30 and 31, KA. Tapola, Kustaa Anders, an extract from personal details, no. 20739, KA. 
322 The minutes of the Defence Revision Committee recorded in April 1949 include the following 
entry: ‘Tapola gave an account of the work that the committee tasked with the territorial division of the country.’ 
See the minutes of the Defence Revision Committee, dated 5 April 1949, T 19572/377, KA. 
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the training of the troops.323 The second volume was published in June 1949, giving 
a detailed account of the organisation of the Defence Forces.324 The latter volume 
repeatedly puts the focus on the territorial organisation of the national defence. 
Above all, the territorial principle was justified by the heightened readiness it offered 
for Finland’s mobilisation and defence capacity. ‘Using peacetime units as a framework, 
troops could be formed in each military province during mobilisation. The Defence Revision Com-
mittee had placed particular emphasis on the maximum defence and protection capabilities of each 
province, even in the case of surprise attacks. Therefore, the Defence Revision Committee states that, 
in principle, the number of military provinces should be equal to that of the administrative provinc-
es, and that both should overlap in so far as the military aspects do not require otherwise.’325 The 
influence that K. A. Tapola exerted and his connections to the Territorial Division 
Committee clearly come across in the report submitted by the Defence Revision 
Committee. 
 
It must be remembered that towards the end of the Defence Revision Committee’s 
work, President of the Republic Juho Kusti Paasikivi authorised the military to 
begin secret operational planning and the preparation of mobilisation plans in 
March 1948.326 When considering starting points for operational planning, deve-
lopments in tactical thinking constitute an integral part of the work to be completed. 
Experiences gained from the war were not the only factor forming Finnish tactical 
and operational skills; in the new situation, Finland needed to take account of the 
peace treaties it had signed and the restrictions and obligations that the Soviet Un-
ion had unilaterally imposed on the country. The question of adapting the organisa-
tions to meet the requirements set by an effective mobilisation also arose. After an 
analysis and drafting phase lasting approximately eighteen months, the Defensive 
Forces took a principal decision to adopt a brigade organisation. Drafts covering 
operational planning clearly indicated that the threat of a war between East and 
West and the obligations set out for Finland in the treaties made a division too 
cumbersome a unit for mobile operations. This is why mobilisation was based on a 
field army based on a brigade organisation.327  
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323 Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtioneuvostolle 10.3.1949, osat 
Puolustuslaitoksen uudelleenjärjestelyyn vaikuttavat tekijät, Puolustuslaitosjärjestelmä: koulutus, Puolustusvoimain 
järjestely: yleistä, ylin johto (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set 
by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, the sections entitled the Factors impacting the reorganisa-
tion of the Defence Forces; the Military system: training, the Organisation of the Defence Forces, 
general, top leadership’), the library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence 
University. 
324 Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtioneuvostolle 10.6.1949, osat 
Puolustusvoimain järjestely lukuun ottamatta osia: yleistä ja ylin johto, kantahenkilöstö (‘The report by the De-
fence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, the 
sections entitled the Organisation of the Defence Forces with the exception of general and top 
leadership, professional officers and NCOs’), the library of the Department of Military History at 
the National Defence University, pp. 46–66 and 146–150. 
325 Ibid, p. 1 and 56. 
326 The memorandum by Aarne Sihvo, 3 March 1948, UKA 21/15. Presidential presentation on 13 
March, T 23828/Fa 12, KA. See also the memorandum presenting justification for the presentation, 
PvPE:n no. 148/Järj.2/sal/13.3.1948, T 26965/F 1 sal, KA. Tynkkynen, Vesa: Alueellisen puolus-
tuksen kehittyminen sotien jälkeen (‘The development of territorial defence after the war’), a lecture gi-
ven at the National Defence University on 8 December 1999, pp. 1–2. 
327 Tynkkynen (2006), pp. 439–440. 
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With regard to guerrilla troops, it should be mentioned that the plans –principally, 
the establishment charts (PTL) –drafted by the Defence Forces in 1950 for the war-
time composition of the field army included a total of six guerrilla jaeger battalions. 
While the target set for the strength of each guerrilla jaeger battalion was approxi-
mately 600 men, it was exactly 488 men when entered in the establishment chart. 
Three of the battalions were to be formed during the phase in which cover was be-
ing provided for a mobilisation, with the remaining three battalions being formed 
during the full-scale mobilisation. In other words, the combined strength of the six 
guerrilla jaeger battalions in a wartime field army would have been around 3,600 
men. No separate guerrilla jaeger companies were itemised in the establishment 
charts of the early 1950s, but the combined strength of separate infantry units is in-
dicated to be 40,570 men. The total wartime strength of the Defence Forces after a 
full-scale mobilisation was calculated to be 481,194 men.328 
 
 
The teaching, training and research of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla 
warfare in 1945–1950  
 
The work by the Defence Revision Committee and the General Headquarters for 
clarification of the grounds the defence system gave rise to a whole host of addi-
tional questions, most of which were related to the application of operational skills 
and tactics in a situation in which possible reforms were to be put into effect. With 
regard to the methods of waging war and the fighting method, one of the questions 
of the art of war was related to the possibility of using guerrilla-type activities which 
had proved efficient in the previous wars. For this reason, the General Headquarters 
evidently tasked the National General Staff College and the Army Combat School 
with surveying the issue with the aid of officer candidates. Starting from 1946, guer-
rilla-type activities were included in the curriculum of general tactics taught at the 
National General Staff College329 and in the topics taken up in discussions on 
courses for the achievement of a captain’s rank at the Army Combat School330. 
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328 The number of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces is missing, Sodanajan puo-
lustusvoimat, vuoden 1950 perustamistehtäväluettelon luonnos (PTL) (‘The wartime Defensive Forces, a 
draft for the 1950 establishment chart’) 22 December 1950/sal, T 26842/Bb 2 sal, KA. The num-
ber of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces is missing, Laskelma reservin riittävyydestä 
Op.os:n laatimia sodanajan puolustusvoimia silmälläpitäen (‘A calculation of the sufficiency of the reserves 
with regard to the wartime Defence Forces drafted by the Operations Division’) 14.12.1950/sal, T 
26842/Bb 2 sal, KA. Cf. also – The number of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces is 
missing – Laskelma aselajeittain puolustusvoimain henkilövahvuuksista su- ja tsa-kokoonpanoissa (‘A calcu-
lation of the personnel strength of the Defence Forces during the covering phase and in the war-
time composition, broken down by branch of the army’), 2.1.1952/sal, T 26842/Ha 2 sal, KA. 
329 A total of 10 hours of classroom instruction was reserved for guerrilla-type activities during the 
first year of study; on the second, 26 hours. Y17/The curriculum for 1947 at the National General 
Staff College, appendix 6: the curriculum for general tactics, p. 1, and the curriculum of the general 
department of the National General Staff College (second-year students), appendix 6: the curricu-
lum for general tactics, the National General Staff College, 24 October 1947. See also Yleinen tak-
tiikka, Liite no. 5 (‘General Tactics, Attachment no. 5’) MaaSL/YO18, 1949, p. 2. T 21369/Db 5, 
KA. 
330 Discussion topic: Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities, drafted by Captain U. K. Kor-
honen, 18 November 1946, the Army Combat School, Captain Course 17, Eino Penttilä’s private 
collection, Pk 2109/3, KA. 
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Guerrilla-type activities were also simulated and used in map exercises as part of 
other military operations.331 Therefore, the first reflections in the postwar years on 
the use of guerrilla warfare and the means of guerrilla-type activities tended to be 
preparatory studies produced in most cases at military schools or by the operational 
branch. The common denominator of these studies and the teaching given at the 
National General Staff College were the experiences gained from the war, against 
which the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities were compared. A total 
of five theses or dissertations on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were 
completed at military schools between 1945 and 1950.332  
 
A survey of a relatively narrow sector such as articles written by officers and theses 
and studies completed at the various military schools indicate that they include sev-
eral bold analyses of future wars and warfare. In addition to a courageous and inno-
vative approach, they shared the fact that they were based on previous experiences 
and on the strengths derived from them. The authors were also conscious of na-
tional resources, limitations and strengths. The Second World War in particular and 
the postwar period had inspired several officers to write about the future on the ba-
sis of existing knowledge. 
 
While guerrilla training was not a regular or official part of conscripts’or instructors’
training, some attempts to address the issue had been made as early as early 1946. 
Between 10 February and 3 March 1946 ‘Guerrilla training days', were arranged in 
Hamina; a training film of this event focusing on guerrilla skills was produced for 
use by the Defence Forces. This film was a brief training package focusing on the 
combat techniques of guerrilla-type activities and on specific guerrilla skills.333 On 
the basis of this film, a conclusion can be drawn that the objective of this training 
event was to discuss guerrilla training to be given to conscripts and NCOs. Another 
objective was probably to prepare training plans and to draft training materiel in 
support of training. The film is an interesting contemporary document and proof of 
the fact that training in guerrilla tactics was not downplayed due to experiences 
gained from the war. 
 
However, an interesting fresh approach to the description of future wars was pro-
vided by Markus P. Kato, an alias of Professor Arvi Korhionen, in his book Sodan 
uudet kasvot (‘The new face of war’), published in 1944. Pseudonym Kato reports 
that while he is writing in a dispassionate manner, he also bases all his views of the 
future on causality, which characterises the history of war. Referring to a certain 
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331 See, for example, Karttaharjoitus (Sissitoiminta) (‘Map exercise (Guerrilla-type activities’), drafted by 
Colonel E. N. Hämäläinen 26 August 1946, SKK Y 16, T 21369/Dg 111, KA’) A document related 
to the first postwar course arranged at the National General Staff College (Y16/1946) indicates that 
the officer candidates were given a task – in connection with a tactical map exercise – to clarify a 
proposal submitted by the Chief of the Operations Department of II Army Corps to the Chief of 
Staff of the Army Corps on the general arrangements and objectives of guerrilla-type activities.  
332 See the bibliography of this thesis. The various theses, studies, articles and books are presented 
in chronological order. 
333 Sissikoulutuspäivät Haminassa 18.2.–2.3.1946 (‘Guerrilla training days in Hamina, held between 18 
February and 2 March 1946’, a training film’) P 437, KAVA. Cf. also Penttilä, Eino Valfrid, an ex-
tract from personal details no. 33097, KA, according to whom guerrilla training days were arranged 
in Hamina between 10 February and 3 March 1946. 
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formula for events, he seeks to vindicate an old adage stating that ‘a war cannot be 
planned beyond the first battle.’According to this author, it is more important to achieve 
clarity on the new objectives and characteristics of war, including situational aware-
ness, which will ultimately dictate the outcome of a war. Kato describes the devel-
opment of tactics and technology, invoking and forecasting –among other things –
the ease of misunderstanding theorists of war and interpreting them in a manner 
that is all too narrow, the unscrupulous use of unconventional weapons such as gas, 
attributable to the inferior position of one of the belligerents, and the unending cy-
cle of competition between a weapon and its counter-weapon. According to him, 
‘tactics, due to countless factors, are in a constant process of transformation, both in a controlled and 
uncontrolled manner.’334  
 
With regard to the future, Kato, despite all his criticism and eloquent reasoning, 
emphasises one particular factor: Finland’s ability to field hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers. He quotes a statement made by a foreign military expert in 1943 on 
Finland’s qualitative capability of fielding an army that, while being large, was also 
inferior with regard to its numbers compared with its adversary and that it could not 
be regarded as a ‘quantité négligeable’by a prospective invader.335 
 
After the Continuation War had ended, the national possibilities of resorting to 
guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities were brought into the public spotlight as 
Lieutenant General Reino Aaltonen published an article discussing the topic in Soti-
lasaikakausilehti (a Finnish trade magazine on military issues) in 1946. Aaltonen dis-
cussed the total nature of war and the change in warfare that had taken place over 
the course of the Second World War, presenting his own theories regarding the is-
sue. The article was clearly aimed at stirring discussion in Finland regarding the ap-
plicability of the means of guerrilla warfare to Finnish defensive thinking. This arti-
cle defined guerrilla warfare as sabotage, reconnaissance and espionage conducted in 
an area under the control of the adversary and that were, at least in part, under the 
control of Finnish military leadership. Aaltonen also discussed the twofold nature of 
the examples of guerrilla warfare gained from the Second World War: ‘However, with 
regard to its nature and means, guerrilla warfare manifested itself in different ways, depending basi-
cally on whether it was a question of guerrilla-type activities in an enemy-occupied country, some-
thing that the defender had organised in the areas that it had lost, or, alternatively, whether guerril-
la-type activities referred to operations that were closely related to operations that the invader had 
organised and that were con-ducted among a foreign and mostly hostile population.’336 
 
While nobody directly commented on or responded to the initiative proposed by 
Lieutenant Colonel Reino Aaltonen, a series of three articles appeared, all of which 
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334 Kato, Markus P.: Sodan uudet kasvot (‘The new face of war’), Helsinki 1944, p. 13 and 34. 
335 Ibid, p. 134.  
336 Aaltonen, Reino: Huomioonotettava sodankäynnin piirre (‘A feature of warfare that deserves atten-
tion’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 1/1946, pp. 7–8. By training, Lieutenant Colone Reino Aaltonen was a 
coastal artillery and general staff officer whose interest in guerrilla warfare was related to his interest 
in the literature on military history. See also Aaltonen, Reino Olavi, an extract from personal details 
no. 36703, KA. 
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bore a relationship to Aaltonen’s article. Lieutenant Niilo Nurmi337 published two 
articles in Sotilasaikakauslehti in 1949 on the development of Finnish guerrilla-type 
activities and their development during the wars waged between 1939 and 1944. In 
both articles, Nurmi discussed guerrilla-type activities purely from the perspective of 
war experiences, drawing a handful of conclusions from them in the form of rec-
ommendations. ‘Experience showed that even small guerrilla jaeger units had a good chance of 
succeeding, as long as the men had undergone first-rate training and, above all, knew how to handle 
themselves in woods. However, even for this form of warfare, there should be some sort of regulation, 
a book that would provide the bare minimum for training. What about new wars? They will be 
hardly avoidable, or any better than the previous wars. What kind of role will guerrillas play in 
them? I am hardly mistaken if I forecast that guerrillas will work wonders behind the front 
lines.’338 In addition to the previous articles, Nurmi published an article in early 1950 
on the future of guerrilla-type activities. According to him, in the field of guerrilla-
type activities, future wars will bring about completely new methods such as territo-
rial guerrilla-type activities, airborne guerrillas and special equipment.339 In light of 
later developments, it can be said that Nurmi’s views were spot on. 
 
In addition to articles published in trade magazines, guerrilla-type activities were also 
examined in a number of theses produced by students at the National General Staff 
College and the Army Combat School. In 1948, two theses were produced at the 
National General Staff College, both of which discussed repelling a great power us-
ing guerrilla warfare. In the above-mentioned theses, Captain Unto Matikainen dis-
cussed the issue from the perspective of possible guerrilla warfare, while Captain 
Björn Kontiopää examined the possibilities of a resistance movement resorting to 
guerrilla-type activities.  
 
In the introduction to his thesis, Captain Unto Matikainen provided justifications 
for the need to pursue further studies on the issue, particularly in view of drafting 
new operational plans: ‘When preparing new plans for the national defence, the need to pay at-
tention to this issue has also become topical, and even more so as we need to identify all the means 
that could aid us in balancing our inferior strength resulting from our a small population and lim-
ited resources, particularly if we prepare ourselves for warding off an invasion by a great power.’340 
Matikainen also extensively discussed the opportunities for guerrilla warfare availa-
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337 Lieutenant Niilo Nurmi was an officer known as ‘kakkosupseeri’ (‘officer 2nd class’), that is, a re-
serve officer who held an commission in the Defence Forces normally reserved for a career officer. 
See Vakinaisen väen upseeriluettelo 1.1.1947 (‘The roll of officers of the regular army 1 January 1947’), 
Helsinki 1947, p. 3 and 165. 
338 Nurmi, Niilo: Sissitoiminta talvisodassa ja sen kehitys vv. 1941–44 sodan loppuun mennessä (‘Guerrilla-
type activities in the Winter War and their development in 1941–44, until the end of the war’) Soti-
lasaikakauslehti 4/1949, pp. 19–14. 
339 Nurmi, Niilo: Sissitoiminta tulevaisuuden sodissa (‘Guerrilla-type activities in future wars’), Sotilas-
aikakauslehti 3/1950, pp. 7–13. 
340 Matikainen, Unto: Sissisota sodankäyntimuotona suurvaltaa vastaan Suomen olosuhteissa sekä sen organi-
saation, varustamisen, suorituksen ja johtamisen periaatteet (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare against 
a great power under Finnish conditions, including its organisation, the equipment of troops and the 
principles for the conduct and leadership of war’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff 
College in 1948, p. 2, SKK 1/353, KA. See also a summary of this thesis, available at Sotatieteen neu-
vottelukunnan tutkimustyökokoelma (‘Study collection of the Advisory Board for the Military Science’), 
StietNK 1/39, KA. 
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ble to Finland, using factors such as the applicability of tactics, the country’s materi-
el preparedness and geographical aspects. He also discussed the role that the general 
population could play in possible guerrilla warfare. The most interesting aspect of 
the study can be found in its conclusions, in which Matikainen sums up the oppor-
tunities available to guerrilla warfare as follows: ‘Modern war, which is becoming increas-
ingly total in nature, results in a necessity to mobilise all a nation’s all resources. The opportunities 
to wage a successful defensive war alone against a great power using conventional methods of warfare 
will always be uncertain, due to the superior human and materiel resources that the great power will 
be able to commit to combat.’341 The question of why this issue was examined in such de-
tail in a thesis produced at the National General Staff College remains unanswered, 
but judging from the way the study problem was presented and organised, thesis 
may have been a preparatory study commissioned by the General Headquarters, or, 
alternatively, it may have been inspired by a desire of the teaching staff of the Na-
tional General Staff College to shake up operational thinking that was prevalent at 
the time. 
 
A study completed by Captain Björn Kontionpää approached the means available to 
guerrilla warfare using the resistance movements of the Second World War as an 
example. According to Kontiopää, the means of guerrilla warfare could play a signif-
icant role, provided that guerrilla operations were conducted under proper leader-
ship. Lone wolves among the ranks of a resistance movement taking up isolated ter-
rorist acts would generally be caught and executed, but well-led operations that were 
closely linked to other military operations would, as a general rule, be more success-
ful. Kontiopää’s conclusions were fairly consistent with those presented by Mat-
ikainen.342 The reason behind this was probably the fact that both officers working 
on their theses were students at the same time on a course arranged for staff offic-
ers, and both of them were students at the course’s general department.343 
 
theses authored by both Matikainen and Kontiopää were not without influence, 
with their findings and conclusions seeing serious application in teaching given at 
the National General Staff College in the early 1950s.344 After completing his own 
general staff officer course, Unto Matikainen remained in service at the National 
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341 Ibid, pp. 48–49. 
342 Kontiopää, Björn: Vastarintaliikkeet toisessa maailmansodassa ja tulevaisuudessa (edellytykset, organisaatio, 
varustaminen, toiminta ja johtaminen (‘Resistance movements in the Second World War and in the fu-
ture (their prerequisites, organisation, equipment, operations and leadership’), a thesis produced at 
the National General Staff College in 1948, SKK 1/362, KA. 
343 Tynkkynen, Vesa: Officers who have obtained a diploma at the National General Staff College 
between 1924 and 1993 (appendix 3), a list included in the book Sotakorkeakoulusta Maanpuolus-
tuskorkeakouluksi – seitsemän vuosikymmentä 1924–1994 (‘From a National General Staff College to 
the National Defence University – seven decades between 1924 and 1994’), Jyväskylä 1994, p. 144. 
344 See, for example, the teaching materiel used at the National General Staff College Sissisota so-
dankäyntimuotona Suomessa (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in Finland’), drafted by Captain 
U. Matikainen, Helsinki 28 February 1951. Yleisen taktiikan karttaharjoitus no. 5/52, tuntien käyttö-
suunnitelma (‘A map exercise in general tactics no. 5/52’, the plan for using the hours’), Helsinki 1 
September 1952, and a proposal by the chief of the Operations Division of the General Head-
quarters for the general arrangements regarding guerrilla warfare, Helsinki 3 September 1952. 
Vastarintaliikkeet toisessa maailmansodassa ja tulevaisuudessa (‘Resistance movements in the Second 
World War’), Helsinki 31 August 1952. Jorma Järventaus’ private collection, Kansio II: yleistaktiikka 
(‘Folder II, general tactics’), KA. 
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General Staff College, teaching general tactics between 1949 and 1958.345 In autumn 
1952, Major Unto Matikainen planned and led, among other things, an extensive 
map exercise in tactics, which focused on guerrilla warfare in Northern Finland, the 
participants of which were the students of the ground warfare training programme 
of the Staff Officer Course 19 (MSL 19).346 The proportion of guerrilla warfare and 
guerrilla-type activities in tactical teaching appears to have been quite significant, as 
a similar map exercise in guerrilla warfare with practically unchanged content re-
mained on the curriculum for second-year students of the staff officer course until 
at least 1966.347 Unto Matikainen’s activity on the issue is a testimony to the fact 
that individual officers played an important and influential role in promoting the 
various aspects of guerrilla warfare, irrespective of whether the issue involved teach-
ing, the development of tactics or the drafting of operational plans. 
 
One who deserves a mention is Leevi Välimaa, who, while a student at the National 
General Staff College, studied future developments. In his thesis, entitled Tuleva sota 
(‘The future war’) completed in 1948, Välimaa paints an almost Orwellian picture of 
future war. The recently concluded Second World War, new technology, the total 
nature of war, and Finland’s limited resources troubled this officer. Välimaa argued 
that atomic weapons would enable unchecked terror warfare. According to him, this 
could even be likely, commenting, ‘the absolutely last vestiges of humanitarian military ideol-
ogy were shattered in Hiroshima.’This bleak picture of world affairs was accentuated by 
an attachment to his thesis, in which Välimaa categorically placed Finland in the So-
viet sphere of influence. He also expected the battlefield to deepen even further. 
Fighting in three dimensions –vertical envelopment in effect, or strategic landings, 
will be part of the future war. What chance will a small country have in future war? 
Välimaa reasons that ‘defence is never hopeless; it just needs to be closely adapted to the idea to 
which the great powers generally adhere when making preparations for the future war.’348  
 
 Leevi Välimaa emphasises a nation’s will to defend itself, and views this will as a 
qualitative factor. As the area in which battles will be fought will be deep, a territori-
al defence organisation must be created in peacetime, one under which the country 
is divided into strategic areas where the defensive battles will be fought. Further-
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345 Matikainen, Unto Osvald, an extract from personal details, no. 51481, KA. Itsenäisen Suomen 
Kenraalikunta 1918–1996, (‘Officers with the rank of General of independent Finland between 1918 
and 1995’), bibliographies, edited by Rauno Lipponen, Porvoo 1997, pp. 262–263.  
346 Yleisen taktiikan karttaharjoitus no. 5/52 opetusaineisto ja pelitilanteet liitteineen, Majuri U. Matikainen/ 
no.tta/syyskuu 1952, Jorma Järventauksen yksityiskokoelma, Kansio II: yleistaktiikka, KA Yleisen taktiikan 
karttaharjoitus no. 5/52 opetusaineisto ja pelitilanteet liitteineen, Majuri U. Matikainen/no.tta/syyskuu 1952, 
Jorma Järventauksen yksityiskokoelma, Kansio II: yleistaktiikka, KA. A map exercise in general tactics no. 
5/52, the teaching materiel and the various situations in the game, Major U. Matikainen/no 
no./September 1952, Jorma Järventaus private collection, Folder II: general tactics, National Ar-
chives. 
347 See also Jouko, Petteri: Sotakokemusten hyödyntäminen kylmän sodan alussa – kohti alueellista puolustusta, 
artikkeli kirjassa Sotakorkeakoulu suomalaisen sotataidon kehittäjänä (‘Putting the experienced gained 
from the war to good use at the beginning of the Cold War – towards a territorial defence system, 
an article in the book The National General Staff College as a developer of the Finnish art of war’) edited by 
Arto Kotro, Juva 2009, p. 237. 
348 Välimaa, L. K.: Tuleva sota (‘The future war’), a thesis written at the National General Staff Col-
lege in 1948, SKK 1/354, KA. See also Välimaa, Leevi Kalervo, an extract from personal details no. 
46511, KA. 
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more, preparations must be put in place to wage a guerrilla war. In hindsight, 
Välimaa’s conclusions were highly interesting, considering that they date back to 
1948. Välimaa encourages his readers to participate in innovative thinking along the 
lines suggested by the title of his thesis, justifying his arguments by reference to the 
state of the world in the aftermath of the Second World War and seeking to provide 
a picture of the future war on the basis of principles governed by causality.349 
Välimaa’s bleakest predictions never materialised. A total war between the two great 
power blocs never broke out. Plain common sense and an awareness of the fact that 
both belligerents would be annihilated prevented war from breaking out. Neverthe-
less, the Finnish defence system continued to be developed exactly along the lines 
that Välimaa drafted in his thesis. The territorial defence system and territorial com-
bat, coupled with foreign policy, created a successful formula. 
 
In addition to the National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities were also 
examined on general commander courses arranged by the Army Combat School.350. 
Between 1947 and 1950, three separate theses were prepared on such courses, all of 
them addressing guerrilla-type activities. While they paid special attention to guerril-
la-type activities, they did not discuss guerrilla war or guerrilla warfare in any 
depth.351 From this it can be concluded that, with regard to issue related to guerrilla 
war, the division of labour between the National General Staff College and the Ar-
my Combat School reflected the basic division of labour in research, in which the 
National General Staff College focused on tactics and operational skills from the 
brigade and divisional level upwards, while the Army Combat School largely con-
centrated on tactics on the level of the battalion.  
 
When curricula and research subjects are examined, it becomes evident that guerril-
la-type activities had not been forgotten after the war. Under critical scrutiny, the 
content of classes and the conclusions drawn in the studies, the difficult conditions 
which characterised the years of the late 1940s, the changes made to the national de-
fence, and heterogeneity caused by the lack of tactical directions are clearly high-
lighted. In 1949, in order to avoid the pitfalls of misunderstandings, the Infantry Of-
fice of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces drafted training instructions 
for the inspector of the infantry which sought to delineate more precisely individual 
research and experimentation tasks conducted within the infantry. Such experimen-
tation and research highlighted not only experiences gained from Finland’s wars but 
also foreign examples and observations made of the training of Finnish troops. 
What is interesting is the fact that the very same instructions tasked the First Divi-
sion (1.D) with looking into any special requirements that tactics set for warfare in 
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349 Ibid. 
350 The Army Combat School arranged general commander courses from 1947 to 1957, after which 
the name was changed to the general staff officer course. The objective of these courses was to 
train wartime unit commanders, office chiefs of army basic formations and officers holding similar 
posts in peacetime, who were also capable of working as staff officers. See, for example, Taistelukou-
lu 1927–1977 (‘the Army Combat Schools’), Joensuu 1977, p. 176 and 299–301. 
351 Honkaniemi, U.: Sissitoiminta ja sen torjuminen, yleisen komentajakurssin oppilastutkielma vuodelta 1948 
(‘Guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities, a study written on a general commander course in 1948’), T 
26077/1/i/1, KA. Seitamo, A.: Sissi- ja partisaanitoiminta, yleisen komentajakurssin oppilastutkielma vuo-
delta 1949 (‘Guerrilla and partisan activities, a coursework produced on a general commander 
course in 1949’), T 26077/1/i/2, KA. 
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Northern Finland over the four seasons of the year. The instruction stated, by way 
of providing detail, that ‘in this context, special attention should be paid to guerrilla-type activi-
ties conducted by a large force under a concerted leadership.’352  
 
In the next year, training instruction 1/1950, issued by the inspector of the infantry, 
provided additional details on this issue and on training in general, referring to 
guidelines formulated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces which or-
dered units ‘to shift the focus of training to thinly manned defence lines and to guerrilla-type activ-
ities and guerrilla warfare.’ According to the instructions, training in guerrilla-type activ-
ities and guerrilla warfare was to be initiated by issuing research tasks to professional 
officers and NCOs, accompanied by presentations and discussions linked to the 
tasks in question. After providing the trainees with a basic training and giving them 
an overall picture of the field, instructors were to arrange map exercises, followed by 
experimental exercises, terrain exercises and combat exercises.353 The training in-
structions issued for 1949 and 1950 provide a partial explanation for the fact that re-
search subjects and map exercises at military schools were geared towards guerrilla-
type activities and guerrilla warfare. 
 
An interesting aspect regarding research is related to the gathering of war expe-
riences and using the conclusions drawn from them in experimentation. The De-
fence Forces wanted to take advantage of the know-how of Major General Erkki 
Raappana, particularly in questions related to wilderness warfare; during the final 
phases of the Continuation War Raappana had, after all, gained a reputation of be-
ing a master of encirclement battles conducted in a wilderness setting. In March 
1948, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces ordered Erkki Raappana to 
report to the inspector of the infantry in order to take up special tasks under him. 
Raappana was ordered to gather war experiences gained in wilderness warfare, to be 
used particularly in the drafting of regulations and in experimentation in particular. 
According to Raappana’s orders, he had to concentrate on a number of issues, one 
of which was to look into the way guerrilla-type activities were to be organised and 
implemented under varying seasons.354 The orders issued to Raappana were clearly 
linked to the plans made by the Training Division of the General Headquarters to 
prepare a handbook on guerrilla-type activities, part of the reform of other military 
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352 Jalkaväen tarkastajan koulutusohje 7/49, Ohjeita jalkaväen kehittämistä tarkoittavasta tutkimus- ja kokeilu-
toiminnasta (‘Training instruction issued by the inspector of the infantry 7/49, Instructions for 
research and experimentation which seek to develop the infantry’), PvPE:n no. 1172/Jv.tsto/ 
5a/14.7.1949, T 19468/F 37, KA. 
353 Jalkaväen tarkastajan koulutusohje 1/1950 (‘Training instructions issued by the inspector of the in-
fantry 1/1950’), PvPE:n no. 649/Jv.tsto/5b1/10.3.1950, T 19468/F 52a, KA. See also PvPE:n no. 
646/Jv.tsto/5b1/10.3.1950, T 22834/F 48. KA. 
354 Korpisotakokemusten kerääminen, Jalkaväen tarkastajan kirjelmä Erkki Raappanalle (‘The gathering of 
experiences gained from wilderness warfare, a letter sent by the inspector of the infantry to Erkki 
Raappana’), PvPE:n no. 201/Jv.tsto/2b/16.3.1948, Raappana, Erkki Johannes, an extract from 
personal details no. 32877, KA. 
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regulations.355 Unfortunately it appears that Raappana failed to complete his task as 
he reported in October 1948, when specifically asked, that he was in the process of 
laying the groundwork for his survey in order to be enable to start the actual work 
on it.356 The Weapons Cache Case and its aftermath ultimately led to Erkki Raap-
pana being discharged from his commission by the President of the Republic on 30 
April 1949. This decision was motivated by the public interest, and it meant that 
Raappana was transferred to the reserves on 5 May 1949, and his task remained un-
completed.357  
 
In order to facilitate the drafting of training instructions and the implementation of 
experiments on the basis of war experiences in army units, the Training Division of 
the General Headquarters gathered, in 1949, texts on guerrilla-type activities in or-
der to provide background material for the drafting of training instructions. Howev-
er, these writings were never made public or used by the units, as, for reason which 
remained unclear, they were first sent by the Intelligence Division of the General 
Headquarters in 1950 for review. The texts on guerrilla-type activities in question 
comprised a number of memoranda drafted by the officers of three infantry regi-
ments (JR 2, JR 6 and JR8), one military province (EHäm.sl.E), and one military dis-
trict (Kem.Sp), discussing the question in detail and proposing examples applicable 
to the current conditions, albeit –again –against the background of the experiences 
gained from Finland’s wars.358 While it is impossible to say with full certainty why 
the texts were never published, it is evident that their use was restricted due to their 
sensitive content, following recommendations by the Intelligence Division of the 
General Headquarters –after all, they categorically referred to Russia as being the 
enemy. In any event, the content of studies and preparatory reports on guerrilla war-
fare was already at the time considered to be sensitive, because they were archived, 
starting from the early 1950s, as documents which were labelled as a general rule as 
secret (sal) or secret on account of being operational in nature or discussing opera-
tional readiness (OT-sal).359 
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355 The handbook on guerrilla-type activities is referred to on line 27 in the plan put forth by the 
Training Division of the General Headquarters. This handbook was scheduled for printing over the 
course of 1948, with the edition numbering 3,000 copies and the cost of printing at Sanoma Oy 
around 150,000 markka. See the letter by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces to the 
Minister of Defence, including the attachments, PvPE:n no. 987/Koul.2/25/1.3.1948, T 19467/F 
21, KA. 
356 Jalkaväkiosaston tiedustelu liittyen erikoistehtävään (‘Reconnaissance by an infantry unit in connection 
with a special task’), PvPE:n no. 776/Jv.tsto/2a/12.10.1948. Erkki Raappana’s response to an en-
quiry by Colonel B. Ikonen on 26 October, Raappana, Erkki Johannes, an extract from personal de-
tails no. 32877, KA. 
357 Partanen, Jukka – Pohjonen, Juha – Tuunainen, Pasi: E. J. Raappana – Rajan ja sodan kenraali 
(‘E.J.Raappana – a general in action along the border and at war’), Keuruu 2007, pp. 397–398. 
358 Eight in number, the texts discussed guerrilla-type activities, the composition of guerrilla jaeger 
units, anti-partisan operations, reconnaissance and the methods of the enemy (Russians) in deploy-
ing guerrilla jaeger units. The covering letter with attachments by the Training Division of the Gen-
eral Headquarters, addressed to Lieutenant General U. Kähkönen, regarding the writings on guerril-
la-type activities, PvPE:n no. 814/Koul.2/8d/17.2.1950, T 19469/F 63, KA. 
359 ‘The retention of results gained from experiments conducted in connection with training in 
guerrilla-type activities must follow the rules set for confidential issues. The content of the refer-
ence studies can be used in the further training of officers, provided that they are linked in a proper 
manner to training in guerrilla war.’ PE:n no. 48/Koultsto/5 sal/7.3.1955, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. 
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The new policy issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, and the 
training instruction devised by the inspector of the infantry in 1950 were observed 
not only by the military schools but also the divisions and the various units. As an 
example, K.A Heiskanen, the commander of the Second Division (2.D), ordered 
three of his units to arrange a war game involving three guerrilla jaeger battalions 
over the course of 1950. The order obligated the units to specifically address ‘tech-
niques related to guerrilla-type activities (in a guerrilla war).’360 The reasons behind K. A. 
Heiskanen’s enthusiasm to arrange extra war games were not only the new policy by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, as Heiskanen had already led at 
least two war games in his division (in 1949 and 1950), the subject of which had 
been guerrilla warfare, involving five guerrilla jaeger battalions.361  
 
The period between 1944 and 1952 has often been referred to as the planning peri-
od for peacetime activities. With regard to the army, the composition and territorial 
disposition of the Defence Forces comprised the division and brigade organisation, 
as well as the territorial organisation with its nine military provinces and 27 military 
districts, which operated in parallel to each other. This arrangement caused a whole 
host of problems, principally in the command chain of the various branches and 
arms. This is why the nominal strengths of the units were cut by making a transition 
to a configuration known as the training composition in 1948. The arrangement also 
caused several units to be merged with each other or relocated. Entire units were al-
so disbanded.362 
 
The postwar years, up to the early 1950s, were a period of change in the Finnish art 
of war, characterised by developments under which new features were added to the 
trends that had already been in the making before the war. In this setup, reflections 
on the usability of guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities were no exception. 
The soldiers were tasked with applying current trends, experiences gained from the 
previous wars and available resources to tactical thinking, ensuring that the chapters 
of the Paris Peace Treaty and the spirit of the Agreement of Friendship, Coopera-
tion and Mutual Assistance were honoured, using all available means in this process. 
However, the postwar years played an important role in theoretical thinking on the 
art of war, and this was the period when the groundwork for the future defence sys-
tem was laid. A shift towards territorial thinking began to take shape, and the means 
available to guerrilla warfare and its practicability were highlighted. 
 
 
The intensive development of the territorial defence system in the 1950s 
 
The Defence Forces, saddled with a polarised defensive obligation, forced them to 
devise operational plans for two completely opposed scenarios –an invasion from 
the east and from the west. Without going into detail regarding such threat scenari-
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360 Sotapelien järjestäminen (‘Arranging war games’), 2.DE:n no. 1029/Koul./5g/9.9.1950, T 19469/F 
60b, KA. 
361 2.DE:n no. 12/Koul./5 g 2/sal/11.4.1950, T 20131/F 2 sal, KA. 
362 Puolustusvoimat – Joukko-osastoperinteet (‘The Defence Forces – the traditions of the various mili-
tary units’), edited by Marko Palokangas, Jyväskylä 2008, pp. 21–25. 
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os, which have already been discussed in a number of works,363 it can be stated that 
Finland’s strategic thinking was based on the idea that Finland would commit to the 
defence of its territory should an invasion be directed at Finland or at the Soviet 
Union through Finland. This threat scenario, which was in line with the spirit of the 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, theoretically meant 
that operative planning was aimed at repelling an attack from the West, although, in 
practice, the real threat scenario, kept in secrecy, was completely the opposite. A 
memorandum drafted by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in 
1950 expressed this idea in terms of territorial thinking as follows: ‘As warfare is be-
coming increasingly total in nature, and as military operations would be fought in an area that ex-
tends deep into the interior of the Finnish territory, a system known as territorial defence has been 
selected to form the basis of wartime leadership.’364 Initially, the principle of territorial de-
fence was not applied to the tactical level, and defence was based on fighting on a 
conventional front line with associated counter-attacks. During the 1950s, requests 
for territorial thinking were gradually extended to cover fighting operations as well, 
as observations made of the difficulties of initiating battles and defending the rear 
area provided strong support for this.365 
 
In September 1951, the General Headquarters issued an order to one peacetime di-
vision and some military provinces and units to draft defensive plans.366 From au-
tumn 1951 until spring 1952, the arrangements and operational principles of the ter-
ritorial defence system were debated within the Defence Forces. This debate was 
not confined to the General Headquarters; the grounds for territorial defence were 
discussed at a monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences and at 
other similar meetings. A discussion event aimed at general staff officers, arranged 
in February 1952, had a theme linked to territorial defence. Chief of the Operations 
Division of the General Headquarters Leo Sauramo, spoke before the audience on 
‘the principles of territorial defence.’367  
 
Sauramo’s introduction fuelled intense debate among the audience, drawing com-
ments such as the following: ‘Even under a territorial system, there is no need to abandon a 
static defence line, as long as such a line is necessary from a wider perspective. Actually, this is how 
the issue has been approached. As a matter of fact, territorial defence requires that the defenders 
stay put even more doggedly than before, as not even deep breakthroughs or landings of airborne 
troops in our rear areas should normally be a cause for a large-scale retreat or a major straightening 
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(1994), p. 233. Jouko, Petteri: Puolustussuunnittelun käynnistyminen maailmansodan jälkeen (‘Initiating the 
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ral plan for defence preparations’), T 21622/4, KA. 
365 Kanninen, Ermei: Muistio alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän käyttöönotosta Suomessa 1958–1971 (‘A 
memorandum on the adoption of the territorial defence system in Finland 1958–1971’), Helsinki 5 
March 2001, Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, a copy in the possession of the author of this 
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367 The minutes of the monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, held on 5 Feb-
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of the front line. Combat is not a question of holding territory but of annihilating the enemy’s hu-
man resources. We should engage in combat in a terrain that favours us, using the Finnish method 
of fighting. In an open terrain, we would only meet defeat in the face of the enemy’s superior 
strength.’Furthermore, there was a concern that ‘under the proposed territorial defence sys-
tem, areas would tie up too many troops in advance, which would limit their free use and lead to the 
dispersal of forces and shortage of troops.’Sauramo responded to this comments, stating, 
‘that this would be a misunderstanding. While the principles governing the use of troops would not 
change, efforts would be taken to create an unambiguous leadership organisation within the frame-
work of responsibility areas. This is the core issue.’368A territorial approach which repre-
sented a novel thinking in the art of war aroused emotions, as it, as such, had not yet 
evolved into a clear-cut, readily understandable and immediately adoptable principle. 
 
In addition to a discussion event arranged by the Finnish Society of Military Scienc-
es, debate surged back and forth, apparently going on for months, particularly be-
tween two colonels at the General Headquarters, Lauri Haanterä and Sauramo. As 
the debate showed no signs of abating, the new chief of the Operations Division, 
Colonel T. V. Viljanen, drafted a memorandum in 1952 for the chief of the Training 
Division, T. V. Viljanen. This memorandum provided a clear-cut description of the 
military chain of command, on the basis of which ‘territorial defence ’was proposed to 
form the foundation for Finland’s defence arrangements.369 Territorial defence 
sought, above all, to make the chain of command expedient, and to form a system 
under which the country was divided into areas which were under the direct com-
mand of the Commander-in-Chief and which took account of the strategic and op-
erational considerations. The commander of each area –the commander of an army 
or an independent army corps –would lead all the defensive preparations and mili-
tary operations in his area.370 
 
The need for a territorial defence system was justified by the technical development 
and deployment on a massive scale of great powers’ air forces, by improved and 
modern performance of landing equipment, by the increased speed and power 
brought albout by the development and motorisation of armoured units, and by the 
changes in warfare. These trends increasingly pointed towards abandoning conven-
tional front lines. The memorandum emphasised that territorial national defence by 
no means entailed a passive approach to actual operations. The objective was ‘to de-
stroy the enemy that had invaded the country.’According to Viljanen, a territorial defence 
system with its clear-cut chains of command ‘will enable the concentration of all available 
forces within a single, fairly large area for the achievement of the set target.’In forming respon-
sibility areas, certain operational, economic and administrative requirements, as well 
as requirements set by the civil defence, must be taken into consideration. Should an 
area of responsibility face a situation in which all communication between it and the 
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High Command is lost, the military organisation responsible for the area is obligated 
to continue its tasks using all available means.371  
 
The most important conclusion drawn from Viljanen’s presentation was the fact 
that a territorial defence system in itself would not change the basic principles of the 
Finnish way of waging war. By dividing the Finnish territory into responsibility areas 
and by organising a chain of command, prerequisites for a flexible defensive battle 
waged across the entire area, the effective protection of the rear areas, and ‘operations 
carried out by small separate units –even guerrilla jaeger units – under a single leadership’could 
be created. In this context, according to Viljanen, military operations will turn ‘in cer-
tain areas into warfare that will have the nature of guerrilla-type activities and that will culminate 
in a resistance movement that will resort to all available means.’372 Behind this principle of 
combat, a new notion of warfare can be discerned, one in which war has become 
even more total in nature and that no longer makes any distinction between battle-
field and home front. Not even deep breakthroughs by the enemy should be a cause 
for a large-scale retreat or to the straightening of front lines, as yielding large swaths 
of territory would only mean losing the space that the operational freedom of Finn-
ish troops and the supply chain required. 
 
After a short and intensive planning period, the Commander-in-Chief of the De-
fence Forces, General Aarne Sihvo, approved the plans in June 1952. When the op-
erative plan was turned into operational order no. 8, it was given the code name of 
‘Polttoainehankinta’(‘The acquisition of fuel’). With regard to the principles of the ter-
ritorial defence system, the operational order reflected fairly faithfully the content of 
T. V. Viljanen’s memorandum. Polttoaineenhankinta also provided homogeneous 
principles for the use of troops and their composition, which were the peacetime 
composition (RA-kokoonpano), reinforcement composition (T-kokoonpano), covering 
troop composition (SU-kokoonpano), and the full wartime composition (TSA-
composition).373 The principles of use and tasks of the troops were largely in line with 
their composition names. For the maintenance of internal security, the peacetime 
composition (RA-kokoonpano) would be used, in so far as a transition to the compo-
sition in which troops were reinforced from the army reserves (T-kokoonpano) was 
not deemed necessary. Troops reinforced to meet the requirements set for T-
kokoonpano were aimed at maintaining internal order and protecting Finland’s neu-
trality. Safeguarding Finland’s neutrality – the local defence of Finland’s borders –
was a task intended for the SU-kokoonpano. A transition to the full wartime composi-
tion would have meant in practice the reinforcement of the army to the level of its 
maximum nominal strength, something that was planned to be achieved either di-
rectly from the peacetime composition (RA-kokoonpano), or, alternatively, via the 
route of other compositions.374  
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373 PvPE:n no. 80/Op.1/11b/OT/sal./13.6.1952 (Polttoainehankinta), T 26862/F 3–F 4 OT-sal, 
KA. See also Tynkkynen (2006), pp. 444–445. 
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A more detailed establishment chart was completed over the course of 1953. With 
regard to guerrilla troops, the plans from 1954 for the wartime composition – the 
establishment chart (PTL) –the troops of the first priority class of the High Com-
mand, the covering composition, no longer contained guerrilla jaeger battalions.375 
Quite evidently, the idea was to cut the number of guerrilla troops placed directly 
under the High Command, in line with the new operation order, from the six guer-
rilla jaeger battalions in the 1950 establishment chart to the three battalions in the 
1951 chart and further down to two battalions in the 1954 PTL. However, this 
planning did not reflect the real situation, as the six Frontier Guards were tasked 
with establishing a large number of unspecified troops, named after the peacetime 
names of the Frontier Guards, which included guerrilla jaeger battalions and other 
elements of the covering force intended for guerrilla-type activities.376 
 
This new model for defence received a more official approval in 1953, as the third 
volume of Upseerin käsikirja (‘Officer’s handbook’) dedicated one subchapter to it. 
In the definition of the model, Finland was divided into areas, the command eche-
lons of which were tasked to make and implement all preparations related to nation-
al defence in their areas and to lead military operations in accordance with instruc-
tions issued by the government and the General Headquarters.377 Polttoaineenhankinta 
(‘The acquisition of fuel’) was the first operational plan based on the principle of 
territorial defence; this plan was revised in 1957 and 1958.378   
 
In late 1952, the Finnish military system underwent a reorganisation which sought 
to bring all the troops and the various branches under a more homogeneous territo-
rial command structure. In practical terms, this reform entailed significant changes 
to the peacetime organisation of the Finnish Defence Forces.379 Divisions were 
turned into regional echelons of command, with the brigade being confirmed to be 
the army’s basic formation. The practical implementation of the reform retained a 
framework of three divisions and the troops directly under them, supplemented by 
one armoured brigade, which had also been in the previous organisational chart380. 
The territorial organisation was changed to comprise seven military provinces and 
27 military districts. In connection with this, the anti-aircraft artillery branch was de-
tached from the air force and the coastal artillery from the navy, and these were in-
cluded in the army.381 At the beginning of 1957, the names of units of the Defence 
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so PE:n no. 79/Lkptsto/OT/10 c 2 sal/24.2.1955, T 26843/F 6 OT-sal, KA. 
376 Ibid. Cf. also PvPE:n no. 117/Op.1/OT/10 sal/22.12.1950, T 26862/D 1 sal, KA. PvPE:n no. 
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378 Tynkkynen (1999), pp. 6–7. 
379 Asetus puolustuslaitoksesta, Suomen Asetuskokoelma (‘Decree on the Military System, The Statute 
Book of Finland’) no. 358/31.10.1952, KA. 
380 The name of Kevyt prikaati (‘Light Brigade’) was changed to Panssariprikaati (‘Armoured Briga-
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381 Salminen, Pekka: Puolustusvoimien rauhanajan organisaation kehittyminen 5.9.1944–1.7.1966, (‘The de-
velopment of the peacetime organisation of the Defence Forces between 5 September 1944 and 1 
July 1966, a separate study, the research data base of the Department of Military History at the Na-
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Forces reflecting the provincial names were reintroduced. The principal objective of 
the reintroduction of regional names was to bring the Defence Forces closer to the 
population of the recruiting area and, simultaneously, the entire nation. While old 
traditional names were used in most cases, new names with a link to a particular 
unit’s province were also used, in order to strengthen the units’regional identity.382  
 
Experiences gained from the war, a time characterised by shortage of goods, and a 
need to modernise defence solutions led to the adoption of territorial responsibility 
areas. Reflecting the total nature of war, the Defence Forces wanted to create mili-
tary provinces that would be better suited for collaboration with the civil society in a 
crisis situation. The military provinces were required to be capable of engaging in-
dependently in combat. Reorganisation was based on the principle of territorial de-
fence, the gradual introduction of which led to significant changes in the military 
command and control system from the 1950s onwards. Although territorial defence 
emerged as a concept as far back as in the early 1950s, its wider significance was not 
understood at the time in the same sense as it came to be understood in the late 
1960s. However, many parts of the Defence Forces were involved in furthering the 
development work. A map exercise arranged for a general commander course of the 
Army Combat School in 1956 provided valuable information on the shortcomings 
of a defence system based on the traditional front line. Calculations carried out by 
the National General Staff College between 1956 and 1958 also indicated that no 
defensive position or line could withstand an attack by an adversary using strong 
firepower, armoured units and airborne troops. The main weaknesses of the de-
fender were inferior firepower, lack of operational mobility and vulnerable rear are-
as. To compensate for such weaknesses, a territorial combat model was adopted, 
under which guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were seen to play a major 
role.383 
 
An assessment prepared by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in 
February 1956 stated that operational circumstances set a number of requirements 
for the development of the tactics of the various branches, equipment and methods. 
The overarching objective was to repel the attacks of an invading enemy on land, in 
the air and at sea. The enemy was always found to be superior in numbers, materiel 
and firepower on land, in the air and at sea, across the entire theatre of war. When 
assessing the enemy’s operating methods, its possibility to deploy the atomic weap-
ons had to be taken into account as a new factor. With regard to combat operations 
carried out by the covering force, the mobility of the troops should be improved, 
and the troops should take advantage of surprise action everywhere where opportu-
nities to such action became available. Surprise action could be supported by blow-
ing up bridges, by conducting large-scale countermobility activities in considerable 
depth, and by resorting to guerrilla-type activities. ‘However, the superior strength of the 
enemy may prevent our troops from engaging in regular delaying action in certain areas. Should this 
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383 Kanninen, Ermei: Muistio alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän käyttöönotosta Suomessa 1958–1971 (‘A me-
morandum on the adoption of the territorial defence system in Finland 1958–1971’), Helsinki 5 
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be the case, the defender must resort to guerrilla warfare, conducted possibly across a very large area, 
thereby enabling the defender to carry out its tasks that would otherwise be impossible to accom-
plish.’384 Against this background, considering probable circumstances, the conclu-
sions drawn by the General Headquarters become intelligible. 
 
In light of the above, the early years of the 1950s represented the first steps towards 
the development of a territorial defence system, the significance of which, in hind-
sight, was the reform of the strategic-level reform of the defence system. Although 
many aspects of the military threat scenario were given more detail during the late 
1950s, the means available to guerrilla warfare had been integrated into a new kind 
of defensive thinking and the art of war.385 The methods of guerrilla warfare and the 
opportunities available to their utilisation aroused increased interest among Finnish 
officers. A surprise attack began to displace the prospect of a large-scale nuclear 
war. 
 
 
Discussion and reflection on, and influences gained from, the opportunities 
open to guerrilla warfare 
 
Postwar discussion on war experiences was not confined to the late 1940s; as a mat-
ter of fact, it continued into the 1950s. Perhaps the most extensive collection of war 
experiences that was compiled after the war can be found in the archives of the 
Training Division of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces.386 Although 
memoranda on war experiences can be found in the various archives, broken down 
by the body that compiled the archive, war experiences were discussed at units, at 
military schools and at training events for officers. One of the forums of this kind 
of discussion was the monthly meetings of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, 
at which officers discussed and debated, often using a critical tone, questions related 
to the art of war and war experiences.387  
 
An indication of the significance of such meetings was the fact that officers who 
had participated in the Winter and Continuation War, representing both generals 
and less senior officers, participated in them on a fairly regular basis. Such meeting 
sought to provide a forum for general staff officers, enabling them to discuss trends 
of the contemporary art of war and to discuss –from a variety of perspectives –the 
changes that were taking place in the postwar Defence Forces. However, discussion 
topics were often related to experiences gained from Finland’s wars and their ap-
plicability to the art of war when solving future problems. Events were well pre-
pared and well organised. A specifically appointed officer introduced the topic of 
the meeting to the participants, after which participants took the floor, providing 
their comments in the order determined by the chair of the meeting. Until 1955, 
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386 See the collection compiled by PvPE (‘The General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forc-
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kustelufoorumina (‘The experiences gained from Finland’s wars indicate that... – the Finnish Society 
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Helsinki 2012, pp. 165–174. 
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meetings were chaired by General Erik Heinrichs. His successor in this role was 
Lieutenant General Uolevi Poppius. Detailed minutes were kept of each meeting, 
recording the names of the participants and their comments. The minutes also rec-
orded all dissenting opinions and comments, an indication of the fact that in a close 
circle, discussion was fairly free and did not depend on the rank of participants.388 
The material used at discussion meetings –presentations and minutes – were ar-
chived for later use.389  
The presentations and recorded discussions of monthly meetings evidently reached 
–indirectly –a substantial number of other soldiers, as the general staff officers who 
participated in such meetings propagated the ideas put forth at meetings to a wider 
audience within the Defence Forces. The impact of the meetings was also accen-
tuated by the fact that the participation rate was high.390 The topics discussed at the 
monthly meeting included, among other things, the experiences gained from guer-
rilla warfare, guerrilla-type activities, and opportunities available to the application of 
guerrilla warfare tactics. Of the total of 77 monthly meetings, two exclusively ad-
dressed guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities. However, many introductions 
and comments to them at meetings indirectly addressed guerrilla war-related is-
sues.391  
 
At a monthly meeting in December 1950, an introduction given by Major Björn 
Kontiopää addressed the operations of resistance movements during the Second 
World War; he also speculated on the success of similar movements in in the future. 
A total of 60 general staff officers participated in this event, with Lieutenant Gen-
eral Harald Öhquist, among others, taking the floor and commenting in introduc-
tion. Kontiopää discussed the various resistance movements and their methods, bas-
ing his presentation on experiences gained from wars and arguing that such move-
ments could play a role in future wars as well.392  
 
In March 1951, the first meeting focusing solely on guerrilla warfare was arranged, 
with Captain Unto Matikainen giving an introduction entitled ‘Guerrilla warfare as a 
form of warfare in Finland ’. General Heinrichs, who chaired the meeting, addressed the 
meeting after Matikainen’s introduction, summing up the issue and drawing atten-
tion to the extreme nature of guerrilla warfare. ‘Guerrilla warfare can be resorted to only as 
a last-ditch effort, in a situation in which the regular forces are no longer capable of affecting the fate 
of our nation. Guerrilla warfare is a double-edged sword, as the casualties inflicted on the enemy 
may also lead to a situation in which the Finnish population would be subjected to suffering. Fur-
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thermore, it should be noted that maintaining stable leadership over guerrilla war operations would 
be very difficult. Once started, the High Command might lose control over guerrilla war. As for the 
international law regarding guerrilla warfare, we should note that while guerrilla warfare under cer-
tain conditions may meet the criteria of the international law, it is the outcome that would be deci-
sive. The victorious party would interpret the legal aspects as it pleased.’ 393  
 
Guerrilla-type activities were discussed at a meeting in November 1956, with Major 
Olavi Kaakinen giving an introduction on ‘the possibilities and tasks of guerrilla-type activi-
ties in current Finnish conditions.’ In the discussion following the presentation, Colonel 
Valo Nihtilä commented on experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities in a 
critical tone ‘if we had had a functional guerrilla organisation that the introducer referred to in 
his presentation in our previous wars, we would undoubtedly have fared a great deal better, both in 
the Winter and the Continuation War. It is another matter whether we would be in a position to 
perform mobilisation any longer, as politicians will leave all such measures to the last possible mo-
ment. In this context, we must also take into consideration all the surprises that the enemy might 
attempt to utilise, regarding both time and methods. Therefore, we should perhaps study guerrilla 
warfare and think of it as the second form of fighting. Particularly encouraging examples of this 
have been gained from battles in Indochina and North Africa. One of the key prerequisites for such 
operations would be the availability of first-rate communications equipment, something that should 
be the priority in materiel procurement.’394 A particularly noteworthy point in Nihtilä’s 
comments was his references to foreign examples of guerrilla-type activities, which, 
apparently, were closely scrutinised by Finnish officers 
 
Another commentator to Olavi Kaakinen’s introduction drew attention to the im-
portance of guerrilla-type activities and, in particular, the inadequate arrangements 
for the training in guerrilla-type activities. Major General Erkki Kukkonen brought 
up Valo Nihtilä’s role as an advocate of guerrilla-type activities and tactics. ‘Colonel 
Nihtilä, while working as a teacher of general tactics at the National General Staff College, strong-
ly advocated the idea of guerrilla-type activities and also stood by his convictions during the war. 
Today, we can say that his work has come to fruition.’Lieutenant Colonel Kauko Pöyhönen 
emphasised the significance of training in his commentary. ´With regard to training in 
guerrilla-type activities, what is particularly important is the training provided for leaders. Also, it 
should be considered that training in guerrilla-type activities be provided on the largest possible 
scale.’Sakari Simelius, concluding the meeting, commented that ‘while we must see the 
opportunities available to us in guerrilla-type activities in the right light, we also must to avoid ex-
aggerating our own capabilities. The objective, albeit a distant one, is nevertheless clear –each and 
every one must be capable of taking up guerrilla activities.’395 This concluding statement by 
Simelius is in particular is interesting, as it suggests that, evidently, preliminary ob-
jectives for the role of guerrilla-type activities had already been set. 
 
It should be mentioned that all officers giving presentations at the meetings of the 
Finnish Society of Military Sciences were well versed in their respective topics, not 
only by virtue of their war experiences but also by their research interests, as themes 
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or their presentations reflected almost without exception the subject matter of their 
theses that they had completed at the National General Staff College or on general 
commander courses.396 
 
 
Texts and studies on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities between 
1951 and 1960 
 
The military threat scenario that had changed and that was in a constant state of flux 
brought guerrilla warfare, in a novel way and in a fashion that was more convincing 
than ever before, into public debate. Public comments and invitations to discussion 
by officers between 1951 and 1960 were a case apart, embracing conflicts in opin-
ions regarding guerrilla-type activities. However, public discussion on guerrilla war-
fare on a broader scale was considered to be too sensitive in terms of Finland’s for-
eign policy, leading to a situation in which the content of texts was cautious, general 
in tone or only comprised summaries of reflections reduced to their bare bones. 
However, a small number of articles were published as it became evident that Fin-
land’s defence doctrine needed reforming over the course of the 1950s. Such texts 
were not confined to Sotilasaikakauslehti alone. 
  
Lieutenant Niilo Nurmi, who had written on guerrilla warfare in the late 1940s, pub-
lished an article in 1951 in Sotilasaikakauslehti on the pursuit and annihilation of 
guerrilla and partisan troops. While Nurmi –again –discussed guerrilla-type active-
ties in light of the experiences that Finland had gained from its wars, his lengthy ar-
ticle was surprisingly future-orientated considering themes of his previous texts. 
Nurmi also referred to examples of guerrilla-type activities gained from the Korean 
War that was in progress at the time. While expressing his strong opinion on the ef-
fects of the Paris Peace Treaty on Finland’s defence capability and on the deplorable 
state of guerrilla training, using language that was exceptionally bold against the gen-
eral background of the era, Nurmi assumed a softer tone in his final statement. ‘The 
description that I have attempted to conjure up is cursory only, but I do not feel that I am in a posi-
tion where I could provide a more detailed account. Many details that need further clarification 
must be kept from the public, at least until we have managed to take all the advantage that they of-
fer. Other small states have formed security troops and similar to ensure their safety. Why have we 
not? We do not need them because...!!! ’397 While the meaning of Nurmi’s last elliptic sen-
tence is anybody’s guess, it clearly communicated the frustration felt by an officer 
with regard to the credibility of Finland’s defensive capabilities and to the fate of a 
small country becoming a casualty in a competition between great powers.  
 

396 Kontiopää (1948), SKK 1/362, KA. Matikainen (1948), SKK 1/353, KA. Kaakinen, Olavi: Vi-
hollisen sissiosastojen takaa-ajo kesällä ja talvella viivyttävän AK:n kaistalla kun vihollisena on suurvalta, yleisen 
komentajakurssin oppilasupseeritutkielma vuodelta 1955 (‘The pursuit of enemy guerrilla jaeger units in 
summer and winter in the sector of an Army Corps that is engaged in delaying action in a situation 
in which the adversary is a great power; a thesis prepared by a student officer on a general com-
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The article by Niilo Nurmi was followed by a few years’silence, and it was not until 
1955 that guerrilla-related issues were brought up for discussion again. That year, 
Captain Aatos Savunen autored two articles on guerrilla warfare, both of which dis-
cussed guerrilla warfare in a global context. The first article, Sissisodasta (‘On guerrilla 
warfare’), opened with a high-quality discussion on the differences and internal rela-
tionship between guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. According to Savu-
nen, guerrilla-type activities were one aspect of regular warfare. With regard to guer-
rilla warfare, Savunen regarded it as a special form of warfare in which guerrilla-type 
activities took the most important role. As an example of guerrilla warfare and guer-
rilla-type activities, Savunen took up guerrilla wars fought in the Soviet Union, Yu-
goslavia and Indochina, as the experiences gained from them were most recent and, 
therefore, provided the best picture of modern fighting methods. Compared to 
Nurmi, Savunen employs a style that is considerably more restrained and cautious, 
although he concluded his article by stating that the opportunities offered by guerril-
la warfare were worth considering.398 The other article by Savunen focused on guer-
rilla warfare in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.399 Judging from his 
article, Savunen was well versed in the Soviet art of war and, in particular, in the par-
tisan movement during the Second World War. While Savunen continued to explore 
questions related to guerrilla warfare400, public writing on the issue ended with the 
publication of this article. 
 
However, the theses and coursework prepared at the military schools provide a rich 
debate on guerrilla-related issues. Over the course of the 1950s, a total of eight the-
ses were prepared in Finland, all of which had a direct bearing on guerrilla-related is-
sues. Of these, the most central were the studies conducted byMartti Vinari, Georg 
Ahonen, Eero Naapuri, Urho Leskinen, and Paavo Ilmola, who draftd a separate 
study entitled Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suuntaviivat (‘Guerrilla warfare, its 
prerequisites and the guidelines for warfare’).401 All the above-mentioned studies 
shared the fact that their objectives and research problems –to discuss the possibili-
ties of using guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in Finland –had clearly 
been defined either by the General Headquarters or the teacher staff of the National 
General Staff College. These studies exhibited interesting details concerning the def-
inition of concepts. According to Martti Viinari, ‘guerrilla-type activities are understood to 
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20 sal, KA. See also Ilmola, Paavo, an extract from personal details no.45233, KA. 
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constitute a form of fighting that is linked to regular military operations and that is carried out 
within the general framework of our defence arrangements.’402 Paavo Ilmola took the issue 
even further in his definition of concepts. ‘Guerrilla-type activities are a form of fighting in 
which armed guerrilla troops engage. They typically comprise different combat, demolition and re-
connaissance tasks and often the spreading of propaganda and the provision of information.’403 
Comparison of the two definitions reveals that that of Ilmola’s in particular expand-
ed on the dimensions of the art of war and the versatility of tactical means. 
However, between 1951 and 1960, most studies related to guerrilla warfare were 
produced on general commander courses, infantry captain courses and officers’ in-
telligence courses at the Army Combat School. An examination of the list of theses 
reveals that the Army Combat School was a veritable ‘research centre of guerrilla-
type activities’, with a total of 49 studies with a link to guerrillas having been pre-
pared in the 1950s. As a general rule, theses were brief –approximately 20 to 40 
pages in length – the quality of which varied greatly from one author to another. 
However, a number of high-quality studies can be found, of which those authored 
by Martti Avela, Toivo Hannila, Olavi Kaakinen, Unto Korhonen and Viktor Platan 
deserve a mention.404 The emphasis placed on the study of guerrilla-type activities 
can easily be linked to the enthusiasm and ideas of Veikko Koppinen, who was the 
deputy leader of the Army Combat School at the time. 
 
With regard to other studies, a number of separate studies prepared with the sup-
port of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences deserve a mention, with several of 
them exhibiting high quality and meeting the criteria to be set for scholarly work. As 
a general rule, these studies were archived in the collection of studes of the Advisory 
Board for the Military Science (StietNK), kept at the National Archives.405  
 
Captain Unto Matikainen authored a study entitled Sissisota sodankäyntimuotona Su-
omessa, (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in Finland’) which was presented at a 
monthly meeting of the Society in 1951. Matikainen’s study was based on his thesis 
completed in 1948 at the National General Staff College in 1948.406 An extensive 
and meritorious study by Major Aatos Savunen dating back to 1958, entitled Sissisota 
–tulevaisuudenko sota? (‘Guerrilla war –a war of the future?’), provided an exhaustive 
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402 Vinari (1952), p. 2, SKK 1/548, KA. See also Vinari, Martti Johannes, an extract from personal 
details no. 20679, KA. 
403 Ilmola (1958), p. 6, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. 
404 Avela, Martti: Sissitoiminta ja -sota erikoisesti maamme etelä- ja keskiosassa, (‘Guerrilla-type activities 
and warfare, especially in the southern part and in the interior of Finland, a study prepared by a 
student officer on a general commander course in 1951’), T 26077/1/i/4, KA. Hannila, Toivo: Sis-
sitoiminta – sissisota, (‘Guerrilla-type activities – guerrilla warfare, a study prepared by a student of-
ficer on a general commander course in 1953’), T 26077/1/i/8, KA. Kaakinen (1955), T 26077/1/I 
/22, KA. Korhonen, Unto: Sissitoimintaan tukeutuva puolustus, (‘A defence based on guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, a study prepared by a student officer on a general commander course in 1957’), T 
26077/1/i/28, KA. Platan, Viktor: Mahdollisuutemme sissisotaan, (‘Our opportunities for waging a 
guerrilla war, a study prepared by a student officer on a staff officer course in 1958’), T 26077/1/ 
i/40, KA. 
405 See, for example, StietNK 1/39, 42 and 63, KA. 
406 Matikainen, Unto: Sissisota sodankäyntimuotona Suomessa (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in 
Finland’), StietNK 1/39, KA. Cf. also Matikainen (1948), SKK 1/353, KA. The minutes of the 
monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, held on 06/03/1951, Pk 2610/7, KA. 
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discussion of guerrilla warfare in the international context and its possible applica-
tion under Finnish conditions. This 134-page study demonstrated Savunen’s serious 
attitude towards his subject and his scholarly familiarity with the topic. In this con-
text, Savunen’s thoughts concerning the impact of atomic weapons on the means 
available to guerrilla warfare deserve attention. ‘It appears that atomic weapons force even 
those countries that possess no such weapons to adopt and apply the forms of fighting that character-
ise guerrilla warfare. As for small nations that do not possess the latest military technology, princi-
pally the means of transport that facilitate mobility, let alone atomic weapons, the adoption of the 
means of guerrilla warfare is nothing less than mandatory if they really intend to put up 
resistance.‘407 Again, this study, like so many others, referred to the Soviet Union’s in-
vasion capability and Finland’s actual chances of defending itself against a great 
power. The conclusions drawn by Aatos Savunen and Paavo Ilmola –who was 
mentioned above –in the late 1950s on guerrilla warfare were noteworthy in the na-
tional context, and they were later put to good use in many ways, including their use 
as background material for the Guerrilla Tactics Committee that functioned from 
1961 to 1963.408 
 
 
4.2. Guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare  
 
 
Wartime needs lent vigour to training in guerrilla-type activities 
 
By the early 1950s, the Defence Forces realised that, in addition to discussing guer-
rilla warfare and clarifying the concepts related to it, practical measures were also re-
quired. A particular problem –recognised during the war –was created by a lack of 
personnel with training in guerrilla-type activities and an understanding of its basic 
principles. Although units formed of volunteers were put through crash courses on 
guerrilla-type activities while battles were already raging, the results achieved were 
not promising. After operational planning was restarted in the late 1940s, the prob-
lems related to the provision of training in guerrilla tactics and the principles gov-
erning the use of guerrilla troops remained unsolved.409  
 
Aarne Sihvo, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, issued an order at the 
end of 1949 on the major training themes for 1950, listing a thinly manned defence, 
guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare as such themes. The first phase of this 
training order addressed the need to improve the professional skills of the profes-
sional officers and NCOs in unconventional forms of fighting. Thereby, the skills 
acquired by the regular staff would be transferred for used in the training of con-
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407 Savunen, Aatos: Sissisota – tulevaisuudenko sota? (‘Guerrilla warfare – a war of the future?’), a study 
prepared for the Finnish Society of Military Sciences in 1959, StietNK 1/53, KA, p. 134. See also 
Savunen, Aatos Päiviö, an extract from personal details no.46375, KA. Cf. the general tactical policy 
adopted by the General Headquarters regarding the relevance of the atomic weapon. PE:n no. 
136/Ohjeststo/8b sal/16.5.1957, T 25094/F 5 sal, KA. PE:n no. 80/Ohjeststo/8b sal/11.4.1956, T 
21442/F 7 sal, KA. 
408 Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013. 
409 The addition of guerrilla-type activities to the training of conscripts in the late 1940s was regard-
ed as next to impossible if the other training objectives were to be achieved. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 
341. 
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scripts of all units. The inspector of the infantry also commented on the training in-
structions issued for guerrilla-type activities, ordering that that practical training in-
tended for regular personnel must be initiated at the operational level of each bri-
gade.410 What is peculiar in this setup is the fact that, in reality, guerrilla-type activi-
ties, guerrilla warfare and guerrilla war had not yet been examined from the perspec-
tive of the art of war, let alone that a distinction would have been made between 
them. Theoretical reflection was still in its infancy when the order on the initiation 
of training in guerrilla-type activities was issued. 
 
However, the order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces was 
quite cursory, providing mostly general guidelines for the topics of which training 
was to be provided. Detailed instructions for the organisation of training in guerril-
la-type activities were still missing. For this reason, the Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters submitted a request to the chief of the Training Division, re-
questing the Training Division to provide clarifying details on the orders by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, as the Frontier Guard organisation 
had been tasked with transforming the frontier guards into frontier guard battalions 
and assigning the cadre to guerrilla jaeger battalions formed by the Defence Forces 
on a territorial basis. In other words, guerrilla jaeger battalions were to be formed of 
reservists trained by the Frontier Guard. In order to enable the Frontier Guards to 
gear the training that they provided towards wartime requirements, urgent instruc-
tions regarding the content of the guerrilla training were requested. The Operations 
Division of the General Headquarters was also concerned about the content of 
training in guerrilla-type activities, noting that it should not be confined to opera-
tions carried out in the wilderness alone but also take account of large-scale guerrilla 
warfare conducted in populated areas under concerted leadership. The importance 
of collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard in the training 
was also highlighted: ‘It is also desirable that the further training of the professional officers and 
NCOs of the Defence Forces should be developed and, if possible, carried out in close operation 
with the Frontier Guard.’411 
 
The Training Division of the General Headquarters reacted quickly to the request, 
with the chief of the section sending, in April 1951, a covering letter and a ten-page 
memorandum for review by the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters. The 
memorandum was divided into the requirements set for personnel engaging in guer-
rilla-type activities, the objectives to be achieved by training and its implementation, 
broken down by personnel group, and the time needed for training and the possibil-
ities for its implementation. According to the memorandum, the provision of guer-
rilla training to officer candidates, students on cadet courses, company officers, as 
well as to captains and majors should begin in autumn 1951, and to the professional 

410 Jalkaväen tarkastajan koulutusohje 1/1950 (‘Training instructions issued by the inspector of the in-
fantry 1/1950’), PvPE no. 649/Jv.tsto/5b1/10.3.1950, T 19468/F 52a, KA. See also PvPE no. 
646/Jv.tsto/5b1/10.3.1950, T 22834/F 48, KA. 
411 Rajavartiostojen koulutus, PvPE Operatiivisen osaston kirje koulutusosaston päällikölle 15.2.1951 (‘Trai-
ning at the Frontier Guards, a letter by the Operations Divisions to the chief of the Training Divi-
sion, dated 15 February 1951’), T 20239/F 1sal, KA. See also Iskanius, Markku: Kainuun Prikaatin 
historia 1626–2012 – Nelivuosisatainen taival Savon rykmentistä nykyaikaiseksi valmiusyhtymäksi (‘The his-
tory of the Kainuu Brigade 1626–2012 – a period of four hundred years from the Savo Regiment to 
a modern army readiness formation’), Kajaani 2012, pp. 266–267. 
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NCOs in spring 1952. The Frontier Guard saw it as possible to begin training in au-
tumn 1951.412 What is noteworthy is that the inspector of the infantry, K. A. Tapola, 
entered his comments in the documents a couple of days later, adding the following 
detail to the proposal: ‘In addition to the actual training and the topics covered, the training lo-
cations and calculations regarding the number of students and instructors must be taken into con-
sideration.’413  
 
Simultaneously with the guidelines issued to the Defence Forces regarding training, 
the Operations Department of the General Headquarters took a decision in 1950 to 
transfer part of the responsibility regarding the forming and training of guerrilla 
troops from the Defence Forces to the Frontier Guard. In a situation where Fin-
land’s neutrality needed to be protected, the borders of the country were to be guar-
ded by using Frontier Guard companies reinforced with reservists, in addition to 
which the Defence Forces needed to be prepared to form and use guerrilla troops if 
the threat of war was imminent. Under this arrangement, during a phase when Fin-
land was increasing its level of preparedness, the Frontier Guard was tasked with 
forming border jaeger battalions capable of adopting guerrilla-type activities In addi-
tion, military province were to form guerrilla jaeger battalions of reservists the train-
ing of which was largely the responsibility of the Frontier Guard. This division of 
responsibilities and the methods used ensured that the troops intended to be com-
mitted to guerrilla-type activities would have better skills, something that the Fron-
tier Guard had to take into consideration in its training.414  
 
The Frontier Guard did not waste time. In late 1951, the staff of the Frontier Guard 
issued instructions for the commencement of training in guerrilla-type activities for 
the Frontier Guards over the course of 1952. Training on a broader scale in the 
planned manner began with the Frontier Guards, based on hourly calculations 
which had been performed by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen and which 
were, in 1951, in trial use at the Kaunuu Frontier Guard.415 In early spring 1951, the 
commander of the Kainuu Frontier Guard (KR), Lieutenant Colonel Veikko 
Karhunen, drafted a memorandum, around 30 pages in length, on guerrilla-type ac-
tivities and training, which was sent to the Infantry Division of the General Head-
quarters for the purpose of being put to use by the Defence Forces. Karhunen 
based his views on solid experience; after all, he had been the commander of Guer-
rilla Battalion 3 and Border Jaeger Battalion 3 during the Continuation War. 
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412 PE:n no. 197/Koultsto/5 sal/5.4.1951, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. PvPE:n no. 64/Koul.1/ 
5/sal./21.4.1951 ja liite: muistio sissikoulutuksesta 5.4.1951 (‘and an attachment regarding training 
in guerrilla-type activities dated 5 April 1951’), T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. 
413 Ibid., see particularly the comments added by KAT (Kustaa Anders Tapola), dated 23 April 
1953. 
414 PvPE:n no. 36/Op.1/5 sal./15.2.1951, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. PvPE:n no. 111/Op.1/11 b/OT 
sal/13.9.1952, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confiden-
tial archive’) identifier F 2–6 OT-sal (research permit obtained). See also Suominen, Pertti: Armeijan 
silmänä ja korvana – Tiedustelupäällikkö Raimo Heiskanen, (‘The eyes and ears of the army – Intelli-
gence chief Raimo Heiskanen ’), Keuruu 2012, p. 103. 
415 RvE:n no. 3277/II/21.a/4.12.1951, T 22834/F 57, KA. RvE:n no. 3469/II/21.a/22.12.1951, T 
22834/F 57, KA. RvE:n no. 2665/II/21.a/26.9.1952, T 22834/F 66, KA. A memorandum with at-
tachments by Lieutenant General Veikko Karhunen, prepared in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 
sal, KA Karhunen, Veikko Evert, an extract from personal details, no: 37447, KA. 
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Karhunen’s memorandum was very useful for the General Headquarters, as it not 
only presented a description of guerrilla warfare from the perspective of the art of 
war but also provided precise calculations on the number of hours required for the 
training of operational and tactical leaders in guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type ac-
tivities.416  
 
In addition to discussing the training instructions in use by the Frontier Guards, 
Karhunen’s memorandum also proposed several measures for the reorganisation of 
guerrilla training. Among other things, Karhunen proposed that the basic training of 
guerrilla troops be broken down by topic. According to him, training should be di-
vided into 1) theoretical basics, 2) combat training, 3) territorial guerrilla activities, 4) 
countermobility operations and mine laying, 5) communications, 6) training in cross-
ing waterways, 7) training in collaborating with the air force, 8) reconnaissance, 9) 
skills required by service in the field and fieldcraft, 10) training in the use of weap-
ons and shooting training, 11) physical education, and 12) supply-related issues. A 
total of 1,481 hours were to be reserved for training, out of which theoretical and 
classroom training comprised only 128 hours. Karhunen justified his proposal by 
comparing his figures to those that had actually been used in training at the Kainuu 
Frontier Guard in 1951. Guerrilla training provided to the various groups of person-
nel amounted approximately to 500 to 1,000 hours, which translated into a training 
level that was good but still insufficient.417 Thus, the main difference between the 
current practice was an emphasis put on practical training and a significant increase 
in the number of training hours. It should be mentioned that several theses pre-
pared at the National General Staff College referred to Karhunen’s memorandum, 
an indication of its significance at the time.418  
 
In 1952, the Frontier Guard achieved a degree of preparedness that enabled it to es-
tablish six frontier guards and six guerrilla jaeger companies capable of being en-
gaged in guerrilla-type activities and intended to be used as a covering force when if 
necessary. In addition to the units mentioned above, the Frontier Guard was re-
sponsible for training six understrength guerrilla jaeger battalions, the personnel of 
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416 Guerrilla-type activities in Finnish conditions; the organisation and equipment of guerrilla 
troops; the principles of conducting and leading guerrilla-type activities; and the achievement of 
targets set for the training of the leadership of the Frontier Guard on the basis of the above-men-
tioned factors; sections and attachments of a memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko 
Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. See also Karhunen, Veikko Evert, an extract 
from personal details, no. 37447, KA. 
417 A memorandum with attachments by Lieutenant General Veikko Karhunen, prepared in 1951, 
no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. 
418 See, for example, Vinari (1952), SKK 1/548, KA. Ahonen (1954), SKK 1/582, KA. Juurikko, 
Joona: Sissijoukkojen käyttöön soveltuvat välineet ja keinot vihollisen varastojen, kuljetusvälineiden ja muun so-
tavarustuksen tuhoamiseksi, (‘The equipment and means available to guerrilla troops in the destruction 
of the enemy’s stores, means of transport and other war materiel’), a thesis prepared at the Nation-
al General Staff College in 1955, SKK 1/643, KA. Naapuri (1956), SKK 1/653, KA. Setälä, Erkki: 
Rajavartiostojen alipäällystön ja miehistön koulutustavoitteet ottaen huomioon rajavartiostolle sekä rauhan että so-
dan aikana annettavat tehtävät, (‘The objectives for the training of the Frontier Guard NCOs and 
men, with special reference to the tasks set for the Frontier Guards in peacetime and at war’), a 
thesis prepared at the National General Staff College in 1956,, SKK 1/658, KA. Leskinen (1958), 
SKK 1/693, KA. Naapuri, Eero Johannes, an extract from personal details no. 55699, KA. See also 
Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 341–342. 
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which –fully trained reservists –were to be transferred to the responsibility of mili-
tary provinces tasked with keeping track of and forming units of this reserve. In 
practice, this meant that the previous orders issued in 1950 on the responsibility of 
establishing border jaeger battalions were revoked. All planning was carried out in 
collaboration with the responsibility area in question and the headquarters of the 
territorial organisation.419 The first results of training, including an exercise on the 
establishment of a guerrilla jaeger unit, were inspected after two years, when the 
Southeast Finland Frontier Guard arranged a war game involving guerrilla-type ac-
tivities by a guerrilla jaeger battalion.420 
 
Unlike the Frontier Guard, the Defence Forces failed to find an immediate solution 
to the initiation and organisation of training in guerrilla-type activities. The inspector 
of the infantry was concerned –justifiably so –about the cursory nature and ques-
tionable suitability of the training instructions issued for guerrilla-type activities. 
This prompted him to send a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces about the issue, in which he requested the establishment of a unit dedicated 
to the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities at the Army Combat School. 
Thus, the lack of systematic training in guerrilla-type activities led to General Aarne 
Sihvo, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, being involved in decision-
making. Although not unheard of, escalating issues on this level, or at this level of 
detail, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces were rarely undertaken. 
In his own words, Tapola had familiarised himself with ‘memoranda drafted by certain of-
ficers, demonstrating a laudable interest in the issue.’421 Indeed, the archives of the Infantry 
Division contain a number of highly detailed accounts on guerrilla warfare, of which 
the memoranda drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen and Major Into 
Kuismanen deserve a mention.422  
 
The memorandum prepared by Major Into Kuismanen –he had participated in the 
weapons caching operation –on the tasks and organisation of a guerrilla jaeger bat-
talion was very explicit and of great interest. Kuismanen clearly matched guerrilla 
tactics against his personal experiences of the wars, in which he had acted as the 
commander of the Separate Detachement Kuismanen (Erillinen Osasto Kuismanen 

419 PvPE:n no. 202/Järj.2/OT 10 b 1 sal./11.9.1952, PvPE:n no. 111/Op.1/11 b/OT sal/ 
13.9.1952, RvE:n no. 87/III/OT 28 a sal./17.10.1952, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970,(‘a 
confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 2–6 OT-sal (research permit ob-
tained). 
420 Kosonen – Pohjonen (1994), p. 393. Kirjavainen, Ilmari: Rajavartiolaitos 1944–1969, artikkeli kir-
jassa Rajavartiolaitos 1919–1969, (‘The Frontier Guard in 1944–1969, an article in the book The 
Frontier Guard in 1919–1969’), Mikkeli 1969, pp. 418–419. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 341. 
421 Sissikoulutuksen järjestely ja TaistK:n harjoitusjoukko, Jalkaväen tarkastajan kirje Puolustusvoimain komen-
tajalle 27.10.1951, (‘Organisation of training in guerrilla-type activities and the training unit of the 
Army Combat School; a letter by the inspector of the infantry addressed to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Defence Forces dated 27 October 1951’), T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. 
422 A memorandum by Major Into Kuismanen regarding the tasks and organisation of a guerrilla 
jaeger battalion, Tuusula 28 February 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA. Guerrilla-type activ-
ities under Finnish conditions; the organisation and equipment of guerrilla troops; the principles of 
conducting and leading guerrilla-type activities; and the achievement of targets set for the training 
of the leadership of the Frontier Guard on the basis of the above-mentioned factors; sections and 
attachments of a memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identi-
fier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. 
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–ErOs Kuismanen) in Eastern Karelia. According to Kuismanen, Finnish tactics 
should be developed increasingly towards the adoption of systematic and ruthless 
guerrilla-type activities, which should be linked to the operations of the field army in 
its all forms of fighting. ‘Battles in which the enemy’s numerical and technical superiority comes 
to its best advantage must absolutely be avoided. To balance this disparity, the defender is required 
to be extremely active.’423 
 
All the evidence suggests that the General Headquarters found it difficult to put 
training in guerrilla-type activities on the right track, as foreign sources were resort-
ed to for guidelines in addition to Finnish experiences. In 1950, the Foreign Affairs 
Division of of the General Headquarters distributed, using a large distribution list, a 
memorandum entitled Amerikkalaisia sotakokemuksia, (‘American war experiences’), 
one chapter of which was dedicated to American guerrilla troops and their training. 
This memorandum solely discussed war experiences that the Americans had gained 
from the Korean War, which began in the summer of 1950.424 There was an appar-
ent need for guerrilla-style troops as, as the Americans put it, guerrilla troops operat-
ing in a limited area and in a difficult terrain should be ‘given the credit that they deserve ’. 
According to this memorandum, training in guerrilla-type activities at some of the 
largest training centres of the U.S. Army had already been started while the war was 
still in its early stages. The training was principally aimed at providing guerrilla 
troops with an ability to perform long marches across terrain. The equipment of 
guerilla troops needed be light in order to enable the troops to maintain their ability 
to function; consequently, its suitability was carefully examined and tested during 
training. The final words and phrases give verbal expression to realism, well known 
to the Finns: ‘The Americans recognise the fact that the practice of forming elite guerrilla jaeger 
units is something completely new, and cannot be accomplished in an instant.’According to the 
comments added to the margin of the cover letter of the memorandum, the inspec-
tor of the infantry, Kustaa Tapola, carefully went over the memorandum, adding his 
comments to the cover letter on issues that needed addressing in the Finnish art of 
war: ‘training and the time required by training, war experiences, guerrilla-type activities, and heli-
copters.’425 This proves the General Headquarters closely followed developments in 
guerrilla tactics outside Finland.  
   
The Defence Forces took a decision to start systematic training in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities by arranging what they termed sissitoimintakurssit (‘courses in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities’) for infantry officer candidates at the Army Combat School from 1952 on-
wards. The curricula and content of the courses were largely based on the memo-
randum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951. In other words, 
the syllabus reflected almost verbatim the training plan and training package used by 
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423 A memorandum by Major Into Kuismanen regarding the tasks and organisation of a guerrilla 
jaeger battalion, Tuusula 28 February 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA. Into Kuismanen 
had prepared his memorandum while being a student on the general commander course 6 at the 
Army Combat School. See also Kuismanen, Into Ensio, an extract from personal details, no. 26447, 
KA. 
424 Amerikkalaisia sotakokemuksia (‘American war experiences’), PvPE:n no. 72/50/17.11.1950, T 
20239/F 1 sal, KA. 
425 The cover letter for Amerikkalaisia sotakokemuksia (‘American war experiences’), PvPE no. 
116/Ulk.2/Dc/Sal./17.11.1950, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. 
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the Frontier Guard.426 A separate guerrilla jaeger unit, established at the Army 
Combat School on the initiative of K.A. Tapola, assisted in the training by, among 
other things, assuming the role of the Red Team in exercises. The composition of 
this unit was similar to that of a guerrilla jaeger platoon of a guerrilla jaeger battal-
ion. As the Defence Forces did not have their own instructors, the personnel of the 
Frontier Guard served as course instructors until 1954. Although such courses were 
initially intended for infantry officer candidates, professional NCOs, starting from 
1952, and officers, from 1953, also participated.427  
 
The content and duration of training in guerrilla tactics varied from one course to 
another. On courses termed jalkaväen sissitoimintakurssit (‘Guerrilla courses for the in-
fantry’), initiated in 1952, training was provided not only to officer candidates but 
also to professional NCOs and officers. Such courses, approximately 20 days in 
length, were arranged three times a year at the Tuusula Army Combat School. In 
connection with guerrilla courses, another type of training event, jalkaväen sissi-
toimintakoulutustilaisuudet, (‘training events in guerrilla-type activities’), 20 days in du-
ration, were arranged from 1953 onwards, intended principally for professional 
NCOs and junior officers.428 Such three-week courses sought to provide the com-
manders of guerrilla jaeger battalions and army corps staff personnel, as well as 
peacetime instructors, with a uniform understanding of guerrilla-type activities and 
guerrilla warfare. From 1954 onwards, training provided by the Army Combat 
School was expanded to include sissipataljoonan komentajien opetustilaisuudet (‘training 
events for guerrilla jaeger battalion commanders’).429 From 1954 onwards, the teach-
ing staff of all of the above-mentioned courses was composed by the regular teach-
ers of the Army Combat School as well as officers and NCOs from army units and 
Frontier Guards appointed to teach fieldcraft and guerrilla-type activities. All of the 
above courses sought to standardise guerrilla-type activities and develop a uniform 
basis for their continued study and development ‘when operating within a large framework 
’.430 In practice, this translated into training in guerrilla-type activities that was car-
ried out by the units of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard and that, over 
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426 PvPE:n no. 2671/Koul.1/5a4/16.9.1952, T 20169/F 85, KA. PvPE:n no. 1693/ Koul.1/ 
5b6/21.5.1952, T 20169/F 86, KA. Compare the course curricula with the memorandum with at-
tachments, drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, 
KA. 
427 TaistK:n no. 1615/II/Db1/2.12.1952, T 20169/F 86, KA. TaistK:n no. 1097/II/Db1/ 
31.7.1953, T 20170/F 95, KA. TaistK:n no. 1300/II/5c/14.9.1953, T 20170/F 95, KA. TaistK:n 
no. 1383/II/Db1/29.11.1954, T 20171/F 106, KA. TaistK:n no. 35/II/Db1 sal/3.12.1955, T 
20239/F 3 sal, KA. 
428 PvPE:n no. 3184/Koul.1/5a/6.11.1952, T 20169/F 83, KA. 
429 TaistK:n no. 71/II/5c/15.1.1955, T 20172/F 118, KA. PE:n no. 675/Koultsto/5a5/4.2.1955, T 
20172/F 118, KA. PE:n no. 76/Koultsto/5 sal/30.4.1955, T 21442/F 5–6 sal., KA. See also RvE:n 
no. 71/II sal/4.5.1955, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a confidential document and a 
confidential archive’) identifier F 1–7 sal (research permit obtained). 
430 TaistK:n no. 298/II/5c/24.2.1955, T 20172/F 118, KA. See also RvE:n n: 99/III/OT/28 a 
sal/19.11.1955, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confiden-
tial archive’) identifier F 2–6 OT-sal (research permit obtained). 
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time, would gradually produce a cadre of professional officers and NCOs familiar 
with guerrilla-type activities.431 
 
One-month intelligence courses for officers, arranged at the National General Staff Col-
lege starting from 1952, also provided training in guerrila-style issues. Most students 
ordered to attend such courses were younger officers serving as staff or general staff 
officers at their units. As the name of these courses suggests, they were training 
events focused on intelligence, but, in spite of this, their content mostly comprised 
introductions, lectures and coursework produced by the students, all of which was 
related to guerrilla warfare.432 
 
From 1953 onwards, month-long intelligence courses for staff officers were arranged in se-
cret under the leadership of the Foreign Affairs Division of the General Headquar-
ters; only officers who had graduated from the National General Staff College and 
held the rank of captain or major were ordered to attend these courses. Courses 
were arranged at premises in Santahamina (a military island off Helsinki) reserved by 
the Finnish Military Academy for this purpose, protected from the prying eyes of 
outsiders, and all the teaching material and coursework produced by the students 
was declared classified information after the training ended. However, it is interest-
ing that part of the syllabus of even these courses related to the use of guerrilla jae-
ger troops in reconnaissance duties or generally in guerrilla-type activities conducted 
in connection with regular military operations. An example of this is provided by a 
case study presented on intelligence course no. 1 for staff officers, bearing the title 
‘Opportunities and means available to carry out reconnaissance by a battalion ordered to take up 
guerrilla-style operations.’433 This can be explained in part by the fact that guerrilla-type 
activities and long-range patrolling were understood to be very similar with regard to 
their methods. One of the factors which might explain this is that at least some of 
instructors on the intelligence courses were veterans of the wartime Separate Battal-
ion 4 (ErP. 4), in other words, long-range patrolmen. 
 
In spring 1953, the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters determined, 
while assessing the arrangements in place for guerrilla-type activities that it was off 
to a good start but took up too much of the time of the personnel of the Army 
Combat School, preventing them from teaching other courses. The General Head-
quarters further saw that the curricula in use at the time were in the process of being 
adopted into wide-spread use. However, experiences gained from the courses were 
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431 For example, courses on guerrilla-type activities were arranged by three units of the Defence 
Forces, of which the Pohjois-Savo Brigade, starting from 1955, was one to the units responsible for 
arranging courses on guerrilla-type activities. Iskanius (2012), p. 267. 
432 Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 2, tutkielmat ja alustukset (‘Intelligence course 2 for officers, coursework 
and introductions’), 16 July 1952, T 26890/Hla 5 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by the Na-
tional Defence University). Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 3, tutkielmat ja alustukset 1953 (‘Intelligence 
course 3 for officers, coursework and introductions’), 1953, T 26890/Hla 6 sal, KA, (a research 
permit granted by the National Defence University). Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 4, tutkielmat ja alustukset 
1953 (‘Intelligence course 3 for officers, coursework and introductions’), 1953, T 26890/Hla 6 sal, 
KA, (a research permit granted by the National Defence University). Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 5, kurs-
sin luennot ja oppilastyöt 1954 (‘Intelligence course 5 for officers, coursework and by the students’), 
1954, T 26890/Hla 6 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by the National Defence University). 
433 PE:n no. 31/Ulkmtsto/5/sal./10.3.1953 (with attachments), T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. 
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to be used as before. In connection with this, the Mobilisation Division of the Gen-
eral Headquarters compiled a calculation of training needs, according to which the 
six guerrilla jaeger battalions in the list of planned wartime units (PTL) required a 
trained reserve amounting to 3,723 men. Considering that the training arrangements 
at the time enabled the Frontier Guard and the Defence Forces to train 200 to 300 
men each year, training clearly required intensification.434 In other words, there was 
work to do, although training was off to a good start. 
 
The quality of training and its numerical outcome were also assessed by the Frontier 
Guard in spring 1953. The Frontier Guard Headquarters requested that the Frontier 
Guards under its command submit the number of men who had undergone guerrilla 
jaeger training in order to enable the Headquarters to make modifications to the 
training plans. Each Frontier Guard was expected to provide answers to the follow-
ing questions: ‘How many men are serving at your Frontier Guard who were engaged in guerril-
la-type activities during the war? How many of such men can be deemed to be suited for guerrilla-
type activities at the moment? How many of those in service at the moment (nominal strength) can 
be deemed to be capable of guerrilla-type activities? How many of those who resigned from service be-
tween 1948 and 1953 can be assessed to have received (good –satisfactory) guerrilla training and 
to be suited for guerrilla-type activities (broken down by year)? ’435  
 
The Training Division of the General Headquarters had calculated in 1951 that a to-
tal of around 60 officer cadets out of each intake could be trained each year on a 
two- or three-week guerrilla course, the arranging of which would be the responsi-
bility of a unit designated by each division.436 The Training Division distributed, us-
ing a large distribution list, a summary of the material to the units, military schools 
and the headquarters of the military provinces, seeking to provide additional infor-
mation for the guidelines presented in a standing order issued in November 1954 on 
the arrangement of further guerrilla training at army units.437 By 1955, a sufficient 
body of material had been gathered from guerrilla courses representing a variety of 
training levels, enabling its use in the training of conscripts and regular army per-
sonnel alike. The material started with a description of the main features of guerrilla-
type activities, emphasising the importance of international treaties and the rules of 
war, using the following formulation: ‘Current international treaties legalise guerrilla-type 
activities, provided that guerrilla fighters wear the uniform or other distinctive insignia of their own 
country, wearing their weapons in a visible manner and meeting a number of other requirements.’
In addition to providing the basics, the material also described various situations ac-
companied by their solutions, intended to be applied to training. In a follow-up situ-
ation, the commander of an imaginary guerrilla jaeger battalion gave an order to one 
of his company commanders as follows: ‘You must take hostages. Act honourably and 
with pure arms! ’The model solution to the problem reopened the issue: ‘We will take 
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434 PE:n no. 65/Jvtsto/5 sal./14.9.1953, T 20239/F 2 sal, KA. Compare also PE:n no. K 
24/Lkptsto/Da sal/26.5.1956, T 26965/F 11 sal, KA. 
435 RvE:n no. 57/II/sal./29.8.1953, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a confidential docu-
ment and a confidential archive’) identifier F 1–7 sal (research permit obtained). 
436 PvPE:n no. 64/Koul.1/5/sal./21.4.1951 and an attachment on training in guerrilla-type activities 
dated 5 April 1951, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. See also Iskanius (2012), p. 267. 
437 PE:n no. 35/Koultsto/5a sal./15.2.1955, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. See also See also Koulutuksen 
pysyväiskäsky (Kpk) (‘Permanent order on training’), PE:n no. 332 C 1/13.11.1954, T 21442/F 5–
6 sal, KA. 
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hostages, in order to be able to exchange them for our own prisoners of war. Right from the begin-
ning, capture many prisoners. We will need them.’Another section of the training material 
described the commander of an imaginary guerrilla jaeger battalion communicating 
with the enemy by letter, in order to arrange for an exchange of prisoners: ‘The pris-
oners, 23 men in total, were left behind at the scene of annihilation, with the exception of eight hos-
tages. I left a letter with them, to be delivered to their leader.’438 These sections in the training 
material, related to prisoners of war and keeping in contact with the enemy, received 
a highly polarised reception among the troops that had received this ‘training mate-
rial’.  
 
In the 3rd division (3.D), the standing orders regarding training and the teaching 
material were applied as above. According to the training instructions prepared by 
the headquarters of the division, the development of guerrilla-type activities was 
based on the guidelines issued by the General Headquarters. Guerrilla-type activities 
were to be studied theoretically in further training before they could be applied to 
practical exercises. In addition to the support material provided by the General 
Headquarters, Upseerin käsikirjan III osa, (‘The officer’s handbook, part III’) was to 
be used as teaching material in training. According to the training instructions issued 
by the division itself, the objectives of guerrilla warfare could be achieved through 
guerrilla-style operations conducted by individual guerrilla jaegers, guerrilla jaeger 
patrols, platoons and battalions in the enemy’s rear. The tasks of a guerrilla jaeger 
patrol included ‘the capturing, interrogation and guarding of prisoners.’As of 1955, guerrilla-
type activities needed to be linked to all manoeuvres ‘in some form or another.’439 The 
2nd Division (2.D), while following the instructions, issued, completely ignored the 
section concerning the capture of prisoners of war in its map exercises.440 
 
The view of the 1st Division (1.D) is diametrically opposite to the previous one. The 
commander of the Division, General Lieutenant V. J. Oinonen, sent an incendiary 
query to the Training Division of the Defence Command, expressing his disbelief 
regarding the methods proposed by the material for the taking of hostages and 
maintaining communication with the enemy. ‘As I need to issue training instructions to my 
troops regarding, among other things, training in guerrilla-type activities, I have to ask you whether 
you really mean that the commanders of guerrilla jaeger units attempt to complete tasks such as ex-
changing prisoners or making contact with the enemy leadership, which, in practice, are impossible 
to accomplish in reality, and if so, what are these kinds of activities based on? ’441 Breaking the 
rules of war and the rapid emergence of unconventional means of waging war, in-
cluding guerrilla operations taken to their extremes, clearly failed to follow the tradi-
tions of the Finnish art of war. The General Headquarters sent a polite response, 
admitting that part of material was unsuited for training purposes. ‘The example of hos-
tage is undoubtedly off the mark, and the whole notion of hostages is too questionable to be used in 
training. The practice mentioned in the example –leaving a letter in terrain addressed to the enemy 
leadership –may be successful on occasion. ’ The response of the Training Division of the 
General Headquarters emphasised that the material that they had sent should be re-
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438 PE:n no. 35/Koultsto/5a sal./15.2.1955 (with attachments), T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. 
439 3.DE:n no. 1400/Yl koultsto/5 a/21.12.1954, T 20171/F 109, KA. 
440 2.DE:n no. 1413/Koul/5 c 1/21.11.1955 (with attachments), T 20172/F 120, KA. 
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garded as support material, something that should be applied rather than used ver-
batim in training.442  
 
This episode provides an excellent example of the sensitive nature of guerrilla war-
fare and its position in the grey zone between the art of war and the rules of war. 
Not even in guerrilla warfare was there a reason to undermine the high morale and 
ethics that had traditionally characterised the Finnish art of war. On the other hand, 
this incident provided a demonstration of a change in the art of war that had started 
in the 1950s, one in which the creation of models for guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-
type activities were still vey much in their infancy. The major reason behind this was 
probably the fact that there was no handbook or military regulation covering train-
ing in guerrilla-type activities.  
 
Although training in guerrilla-type activities, provided by the Defence Forces and 
the Frontier Guard, began to assume increasingly established forms, units continued 
to provide proposals for improving training arrangements. According to a memo-
randum drafted by the Frontier Guard Headquarters in summer 1955, training pro-
vided by the Frontier Guard was increasingly geared towards guerrilla training, and 
training was also increasingly intensified. ‘This requires a great number of instructors. The 
relatively limited instructor resources of the Frontier Guard are committed to such a degree that the 
Frontier Guard companies, which carry out the actual border surveillance and which are dispersed 
across long sections of the border, need to get on as best they can, having available only the company 
commander and a maximum of two junior officers.’In order to alleviate the problem created 
by the lack of instructors, the Frontier Guard proposed that the responsibility for 
the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities be increasingly divided between 
the Frontier Guard and the Defence Forces.443   
 
In early January 1956, the Headquarters of the Joensuu Military District submitted a 
proposal to the General Headquarters regarding the arrangements of training in 
guerrilla-type activities and other details of guerrilla tactics. According to the pro-
posal, the Defence Forces still had an insufficient number of skilled instructors to 
be able to provide training in guerrilla tactics, which had led to a situation in which 
the Joensuu Military District, part of the organisation of the 3rd Division, required 
that the Frontier Guard provide them with instructors with skills in guerrilla war-
fare. The General Headquarters responded to the proposal, stating that as necessary 
as the reorganisation of training might be, no measures would be taken to address it, 
as the issue was being clarified.444 With this, the General Headquarters referred to 
Sissikoulutusopas (‘Handbook in guerrilla training’) and to a thesis prepared by Major 
Erkki Setälä for the attainment of his diploma.445   
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443 RvE:n no. 78/III/OT/28 a 1 sal/20.7.1955, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confi-
dential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 2–6 OT-sal (research permit obtained). 
444 PE:n no. 18/Jvtsto/5 f/sal/7.2.1956, T 25094/F 4 sal, KA. See also a handwritten memo-
randum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Karhunen, dated 6 February 1956, T 25094/F 4 sal, KA. 
445 Sissikoulutusopas (‘Handbook in guerrilla training’), Helsinki 1956. Setälä (1956), SKK 1/658, 
KA. Setälä, Erkki: An interview on 13 June 2006. Setälä, Erkki Vilhelm, an extract from personal 
details, no. 53560, KA. 
 
131 
By 1956, the Frontier Guard had made training in guerrilla-type activities an estab-
lished form of training, the guidelines of which were being elaborated upon on the 
basis of gathered experiences. Major Erkki Setälä, who at the time was a student at 
the National General Staff College, actively participated in the reorganisation of the 
guerrilla training provided by the Frontier Guard while working on his thesis. The 
guidelines for the training in guerrilla-type activities provided by the Frontier Guard 
were discussed, as an issue requiring urgent attention, at a meeting of the Frontier 
Guard commanders held in February 1956. As a result of this meeting, the provision 
of training in guerrilla-type activities was to be standardised and extended to all 
troops. The modifications to training in guerrilla-type activities were based on a task 
given to the Frontier Guard to train a total of five guerrilla jaeger battalions over a 
period of four to six years for the wartime needs of the Defence Forces.446 
 
The guidelines for and content of the training in guerrilla-type activities provided by 
the Frontier Guard were further defined by breaking them down by training pro-
grammes for senior officers, junior officers, professional NCOs, border jaegers and 
conscripts. Senior officers were given guerrilla training at training events for the 
commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions arranged by the General Headquarters, at 
events organised by the Frontier Guard Headquarters, and at events coordinated by 
the various Frontier Guards. The training of junior officers consisted of training 
events for intelligence officers, guerrilla courses organised by the Frontier Guard 
Headquarters, advanced courses arranged by the Frontier Guards, homework, and 
work as an instructor. Professional NCOs received their training on guerrilla courses 
organised by the Frontier Guard Headquarters, on training courses and training ex-
ercises arranged by the various Frontier Guards, and by serving as instructors. The 
guerrilla training of border jaegers comprised three-week guerrilla training exercises, 
advanced guerrilla training provided in connection with other training, refresher 
training, and service as a co-instructor in the training of conscripts. The training of 
conscripts was divided into training given to officer candidates, NCOs and men 
during their basic, specialisation and refresher training periods as well as military ex-
ercises.447  
 
The organisation of training described above was based on one of the conclusions 
drawn by Major Erkki Setälä in his unfinished thesis. Setälä had participated in the 
meeting of the Frontier Guard Commanders held in February 1956, and his study 
was deemed to be of high quality after he completed it. The commander of the 
Frontier Guards, Lieutenant General Kaarlo Vaala, added the following comments 
to a detailed statement on the Setälä’s thesis: ‘By way of summary, it can be stated that 
Major Setälä specifies the training objectives in his thesis with expertise, demonstrating the right 
spirit. The training objectives that he sets for guerrilla-type activities also appear to be sound, 
providing a firm foundation for further development on the basis of experiences that are likely to be 
gained in the future. Provision of training within the framework that the author presents can be 
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deemed completely feasible. Taken as a whole, Setälä’s thesis provides an exhaustive discussion of 
its topic, taking a solid and factual approach. ’448  
 
Foreign models also appear to have played a certain role in Finnish guerrilla training 
in the late 1950s. Major Holger Krogerus (UudPr) and Major Leo Rantanen (RvE) 
made a study trip to Armèns Jägerskola (the Jaeger School of the Swedish army), lo-
cated in Kiruna, between 19 and 22 March 1957. In particular, the Finnish visitors 
sought to gain insight into the Swedish model of guerrilla-type activities, in opera-
tions carried out in the enemy’s rear, and in guerrilla training provided by the 
school. At the beginning of their report, Krogerus and Rantanen stated the follow-
ing: ‘...as such, the concept of our guerrilla-type activities is not equivalent to the Swedish notion of 
the way infantry operates in the enemy’s rear. However, as the Swedes have already finalised most 
of their notions on the issue, and as we have not yet made any final decisions, the best approach here 
probably is to avoid any comparisons and just present the observations we made of the Jaeger 
School.’ According to Krogerus and Rantanen’s report, Swedish guerrilla tactics 
combined Finnish long-range patrolling with guerrilla-type activities as, under the 
Swedish model, the objective of warfare was to push military operations and recon-
naissance as deep into the enemy’s rear as possible by using air transport and jaeger 
troops that had received special training for such operations, known as 
Fallskärmsjägartrupper or Kårjägartrupper. In other words, such activities did not repre-
sent pure paratrooper operations for which the Swedes provided training at a dedi-
cated school, Fallskärmsjägarskola. Jaeger troops that had undergone guerrilla training 
were intended for operations in areas of enemy-held territory, approximately 40 to 
80 kilometres away from the Swedish front line, while paratroopers with guerrilla 
training were used in the enemy’s rear, more than 80 kilometres away from the 
front.449 
 
Finnish wartime long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities and the 
Swedish troops shared the fact that paratroopers were placed under High Com-
mand, while jaegers with guerrilla training were attached to army corps and brigades. 
Taken together, the Finnish officers perceived Swedish guerrilla-type activities to 
have more of a character of long-range offensive reconnaissance tasks rather than 
operations in which troops stayed behind enemy lines in order to carry out defen-
sive missions. The two Finnish majors were particularly interested in Swedish train-
ing programmes, in the number of hours of instruction allocated to guerrilla tactics, 
and in the way various topics were emphasised in training. During their visit, 
Krogerus and Rantanen also carefully examined the special equipment used by the 
Swedish troops. Sketches and illustrations accompanying the report lent support to 
their detailed report. The most important lesson learned and the most noteworthy 
observation in Krogerus and Rantanen’s conclusion were the way the Swedes used 
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helicopters in support of their guerrilla-type activities, ensuring the continuity of 
their troops’supply and the evacuation of their wounded.450  
 
Judging by the comments added to the margins of the report, it aroused considera-
ble interest at the Frontier Guard Headquarters but led to no immediate modifica-
tions to the guerrilla training provided by the Frontier Guard and the Defence Forc-
es. In any event, the report gives a glimpse into the period at a time when the De-
fence Forces were systematically searching for new guidelines, by also looking to 
countries where conditions were comparable to those in Finland. On the other 
hand, the issue involved a mutual interest shared by Sweden and Finland. The 
Swedes also wanted to keep track of the developments in the Finnish art of war by 
engaging in bilateral activity of this kind. In this respect, Finland was a natural 
choice for Sweden if that country wanted to obtain up-to-date information on de-
fensive capabilities and on new theories on the art of war, among which guerrilla-
type activities, developed on the basis of experiences gained from Finland’s war, was 
only one of many. The Swedes also put a high premium on the Finnish art of war, 
an indication of which was the fact that the Swedes used battles fought by the Finn-
ish army both in the Winter War and the Continuation War as examples of innova-
tiveness demonstrated by a party with an inferior quantitative strength at their mili-
tary schools.451  
 
In addition to various training courses on guerrilla-type activities arranged by the 
Frontier Guard, and the provision of guerrilla training to conscripts in the army and 
frontier guard units, training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare was also 
arranged, from the mid-1950s onwards, at the Non-Commissioned Officers School, 
at the Finnish Military Academy, at the Army Combat School, and at the National 
General Staff College, as part of the courses that these schools arranged.452 How-
ever, what is noteworthy is the fact that it was not until the early 1960s that the 
evaluation of terrain reconnaissance operations conducted by the National General 
Staff College were complemented by a separate plan on guerrilla-type activities.453  
 
Various map and military exercises conducted between 1949 and 1960 were used to 
bring variation to the methods of guerrilla warfare and to examine the guidelines set 
for training and the results it had achieved. While most of these exercises, arranged 
by the Defence Forces or the Frontier Guard, were carried out in unpopulated areas 
in Northern Finland or in the wilds of Lapland, some exercises were executed in the 
south of the country, in areas with a denser population and occupied by an ima-
ginary enemy. For example, in summer 1957, a refresher course was arranged at all 
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rittamasta operatiivisesta tiedustelusta 5.–9.6.1961 (‘An account by the National General Staff Col-
lege on operational reconnaissance carried out by MSL 25, MeSL 7 and MSL 26 in an area delimited 
by Hanko – Perniö – Nummi between 5 and 9 June 1961’) T 26890/Hlb 17 sal, KA (a research 
permit granted by the National Defence University). Eräsaari, Eero: An interview on 22 October 
2010. 
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Frontier Guards for reserve officers who were given training in acting as com-
manders of guerrilla jaeger units. This three-week training course was carried out at 
all Frontier Guards in accordance with a programme and framework plan drafted by 
the General Headquarters. The emphasis of the subjects to be trained was placed –
in line with the instructions laid down by the General Headquarters –on the tactical 
leadership of a guerrilla jaeger platoon and on collaboration between the various 
branches of the defence. This training course also provided an opportunity to famil-
iarise the reserve officers with challenging wilderness conditions. It was also note-
worthy that this training was the first refresher training event for reservists organ-
ised by the Frontier Guard after the war.454 The Southeast Finland Frontier Guard 
summed up the importance of the training event by stating the following: ‘Refresher 
training for reserve officers arranged in 1957 turned out to be a versatile and successful event for the 
Frontier Guard, giving rise to many ideas.’Regarding the refresher training for Frontier 
Guard reserve officers, a sizeable body of material on the Southeast Finland Fron-
tier Guard still remains, containing not only customary training reports but several 
suggestions for further development and a number of memoranda on guerrilla jae-
ger training. The instructors who had served at the refresher training also received 
an extensive query.455 
 
The numerous war, combat and refresher exercises played a key role in helping to 
gather a body of practical experiences related to guerrilla warfare. However, the 
most active training period was the 1960s, a decade when several war and combat 
exercises, termed guerrilla exercises, were organised.456 
 
By the early 1960s, the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard had arrangements in 
place for guerrilla training that were considerably more established in nature than 
those used in the 1950s. In his order on the organisation of training for 1960, K. A. 
Heiskanen, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, emphasised more than ev-
er before the importance of troops’mobility, their capability to operate under the 
cover of darkness, and their ability to infiltrate into the enemy’s rear. Heiskanen’s 
order regarded guerrilla-type activities as one of the most fundamental parts of de-
fensive tactics, emphasising them accordingly. Furthermore, the Frontier Guard still 
had the capacity for intensifying its training in guerrilla-type activities, particularly 
when such training was arranged as part of military exercises. In particular, the order 
emphasised the Frontier Guard’s own responsibility for achieving their training ob-
jectives as well as its close collaboration with the staff responsible for training at the 
Defence Forces, especially when military exercises were being prepared.457  

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tial document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 1–7 sal (research permit obtained). See also 
Suominen (2012), pp. 103–105. 
455 See, for example, K-SRE:n no. 51/II/sal/11.9.1957, K-SRE:n no. 402/II/21 g/18.8.1957, 
RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) 
identifier F 8–9 sal (research permit obtained). 
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The reason behind this was probably the fact that the major part of the responsibil-
ity for forming wartime guerrilla jaeger battalions was transferred from the Defence 
Forces to the Frontier Guard in 1956. In 1956, in connection with a reform of the 
army unit reinforcement system, among other things the following was stated: ‘...each 
Frontier Guard could form a guerrilla jaeger battalion that would be the first unit to take up guer-
rilla-type action along the border area.’458 Modifications to responsibilities regarding unit 
establishment and the fact that the Frontier Guards had been ordered to transfer 
229 trained staff members to the various military districts caused a great deal of ex-
tra planning work for the Frontier Guards, as the cadre required for establishing 
units was hopelessly insufficient compared with the requirements set by the Defence 
Forces. The Frontier Guard Headquarters sent the Mobilisation Division of the 
General Headquarters a sharply-worded letter on the issue, stating that: ‘After the 
above-mentioned transfers have been completed, the cadre that the Frontier Guards have available 
for establishing guerrilla jaeger battalions will be so limited that the forming of battalions for the 
needs of a covering force cannot be seriously considered. This being the case, if the plans require that 
the Frontier Guards form wartime guerrilla battalions, the personnel transfers ordered by a General 
Headquarters letter should be reconsidered.’459 The General Headquarters understood the 
concerns put forth by the Frontier Guard regarding the sufficiency of their person-
nel, reducing the number of staff to be transferred to the Defence Forces from 229 
to 30. However, the individual Frontier Guards, under the control of the Frontier 
Guard organisation, were still charged with establishing the original five guerrilla 
jaeger battalions as stipulated by the original plan. The new arrangements for form-
ing Guerrilla Battalions 6, 7, 10, and 15 took effect on 1 March 1957.460 
 
In the 1957 and 1958 establishment chart of the wartime covering force, four Fron-
tier Guards – the Southeast Finland Frontier Guard (K-SR), the North Karelia 
Frontier Guard (P-KR), the Kainuu Frontier Guard (KR) and the Lapland Frontier 
Guard –were all tasked with establishing one guerrilla jaeger battalion each, with a 
strength of 488 men461. The Defence Forces – in this case, the Kemi Military Dis-
trict (KemSp) –were responsible for establishing the fifth guerrilla jaeger battalion. 
In other words, the plans required that five guerrilla jaeger battalions be established, 
to be used as a covering force along the eastern border from Miehikkälä up to the 

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ned). PE:n no. K 46/Lkptsto/OT Dc 10 b 1 sal/10.12.1957, T 26842/Ha 2 sal, KA. 
459 RvE:n no. 22/III/OT/a sal/16.8.1956, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential 
document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 7–8 OT-sal (research permit obtained). 
460 RvE:n no. 40/Järj/OT/a sal/22.11.1956, RvE:n no. 56/III/OT/sal/11.12.1956, RvE:n no. 
35/Järj/OT/b sal/7.2.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and 
a confidential archive’) identifier F 7–8 OT-sal (research permit obtained). 
461 KRE:n no. 17/II/OT 10 c sal/22.2.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confi-
dential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 7–8 OT-sal (research permit obtained). 
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level of Kemijärvi in the north; such battalions were to be designated as guerrilla 
jaeger battalions 6, 7, 10, 12 and 15.462  
 
The quality and quantity of the covering force troops played a critical role at the on-
set of possible hostilities. In order to drive home this point regarding, for example, 
the guerrilla jaeger battalions, the Frontier Guard Headquarters compiled separate 
guidelines for training to be followed,if necessary. These guidelines stated that: 
‘Should hostilities break out, the Frontier Guards, including any other troops established for the 
protection of Finland’s neutrality, will be regarded as a covering force, irrespective of their composi-
tion at the time.’463 In 1957, the Frontier Guards and the military districts of the De-
fence Forces initiated in-depth collaboration regarding training in Finland’s opera-
tional readiness by organising negotiations between the two organisations on a re-
gional basis. In these negotiations, the military districts and Frontier Guards drew 
up collaborative agreements which covered both training and operational issues in a 
way that served the interests of the two parties to the greatest possible extent.464 
Apparently, the Frontier Guard took the task assigned to it seriously –training re-
servists for guerrilla jaeger battalions in peacetime and making preparations for their 
role in wartime –when this organisation was drawing up peacetime training guide-
lines and wartime operational plans. All of this represents close collaboration be-
tween the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard in the development of the Finn-
ish art of war and the defence of Finland by military means. 
 
Another testimony to the closeness of collaboration on guerrilla-type activities and 
guerril-la jaeger training between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard was 
provided by the training films related to the art of guerrilla warfare which were pro-
vided at the time. Over the course of 1959, a total of four training films were pre-
pared by the Defence Forc-es and the Frontier Guard with the purpose of support-
ing the training efforts, all of which were released for use by troops in May 1960. 
The films were prepared by the Southeast Finland Frontier Guard in Immola during 
1959. The first three films, Sissitaitoja kesällä (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the summer’), 
Sissitaitoja talvella (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the winter’), and Hiihtosissit (‘Guerrilla 

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were to be established for a covering force duty: SissiP 6 (K-SR), SissiP 7 (P-KR), SissiP 10 (KR), 
SissiP 12 (LR) and SissiP 15 (KemSp). Compare the previous with the plans devised for 1953 and 
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sal/14.12.1953, T 26862/E 4 OT sal, KA. See also Partanen, Tapio: Liikekannallepanojärjestelmämme 
syntyminen ja kehitys itsenäisyytemme aikana sekä suoritetut liikekannallepanot (‘The inception and deve-
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lisations carried out), a thesis for the achievement of a diploma produced at the National General 
Staff College in 1975, p. 60, and attachment 4.12., SKK 1/1212, KA. 
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jaegers on skis’) gave a detailed presentation of guerrilla jaeger skills throughout the 
year. The fourth training film, Sissit iskevät (‘Guerrilla jaegers strike’), addressed the 
operations of a squad and a platoon engaged in guerrilla-type activities in the ene-
my’s rear. Experts for all of the above-mentioned films came from the Defence 
Forces and the Frontier Guard. Responsibility for the planning and implementation 
of the films was split between the representative of the Training Division of the 
General Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Erkki Setälä, and Colonel Osmo 
Karhunen and Lieutenant Colonel Martti Avela of the Frontier Guard Headquar-
ters.465 As all these officers had gained familiarity with guerrilla-type activities and 
cut an image of being experts in the field, the four films were of high quality and 
provided a valuable contribution to training in guerrilla tactics.466 These films were 
used in training until the 1970s, when Sissitoimintaopas (‘Handbook on guerrilla-type 
activities’), published in 1979, replaced them.467 
 
In early 1959, serious consideration was given to the composition and equipment of 
the guerrilla jaeger battalions in the establishment chart (PTL). In January 1959, the 
Frontier Guard Headquarters requested proposals for possible modifications to the 
composition, to be submitted over the course of February. The Frontier Guards 
submitted their proposals with justifications to the Frontier Guard Headquarters, 
which, on the basis of the proposals it had received, took a decision to develop a 
completely new type of troopsto replace guerrilla jaeger battalions. The review of 
the composition and tasks of guerrilla jaeger battalions apparently led to the estab-
lishment of frontier brigades.468  
 
In 1959, a major modification was made to the composition and tasks of troops 
which were to be established by the Frontier Guard. The order issued in spring 
1957, which obligated each Frontier Guard to establish a guerrilla jaeger battalion, 
was revoked, with more challenging tasks being assigned to the Frontier Guard. The 
Operations Divisions justified the additional tasks and responsibilities with ‘the com-
prehensive protection of Finland’s borders in accordance with the country’s neutrality principle. This 
plan implies no military policy; its sector is only 360 degrees, reflecting the above-mentioned policy.’
In connection with the presentation of the plan and reorganisation, the importance 
of the provision of guerrilla training in collaboration between the Defence Forces 
and the Frontier Guard was emphasised: ‘Although part of the training may be given out-

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side the Frontier Guard, men can be ordered to participate in guerrilla-style exercises with the 
troops of their own Frontier Guard if necessary.’469 
 
In a presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, held on 6 
April, the new composition of troops that the Frontier Guards were to establish up-
on mobilisation was specified as the frontier brigade. Each frontier brigade comprised 
its headquarters and a command company, the units carrying out the actual surveil-
lance tasks of the border –companies and battalions –as well as separate units and 
border jaeger troops, such as companies and battalions combined into a task force 
to carry out a task assigned to them on a territorial basis.470 However, the tasks as-
signed to the Frontier Guard troops remained unchanged, being the following: a) 
the surveillance of the border, b) combat tasks assigned to the covering force, and c) 
guerrilla-type activities. In each frontier brigade, the previous reserve company was 
to be replaced by one border jaeger company the composition of which was equiva-
lent to the company of a guerrilla jaeger battalion. In practical terms, this change 
meant that one guerrilla jaeger battalion was removed from the establishment chart 
of four Frontier Guards (K-SR, P-KR, KR and LR) –SissiP 6 from K-SR, SissiP 7 
from P-KR 7, KR:lta SissiP 10 from KR, and SissiP 12 from LR –with this reduc-
tion being compensated for by adding twice as many border jaeger battalions and 
other special units to the wartime organisation.471 Reservists who had received their 
guerrilla training before this change were to be placed in the one surviving guerrilla 
jaeger battalion (SissiP15) –which was to be formed by the Lapland Frontier Guard 
– and in other reconnaissance companies and in the reserve platoons of frontier 
guard companies.472  
 
The Frontier Guard Headquarters informed the General Headquarters that the re-
organisation could only be implemented if the number of personnel that the Fron-
tier Guards were to transfer to the Defence Forces was reduced and if the method 
of calling reservists to service in the municipalities located along the border was de-
veloped further. The Defence Forces regarded the proposal as an absolute prerequi-
site, taking the view that it could be solved simply by issuing orders and making the 
proper arrangements. In late April 1959, the Frontier Guard received a preliminary 
order to change its wartime unit compositions and responsibilities regarding unit es-
tablishment.473 Thus, this arrangement concerned Finland’s entire wartime field ar-
my and its troops, causing the issue to be taken up by the Defence Council during 
the spring and summer of 1959. The Defence Council made a proposal on 18 June 

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1959, according to which ‘the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard be ordered to make all 
the necessary preparations for the implementation of the plan without delay.’The President of 
the Republic approved the issue at a presentation held on 3 September 1959.474  
 
The reorganisations were implemented during 1960. The most far-reaching conse-
quence of the reform was the fact the Frontier Guards were to have –in addition to 
their peacetime composition (frame formation) – only one wartime composition, 
formed in a flexible manner that best met the requirements set by each situation.475 
At least between 1960 and 1962, in addition to forming frontier brigades, the Fron-
tier Guard was tasked with establishing a total of 13 border jaeger battalions which, 
regarding their training and equipment, were expected to be on a level of covering 
force troops, capable of conducting guerrilla-style operations.476 
 
Policy definitions and arrangements implemented in the 1950s laid the foundation 
for providing systematic training in guerrilla-type activities, something which gained 
an established position in the basic and specialisation training of all conscript classes 
over the course of the 1960s and 1970s and which was continued until the 1980s.477 
It is important to understand that all the above-mentioned measures and arran-
gements were based on wartime needs and that they could only be implemented 
through close cooperation between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, in 
spite of all the visible and invisible borderlines between the ministries involved.  
 
 
A change in the thinking regarding the art of war required that regulations 
and handbooks be renewed 
 
Although guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare and a total guerrilla war were top-
ics that officers had discussed since 1945, in the early 1950s, the practical founda-
tions were still in their infancy. Problems were caused by the confusion around the 
concepts regarding guerrilla warfare and the lack of a guerrilla regulation and train-
ing handbook, which, had they been available, would have standardised training.  
 
The key handbooks and regulations were deemed to be outdated already at the out-
set of the Winter War or were regarded as obsolete during Finland’s wars, but the 
war put their renewal process on hold. After the Continuation War ended, the issue 
became topical again, prompting the General Headquarters to take a decision on the 
updating or complete rewriting of the regulations and handbooks. In December 
1944, the Defence Forces set up a Regulation Committee to address the issue.478 In 
February 1945, a more detailed plan for the updating of the key regulations was 

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document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 10 OT-sal (research permit obtained). 
475 RvE:n no. 38/III/OT a sal/10.3.1960, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential 
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drawn up, according to which not only field regulations but also handbooks and the 
regulations of the infantry should be revised. However, the updating of regulations 
for the various branches of the defence were also made part of these objectives. In 
early May 1945, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces approved a total of 
54 different handbooks and regulations to be produced. This work was started, but 
the compilation of regulations and the background work necessary for the writing 
process was disturbed by the Weapons Cache Case which had come to light. Some 
officers who had been appointed to the writing task had participated in the weapons 
caching operation, and, as they were being interrogated or sentenced to prison, their 
contribution was unavailable for the regulation work. For example, Colonel Valo 
Nihtilä, chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, who had 
been appointed the principal author of the field regulations, was arrested for inter-
rogation on 9 June 1945.479  
 
The fact that the field regulation aimed to address entirely new topics can be regard-
ed as a notable manifestation of a change that had taken place in the art of war. 
Among other things, the field regulation was intended to contain a chapter on guer-
rilla-type activities and anti-guerrilla operations, with Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi 
having being appointed by Nihtilä to write this chapter. In addition to this, Susi was 
ordered to write a separate guidebook on guerrilla-type activities.480 Susi failed to 
complete his assignment as he, as many others, had to resign his commission due to 
the Weapons Cache Case in spring 1945. Susi’s resignation was a major setback for 
the regulation project, meaning in practice that a handbook on guerrilla-type activi-
ties continued to be unavailable as nobody was appointed to replace him despite the 
fact that the guerrilla handbook remained on the list of regulations to be written.481 
 
The completion of the field regulation was slowed down, not only by the many 
changes among its authors but also the discussions that were going on in the De-
fence Forces in 1948–1949 regarding the transfer to a brigade organisation.482 How-
ever, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare appeared to have been part of the 
planning process since Nihtilä’s plans, as both concepts can be found in a draft 
handout for the Field Regulation, which had been used by the troops between 1947 
and 1948. A handout of the draft for the Field Regulation was prepared, and the li-
brary of the General Staff let anyone who needed it borrow it. One of the chapters 
in the draft was entitled Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. The draft defined 

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guerrilla-type activities as ‘harassment carried out in the enemy’s rear or in an area occupied by 
the enemy, linked to regular military operations or guerrilla warfare.’By this point it was made 
clear that guerrilla-type activities, if ever resorted to, were part of planned, conven-
tional and regular warfare. The draft introduced a new concept in the realm of the 
art of war, the concept of guerrilla war, which was mentioned as the second item. It 
was defined as ‘warfare conducted in an area occupied by the enemy in place of regular military 
operations.’It can be concluded from the definitions of the concepts and their inter-
nal relationships that guerrilla war was understood to be the opposite of conven-
tional warfare, which also left the door open for guerrilla-type activities.483 
 
After taking a circuitous route, two separate regulations, Kenttäohjesääntö I and II 
(‘Field Regulation I and II’), were published in summer 1954. The first volume of 
the Field Regulation484 made no reference to guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activi-
ties, as it only discussed grounds for the deployment of troops and operational in-
structions for other special fields. The second volume of the Field Regulation fo-
cused on the combat conducted by an army wartime formation, the brigade, by dis-
cussing its different forms and methods of fighting. The second volume of the regu-
lation also contained a main chapter of its own on guerrilla-type activities and guer-
rilla warfare.485 
 
In the second volume of the Field Regulation, a 17-page chapter dedicated to guer-
rilla-type activities discussed the topic in somewhat greater depth. The introduction 
to Chapter 8 of the Field Regulation, entitled Sissitoiminta ja sissisota (‘Guerrilla-type 
activities and guerrilla warfare’) justified the need for two different methods of 
fighting, including their internal relationship, by referring to the changes in the na-
ture of war and the art of war that had taken place. ‘The more mechanised armies have be-
come with the introduction of motorisation, with the growing proportion of armoured units and with 
the developments in armament, the more dependent they have become on the road network, on rapid 
and unhindered opportunities to troop movements and supply shipments. The more wooded the ter-
rain is, the more sparsely populated the area is, the sparser the road network is, and the more dis-
continuous the front lines are, the better the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities are. In 
large swathes of wilderness, they may even be the only operational method. Well-planned, carefully 
prepared and skilfully executed guerrilla operations may, when linked to other operations, be of 
great significance, and in any event cause the enemy trouble and inflict casualties upon it. In the 
worst-case scenario, after regular operations have become impossible, expanding the scale of guerril-
la-type activities so that the entire warfare scenario turns into guerrilla warfare can be 
considered.’486 Changes in the art of war were emphasised by the fact that uncon-
ventional methods of warfare were combined with conventional tactics, and that 
under certain circumstances war would turn total in nature, necessitating the use of 
all available means in order to safeguard the country’s independence.   
 

483 See the handout at the library of the General Staff: Concepts found in the new Field Regulation, 
Chapter XI, Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities; sections of the Field Regulation, KO II 
1947, a handout, Vesa Tynkkynen’s private collection (a copy of the handout is in the possession of 
the author of this thesis). 
484 Kenttäohjesääntö I osa (KO I) (‘The Field Regulation Part I’), Helsinki 1954. 
485 Kenttäohjesääntö II osa (KO II) (‘The Field Regulation Part II’), Helsinki 1954, pp. 231–248. 
486 Ibid, pp. 231–232. 
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However, the Field Regulation, completed in 1954, was not the first handbook to 
address guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare. Upseerin käsikirja (‘The officer’s 
handbook’), published in three volumes in 1950–1953, can be regarded as having 
provided the fundamental general guidelines and a summary of the Finnish art of 
war during the postwar years. The principles behind this handbook reflected inpart 
pre-war thinking. At that time, a handbook entitled Upseerin muistiopas (‘The officer’s 
memory refresher guidebook’), and an amended edition ofUpseerin käsikirja (‘The of-
ficer’s handbook’) had been published, the former in 1935 and the latter in 1936, to 
be used alongside with Kenttäohjesääntö Both handbooks, prepared by the National 
General Staff College, were aimed to supplement the regulations in effect at the 
time and to be used in officer training, at military schools, on courses, and in 
units.487 Due to the lack of regulations adapted to the postwar world, the National 
General Staff College proposed in 1949 that a new version of Upseerin käsikirja (‘The 
officer’s handbook’) be drafted in compliance with principles behind the pre-war 
handbooks. The teaching staff of the National General Staff College also an-
nounced that they would be available for the writing job.488 
 
An evident need for this handbook existed as as soon as the decision to write it had 
been taken –work on it began began at the National General Staff College in early 
1950. The first volumes, Upseerin käsikirja I489 and II490, were completed in June 
1950. From the perspective of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, the most 
important volume was the third one, Upseerin käsikirja III, which was completed only 
after the decisions regarding the wartime composition had been taken in late 1953. 
The first two volumes of Upseerin käsikirja addressed the wartime field army and its 
basic formations, or divisions and brigades. Upon its completion, the third volume 
was the first presentation of its kind that resembled a military regulation, which was 
based on new thinking on the art of war and that limited its discussion to the basic 
wartime formation –the brigade. This handbook was regarded highly successful as it 
provided an in-depth and comprehensive discussion on national defence from a 
broad perspective.491   
 
The third volume of Upseerin käsikirja defined national defence as being based on 
‘the concepts of total warfare and territorial defence’. The description of total warfare as pre-
sented by the selected officers of the National General Staff College speaks volumes 
of the need to change the Finnish art of war and adapt it to the contemporary na-
ture of war. With warfare and tactics being subject to continuous development, the 
nature of combat has changed, especially due to the developments that have taken 
place in technology, turning combat into an activity that involves all the possible as-

487 Upseerin muistiopas (‘The officer’s memory refresher guidebook’), Helsinki 1935. Upseerin käsikirja 
(‘The officer’s handbook’), Helsinki 1936. See also the third edition of Upseerin käsikirja (‘The of-
ficer’s handbook’), Helsinki 1937, and the fifth edition, Helsinki 1940. 
488 SKK:n no. 465/7a/17.3.1949, T 19468/F 47, KA. 
489 The first volume mostly addressed the leadership of troops, general issues, and the role that the 
various arms and branches played in operations conducted by a formation. Upseerin käsikirja I (‘The 
officer’s handbook I’), Helsinki 1950. 
490 The second volume provided the compositions and strengths of troops to be used in exercises. 
Upseerin käsikirja II (‘The officer’s handbook II’), Helsinki 1950. 
491 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 314–315.  
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pects of battle. Warfare turned modern set a whole host of requirements for nation-
al defence, something which had to be countered with ‘a total defence’. ‘A nation that 
defends itself with consistency, basing its defence on facts, also accepts the principle of total defence 
which requires that a nation under attack also attempts to repel the attack by committing all its re-
sources and by taking sufficient measures for such eventualities in peacetime.’492 
 
This handbook refers to territorial defence as a phenomenon closely related to de-
velopments in contemporary warfare. The reasons behind the introduction of a ter-
ritorial defence system are, according to this manual, ‘the altered nature of war, involving 
principally a threat posed by a surprise attack at an early stage of hostilities, the increasingly total 
nature of war, the possibility of internal unrest, the mobile nature of operations which involve 
breakthroughs deep into the defender’s territory, landings by airborne troops and putting troops 
ashore in the defender’s coastal areas.’ Instead of a war waged along continuous front 
lines, conflict is described to have turned into territorial combat which can only be 
countered by introducing a territorial defence system. This referred to the division 
of the country into areas, the command structure of which was responsible for mak-
ing all preparations for national defence in their areas, ensuring their implementa-
tion and leading military operations in accordance with orders and instructions is-
sued by the High Command.493 With regard to the entire country, the advantages 
provided by such a system, from the viewpoint of military operations, were its high 
level of preparedness and the opportunities it offered to committing forces as the 
situation required. This description of the territorial defence system can be com-
pared to a memorandum entitled ‘Alueellisen maanpuolustuksen järjestely- ja toimintaperi-
aatteet ’(‘The principles for arranging and organising territorial defence’), which was 
perfectly in line with the introduction to Upseerin käsikirja.494 
 
While the Finnish art of war continued to rely on conventional warfare, a key chap-
ter at the beginning of this handbook hinted at a major policy change towards the 
adoption of unconventional methods of war. Should the mobilisation fail, or should 
the regular front lines collapse, the objective of the area of responsibility was to har-
ass and slow down the enemy attack, thereby gaining time for preparations carried 
out elsewhere in the country and aiming at defeating the enemy. ‘In such a situation, 
defence will be based on active and flexible operations carried out by separate and often under-
strength troops and even by the general population –operations which in the areas occupied by the 
enemy may turn into ruthless guerrilla warfare, culminating in the birth of a resistance movement 
that will resort to all means available to it.’495 Although this handbook justified the means 
of guerrilla warfare by experiences gained from Norway, Denmark, the Soviet Un-
ion and France, the fact that it highlighted the possible emergence of a resistance 
movementsrepresents new and radical thinking by the officers at the National Gen-
eral Staff College in the field of the art of war. However, the handbook made an at-
tempt to tone down this view by suggesting that a guerrilla war and a resistance 
movement would always be based on decisions and measures taken by a legal gov-

492 Upseerin käsikirja III, (‘Officer’s handbook III’), Helsinki 1953, pp. A-5. 
493 Ibid, p. 6. 
494 PvPE:n no. 165/Op.1/11 a./15.4.1952, T 20169/F 90, KA. This memorandum was drafted at 
the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, evidently in collaboration between Colonel 
T.V. Viljanen and the chief of Op.1, Lieutenant Colonel A. Maunula.  
495 Ibid, p. 7. Cf. also PvPE:n no. 165/Op.1/11 a./15.4.1952, T 20169/F 90, KA. 
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ernment, which, in turn, would be based on the nation’s will to maintain its inde-
pendence. ‘Crucial to success is that operations are conducted under a unified leadership and that 
those who participate in them submit themselves to a discipline and order equal to the regular 
forces.’496 In light of all this, the change that had taken place in warfare had a pro-
found effect on the authors’ thinking on the art of war, as the total nature of war 
waged by the invader could only be countered by a war equally total in nature by the 
defender. 
 
What is interesting in this handbook is the fact that although it opens up with a 
main chapter stating that the means available to guerrilla warfare are the culmination 
of total warfare, it nevertheless dedicates a whole main chapter of ten pages to guer-
rilla-type activities, entitled Tietoja sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’). This 
chapter discusses the objectives and opportunities available to it as follows: ‘Guerril-
la-type activities are linked to regular military operations; they are carried out by troops of the field 
army; and they target the enemy’s rear areas and areas occupied by the enemy. Such operations seek 
to tie up enemy troops to protect their stores, communication lines and traffic in the rear areas, forc-
ing the enemy to commit its most mobile reserves to hunt down guerrilla troops. One of the objectives 
of guerrilla-type activities may be collaboration with the population that has stayed in the enemy’s 
rear or that was left there. In such a situation, the main tasks of our guerrilla troops is to support 
the objectives of the civilian population, as long as they are in line with the objectives of our own 
warfare.497 The objective of such operations, from the viewpoint of the art of war, 
was very exceptional, as, according to it, guerrilla-type activities also included the 
participation of the civilian population in military operations and in activities that 
supported such operations.  
 
In connection to this, the discussion on the art of war presented in Upseerin käsikirja 
III should be compared to theories on and means available to a total guerrilla war 
advocated by Mao Zedong. During what is known as the Long March, from South 
China to the provinces of North China in 1934–1935, and during his resistance 
against the Japanese in 1937–1945, Mao formulated a number of tenets which, in a 
way, can be said to express the fundamental elements of a guerrilla war that has po-
litical overtones. According to Mao, one of the key factors was support given to the 
civilian population, which ensured that guerrillas had support areas which enabled 
them to carry out their operations,. In other words, guerrilla warfare was total and 
savage in nature, and in which adhering to the rules of war would be nigh on impos-
sible as it would be difficult to distinguish soldiers from civilians. Thus, while the 
definition that Upseerin käsikirja III presented came close to Mao Zedong’s theories, 
it was also quite outlandish against the framework of the Finnish art of war and the 
humanitarian principles that were prevalent at the time.498 
 
It is difficult to identify a single reason behind the policy change relating to the art 
of war expressed by Upseerin käsikirja. It is equally difficult to pinpoint any individu-
als behind the inclusion of guerrilla warfare and the resistance movement in the 
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496 Upseerin käsikirja III, (‘Officer’s handbook III’), Helsinki 1953, p. 8. 
497 Ibid, p. 218. 
498 Mao Zedong: Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan, Peking 1966, pp. 5–6 and 50–
56. See also Seppänen (1971), p. 35 and pp. 55–56. Kesseli (2002), pp. 73–75.  
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handbook. However, behind the developments in the art of war lay, above all, the 
experiences that Finland had gained from the wars it had fought, the orders issued 
in the late 1940s on the initiation of training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla 
warfare, and discussions among the officers and students at the National General 
Staff College focusing on changes in warfare. However, the effect of certain indi-
viduals on the change in military thinking and on the direction that the art of war 
took becomes clear when one examines the authors of Upseerin käsikirja and the re-
vised Kenttäohjesääntö, for example. Among the authors, several individuals who had 
gained familiarity with questions related to guerrilla warfare and who had participat-
ed in discussions around the issue can be found. For example, the introduction to 
Upseerin käsikirja lists among its authors499 Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen, 
Major Unto Matikainen and Captain Helge Seppälä, all of whom later gained re-
nown as being experts in guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare and resistance 
movements. Of the authors of the Field Regulation500, Colonel Valo Nihtilä, Colo-
nel Alpo Marttinen, Lieutenant Colonel Usko Sakari Haahti, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Sulo Susi had a background in guerrilla issues. All of them had participated either in 
the dispersed storage of weapons or had engaged in guerrilla or long-range patrol-
ling during Finland’s wars. 
   
The presentation of guerrilla warfare as the most extreme form of fighting in the 
postwar context with the Finnish defence arrangements undergoing a development 
process appears to have been based partly on foreign views and experiences. The 
experiences that the Germans had gained from their fight against the French re-
sistance and the Soviet partisans provided background material for the Finnish anal-
ysis of guerrilla warfare as early as during the Continuation War.501 Reflections on 
the operations of the Norwegian and Danish resistance movements, published in 
1941–1955 in Sweden and Germany, also gained prominence in Finnish analysis. 
After 1945, Finnish researchers had obtained a large body of literature discussing 
fighting and guerrilla-type activities in the German-occupied areas.502  
 
When attempting to formulate a Finnish defensive solution and opportunities open 
to guerrilla-type activities, the Defence Forces also looked to countries outside 
Scandinavia for inspiration, countries that had resorted to unconventional methods. 
In addition to the Russian-style partisan war, the Defence Forces also analysed the 
methods employed in the Yugoslavian revolutionary war and the tactics used by the 
French and Belgian resistance movements during the Second World War. So, while 
a wealth of examples abounded, their application as such to the Finnish way of 
thinking ran counter to reality. The situation of the population in a guerrilla war, 
possible shortcomings in preparations, the role played by the infrastructure in mili-
tary operations, the difficulties faced by the medical care organisation when attempt-
ing to operate in a dispersed manner, as well as the factors imposed by the Finnish 
terrain and geography, were identified as possible problems. In examining the popu-
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499 Upseerin käsikirja III (‘The officer’s handbook III’) 1953, Johdanto (‘Introduction’) See also Mati-
kainen, Unto Osvald, an extract from personal details, no. 51481, KA. 
500 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 307. 
501 Matikainen (1948), SKK 1/353, KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 339. 
502 See, for example, Brand, W.: Guerrilla Krieg, Stockholm 1942. Lindgren, P.: Sabotageverk-
samhet, Stockholm 1944. Hammarsjö, A.: Partisankriget, Stockholm 1944. Ehrhardt, A.: Kleinkrieg, 
Potsdam 1948. Hawemann, W.: Achtung, Partisanen, Hannover 1955. 
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lation density and its effects on guerrilla warfare in Finland, detailed criteria were 
applied.503  
 
Partisan wars, as the guerrilla wars fought by Germany in the territory of European 
small states were customarily called, were characterised from the very beginning by 
features of revolutionary warfare. Partisans fought for a completely new kind of 
state. German counter-operations, such as large-scale cleansings carried out in the 
support areas of guerrilla fighters, were often extremely brutal. By applying scorched 
earth tactics, the Germans attempted to make the chronic shortage of weapons and 
provisions experienced by the guerrillas intolerable. For this reason, the hard-to-
traverse mountains in Yugoslavia were deemed to be the guerrillas’s best ally, but 
the Finns also paid attention to the partisans’chain of supply and, in particular, to 
their hidden hospitals. Ensuring a well-functioning supply network in a guerrilla war 
requires a hefty dose of imagination and a great deal of sweat. With no preparations 
in place, setting the operations in motion required a long time. According to Finnish 
estimates, imagination is the sole limiting factor. The extent and duration of guerrilla 
operations, the number of troops committed, and the results they achieved meant 
that guerrilla warfare during the Second World War even had strategic signifi-
cance.504  
 
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s in particular, a number of foreign military regu-
lations were translated into Finnish in order to provide reference material for the 
formulation of a genuinely Finnish defence solution, and Finnish delegates visited 
foreign military schools in order to gain new insights.505 Via the Foreign Affairs Of-
fice of the General Headquarters, the Operations Division received, for example, 
translations of US Army regulations, some of which discussed guerrilla warfare. In 
1956, the Infantry Division received a translation of the US 1954 Kenttäohjesääntö 
(‘Field Regulation’), one of the sections of which entitled Sotatoimet (‘Military opera-
tions’) discussed guerrilla warfare under a heading of its own. According to this reg-
ulation, guerrilla warfare should be conducted by troops specially trained for such 
operations, or by other combat units.506 In 1960, the Finnish military attaché in 
Washington sent a partial translation of the US regulation FM 31–21/1958 ‘Guerrilla 
Warfare and Special Forces Operations ’ to Helsinki. The translation was forwarded to 

503 Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. Palmén, Niilo: An interview on 19 March 2007. 
Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview between March and April 2007. Lukkari (1984), p. 20. 
504 Eronen (1978), T 26077/Hi 83, KA. Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview conducted between March 
and April 2007. 
505 PE:n no. 5/Koultsto/14 sal/19.1.1959 (ylil Sihvon kertomus opintomatkasta Ranskaan) (‘Report by 
Senior Lieutenant Sihvo on his visit to France for the purpose of study’), T 21442/F 11 sal, KA. 
PE:n no. 94/Tarktsto/5 sal/26.10.1960 (kapt Hyvärisen matkakertomus) (‘Captain Hyvärinen’s travel 
report’), T 21442/F 11 sal, KA. PE:n no. 371/Ulkmtsto/14e/sal/21.10.1960 (kertomus tutustu-
miskäynnistä Ranskan laskuvarjojoukoissa) (‘Report on a visit to French paratroop units for the pur-
pose of study’), T 21442/F 11 sal, KA. PE:n no. 135/Ulkmtsto/14e/sal/10.6.1961 (kertomus eräästä 
harjoituksesta Ranskan SKK:ssa) (‘Report on an exercise conducted at the French National General 
Staff College’), T 21442/F 12 sal, KA. PE:n no.tta 15.8.1962/sal (kertomus opiskelusta Ranskan So-
takorkeakoulussa 74. kurssilla 1960–1961, kapteeni Niilo Palmén) (‘Report on studies on Course 74 at 
the Frenceh National General Staff College’), T 21442/F 13 sal, KA. See also Sihvo, Sami Seppo 
Ilmari, an extract from personal details, no. 71936, KA. 
506 PE:n no. 211/B sal/1956 (FM 100-5/29.9.1954), T 25094/F 4 sal, KA. 
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the Infantry Division, the Training Division and the Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters, as well as to the National General Staff College, where it, 
judging by the notes added to the margins of the translation, was used in the devel-
opment of a Finnish method of waging a guerrilla war.507  
 
The translation into Finnish of foreign regulations was not confined to the Western 
art of war; with regard to guerrilla-type activities in particular, regulations were gath-
ered from and information gained on the Soviet Union. A translation of a Soviet 
field regulation, sent to Finland apparently by one of the Finnish military attachés 
posted in Moscow, provides an excellent example of intelligence targeting the East. 
Neuvostoliiton aseellisten voimien kenttäohjesääntö, Divisioona –Armeijakunta (‘Field Regula-
tion of the Soviet Armed Forces, Division –Army group’) from 1959 discussed the 
principles of modern war and the role of the various branches of the defence, the air 
force and special troops in different military operations under various conditions.508 
From the viewpoint of the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activities, the ca-
pability of the Soviet army to mount anti-guerrilla operations interested Finnish of-
ficers in particular.  
 
An assessment of the ultimate applicability of foreign influences reveals that the 
compatibility of the writings on guerrilla-type activities originating from foreign 
sources with each other was questionable at best. It is obvious that only the tactical 
characteristics of guerrilla-type activities, combat techniques, the similarity of cir-
cumstances, and geographical aspects available in the foreign source literature were 
factors that could be used in the development of the Finnish art of war at different 
times. 
 
Counter arguments against total guerrilla warfare also received support. As early as 
1948, Unto Matikainen drew a conclusion in his thesis at the National General Staff 
College which stated that ‘…by only preparing for guerrilla warfare, the invader will be offered 
an opportunity to occupy the country quickly without making any major sacrifices.’Although 
Matikainen regarded guerrilla warfare as an efficient method of fighting, he argued 
that it would be impossible to stockpile sufficient materiel in advance for a pro-
longed guerrilla war. According to Matikainen, any strategy for the defence of Fin-
land should be based on conventional warfare, with guerrilla warfare being resorted 
to only as a last-ditch effort.509 
 
Against the background described above, it becomes understandable that guerrilla 
warfare was relegated to a form of extreme warfare in Finland as well. Considering 
the wars that Finland had fought, it no longer appeared impossible that the entire 
country or some parts of it would be occupied, all the more so as the changes in the 
nature of war had made war take on increasingly total aspects. Small countries 
caught in the crossfire in a conflict between great powers had fought successfully by 
resorting to guerrilla warfare, and had found in it an efficient method in their fight 
against a superior enemy. The extreme methods of guerrilla warfare, and its nature 
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in general, polarised the opinions of Finnish officers. Opinions for and against re-
garding a total guerrilla war were expressed in public discussion and in confidential 
memoranda alike. An examination of the threat scenario that had changed since the 
Second World War makes it understandable that a full-scale guerrilla war also found 
its supporters, as a certain number of officers holding views that were very realistic 
in nature argued that any conventional defence would collapse under an attack 
launched by a great power. According to them, it would only be a question of time 
until conventional Finnish defences would collapse under vastly superior numbers. 
 
 
A handbook in guerrilla training and a regulation regarding guerrilla-type ac-
tivities were drafted to support training 
 
The internal multiformity of the Finnish art of war was characterised by confusion 
regarding concepts, typical of the early 1950s. In Sotilaskielen sanakirja (‘A dictionary 
of military terminology’), published in 1953, Väinö Oinonen sought to clarify the 
meaning of terms used in military jargon. Oinonen also gave his own interpretation 
of guerrilla-type activities: ‘Harassment carried out in the enemy’s rear or in areas occupied by 
the enemy, either linked to regular military operations or carried out independently of such opera-
tions.’This definition of guerrilla-type activities is not entirely in line with the regula-
tions in effect at the time, as it gives the idea that guerrilla-type activities would have 
been possible to carry out in connection with regular military operations, or inde-
pendently of such activities. Oinonen’s interpretation of guerrilla warfare is equally 
different and equally interesting: ‘Guerrilla war; guerrilla-type activities that, with regard to 
their effects, comes close to regular warfare.’510 This definition is very idiosyncratic, differing 
as it does from the other definitions put forth at the time by drawing a parallel be-
tween guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities in which the intensity of operations is 
the decisive factor. 
 
Through concept definition, attempts were made to clarify the strategic position and 
content of guerrilla war in the second volume of 1954’s Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regu-
lation’), and Jalkaväen taisteluohjesääntö II (‘Combat Regulation for the Infantry, Part 
II’) from 1955, which continued the development of tactics and the art of war based 
on experiences gained from Finland’s wars. These regulations emphasised the signif-
icance of terrain from the defender’s perspective and stressed the role of guerrilla-
type activities in the defensive battle. With the publication of the Field Regulation, 
the concept of guerrilla warfare was established in the Finnish regulations for years 
to come, which, almost without an exception, included the key concepts and formu-
lations of ‘in addition to regular military operations or in their place’and ‘in the enemy-occupied 
territory.’511 However, it was recognised that instructions on guerrilla warfare that was 
more extensive in scope and a separate regulation for guerrilla-type activities were 
still lacking. 
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It was not until 1954 that the compilation of regulations addressing guerrilla-type ac-
tivities was properly initiated. Via the Foreign Affairs Division, a report on training 
in guerrilla tactics provided by the Swedish army had been sent to the Training Divi-
sion and the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters, the Army Combat School 
and the Frontier Guard Headquarters, and this report obviously played a role in a 
decision taken to draft a handbook and regulation on training in guerrilla-style oper-
ations for use by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. The fact that the 
fourth chapter of the memorandum discussed the role of guerrilla warfare in the 
Swedish military regulations is worthy of a mention.512 An order issued by the Train-
ing Division, signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, noted that 
significant gaps remained in the set of army regulations, although one of the objec-
tives set for the postwar work on regulations had been achieved with the comple-
tion of Parts I and II of the Field Regulation: ‘Regulations for the signal branch, reconnais-
sance, guerrilla-type activities and staff work are also missing.’In order to address the most 
serious shortcomings, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces issued an 
order tasking the Defence Forces to prepare, by the end of June 1956, drafts for the 
general section of the field regulation, as well as for the military operations and 
combat conducted by the various arms. In addition to this, the order required the 
Defence Forces to prepare a draft, by the end of December 1955, for a regulation 
regarding guerrilla-type activities, under the direction of the chief or the Training 
Division. The principal content of each new regulation, and each regulation requir-
ing substantial revisions, were to be presented to the General Regulation Committee 
by the end of 1954, before the writing process commenced.513  
 
In connection with the previous order, Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Koppinen, depu-
ty chief of the Army Combat School at the time, was ordered to write a handbook 
on guerrilla training and a separate regulation for guerrilla-type activities. While it 
remains unclear exactly why it was Koppinen who was tasked with writing the guer-
rilla handbooks, it may be surmised that his participation in the drafting of Upseerin 
käsikirja (‘The officer’s handbook’), published previously, and his serving as the 
leader of courses on guerrilla-type activities for the infantry played a role in the se-
lection process.514 Koppinen embraced his task with obvious enthusiasm and a seri-
ous attitude as by late 1954 – in other words, barely one month after receiving his 
orders –he submitted his proposal for the organisation of ‘the guerrilla regulation ’ to 
the Regulation Committee.515 Although the presentation only refers to the regu-
lation for guerrilla-type activities, both Sissikouluttajan opas (‘Handbook for the in-
structor in guerrilla-type activities’) and Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type 
activities’) were approved to be written under temporary working names so that the 
manuscript for Sissikouluttajan opas would be completed during 1955, to be submit-

512 PE:n no. 54/Ulkmtsto/14e/sal./24.3.1954 sekä lähetteen liite Sissikoulutus Ruotsissa (‘including 
an attachment to the covering letter entitled Guerrilla training in Sweden’), Stockholm 18 March 
1954, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA. 
513 PE:n no. 17/Ohjeststo/8b/sal./16.11.1954, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA. 
514 TaistK:n no. 1300/II/5c/14.9.1953, T 20170/F 95, KA. TaistK:n no. 1383/II/Db1/29.11.1954, 
T 20171/F 106, KA. 
515 Polttopöytäkirja (‘Deletion diary notes’) PE:n no. 1/Ohjeststo/C/11.6.1958, with a reference to a 
presentation on the Sissiohjesääntö, PE:n no. 181/Ohjeststo/8b/29.12.1954, T 21464/F 14–15 sal, 
KA. 
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ted for use by troops in early 1955, and Sissiohjesääntö during 1956, to be sent to 
troops either in 1956 or 1957. The responsibility for writing both handbooks was 
assigned to Veikko Koppinen.516 Koppinen kept his schedule, as by January 1956, 
Sissikoulutusopas had been published, after having first been approved by the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, and was immediately put into training use. 
Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type activities’) was competed in June 1957, 
and was delivered to the troops in the autumn of the same year.517  
 
An interesting assessment of the situation, and one which was almost identical to 
that made by the Defence Forces, was carried out around at the same time by the 
Frontier Guard, which, in the early 1950s, recognised that the lack of military regula-
tions for guerrilla-type activities and training instructions seriously hampered train-
ing in guerrilla tactics. In a memorandum he drafted in 1955 and in a separate doc-
ument in December 1955, the commander of the Kainuu Frontier Guard (KR), 
Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen, raised the question of the lack of military 
regulations on guerrilla-type activities and the ensuing problems in training.518 Alt-
hough the archival material of the Frontier Guard contains no actual assignment or 
order in support of writing a separate regulation, Major Georg Ahonen519, who 
served as an aide to Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen and wrote –either being 
aware of the work on regulation under way at the Defence Forces at the time or not 
conscious of it –a draft for Sissikouluttajan opas (‘The handbook for the instructor 
for in guerrilla-type activities’), the name of which was almost identical to that of 
Veikko Kopponen’s draft. Like Ahonen, he had written his thesis at the National 
General Staff College on training in 1954 on guerrilla-type activities, and he had a 
solid understanding of the subject. Georg Ahonen highlighted in his thesis the im-
portance of having a guidebook for instructors in guerrilla-type activities in order to 
ensure the quality of peacetime training and its quality.520 The Frontier Guard 
Headquarters considered Ahonen’s study as being of high quality, which was well 
reflected in the statement of thesis: ‘Taken as a whole, Captain A’s thesis is thorough, well-

516 PE:n no. 2860/Ohjeststo/8b/12.10.1955. PE:n no. 1/7a/26.1.1956, liite 2, T 20173/F 138, KA. 
517 Sissikoulutusopas (‘Handbook in guerrilla training’), Helsinki 1956. Jv:n ohjestmk:n no. 1/7a/ 
26.1.1955, T 20173/F 138, KA. PE:n no. 1/Ohjeststo/8 b/2.1.1956, T 20173/F 138, KA. PE:n no. 
1187/ohjeststo/8b/26.3.1956, T 20173/F 138, KA. PE:n no. 1246/ohjeststo/8b/ 6.4.1955, T 
20173/F 138, KA. TaistK:n no. 2/II/8d sal./14.1.1956, T 22755/F7, KA. PE:n no. 
2395/ohjeststo/8b/19.6.1957, T 22780/F 148, KA. PE:n no. 3338/ohjeststo/7a/26.9.1957, T 
22780/F 149, KA. Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA. 
518 Guerrilla-type activities under Finnish conditions; the organisation and equipment of guerrilla 
troops; the principles of conducting and leading guerrilla-type activities; and the achievement of 
targets set for the training of the leadership of the Frontier Guard on the basis of the above-
mentioned factors; sections and attachments of a memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel 
Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. KRE:n no. 2530/II/16.a/5.12.1955, 
T 20173/F 138, KA. See also Karhunen, Veikko Evert, an extract from personal details, no. 37447, 
KA. 
519 Between 1947 and 1961 Major Georg Ahonen held various posts at the Kainuu Frontier Guard, 
dealing with training and development related to guerrilla-type activities. Together with Veikko 
Karhunen, his commanding officer and – reportedly – his close friend, Ahonen developed training 
in guerrilla-type activities at the Kainuu Frontier Guard between 1951 and 1956. Setälä, Erkki: An 
interview on 13 June 2006. See also Ahonen, Georg Aleksanteri, an extract from personal details, 
no. 55635, KA. 
520 Ahonen (1954), SKK 1/582, KA. 
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thought-out and demonstrates the author’s expertise in its subject matter. It will be an excellent con-
tribution to the practical implementation and further development of the issue in question.’521 
 
In April 1956, Major Georg Ahonen completed –only slightly later than Koppinen 
–a draft for Sissikouluttajan opas which was delivered in May to the other Frontier 
Guards for familiarisation. In June 1956, Ahonen also completed a draft for Sissi-
joukkojen taisteluohjesääntö (‘Combat regulation for guerrilla troops’).522 A comparison 
of the content of these handbooks reveals that the methods presented in them were 
very similar but they were entirely different in spirit. Koppinen’s handbook empha-
sises the right guerrilla spirit imbued with traditions that should be part of training 
considerably more than the draft authored by Ahonen. However, the core subject 
matter –general arrangements regarding training and topics for which training was 
to be provided –was similar in both drafts. Due to the cuts made to the archives, it 
remains unexplained as to why Koppinen’s regulation and handbook gained an offi-
cially sanctioned status and not Ahonen’s.  
 
An examination of Sissikoulutusopas, with a label ‘For official use only ’523, reveals that it 
is quite thorough and practical in its approach. It was exactly this kind of handbook 
that the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard needed for the training that they 
provided in guerrilla style tactics. The organisation of the handbook reflected gene-
ral arrangements for conscripts’training at the time, being divided into general train-
ing in guerrilla-style tactics and fieldcraft, in combat training, and in specialisation 
training. The general section on training gave a detailed discussion and examples of 
a variety of topics, including tracking, deception, bivouacking, the transport of 
equipment and supplies, techniques for crossing waterways, the measures that each 
soldier needed to take in order to maintain his physical and mental and fighting ca-
pability, and the use of confirmed signs in guerrilla operations. With regard to com-
bat training, the handbook provided basics for combat conducted by an individual 
soldier, by a pair of soldiers, and by a guerrilla jaeger unit. The chapter on special 
training addressed signalling, engineering, driving vehicles, and medical care, all as 
applied to guerrilla style operations.524 Although the handbook presented no de-
tailed plans for lessons and exercises, it nevertheless provided sufficient grounds for 
training troops in guerrilla-type activities, particularly at units training wartime guer-
rilla troops. 
 
Sissikoulutusopas provides a very interesting description of the objectives of guerrilla-
type activities. According to it, guerrilla-type activities entail a large number of spe-
cial situations, which can be dealt with only by giving the troops proper training for 

521 RvE:n no. 138/II/sal/29.10.1954, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential do-
cument and a confidential archive’) identifier F 1–7 sal (research permit obtained). 
522 KRE:n no. 780/II/16.a/13.4.1956, T 22834/F 108, KA. RvE:n no. 1025/21a/12.5.1956, T 
22755/F 7, KA. KRE:n no. 45/II/sal/20.6.1956, T 24014/F 4 sal, KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), 
p. 342. 
523 The ‘For official use only’ classification indicated that while the regulation in question was a 
public and official document, it was limited for internal use by the Defence Forces and the Frontier 
Guard. However, as it was not a confidential document, it could also be used in the training of con-
scripts, in addition to training the professional personnel. 
524 Sissikoulutusopas (‘Handbook in guerrilla training’), Helsinki 1956, pp. 5–7 and 9–88. 
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them. ‘Guerrilla-type activities aim at throwing the enemy’s rear areas and operations into chaos. 
Guerrilla-type activities entail such a variety of special cases and technical problems that, in order to 
achieve good results, leaders and men must receive special training. In particular, training helps to 
reduce the number of casualties and boosts the confidence of the troops.’525 All in all, while this 
handbook was much-needed upon its completion, it was also very much like its au-
thor. All the evidence suggests that Veikko Koppinen, while drafting his handbook, 
had thoroughly familiarised himself with his subject matter, as, if hearsay is to be be-
lieved, he subjected his ideas to practical testing. Kaiju Kallio, Veikko Koppinen’s 
daughter, recounted when interviewed numerous details of the experiments that her 
father had conducted based on his war experiences and that he took to great lengths 
with his immediate family. Among other things, she said that she had spent a night 
at the request of his father in an experimental sleeping bag made of paper, termed a 
‘guerrilla-style sleeping bag ’, on the shores of Tuusulanjärvi in the mid-1950s. Numer-
ous details and lofty ideas presented in the handbook, such as the use of makeshift 
equipment, were incorporated into the training of professional staff and con-
scripts.526  
 
After Sissikoulutusopas was completed in spring 1956, the Regulations Office of the 
General Headquarters compiled a document entitled Yleistaktillisia suuntaviivoja 
(‘Guidelines for general tactics’). The general section of this handbook emphasised 
the significance of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in the art of war, bas-
ing this view on premises under which the enemy in a possible war would always 
have superiority in numbers, materiel and firepower. ‘As there would not be continuous 
front lines, and for other reasons, a guerrilla war might ensue. We have to regard guerrilla-type ac-
tivities as being an integral part of all combat operations.’527 The General Headquarters re-
quested the arms commanders and the inspectors of the various branches to pro-
vide statements on the guidelines for general tactics and submit them by the middle 
of May 1956. Counted by the number of pages, such statements constituted an im-
pressive collection of information, including statements addressing questions related 
to guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities viewed from the perspective of the 
art of war.528  
 
A statement submitted by the Staff Duties Office of the General Headquarters, 
which was responsible for the peacetime composition of troops and the nominal 
strength of wartime troops, drew attention to problems related to the requirements 
which required the intensification of guerrilla-type activities and the establishment 
of new units. ‘Guerrilla-type activities and our possibilities to wage guerrilla war cannot probably 
be intensified by establishing new special formations for guerrilla-style warfare, as this would lead to 

525 Ibid, p. 9. 
526 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007. See also Norkola, Kari: Poikakirja aikamiehille 
(‘Boys' own adventure book for grownup men’), a review of Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä, Sotilasaikakauslehti 
10/2012, p. 55. ‘I enjoyed the book, as it brought vivid memories to me of my own company officer course in 1959, 
during which Koppinen made an experiment on the ice cover of Tuusulanjärvi to find out whether a guerrilla jaeger 
would be able to stay warm being just wrapped in potato bags made of paper and burrowed in snow. He received sup-
port from the duty officer of our course, who checked once every hour at night whether or not he was still alive. Well, 
he reported that he wasn’t cold! ’ 
527 PE:n no. 80/Ohjeststo/8b sal/11.4.1956, T 21442/F 7 sal, KA. 
528 Statements can be founded in the archives of the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters, 
kept at the National Archives under the identifier T 25094/E 1 sal, KA. 
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a reduction in the number of troops available to other units. Instead, as the need for committing 
troops to guerrilla-type activities may suddenly emerge, special guerrilla activity compositions should 
be defined for infantry troops and, possibly, for units representing other branches as well –composi-
tions to which such troops could quickly be transferred from their normal order of battle.’This 
statement by the Staff Duties Office evidently affected Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for 
guerrilla-type activities’), which, at the time, was still being in the process of being 
drawn up and according to which guerrilla troops proper were part of the composi-
tion of infantry troops. Troops representing other branches and arms needed to be 
prepared to engage in guerrilla-type activities.529 The Navy also needed to be able to 
carry out guerrilla-type activities, especially in the archipelago.530 After the arms and 
branches had submitted their statements, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces, K.A. Heiskanen, approved the tactical guidelines in May 1957, confirming 
that guerrilla-type activities were an integral part of all combat operations.531 From 
the perspective of the art of war, this represented a clear departure from the practice 
of the army during its previous wars of forming temporary units for guerrilla-type 
activities and putting them through a crash course before sending them into action.  
 
The publication of the 1957 Sissiohjesääntö, authored by Veikko Koppinen, supple-
mented Sissikoulutusopas. Sissiohjesääntö was also the labelled ‘for official use only ’, indi-
cating that it was intended for training use only. With regard to its content, this 
regulation focused solely on guerrilla tactics and fighting methods. This was the rea-
son behind the fact that the handbook discussed the operations carried out by guer-
rilla troops, their leadership, the preparations they made for operations and any op-
erations conducted under special conditions in a fairly comprehensive manner.532 
Subsection C1 of Chapter 5 of this handbook provides a highly important discus-
sion of combat operations, dividing guerrilla-type activities into concerted and dis-
persed operations. According to this regulation, a guerrilla jaeger unit is engaged in a 
concerted operation when it targets its efforts against a clearly delineated area in the 
terrain. Concerted operations are aimed at providing support to the troops holding 
the front line and engaged in a decisive battle. Dispersed operations referred to tying 
up enemy forces in their rear areas, harassing them and carrying out reconnaissance. 
Guerrilla jaeger units in dispersed operations operated independently in their target 
areas under the command of their own leaders.533 The regulation for guerrilla-type 
activities was adopted for training use in 1957 by all Frontier Guards, with instruc-
tions issues to quietly comply with it despite its unconfirmed status: ‘For this reason, 
the draft has been classified confidential and remains so at the moment.’534 
 
Sissiohjesääntö geared the concept of guerrilla-type activities, with its internationally 
recognised meaning, towards a notion that was more Finnish in nature. ‘Guerrilla-type 
activities refer to combat, harassment and reconnaissance operations in an enemy-held area. They 
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529 PE:n no. 24/Järjtsto/8 sal/14.5.1956, T 25094/E 1 sal, KA. Cf. with Sissiohjesääntö (SissiO), 
Helsinki 1957, p. 12. 
530 MeriVE:n n: 128/Järjtsto/8b sal/14.5.1956, T 25094/E 1 sal, KA. Cf. with Sissiohjesääntö 
(SissiO), Helsinki 1957, p. 10. 
531 PE:n no. 136/Ohjeststo/8b sal/16.5.1957, T 25094/F 5 sal, KA. 
532 Sissiohjesääntö (SissiO) (‘Regulation for Guerrilla-type Activities’), Helsinki 1957, pp. 5–6. 
533 Ibid, pp. 120–122. 
534 RvE:n no. 90/II/sal/5.6.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential docu-
ment and a confidential archive’) identifier F 8–9 sal (research permit obtained). 
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are always linked to operations carried out at the front line, providing support to them in an opti-
mal manner, and are the most effective means available to a guerrilla war.’ Although this regu-
lation principally addressed guerrilla-type activities, it also made frequent references 
to guerrilla war, a concept which was receiving attention during the era. It is inter-
esting to note that the definition of guerrilla war contains one sentence which hints 
at the possibility of using the civilian population in the achievement of the goals set 
for a war. ‘Guerrilla war is a form of warfare carried out using guerrilla troops, often with the aid 
of the general population, alongside regular military operations or in their place in certain areas or 
in the entire area of a country in a situation in which the relative strengths of the belligerents are so 
unbalanced that the defender’s quick defeat is imminent and regular operations on the front line 
appear impossible or even self-defeating, but a decision is nevertheless taken to continue resistance 
while giving up continuous front lines.’535 Both definitions presented above were quite 
clearly formulated by Veikko Koppinen,, with the description of guerrilla war in par-
ticular being clearly linked to his novel manuscript Räjähtävä tyhjyys (‘Exploding wil-
derness’).536 
 
While Koppinen sought to standardise the terminology on guerrilla-type activities in 
general use at the time, using the regulation for guerrilla-type activites in particular, 
it was Paavo Ilmola, who in his 1958 separate study of high quality, entitled Sissisota, 
sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suuntaviivat (‘Guerrilla warfare, its prerequisites and 
guidelines for warfare’) raised the question that had hampered the concepts of guer-
rilla warfare in the Finnish art of war during the 1950s. ‘Texts and discussions on the use 
of guerrilla troops are characterised by terminological richness. Such terminology includes guerrilla-
type activities, resistance movements, sabotage, passive and active resistance, popular risings and 
even insurgencies. Depending on the predominant type of activity adopted by guerrilla fighters at any 
given given time, or on the objectives that such fighters had set for themselves, their warfare might 
have come to be called by a name reflecting this situation in common parlance. Not even our own 
regulations are entirely blameless with regard to the proliferation of terminology, having drawn a 
parallel between guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities. On the other hand, this error was cor-
rected in Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type activities), which was published later.’
Ilmola regarded guerrilla war as an umbrella term which, according to him, was di-
vided into two major forms of operations which were related –guerrilla-type activi-
ties and resistance movements.537  
 
While the criticism presented by Paavo Ilmola regarding the equation of guerrilla 
war and guerrilla-type activities in the Field Regulation was a step in the right direc-
tion, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities were not clearly differentiated until Sis-
siohjesääntö came out in 1957. This regulation defined guerrilla-type activities to be 
just one of the forms of guerrilla war when viewed from the Finnish perspective. 
However, the regulation for guerrilla-type activities paints a different picture of 
guerrilla war compared with the 1954 Kenttäohjesääntö, (‘Field Regulation’), in which 
guerrilla war was to involve the general population if necessary: ‘Guerrilla war is a form 

535 Ibid, pp. 7–8. 
536 ‘To the enemy, the exploding wilderness spells deception and playing with the wrong cards, 
something which deprives him of confidence and courage and renders years of training worthless, 
which has always been based on five words: enemy over there, engage him! In a guerrilla war, this 
premise is missing.’ Koppinen (2012), pp. 120–121. 
537 Ilmola (1958), pp. 5–6, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. 
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of warfare carried out using guerrilla jaeger troops and, often, with the aid of the general population, 
alongside regular military operations or in their place in certain areas or in the entire area of a 
country, when the relative strengths of the belligerents are so unbalanced that the defender’s quick 
defeat is imminent and regular front line operations appear impossible or even self-defeating, but 
when a decision is nevertheless taken to continue resistance while giving up continuous front 
lines.’538 
 
Soon after the handbooks authored by Koppinen had been published, a revised ver-
sion of Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa, (‘The General Section of the Field Regulation’) 
was published in 1958, in which guerrilla war was relegated to a subchapter of its 
own under a main chapter addressing military operations. The commander of the 
Frontier Guards paid personal attention to the definition of guerrilla war, after the 
regulation had been submitted for comments: ‘In common parlance, guerrilla war may also 
refer to warfare that ignores all the international conventions, leading to a situation in which the po-
litical background of such a war is somewhat different compared with regular military operations. 
This, naturally, does not prevent the adoption of a definition of guerrilla war that is precise in mili-
tary terms and, as I see it, this is exactly what we should do. The author, who evidently wanted to 
avoid drawing a borderline between guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war, settled –due to the 
organisation of his draft –on a solution that paralleled defensive battle with strategic defence and 
guerrilla-type activities with guerrilla warfare, something that we think was less than successful.’539 
In the final confirmed regulation, guerrilla-type activities were described as ‘warfare 
carried out alongside regular military operations or in their place in enemy-held territory, the more 
important forms of which are continuous operations conducted by regular or temporarily formed 
guerrilla jaeger troops.’540 The description provided by this regulation of guerrilla war-
fare and its definition can be regarded as a kind of synthesis of the discussions on 
guerrilla war, guerrilla-type activities and their adoption to the Finnish art of war 
that had been going on between 1944 and 1957. 
 
In the late 1950s, the connection between guerrilla-type activities and recon-
naissance was growing increasingly stronger. Completed in April 1958 and distribut-
ed to the troops in the summer of the same year, Tiedusteluohjesääntö (‘Regulation for 
Reconnaissance’) was the first document to provide official grounds for reconnais-
sance carried out in connection with guerrilla-type activities. According to the regu-
lation, ‘reconnaissance is one of the tasks of guerrilla jaeger units and detachments, aimed at fur-
thering their own operations as well as intensifying the combat operations led by the various com-
mand echelons.’541 The forms and principles of reconnaissance presented in this regu-
lation reflected, to a high degree, experiences that the Finnish army had gained from 
the wars that it had waged, in which context long-range patrolling, as well as shorter 
patrolling tasks, were described as incorporating the skills and methods needed in 
guerrilla-type activities. 
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538 Sissiohjesääntö (SissiO) (‘Regulation for Guerrilla-type Activities’), Helsinki 1957, pp. 7–8. Cf. Kent-
täohjesääntö II (KO II) (‘Field Regulation II (KO II)’), Helsinki 1954, p. 254. 
539 RvE:n no. 81/II/sal/11.9.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential docu-
ment and a confidential archive’) identifier F 8–9 sal (research permit obtained). 
540 Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regulation, General Secton’), 1958, p. 94 and 215. 
541 Tiedusteluohjesääntö (TiedO) (‘Regulation for Reconnaissance’), Mikkeli 1958, pp. 162–165. 
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In the 1950s, the Army Combat School in particular had the major responsibility for 
the guerrilla training of the Frontier Guard’s personnel and officer candidates. By 
1958, the Army Combat School had arranged a total of two courses for guerrilla jae-
ger unit commanders and 13 infantry guerrilla courses, with the number of partici-
pants amounting to 396 men. The courses for guerrilla jaeger unit commanders 
standardised the training provided by the various formations, schools and military 
schools. Courses were intended to qualify officers and professional NCOs to act as 
instructors in guerrilla-type activities in their units.542 In 1950, a break occurred both 
in guerrilla jaeger unit commanders and infantry guerrilla courses. The break was 
caused by a standing order issued in 1958 to transfer the responsibility for such 
courses from the Army Combat School to the Headquarters of the 2nd Division. 
The General Headquarters considered that guerrilla courses used up too many of 
the resources of the Army Combat School, necessitating the distribution of the re-
sponsibility to the headquarters of the formations. Due to certain problems, the 
headquarters of the 2nd division failed to arrange the courses planned for 1959.543 
 
This break in training prompted the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters to 
propose that the responsibility be redistributed so that the responsibility for courses 
for guerrilla commanders or, to use the official designation, ‘The training event for com-
manders and deputy commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions ’be transferred to the Army 
Combat School. The Infantry Office also proposed that the name of the course be 
changed to the officers’training event and that its objectives be changed to match 
officers’wartime duties. Similarly, the responsibility for courses in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities and intelligence courses was transferred to the army formations. The Infantry 
Division had also drafted course objectives, according to which the students were to 
be given an orientation in guerrilla-type activities conducted on the level of army 
corps, brigades and basic formations.544 Thus, the problems associated with training 
responsibilities were closely linked to the dual nature of guerrilla-type activities and 
guerrilla warfare and to ambiguous definitions. 
 
In response to the proposal by the General Headquarters, the Army Combat School 
prepared a statement noting that especially Sissikoulutusopas (1956) and Sissiohjesääntö 
(1957), as well as the training provided on the various courses, had put training back 
on track. ‘On the basis of the above, it can be stated that issues related to guerrilla-type activities, 
after some initial difficulties, have been put back on the rails and that normality has been restored, 
even in this field.’By early 1969, the Finnish Military Academy had in place a cur-
riculum that provided rigorous training in guerrilla-type activities. Junior officers 
were found to have had fairly good training in guerrilla-type activities, regarding 
both personal skills and training competence. At the Army Combat School and the 
National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities had been seamlessly integrat-
ed into general tactics.545  
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542 TaistK:n no. 238/Koultsto/5 c/2.3.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA. 
543 PE:n jvtston kirj. 13.2.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA. 
544 Ibid. 
545 TaistK:n no. 238/Koultsto/5 c/2.3.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA. 
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The response of the Army Combat School highlighted the relationship between 
guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and the fuzzy border between the two 
concepts. A review of the situation indicated that the National General Staff College 
and the Army Combat School provided training, within the subject of general tac-
tics, in leadership for guerrilla operations conducted by wartime army corps and bri-
gades. Teaching provided by the Finnish Military Academy provided junior officers 
with skills in guerrilla-style combat, which they brought with them to army units. 
The performance of guerrilla jaeger troops, opportunities for their use, and the gen-
eral arrangements for training in guerrilla-type activities would be best managed, in 
the view of the Army Combat School, via regulations and by resorting to the experi-
ence of senior officers. By contrast, the Army Combat School saw that the order is-
sued by the General Headquarters, requiring the Army Combat School instructors 
‘to orientate their students in guerrilla warfare conducted within the framework of a basic formation ’, 
led to problems.’546  
 
The position of the Army Combat School was clear. Although the regulations re-
ferred to guerrilla warfare as an option, the Defence Forces were poorly prepared to 
provide training in it, thereby making it a completely new training objective. The 
provision of training in guerrilla-type activities on the various levels, alongside other 
training, was, according to the Army Combat School, in good shape. The various 
branches of the defence had been issued clear instructions covering the topics on 
which training was to be provided and the number of hours of instruction to be giv-
en, all of which had been integrated into military exercises and even applied to the 
live ordnance exercises of artillery units in Rovajärvi. ‘If the intention really is to expand 
the scope of training in guerrilla-type activities, that is, to include guerrilla war waged in Finland, 
the Army Combat School will naturally contribute to such training. However, considering the sig-
nificance of the issue, the General Headquarters should provide the instructors of the schools in-
volved with orientation on the issue, thereby ensuring that the training provided follows general 
guidelines laid down in advance.’547 This is a clear indication of the fact that in 1960, the 
Defence Forces had insufficient resources for providing training in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities or a large-scale guerrilla war. 
 
From the viewpoint of the arrangements in place for the national defence, the func-
tioning of the Defence Forces and the Finnish art of war, the late 1940s and the ear-
ly 1950s were a period during which guerrilla-type activities – in theory at least –
stabilised their position in the military operations that formations conducted. On the 
other hand, guerrilla war was regarded in discussions as an extreme form of warfare 
and as an option for fighting under desperate conditions. The key content of Sis-
sikoulutusopas and Sissiohjesääntö, both authored by Veikko Koppinen, directed train-
ing, the objective of which was take combat to the enemy-held territory, thereby fur-
thering the operations of the Finnish forces. Although guerrilla-type activities prop-
er were divided into two types of operations –concerted and dispersed –concerted 
guerrilla tactics continued to be regarded as the principal mode of fighting in the 
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early 1960s.548 With a systematic training system for guerrilla-type activities in place, 
concerted guerrilla-type activities achieved an almost established position in the late 
1950s, with especially the Frontier Guard paying serious attention to it until they 
were superseded by more dispersed tactics in the mid-1960s.549 By contrast, guerrilla 
war still required a great deal of study with regard to both training and the art of 
war. 
 
 
Parachute training in long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities 
 
The change that took place in the Finnish art of war in the late 1950s was cha-
racterised by solutions and lessons obtained from abroad and the adoption of inter-
national influences. The ‘paratrooper guerrilla jaegers ’ training, for which ideas were 
presented between 1958 and 1960; can be seen as an example of such influences. 
Such ideas led to the initiation of parachute courses in 1961 and the establishment 
of the Parachute Jaeger School in 1962. The training of Finnish paratroopers includ-
ed guerrilla-type activities from the very beginning; unlike foreign examples, the 
Finnish paratrooper was not a soldier of airborne troops but a patrolman with spe-
cial training in long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities.550 This is why 
the badge depicting a spruce twig was adopted in 1962 as the training branch em-
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12.7.1960, T 25991/F 2, KA. PE:n no. 1750/Jvtsto/5 f 1/1.12.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA. 1.DE:n no. 
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ja joukkohenki, (‘Group cohesion and team spirit in Finnish paratroopers’), a pro gradu thesis from 
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blem of the paratroopers –a spruce twig being an obvious reference to forests, the 
operational area of Finnish guerrilla jaeger.551 
 
Large airborne operations in the European theatre during the Second World War, 
such as Operation ‘Market Garden ’ in the Netherlands in September 1944, demon-
strated the efficiency of paratroopers in warfare and in the transportation of large 
number of troops from one area to another.552 Paratrooper training became increas-
ingly common in many armies after the Second World War. Airborne troops were 
also more frequently used in wars waged throughout the 1950s.553 During the Con-
tinuation War, Finnish long-range patrol units under the direct control of General 
Headquarters had experimented with parachute drops but, for several reasons, the 
number of such drops had remained limited. Captain Keijo Ilkama, who served at 
the Air Force Headquarters, prepared a study while a student on intelligence course 
5 for officers in 1954, in which he proposed that ‘a guerrilla training centre ’be estab-
lished in the Air Force. This study by Captain Ilkama is an extremely interesting and 
highly detailed description of the methods by which training in parachute drops and 
guerrilla tactics could be arranged through close cooperation between the Air Force 
and the infantry.554 The study also bore surprising resemblance to the organisation, 
operations and training of the Parachute Jaeger School, which was founded in 1962.  
 
Ilkama’s proposal for combining guerrilla-type activities with parachute training, 
both necessary for long-range reconnaissance operations, was not the first of its 
kind. Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen had made a proposal in a memorandum 
submitted in 1951, which was practically identical to that of Ilkama’s and which 
contained an attachment entitled ‘a proposal for the arrangement of training in guerrilla-type 
activities and guerrilla warfare for tactical guerrilla leaders ’. Section VII of attachment 8 to 
Karhunen’s memorandum discussed training carried out in collaboration with the 
Air Force. It provided detailed calculations presented in hours for transport by air, 
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551 Ahokanto (2004), p. 13. The ‘guerrilla jaeger badge’, or the training branch emblem of a soldier 
who had undergone training in guerrilla-type activities, was adopted in the units of the Defence 
Forces providing training in guerrilla-style tactics on 16 November 1960. The border of this shield-
shaped emblem on a green background was initially embroidered in orange thread at the Frontier 
Guard and in grey at the Defence Force units. In 1962, the badge was standardised, with both the 
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picted on the badge – a spruce twig – is white. A spruce twig as a symbol in Finnish military herald-
ry dates back to the War of Independence. Laurla, Kari K.: Sotilasheraldiikka – liput, merkit ja tun-
nukset (‘Military heraldry – standards, insignia and emblems’), Kuopio 2003, p. 78 See also Ahokan-
to, Hannu – Vilkuna, Janne: Tunnukset ja traditiot, Punabaretit – Laskuvarjojääkärikoulu 1962–1996, 
(‘Emblems and traditions, the Red Berets– the Parachute Jaeger School 1962–1996’), 2nd revised 
edition, Hämeenlinna 2004, p. 232. 
552 See, for example, Market Garden, September 1944, ed. A. Korthals Altes – K. Margry – G. Thu-
ring – R. Voskuil, Department of Military History, Royal Netherlands Army, Amsterdam 2004. 
553 The French Army, for example, deployed airborne troops in the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 
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(‘Guerrilla-type activities in the Air Force, a study prepared on intelligence course 5 for officers in 
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for parachute training, for communication with the Air Force, and for organising a 
chain of supply with the aid of the Air Force.555 From this it can be concluded that 
Captain Keijo Ilkama had used the 1951 memorandum by Veikko Karhunen as 
background material for his study.  
 
In any event, Ilkama’s study can be directly linked to the fact that the Air Force 
Headquarters made a proposal in a confidential document dated 11 May 1955 to the 
Training Division of the General Headquarters that ‘provision of parachute training for 
conscripts be initiated ’. The Training Division sent the Air Force’s proposal to the In-
fantry Division, Mobilisation Division and Operations of the General Headquarters 
for comments. Comments received suggested that the provision of parachute train-
ing for conscripts was worth considering and merited further investigation. The Air 
Force Headquarters took advantage of the positive tone of the statements, sending a 
‘cursory calculation of the costs that parachute training would incur ’, dated 11 December 
1955, to the General Headquarters. In addition to a detailed calculation, the memo-
randum proposed that ‘in order to ensure that training would be put on track from the very be-
ginning, at least one officer should be sent to Sweden to attend the instructors’course at the Swedish 
paratrooper school or, alternatively, Sweden should be requested to send an instructor to provide 
training here.’556 All of this indicates that not only was there considerable interest in 
parachute operations combined with guerrilla tactics in the mid-1950s but also a 
clear need for such training. 
 
However, as the experience of paratrooper training in Finland of the 1950s was in-
sufficient for the initiation of a systematic parachute training, Finland looked abroad 
for lessons and examples. France provided the most natural opportunity to gain new 
influences, as it was a country that had specialised in airborne troops and had mili-
tary schools with which Finland had good relations. Another natural choice was 
Sweden, which had established a school specialising in paratrooper training known 
as Arméns Fallskärmsjägarskola (FJS) in 1952.557 The Finnish officers sent to France 
and Sweden, one to each country, brought back information on which Finnish para-
trooper training was founded.558 However, not until 1957 did that paratrooper train-
ing in Finland gain real impetus. That year Colonel Jorma Järventaus, adjutant gen-
eral and chief of training and education at the General Headquarters, visited FJS 
while visiting the Swedish Armed Forces. Järventaus was evidently familiar with the 
content of the documents and proposals drafted in 1955, as he asked the command-
er of the Swedish Armed Forces whether Finland could send officers to attend par-
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achute courses arranged by FJS. The Swedes responded officially by inviting two of-
ficers or, alternatively, one officer and one NCO, to attend a course to be arranged 
in 1958.559 
 
Captain Kaj Hagelberg, Commander of the 3rd Company, Jaeger Battalion 2, had 
repeatedly told to his colleagues over the years about his interest in attending a para-
chute course and, as no such courses were available in Finland, had on many occa-
sions raised the question of the need to have such training in Finland. The Infantry 
Division of the General Headquarters was clearly aware of Hagelberg’s interest and 
his proposals.560 The invitation from Sweden, Hagelberg’s interest, and the curiosity 
of the deputy of the Inspector of the infantry, Major General Arvi Kurenmaa led to 
Hagelberg being asekd whether he was willing to attend a course in Sweden. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Martti Hannila, Deputy of the Chief of the Training Division of the 
General Headquarters, asked Hagelberg about the issue as follows: ‘Since you have re-
peatedly talked about your interest in initiating parachute training in Finland, would you be pre-
pared to go to Sweden, in order to attend a parachute course, if we decided to send somebody there? ’
Apparently Hagelberg’s response left little room for interpretation, as he was sent to 
Sweden in May 1958, deemed to be the Finn who was best suited for attending a 
parachute course. Hagelberg spent a total of five weeks on various courses, gaining 
familiarity with parachute training at Arméns Fallskärmsjägarskola and attending 
such training. Hagelberg gathered a sizeable body of information on Swedish para-
chute training, preparing a detailed report on his experiences and compiling a mem-
orandum on the basis of his report that discussed the guidelines for corresponding 
training in Finland.561  
 
At about the same time, in 1957–1958, 1st Lieutenant Sami Sihvo had received or-
ders to attend an infantry course for officers arranged in France. This course began 
in autumn 1957 and was scheduled for completion in August 1958. The programme 
and teaching of this course was heavily influenced by the Algerian Crisis, which be-
gan in 1958 and which is why the training it provided was focused on anti-guerrilla 
operations. In 1958, Sami Sihvo had requested his commanding officers on the 
course about the possibility to complete a parachute training course in France. This 
is why Sihvo underwent a medical check-up, along with Frenchmen seeking admis-
sion to the parachute troops, including a fitness test in May 1958. Around the mid-
summer of 1958, the French officers on the course were sent to Algeria in order to 
participate in the war that was in progress there, which led to the termination of the 
course. As more than two months of the original course period remained, the non-
French officers were given an opportunity to complete their training at a French 
training centre of their choice. A French colleague of 1st Lieutenant Sihvo suggested 
that he take a parachute course at the Pau military base, schedules to be arranged be-
tween 7 June and 27 August 1958, a suggestion that was ideal with regard to the du-
ration of Sihvo’s secondment in France. Sihvo contacted Finland on the issue, ap-
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plying to the General Headquarters for a permission to participate, which was grant-
ed only one day before the commencement of the course.562  
 
In practice, the course that Sihvo attended was a basic course for paratrooper offic-
ers, arranged at the Pau training base for airborne troops, the French name of which 
was Base Ecole des Troupes Aéroporées. The content of the course was focused, accord-
ing to Sihvo, on ‘tactical issues ’; in other words, tactical combat training and jump in-
struction constituted the main portion of the programme. With regard to training in 
guerrilla tactics, the course focused on anti-guerrilla operations, in which training 
was given during the course. Sami Sihvo prepared a two-part, detailed memorandum 
on his secondment to France, emphasising the influences gained from abroad and 
their use in Finland. According to Sihvo, France was an interesting and useful coun-
try for Finland for a variety of reasons. With regarding to the Finnish art of war, the 
key aspects, in Sihvo’s assessment, were France’s Western orientation and the expe-
riences that this country at war had accumulated. ‘France is a country at war and in a po-
sition in which it needs to solve practical problems forced upon it. The French Army is not an army 
of a rich country, and cannot ignore the problems regarding training, supply, tactics and technology 
that we also face. French tactics, in the small scale at least, are very similar to ours.’563  
 
By the end of 1958, two Finnish officers, Captain Kaj Hagelberg and 1st Lieutenant 
Sami Sihvo, had, as if by chance, simultaneously received parachute training outside 
Finland, bringing home a host of valuable experiences. The General Headquarters 
took a deep interest in the detailed information and experiences in Hagelberg’s and 
Sihvo’s reports, prompting the Infantry Division to plan the initiation of para-
trooper training in Finland. Captain Jukka Suviniemi, posted at the Infantry Division 
of the General Headquarters, was ordered to draft guidelines for Finnish para-
trooper training. Suviniemi prepared his proposal in collaboration with Captain Kaj 
Hagelberg, leading to the organisation of Suviniemi’s proposal to be heavily in-
fluenced by Hagelberg’s memorandum entitled ‘Thoughts on initiating paratrooper trai-
ning in Finland ’.564  
 
On 31 Decembere 1959, the issue was presented to Lieutenant General Sakari Sime-
lius, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, who ordered a special Para-
trooper Training Committee to be set up to examine the issue. The objective set for the 
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committee was to formulate guidelines and foundations for the initiation of para-
trooper training in Finland as soon as possible. The committee was tasked to submit 
its report to the General Headquarters by 1 April 1960. Lieutenant Colonel Simo 
Sirkkanen (PE jv-os) was ordered to chair the committee; with Capatain Jukka Su-
viniemi (PE jv-os) functioning as its secretary and Colonel Olavi Valonen (PE hu-
olto-os), Lieutenant Colonel Martti Avela (RvE); Lieuenant Colonel Erkki Setälä 
(PE koul-os); Major Ermie Kanninen (PE op-os); Major Raimo Heiskanen (PE 
tarktsto); Captain Martti Suhonen (PE järj-os); and Captain Veli-Matti Siiskonen 
(IlmavE) being its ordinary members. Captain Kaj Hagelberg (UudjP) was ordered 
to act as an expert to the committee, without actually being one of its official mem-
bers. The committee held frequent meetings in early 1960, enabling it to complete 
its report by 21 March 1960.565  
 
The memorandum by the Parachute Training Committee and the proposals pre-
sented by it focused on a plan which aimed at giving a selected group of conscripts 
parachute jaeger training adapted to Finnish conditions, enabling them to be placed 
in wartime reconnaissance and guerrilla jaeger units. The training also aimed at 
maintaining the operational preparedness of personnel who had undergone para-
chute training and had been placed in the reserve, by providing them with refresher 
training and by developing collaboration between the various arms of the defence 
through putting in place fire support and flight task capability related to guerrilla-
type activities and reconnaissance operations. However, the committee saw no op-
portunities for training actual airborne troops. The report submitted by the commit-
tee stated that ‘the designation to be applied to soldiers who had undergone paratrooper training 
be paratrooper jaeger ’, which in itself is an apt description of Finnish training in long-
range reconnaissance tasks. Infantry tactics in the 1960s did not recognise actual 
special troops, with jaeger training being regarded as basic infantry training. For this 
reason, some commentators suggested that parachute training should only be re-
garded as a supplement to other basic training. The key proposal by the committee 
was the establishment of a paratrooper unit or school with a fixed operational mod-
el. Better than separate courses, such a unit would create the necessary prerequisites 
for the development of collaboration between the army and the air force –a neces-
sity for guerrilla-type activities –‘which require increased consideration as the scope of guerril-
la-type activities is expanding.’The report also highlighted the need for creating a com-
bat regulation for parachute troops, especially if parachute training was to be con-
tinued or extended. The committee noted that before a paratrooper school could be 
operational, its personnel should first be trained, all special equipment acquired and 
a location suitable for training identified.566 
 
Following the proposal by the Parachute Training Committee, the first experimental 
parachute course in Finland was arranged in Utti between 11 July and 13 August 
1960, in collaboration between the Air Force Headquarters and the Karelia Air 
Command. Captain Kaj Hagelberg acted as the commander of the course, with 1st 
Lieutenant Sami Sihvo being his deputy. From among 300 applicants, a total of 12 
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Training Commttee’), UtJR:n perinnearkisto. See also Solasaari (2004), pp. 23–33. 
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officers and NCOs representing the Defence Forces and three NCO the Frontier 
Guard were selected. As two individuals who had been selected for the course failed 
to attend the course, a total of 13 individuals completed the course successfully. In 
the autumn of 1960, between 3 and 4 October, a refresher course was arranged for 
the same personnel in Utti. By 1961, Finnish parachute training was already in full 
swing. The first course for parachute training instructors was arranged in summer 
1961, followed by the second parachute course for professional officers and NCOs 
between 26 and 29 July, a training event for Air Force cadets held between 3 July 
and 8 July, and the first parachute course for conscripts between 31 July and 2 Sep-
tember 1961 and the second between 4 September and 7 October 1961.567  
 
While the experiences gained from the courses arranged for career personnel and 
conscripts in 1960 and 1961 were positive, the objectives to be set for the training 
and their link to wartime operations were still in their infancy. However, no factors 
speaking against the establishment of a paratrooper school were identified on the 
experimental courses. At around the same time, with the General Headquarters 
drafting the principles for territorial defence which included training in guerrilla-type 
activities, the planners also regarded paratrooper training as necessary for ensuring 
the reconnaissance and long-range patrolling capabilities of guerrilla troops which 
were directly under control of the High Command. This aspect was highlighted not 
only by the members of the Parachute Training Committee but also Major Kaj 
Hagelberg and Captain Sami Sihvo, who had participated in the planning.568 After a 
circuitous process, following planning and experimentation spanning several years, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces approved at a presentation held on 
26 October 1961 that the Parachute Jaeger School be established in an experimental 
composition in Utti under the command of the 3rd Division, initiating its operations 
as of 1 February 1962.569  
 
Training provided to conscripts at the Parachute Jaeger School (LjK) was divided 
from the very beginning into a basic training period, an NCO and jump training pe-
riod, and a specialisation period. The training programme also included two live 
ammunition exercises and, from 1963 onwards, a two-week exercise in Lapland 
aimed at providing conscripts with experience in jumping and guerrilla-type ac-
tivities under wintry conditions. As its name suggests, the focus of training was on 
paratrooper training, comprising jump, guerrilla tactics and reconnaissance training. 
Although guerrilla-type and reconnaissance activities followed fairly established pat-
terns in the Defence Forces and Frontier Guard in the early 1960s, the guerrilla-style 
aspects of the newly-established paratrooper training were still undergoing their 
formation processes. Practical training was also hampered by the partially outdated 
content of infantry regulations on combat, reconnaissance and guerrilla training in 
effect at the time. This is why the personnel at LjK were forced to create ope-

567 Ibid. See also Varusmiesten laskuvarjohyppykurssi 1 (‘Parachute course for conscripts number 1’), 
31.7.–2.9.1961, Orivesi 2011, pp. 8–15. 
568 Solasaari (2004), pp. 33–37. Sihvo, Sami: An interview conducted on 23 October 2013. See also 
Suominen (2012), p. 118. 
569 PE:n no. 1746/Jvtsto/12 h/26.10.1961, T 25094/F 9 sal, KA. Note. Kaj Hagelberg was pro-
moted to the rank of Major in 1960, and Sami Sihvo to Captain in 1961. 
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rational models for guerrilla and reconnaissance activities by themselves or shape 
such models on the basis of experimentation.570  
 
Sami Sihvo confirmed in his interview that the training given in guerrilla-type activi-
ties at LjK between 1962 and 1964 was based to a high degree on instructors’per-
sonal experiences and views on guerrilla-type activities. Neither was any appreciable 
advantage taken of the skills and experience of the Frontier Guard personnel in 
guerrilla training, although small-scale collaboration with the Frontier Guards locat-
ed closest to Utti was practised on occasion, especially in connection with manoeu-
vres. Sihvo also said that one factor that might have contributed to the foundation 
of LjK was the army leadership’s desire to establish a separate unit, dedicated to 
guerrilla-style and reconnaissance activities, within the Defence Forces.571 However, 
LjK was increasingly providing and developing training in guerrilla-type activities. 
For example, the training plan for 1963 included approximately 200 hours of train-
ing in guerrilla-style activities, which represents less than 10 per cent of the total 
hours dedicated to training. Although several hours had been reserved for theory 
and practice of guerrilla-type activities, their number was regarded as too small from 
the very beginning, compared with the targets set for training. By comparison, in the 
1970s, LjK dedicated more than 400 hours to training in guerrilla-type activities, 
which corresponded to around 25 per cent of the total of training hours. Training 
on the first paratrooper course was initiated at short notice and with limited re-
sources, causing instruction to be characterised by improvisation.572 
 
Insufficient guidelines for guerrilla and reconnaissance activities in particular led to a 
situation in which paratroopers were used just as any airborne troops in manoeuvres 
and combat exercises arranged in 1963 and 1964. The Operations and Training Di-
visions of the General Headquarters believed that this trend was attributable to un-
confirmed training instructions and the unclear wartime role of paratroopers, 
prompting them to address the issue as soon as possible. At a presentation of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, held in November 1964, the wartime 
duties of paratroopers and the operational concepts derived from such duties were 
confirmed to be ‘long-range patrolling and special reconnaissance operations deep in the enemy’s 
rear, special tasks and the provision of support to general guerrilla operations and, in exceptional 
cases, actual guerrilla-type activities  ’. The justifications for the presentation emphasised 
the fact that the ‘usage doctrine’of paratroopers at wartime could possibly not follow 
the principles of use applied by great powers to their paratroopers. At the same 
presentation, two guidelines were confirmed. The first was ‘permanent tactical training 
guidelines ’ for paratrooper training, according to which the emphasis of training 
should be placed on paratroopers’wartime functions in the order of importance sta-
ted above; while the second guideline concerned general guidelines for the use of 
LjK’s troops in war exercises. Conscripts undergone paratrooper training were to be 

570 Reiman, Kalevi: Koulutuksen järjestelyt 1960-luvulla, Punabaretit – Laskuvarjojääkärikoulu 1962–1996, 
(‘Arrangements in the 1960s, the Red Berets – the Parachute Jaeger School 1962–1996’), 2nd revi-
sed edition, Hämeenlinna 2004, pp. 72–76. Laskuvarjojääkärikoulun koulutuskäsky no. 2/1963 
no:tta 2.5.1963, UtJR:n perinnearkisto. 
571 Sihvo, Sami: An interview conducted on 23 October 2013. 
572 Ibid. Reiman (2004), pp. 78–79. See also Kajosmaa (2011), p. 22, SK/1249, the Department of 
Military History at the National Defence University. 
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placed primarily in the reconnaissance battalion which was under the direct control 
of the High Command, and, secondly, in the case of surplus men, in guerrilla jaeger 
units directly under the High Command.573   
 
A pronounced change in the guerrilla training provided by the Parachute Jaeger 
School took place over the course of 1967 when Captain Olavi Jokela acted as the 
Commander of the Paratrooper Company. Acting in collaboration with the lea-
dership of the School, Captain Jokela harmonised the School’s training plans with 
the policy statements issued by the General Headquarters, effectively giving guerrilla 
training a more central role in the training plan. In practical terms, this translated in-
to a reduction in the number of hours dedicated to close combat skills in favour of 
guerrilla and reconnaissance training to be carried out during conscripts’NCO and 
jump training and specialisation periods.574 
 
Paratroopers’training can be said, with justification, to have been one of the links in 
the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activities. On the one hand, Finnish offic-
ers looked abroad for models; on the other hand, they tapped into strong national 
traditions in guerrilla-type activities. The experiences that Kaj Hagelberg and Sami 
Sihvo had gathered abroad played a key role in the planning and initiation of Finnish 
parachute training. The establishment of the Parachute Jaeger School in 1962 and 
the ensuing period were characterised by continuous interaction between experi-
mentation and development in the field of guerrilla training and guerrilla-type activi-
ties. Although the training programmes, training plans and the focus of training var-
ied, training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla skills made slow progress as LjK 
was gaining experience. By the late 1960s, the Parachute Jaeger School had over-
come the most difficult problems, bringing training in guerrilla-type activities to a 
high standard.  
 
 
Veikko Koppinen – a man with ideas for guerrilla-type activities and the fa-
ther of ‘Exploding Wilderness’  
 
Veikko Koppinen is frequently referred to as a man with ideas for guerrilla-type acti-
vities and guerrilla warfare and an innovative developer of such tactics. However, 
Koppinen’s career and persona tell us about his involvement in Finnish guerrilla-
type activities a great deal more than mere articles or preparatory documents could 
do. This is why Koppinen’s personal history deserves a discussion that goes deeper 
than that of most of the other individuals referred to in this context.  
 
Veikko William Koppinen was born to a merchant family on 31 March 1910 in Mul-
tia, which is a municipality located in central Finland, at the southern tip of Suo-
menselkä, a drainage divide crossing western Finland, 60 kilometres from Jyväskylä. 
Koppinen initiated his involvement with Finland’s national defence while he was 
still a student at the Haapamäki co-educational school, enrolling in the school’s Civil 
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573 PE:n no. 709/Optsto/11 sal/2.11.1964 (esittely puolustusvoimain komentajalle) (‘A proposal for the 
commander of the Defence Forces’), T 26965/F 32 sal, KA. 
574 Reiman (2004), p. 87. 
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Guard which provided him with a modicum of military training and experience dur-
ing his formative years between 1924 and 1929.575  
 
After reaching conscription age, Veikko Koppinen started his military service in the 
Finnish White Guard in 1929. Evidently the experiences that Koppinen had gained 
in the ranks of the Civil Guard and his personal inclination towards being a woods-
man caused him to take a decision to apply for a study place at the Finnish Military 
Academy, located at the time in Munkkiniemi, Helsinki. Between 1930 and 1932, 
Koppinen was a student on a cadet course, after which he initiated his career serving 
for the Second Machine Gun Company of the Karelia Guard Regiment in his capac-
ity as junior officer. Koppinen’s competence and skills accelerated his career to 
more demanding tasks in the office of inspector of the infantry at the General Staff 
between 1935 and 1939.576  
 
During the extra refresher training of the troops arranged before the outbreak of the 
Winter War (Finnish literature normally refers to the extra refresher training by its 
Finnish abbreviation ‘YH’; this exercise, in effect, was a covert mobilisation), Kop-
pinen acted as the commander of a mortar company in the organisation of Infantry 
Regiment 33 placed under the 11th Division.577 After the Winter War, during what 
is known as the Interim Peace, Koppinen remained in the services, first acting as the 
adjutant of the Infantry Regiment 6 and then as the commander of the mortar com-
pany in the 2nd brigade. In the early stages of the Continuation War, Koppinen 
continued in his post as the commander of a mortar company at the Infantry Regi-
ment 23 of the 5th Division in the VI Army Corps of the Karelian Army In Febru-
ary 1942, he was transferred to the 11th Division under the VI Army Corps, where 
he became the chief of the Operations office of the Division Headquarters. During 
the period of static warfare between 1942 and 1944, Koppinen acted as the chief of 
the Intelligence Office of the Division Headquarters of the 11th Division of the VI 
Army Corps, and as a desk officer at the Staff of the Senior Inspector of War 
Schools. In the summer of 1944, during a phase when the Finnish army was fighting 
defensive battles, Koppinen temporarily held the post of the chief of staff in the 
11th Division during the days when the massive Tali-Ihantala battle was being 
waged, and as the chief of staff of Group Puroma in the Lapland War between 1944 
and 1945.578 Against this background it can be safely said that Veikko Koppinen 
gained a wealth of versatile and colourful, albeit burdensome, experiences during the 
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575 Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA. Itsenäisen Suomen 
Kenraalikunta 1918–1996, (‘Officers with the rank of General of independent Finland between 1918 
and 1995’), bibliographies, edited by Rauno Lipponen, Porvoo 1997, pp. 199–200. 
576 Ibid. While the inspector or the infantry and his office were under the direct control of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, they were part of the organisation of the General 
Staff. The office of the inspector of the infantry was tasked with assisting the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Defence Forces and to develop the activities, training and organisation of the infantry. See, 
for example, Virkki, Eino: Sotalaitosoppi II osa (‘A doctrine regarding the military system, Part II’), 
Helsinki 1936, pp. 178–179. 
577 As of 1 January 1940, the 2nd Division. 
578 Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA. Itsenäisen Suomen 
Kenraalikunta 1918–1996, (‘Officers with the rank of General of independent Finland between 1918 
and 1995’), bibliographies, edited by Rauno Lipponen, Porvoo 1997, pp. 199–200. 
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war, which certainly played a role in the descriptions of the events that he presented 
in ‘Exploding Wilderness’. 
 
During his postwar years, from 1945 onwards, Koppinen served at the office of the 
inspector of the infantry, working with tasks related to infantry technology and 
studying later at the National General Staff College. After graduating, Koppinen 
taught operational skills and tactics at the National General Staff College until 1949. 
He obtained his first commander post at the II Battalion of Infantry Regiment 6, a 
position which he held between 1949 and 1950. Between 1950 and 1952, Koppinen 
acted as the chief of staff in the military province of south-western Finland.579  
 
Between 1 December and 8 November 1957, Koppinen acted as an aide to the chief 
of the Army Combat School. Sissikoulutusopas, Sissiohjesääntö (‘Handbook in guerrilla 
training and Regulation for guerrilla-type activities’, respectively), several articles 
and, most likely, the manuscript for a novel bearing the title Räjähtävä tyhjyys (‘Ex-
ploding wilderness’) –the circumstances around its coming into being will probably 
remain unclear for ever – date back to this period that Koppinen spent on the 
shores Tuusulanjärvi. After his stint at the Army Combat School, he was appointed 
deputy of the National General Staff College. After his stint as an assistant to the 
chief of the National General Staff College, Koppinen took up a post as the deputy 
chief of the General Staff, after which he became aide to the chief of the Frontier 
Guards in 1965.580 After holding the assistant’s post for a year, Veikko Koppinen 
was appointed chief of the Frontier Guards, which, at the time, was the highest po-
sition in the Frontier Guard. Koppinen resigned his post as the chief of the Frontier 
Guards after reaching the statutory age on 31 March 1970.581 Veikko Koppinen 
achieved the rank of Lieutenant General, which is an indication of high personal ca-
pabilities as an officer. 
 
Vaikko Koppinen was later called –humorously –‘Finland’s Che Guevara.’582 Howev-
er, Koppinen was no theorist for a revolutionary struggle for freedom; rather, he 
was an open-minded and dyed-in-the-wool advocate of unconventional forms of 
fighting, tactics and methods of combat.583 His contemporaries nicknamed him Ah-
ma-Koppinen (‘Koppinen the Wolverine Man’), Sissi-Koppinen (‘Koppinen the Guerrilla 

579 Ibid. 
580 Koppinen’s appointment to the position of the assistant of the chief of the Frontier Guards was 
backed by the Commander -in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelius. He refers to 
the issue in his memoirs: ‘With regard to the plans on general appointments at the armed at the end of year 
(1964), it should be mentioned that as the assistant to the chief of the Frontier Guards, Lieutenant General Veikko 
Karhunen, was approaching the statutory retirement age, I proposed to the President of the Republic at the next cabi-
net presentations that Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen be appointed Karhunen’s successor. Koppinen could 
later be appointed the chief of the Frontier Guards, succeeding Lieutenant General Antti Pennanen in this post. 
With regard to his character and interests, I found him highly suited for this post. This plan was effected later, in the 
way I had proposed.’ Simelius (1983), pp. 225–226. 
581 Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA. Itsenäisen Suomen 
Kenraalikunta 1918–1996, (‘Officers with the rank of General of independent Finland between 1918 
and 1995’), bibliographies, edited by Rauno Lipponen, Porvoo 1997, pp. 199–200. 
582 Palmén, Niilo: An interview on 19 March 2007. 
583 Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013. Roudasmaa, Stig: An interview on 6 February 
2008. Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. Setälä, Erkki: An interview 13 June 2006. 
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Jaeger’) and Raja-Koppinen (‘Koppinen the Border Patroller’). Such nicknames pro-
vide an apt description of the various phases of Koppinen’s life, interests and career. 
Koppinen also made himself a guinea pig for his ideas. Starting in the early 1950s 
and continuing well into his retirement, Koppinen spent every spring on the trail on 
skis in Lapland, bringing elements of guerrilla-style fieldcraft and survivalism to his 
trips. In the early years of his trips, when the hunting of predators was still legal, 
Koppinen often brought home wolverine pelts from Lapland; these pelts then made 
a bed for his dog that accompanied him on his trips. Sissi-Koppinen developed guerril-
la tactics and warfare, Raja-Koppinen was the chief of the Frontier Guard, and Ahma-
Koppinen hunted and explored the outdoors. Whenever possible, he sought to com-
bine business with pleasure, conducting his inspections of Frontier Guard stations 
by skiing.584 
 
Koppinen was a nature enthusiast, heart and soul. At his holiday cottage in Multia, 
he was free to hone his fieldcraft skills, and to fish and hike in the outdoors. In Mul-
tia he also developed prototypes for simple equipment, suitable for guerrilla-style ac-
tivities. Such equipment included a tarp made of plastic, capable of being turned at a 
moment’s notice into a boat carrying one man; a pyramid-shaped tarp –‘nippa ’–
made of impermeable fabric, capable of being pitched by tying its top part to the 
top of a young bent birch tree; a sleeping bag made of kraft paper; experiments with 
snow caves, and so on.585 Koppinen argued that a paper sleeping bag was ideally 
suited for guerrilla-type activities, as the occupant could always escape, even if the 
bag caught fire in a campfire. He also experimented with issues related to food sup-
ply and surviving in the field. Koppinen’s normal experiments included air-curing 
roach strung on a cord, and various methods of cooking in the field. Koppinen’s 
daughter often rowed his boat, accompanied him on overnight trips to some island, 
or sat in a sledge in wintertime to provide ballast when Koppinen was training his 
dog to pull a sled. 586  
 
Despite his image of being a craggy-faced professional officer, Koppinen was a lov-
ing father and a sensitive poet. Among other things, he kept in close contact with 
his family by letter during the war. His letters were characterised by an optimistic 
tone; they were openly sensitive, and many of them were concluded by a brief poem 
or a stanza.587 Looking back to his father, Kaiju Kallio, Veikko Koppinen’s daugh-
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584 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007. 
585 See, for example, Lumimaja ja sen rakentamisohjeet (‘A snow cave and how to build one’), an un-
dated memorandum by Veikko Koppinen, Veikko Koppinen’s private collection; a copy of the 
memorandum is in the possession of the author of this thesis. SKK:n no.tta 9.4.1959 (ma-
joituskokeilu) (‘An experiment with accommodation in the field’), Veikko Koppinen’s private collec-
tion; a copy is in the possession of the author of this thesis. SKK:n no. 371/8/5.5.1960 (lu-
mimajakokeilu) (‘An experiment with a snow cave’), T 25991/Ea 1, KA. K-SRE:n no. 864/II/ 
8/13.4.1960, T 25991/Ea 1, KA. LR:n no. 845/II/8 b/17.3.1960, T 25991/Ea 1, KA. RvE:n no. 
13/X/sal/22.1.1960 (kuuntelutiedusteluvälineiden käyttö sissikoulutuksessa) (‘Listening equipment in the 
training of guerrilla-type activities’), RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential docu-
ment and a confidential archive’) identifier F 11 sal (research permit obtained). 
586 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007. 
587 Mun kaunis kultaseni! Vanhempieni Veikko ja Martta Koppisen rintamakirjeitä vuosilta 1941–1945 
(‘Letters to and from the front covering the years of 1941–1945 , by my parents Veikko and Martta 
Koppinen’), edited by Kaiju Kallio, Porvoo 2009. 
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ter, said: ‘While other fathers, returning home from army exercises in Rovajärvi, brought their 
daughters dolls wearing the traditional dress of the indigenous Sami people, my father brought me a 
traditional Sami knife, and I didn’t see anything odd in this. Indeed, returning home with a bou-
quet in his hand would definitively not have been Koppinen’s style. Instead, he would cheer up his 
nearest and dearest by composing poems which he was able to write for just about any occasion. 
There are countless numbers of them: poems dating back to the war years, written for his wife to al-
leviate the feelings of longing; poems for his newly-born daughter; poems taking on a narrative form; 
poems written by way of thanking a hostess of a party; brief poems for Christmas cards, and so 
forth. Even today it is possible to find a piece of paper, stuck between the pages of a book, on which 
Koppinen had jotted down a number of rhyming lines. For his grandchildren Koppinen wrote fairy 
tales with motifs taken from the animal kingdom. For festive occasions, he rerhymed songs which he 
then proceeded to perform himself – after he first had taught the accompanist the melody of the 
song.’588  
 
Poems written by Veikko Koppinen can still be found at many of the Frontier 
Guard wilderness cabins. For example, the following poem had been carved with a 
knife into the wooden covers of a guest book, found in the headquarters hut in the 
Hiienvaara exercise area in North Karelia: Rajalle polku vie, majalle vie sen tie, rannalle 
lampareen, välkkyvän veen. Vieritse vaarojen, ylitse jänkien. Sinne käy rajamies, sinne se polku 
vie. 
  
“The path leads to the border,  
To the hut to carry out his order,  
To the edge of the pond  
Its waters and beyond.  
Over tree-covered hills and swamps.  
Patrolling the landscape that’s broader ’  
(Translation by Robin Maylett)589 
 
 Koppinen was an active writer and a skilled penman. He wrote all his life. In the 
1950s, he contributed to Metsästys ja kalastus – a Finnish magazine specialising in 
sport fishing and hunting –almost on an annual basis. Later, he shifted his attention 
to articles published in trade magazines and, after he retired from active service, 
even to letters to the editor. For Koppinen, maintaining his physical condition was a 
matter of honour. When he turned 50, his colleagues presented him with an archery 
bow. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a better present for a guerrilla commander. 
Archery turned into a beloved hobby for him, and he even became a competitive 
archer. When his near vision began to fail him, he had to shift to a class based on 
instinctive aiming. In the late 1960s, he supplemented skiing with walking. He spent 
his retirement in Tapiola, Espoo A couple of hours after the first snow had fallen in 
Espoo, a lone man would appear on a meadow in Otsolahti, opening a track with 
his long skis in the newly-fallen snow.590 
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588 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007. 
589 The guest book at Hiienvaara, with a poem by V. Koppinen carved into its cover; an observation 
made by the author of this thesis. 
590 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007. 
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Veikko Koppinen’s thoughts on the utilisation of the methods of guerrilla warfare 
were largely based on his personal views regarding the means available to Finland to 
defend itself in a cost-effective manner, although, from a military point of view –
availability and quality of materiel –Finland had increasingly limited resources to de-
fend its territory against an enemy with superior strength. The issue can be present-
ed by drawing a simple conclusion: Veikko Koppinen had an unprejudiced belief in 
the methods of guerrilla warfare and their applicability under Finnish conditions, 
without getting stuck in old patterns. However, handbooks and regulations needed 
to be, after they had been confirmed, sufficiently clear and simple, enabling the ex-
amples in them, when applied to practice to be presented in the form of a simple list 
of instructions. It is very likely that Koppinen’s need to vent his ideas in the form of 
a manuscript for a novel was guided by his orders to write a handbook covering 
training in guerrilla-type activities and a separate regulation for guerrilla-type activi-
ties. These were the premises for the novel Räjähtävä tyhjyys, authored by Koppinen. 
 
The period when Räjähtävä tyhjyys was written and the circumstances around its com-
ing into existence can be regarded an as yet unsolved mystery, as the original manu-
script, written under the pseudonym of Viljami Korpi, is undated and bears no sig-
nature. Many interpretations of this book’s coming into being conclude that Koppi-
nen wrote his book in 1960 or perhaps even later.591 As Koppinen’s novel is known 
to have been reviewed by the General Headquarters in 1960592 and 1961593, for this 
reason alone the manuscript, in excess of 200 pages, must have been at an advance 
stage by 1960.  
 
An examination and comparison of Räjähtävä tyhjyys, Veikko Koppinen’s career, his 
personal profile, literary production and articles on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-
type activities unequivocally suggest that the book was written during the 1950s. 
Although the exact time of the writing of the book will probably remain a mystery 
for ever, it can be concluded that Veikko Koppinen began his novel as a kind of 
background process while he was working on Sissikoulutusopas (1956) and Sissioh-
jesääntö (1957), and had completed it after the handbooks and regulations were fin-
ished by the end of the 1950s. Both handbooks contain almost identical sentences 
and phrases as Räjähtävä tyhjyys, and both books emphasise the same issues as Kop-
pinen’s novel.594  
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591 Cf. Visuri (1994), p. 170. Visuri (2010), p. 53. Tiilikainen, Heikki: Räjähtävä tyhjyys – Kenraalin kirja 
kiellettiin! (‘Exploding wilderness – General’s book was banned!’), Suomen Sotilas 4/1993, pp. 6–7. 
592 The Chief of the General Staff of the General Headquarters, T. V. Viljanen, entered a note in 
the margin of his memorandum dated 1 June 1960, referring to Veikko Koppinen’s proposal re-
garding the adoption of the methods of guerrilla warfare and, indirectly, to Räjähtävä tyhjyys. ‘Dis-
cussed the issue with Col. Koppinen on 7 September.’ A hand-written memorandum by T. V. Viljanen, dat-
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Fairly irrefutable proof of the fact that Räjähtävä tyhjyys was written in the early 1950s 
can be found in Veikko Koppinen’s private collection. While holding the post of as-
sistant to the chief of the Army Combat School, Koppinen prepared a memoran-
dum in 1956 in which he described guerrilla-type activities and the opportunities for 
them in connection with the various forms of fighting. This four-page memoran-
dum is a summary of the key ideas in Räjähtävä tyhjyys. In his memorandum, Koppi-
nen discussed clandestine, brief and lengthy guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla 
warfare in exactly the same way as he does in in Räjähtävä tyhjyys. ‘As the future war will 
be more difficult than the previous one, all available means must be committed to fighting in order 
to improve our efficiency. In guerrilla-type activities, an individual solder represents efficiency that is 
superior by a huge factor compared to that of a fighter on the front line.’595  
 
What were the objectives that Räjähtävä tyhjyys sought to achieve, and what was its 
target audience? Over the course of the 1950s, a great number of books known as 
boys’ adventure books were published. In such books, boys, who were generally 
scouts, cracked cases involving crime and espionage. A strong patriotic spirit, strict 
adherence to the ethical principles of warfare, chivalrous treatment of the enemy, 
and a happy ending suggest that Räjähtävä tyhjyys was intended for a young rea-
dership who, in addition to enjoying an adventure story, would also learn useful 
skills. The fairly pedagogical approach of the book lends credibility to this interpre-
tation. Koppinen’s boyish character, prone to engaging in adventure –coupled with 
his wartime experiences –enabled him to write instructions that were strategic in 
nature, while on other occasions they provided highly detailed instructions for dig-
ging a foxhole or clearing a mine field.  
 
The author of the novel, supposedly a certain ‘Viljami Korpi’, also reflected the 
charismatic character of the real author, Veikko Koppinen.596 By resorting to a 
pseudonym and by making the protagonist of the book, Colonel Savukorpi, his 
mouthpiece, Koppinen, using colourful language, puts forth his thoughts on the 
opportunities open to guerrilla war. ‘The exploding wilderness was Colonel Savukorpi’s fa-
vourite phrase, which he used with great success when giving tactical instructions to his subordinate 
guerrilla district commanders at the time when leaders of guerrilla warfare, ranging from patrol 
leaders to regional commanders, were receiving refresher training. It is impossible to fight a void; you 
cannot shell it with artillery fire; you cannot fire at it using automatic weapons; and you cannot 
launch rockets on it from the air. ‘To the enemy, the exploding wilderness spells deception and play-
ing with the wrong cards, something which deprives him of confidence and courage and renders years 
of training worthless which has always been based on five words: enemy over there, engage him! In a 
guerrilla war, this foundation would be missing.’It will be displaced by a completely new situation, 
which is: The enemy will see you; just try it – if you take ten steps in any direction, you will be 
killed; so, stay put, wondering if you will live on for the duration of just one more cigarette. Talking 
like this and writing like this, Colonel Savukorpi made the eyes of his trainees shine with enthusi-
asm and the number of volunteers reporting for service grow exponentially. Around a nucleus 
formed by three hundred officers and seven thousand patrol leaders, he gathered a guerrilla army of 
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nearly 30,000, comprising under-age and over-age volunteers, who, on a certain September day, ral-
lied at 150 places of assembly, received their weapons and equipment, cached them, and, on the 
next day, turned hundreds of square kilometres of Finnish countryside into an exploding wilder-
ness. The first enemy unit to get a taste of this was an airborne division that had invaded an area 
near Mikkeli.’597  
 
Koppinen’s novel was never published as its publication was strictly forbidden by 
the top military leadership.598 Over the years, a whole host of interpretations and 
theories have been proposed for the publication ban. Pekka Visuri, among others, 
has argued that the ban was laid down by the General Headquarters. According to 
Visuri, Lieutenant General T.V. Viljanen had, in a review that he had written in the 
summer of 1960 of a document entitled Sissisotamenetelmä, (‘A method for waging 
guerrilla war’) written by Koppinen, put forth a dissenting opinion; however, 
Viljanen probably referred to the novel manuscript entitled Räjähtävä tyhjyys. It is true 
that Veikko Koppinen drafted a document entitled Sissisotamenetelmä, (‘A method for 
waging guerrilla war’), dated 1 June 1960, but, as it was labelled confidential, its pub-
lication would have been impossible for that reason alone. Heikki Tiilikainen and 
Ermei Kanninen have also commented on the reasons behind the publication ban. 
According to Heikki Tiilikainen, the publication ban was motivated by a desire to 
avoid any references to and any provocations against the Soviet Union, a behaviour 
typical of the era or, alternatively, by the fact that the idea that Koppinen had pre-
sented was too brilliant, prompting the Defence Forces to investigate it in peace 
without drawing attention to it. ‘It is also possible that the oyster contained a pearl –and they 
wanted to keep quiet about it.’599 Ermei Kanninen, who had acted as the secretary of the 
Guerrilla Tactics Committee and who was well familiar with Räjähtävä tyhjyys, com-
mented on the publication ban in similar terms. ‘Being a high-ranking officer, he (Koppi-
nen) must have understood why his book was banned. He naturally felt sorry for having hit too 
close to the target. Thus, there was no actual need to ban the book. However, the decision was un-
ambiguous: the book could not be published.’600  
 
The Chief of the General Staff of the General Headquarters, T.V. Viljanen, entered 
a review-like statement regarding Räjähtävä tyhjyys in a memorandum dated 1 June 
1960. ‘The novel by Colonel Koppinen is based on the presumption that the adversary would act in 
a highly chivalrous manner, that a vast supply of provisions could be cached, etc. He assumes the 
war would last only a few months (around nine). In reality, the adversary may displace the entire 
population, burn the houses, and shoot the men in order to pacify the Finnish territory over the 
course of one to two years. Would that be the right policy for Finland under the current circum-
stances? Instead of a guerrilla war, I recommend the deployment of guerrilla troops in support of the 
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field army, not as its substitute.’601 Quite evidently T.V. Viljanen proposed to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Sakari Simelius, that the book remained 
unpublished, prompting Simelius to take a decision on the awkward issue in spring 
1961 and even enter a note on it in his journal.602 Deemed to be too politically sensi-
tive, running counter to the political climate of the time, and constituting a provoca-
tion against the Soviet Union, the manuscript of Colonel Koppinen’s manuscript 
was locked away in archives for decades. In any event, the book is interesting and 
provides, through its examples, an in-depth insight into the contemporary guerrilla 
warfare and guerrilla-type activities. Räjähtävä tyhjyys constituted a bold proposal and 
a catalyst that summed up the needs for a change that many sections of the Defence 
Forces felt to be necessary, including the associated fragmental ideas, and encapsu-
lated them in a crystal-clear doctrine. 
 
Koppinen was an eternal optimist and was steadfastly loyal. He did not worry about 
anything beforehand and did not let setbacks discourage him. Loyalty is reflected in 
his firm belief in the grounds for national defence. He was always loyal to his supe-
riors, one indication of which is the fact that he submitted Räjähtävä tyhjyys to the 
General Headquarters for review. After receiving a refusal of publication permis-
sion, he –the loyal officer that he was –left his manuscript to gather dust on a shelf 
for more than 50 years, with not even his children being aware of it.603 Guerrilla tac-
tics, fieldcraft and life in the field were more than just part of a soldier’s work for 
Koppinen; for him, they were his mission in life. An analysis of the internal connec-
tion between facts reveals that Koppinen’s enormous contribution to the creation, 
development and establishment of Finnish-style guerrilla tactics cannot be over-
looked. Veikko Koppinen was an officer with ideas well ahead of his time and one 
who stood by his moral compass in a manner that sets an example for many people 
of our time. 
 
However, other interpretations were also proposed. According to contemporary tes-
timonies, Koppinen was also criticised, especially in the early 1950s, with harsh 
words for putting forth ‘fooleries of backwoodsmen at the expense of the common people.’
Lieutenant General Erkki Setälä, who had known Veikko Koppinen well, told the 
author of this thesis in an interview that he frequently heard certain officers at the 
General Headquarters –whose names are to be left unmentioned –openly laughing 
at Koppinen’s ideas regarding guerrilla-type activities, and directing harsh criticism 
at his plans and far-reaching experiments. Juhani Ruutu, who had served at the Op-
erations Division of the General Headquarters, also confirmed this.604  
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The General Headquarters issued guidelines with the aim of suppressing and even 
avoiding the public use of the concept of ‘exploding wilderness ’, which Koppinen had 
introduced in his novel. ‘Exploding wilderness’, set in the Tuohikotti wilderness ar-
ea in the northern part of present-day Kouvola, was in the General Headquarters’
view excessively provocative, as it presented a train of events that hinted all too 
openly at a military threat from the Soviet Union. While Koppinen’s ideas were ini-
tially regarded as grotesque myth-making based on chivalrous stories – a form of 
wilderness romance in fact –his theoretical ideas nevertheless resonated with the 
planners of Finnish defence and were integrated into the territorial defence system 
and, in particular, the local defence system.605 
 
Scholarly examination of the issue unquestionably shows that Veikko Koppinen was 
one of the strongest contributors to and leading theorists of guerrilla-style tactics as 
well as a key innovator in the early stages of the development of such tactics in Fin-
land; indeed, issues related to guerrilla activities appeared to have been a sort of phi-
losophy of life to him. On the other hand, Koppinen’s colleagues gave credit to him 
for his open-mindedness and courage, a testimony to which is his long and success-
ful career. The younger officer generation in Finland in particular quickly adopted 
his ideas, showing less prejudice than their senior colleagues. Despite the publishing 
ban, Räjähtävä tyhjyys circulated within the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard in 
the form of a scanned handout, being a kind of public secret, and as such it has sur-
vived to our day. Even unpublished, Räjähtävä tyhjyys can be said to have exerted 
strong influence, as based on it and a proposal by Koppinen, entitled Sissisotame-
netelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’), a specific committee was established 
to look into methods available to guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.  
 
 
A Guerrilla Tactics Committee is set up to investigate the proposals made by 
Koppinen and his Räjähtävä tyhjyys 
 
By the early 1960s, high-flying ideas for the methods of guerrilla warfare, theoretical 
thinking, published texts increasingly open in tone, completed regulations, and the 
provision of training in guerrilla tactics that were in the process of becoming an es-
tablished form of warfare, had all grown into a complex system that required more 
systematic measures in order to be manageable. At the time, the highest-ranking of-
ficers of the Defence Forces were paying increased attention to the teaching and 
training of the methods of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. 
 
While holding the post of aide to the chief of the National General Staff College, 
Colonel Veikko Koppinen drafted a secret report on guerrilla warfare, entitled Sis-
sisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’), in which he made a number of 
proposals for consideration by the General Headquarters. Well aware of the current 
circumstances and the shortage in materiel that plagued the Defence Forces, Kop-
pinen justified his proposal by the efficiency of guerrilla war as a form of national 
defence. In his memorandum, Koppinen stated that his proposal addressed a meth-
od of guerrilla warfare which was suitable for Finland in view of its scant resources 
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of manpower and poor materiel standard, and was based on a field army, accompa-
nied by the deployment of a separate guerrilla army. An army of guerrilla jaegers 
would cover the entire country, with the field army operating on top it, after a fash-
ion. The memorandum described the troops of the guerrilla army as using stationary 
tactics at the onset of the hostilities, only changing their defensive tactics to offen-
sive operations when the moment of decisive battle arrived. Where possible, battles 
were to be waged in areas evacuated of the civilian population. Koppinen proposed 
that the principle form of fighting be ‘defensive ambush’in which pairs of guerrilla jae-
gers, guerrilla jaeger patrols and individual guerrilla jaegers engage the enemy using 
Claymore-type mines and bursts of fire. According to Koppinen’s calculations, de-
fensive ambush is superior to all other forms of fighting with regard to the casualty 
ratio.606  
 
Koppinen’s proposal discussed the need for a completely new and serious way of 
thinking in the art of war. ‘It is probably unnecessary to exhibit proof for the efficiency for guer-
rilla war in national defence, as the leadership of the Defence Forces has recently –emphatically –
drawn the attention of the army units and military schools to the provision of training and practice 
in guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.’607 Veikko Koppinen’s memorandum stir-
red the high command of the Defence Forces, and the proposal was submitted to 
the Operations Division of the Defence Forces for further review. Head of Office 
of the Operations Division, Lieutenant Colonel Taisto Olavi Lehti, entered the fol-
lowing note in the margin of Koppinen’s proposal: ‘Col. Ilmola is requested to familiarise 
himself with this memorandum and to discuss it with Col. Koppinen (this was requested of me by 
Col. Koppinen.) 7 June 1960, TOL.’608 After Colonel Paavo Ilmola, Head of the Opera-
tions Division, had familiarised himself with Koppinen’s proposal, discussions were 
initiated between the leadership of the General Headquarters and the Operations 
Division, leading to the setting up of a specific committee in spring 1961 tasked 
with looking into Veikko Koppinen’s proposals and thoughts on guerrilla warfare.609 
 
Over the course of the discussions, the Operations Division of the General Head-
quarters paid serious attention to a number of scenarios in a situation in which Fin-
land was invaded. Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were also highlight-
ed, probably on account of the proposal by Koppinen. One highly interesting doc-
ument dating to 1960 and linked to this issue is a confidential memorandum drafted 
by the Operations Division, entitled Operatiiviset olosuhteemme Suomen mahdollisesti 
joutuessa sotaan lähivuosina (‘Finland’s operational circumstances should the country be drawn in-
to a war in the next few years ’). This 65-page memorandum discusses the preparedness 
of the Defence Forces and its many shortcomings in a tone that is almost sickening-
ly realistic, providing a view held by the army leadership held at the time.610   
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With regard to guerrilla-type activities, preparedness was assessed to be satisfactory 
at best, despite the fact that the amount of training of conscripts in guerrilla-style 
combat had increased in relative terms. The training provided at the time did not 
fully meet the requirements set for guerrilla-type activities under Finnish conditions. 
Taken as a whole, however, the memorandum recognised that there were increa-
singly better prerequisites for waging battles with a successful outcome, as the ar-
my’s insufficient capacity for long-distance fire and poor opportunities for con-
ducting air reconnaissance could in part be compensated by guerrilla-type activities. 
The guiding principle of the memorandum linked guerrilla-type activities to all other 
military operations carried out by ground forces. Guerrilla-type activities were divid-
ed into operations that provided direct support to ground operations carried out by 
an army or an army corps, and operations that were conducted under the direct con-
trol of General Headquarters deep in the enemy’s rear. If the enemy’s invasion re-
sulted in the occupation of the entire country, General Headquarters needed to be 
prepared to launch a guerrilla war. The starting point of a full-scale guerrilla war was 
twofold: a guerrilla war would ensue if the field army was defeated after its mobilisa-
tion, in which case it would adopt at least in part guerrilla tactics using all its wea-
ponry and equipment; or if the country was caught by a surprise occupation, a guer-
rilla war would ensue carried out by a resistance movement.611 It follows from this 
memorandum that while the significance of guerrilla-type activities were recognised 
and the challenges that they posed to training were well understood, no decision to 
address such issues in the art of war were taken. From the perspective of the art of 
war, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare continued to receive only theoreti-
cal attention in discussions at the General Headquarters. No detailed calculations or 
experiments on the effectiveness of guerrilla-style operations were available. 
 
In April 1961, Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General T.V. Viljanen, issued 
an order for the establishment of a committee named the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, 
to be set up at the Operations Divisions of the General Headquarters, basing his 
decision on the proposal and assessment of the operational situation put forth by 
Koppinen. During the establishment phase of the committee, the content of guerril-
la-type activities and the art of guerrilla war were put under critical scrutiny for the 
first time, something which comes across in the task assigned to the committee. ‘On 
several occasions, Colonel V. V. Koppinen has proposed a model for guerrilla-type activities under 
which patrols of two to three men are left in enemy-occupied territory, divided into sectors for such 
patrols, and in larger areas, patrols of two to three men are left; such patrols then form guerrilla ar-
eas and guerrilla jaeger units which operate under a unified leadership. Such units would use deep 
forest areas as their support area, operating against enemy troops moving along roads, using wire-
operated bounding and anti-tank mines and small arms.’The Guerrilla Tactics Committee 
was tasked with looking into the methods of guerrilla warfare and tactics, followed 
by proposals for further action. The exact wording of the task was the following: ‘To 
look into the general practicability of the method as a means of waging war in the form of a guerril-
la war alongside normal warfare, to examine its practicability in guerrilla-type activities, and to 
present the necessary proposals.’612   
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The initial composition of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, set up in 1961, was the 
following: Chair, Colonel Toivo Kytölä (PE op-os), Secretary, Major Ermei Kan-
ninen (PE op-os), and members, Colonel Veikko Koppinen (SKK), Colonel Risto 
Kare (PE viesti-os), ColonelAatto Salmio (PE pion-os) and Lieutenant Colonel Si-
mo Sirkkanen (PE jv-os). The member listed last was probably commissioned to the 
committee by virtue of his study that discussed the conditions of Northern Finland 
from the perspective of their suitability for military operations. Initially, the Guerril-
la Tactics Committee was placed under the Operations Division of the General 
Headquarters.613  
 
The Guerrilla Tactics Committee began its work by convening in spring 1961, pre-
paring a plan on time management, research and experimentation related to the as-
signment of the committee, and the responsibilities of the individual members to 
draft preliminary reports in accordance with the committee’s objectives. The com-
mittee members worked on their assignments alongside their regular duties, except 
when the committee convened to discuss conclusions or participate in experimental 
exercises in the role of an observer.614 
 
In autumn 1961, the committee worked intensively. During this time, the committee 
convened seven times. The committee reviewed the novel by Veikko Koppinen, 
‘Räjähtävä tyhjyys’, and his other production. In addition to conducting theoretical 
research and drafting preparatory reports, the committee also decided to arrange 
experimental exercises, within the scope of its authorisation, with themes related to 
guerrilla warfare. The Operations Department of the General Headquarters drafted 
framework plans and operational grounds for exercises in line with the guidelines 
provided by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee. The General Headquarters issued an 
order with an accompanying letter which obligated the committee to arrange exer-
cises in varied terrain in order to obtain the most comprehensive results.615   
 
A total of two experimental exercises proposed by the committee were arranged in 
autumn 1961. The first exercise was arranged between 19 and 11 September north 
of Tuohikotti, in other words – the setting of Exploding wilderness –with theme of 
this exercise being a rifle company advancing through the operational area of a guer-
rilla jaeger platoon. The unit deployed in the exercise was formed of the profession-
al officers and NCOs from the Karelia Brigade with no previous skills or training in 
guerrilla-type activities.616 After receiving brief training in guerrilla tactics, the unit –
with insufficient skills–was assigned the task of acting as the Red Team in a situa-
tion in which an enemy company was staging an attack. The results obtained and the 
conclusions drawn from the exercise pointed in two different directions. On the one 
hand, guerrilla jaegers were found to learn the use of Claymore-type mines relatively 
quickly, but on the other hand, they exhibited varying abilities at making independ-
ent tactical decisions. Rifle infantry advancing through the area held by guerrilla jae-
gers were forced into a terrain in which their marching speed was reduced to less 
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than two kilometres per hour. With its marching speed through the guerrilla-held 
territory being significantly reduced, coupled with a high casualty rate, the enemy 
was forced to halt its advance. A detailed 15-page report produced on the exercise 
included an assessment by the referees, according to which the casualties suffered by 
the guerrillas would have been minimal. However, no definitive conclusion could be 
drawn without further experimentation. The casualties suffered by the guerrillas 
equipped with light weapons were generally attributable to the fact that they opened 
fire too early. The exercise offered no insight into the extent of dread that Claymore 
mines possibly instilled in the enemy; nor could an assessment on the impact of 
combat or the fact that guerrilla jaeger patrols fought separately from each other be 
given. Therefore, the decision was taken to continue experimentation, combining it 
with investigation into the impact of winter conditions on the success or failure of 
guerrilla warfare.617 
 
Another experimental exercise, arranged between 28 and 30 November 1961 in the 
Hätilä exercise area, sought to investigate a situation in which a jaeger company rein-
forced with a tank platoon and an engineering platoon advanced through the opera-
tional area of a guerrilla jaeger platoon. While no report on this exercise survives in 
the archives, the final report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee stated 
that guerrilla-type activities had significantly slowed down the advance of the attack-
ing company. The enemy was forced to fine-comb the area defended by the guerrilla 
jaegers before the tanks were able to advance. The enemy detachment was forced to 
make outflanking manoeuvres two to three kilometres in depth. The invader also 
remained in the dark regarding the operational methods of the guerrillas up to the 
point when the leadership of the exercise provided it with information on the guer-
rillas jaegers’tactics.618 
 
In addition to the above exercises, the committee participated as observers in a 
leadership exercise arranged by the National General Staff College in Tammela on 
10 and 11 August 1961. In this exercise, the method under investigation was exper-
imented within a brigade framework. The committee also devised experiments with 
equipment, implemented by the Engineering Division of the General Headquarters 
at various locations, and arranged an experiment with Claymore-type anti-tank 
mines on 1 January 1961. The conclusions drawn from the mine experiments indi-
cated that fragmentation mines that could be attached to tree trunks, bounding 
mines, and anti-tank mines with a shaped charge effect were best suited for use as 
manually operated mines.619 
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thor of this thesis.  
618 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). 
619 PE:n no. 30/Optsto/11 henksal./ .6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietinnön 2. luonnos) (‘The second 
draft for the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’) and PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/ 
25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE 
(research permit obtained). Roudasmaa, Stig: An interview on 6 February 2008. 
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Intensive work and experiments in 1961 led to the preparation of a preliminary re-
port, which was presented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on 29 
December 1961. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari 
Simelius, was reportedly impressed by the committee’s work and its preliminary re-
sults, prompting him to order that the committee’s assignment be extended to in-
clude guerrilla-type activities as a whole. This order also obligated the Guerrilla Tac-
tics Committee to include a proposal in their final report for guerrilla tactics meth-
ods suitable for Finnish conditions, including their organisation and any prepara-
tions.620 
 
At the end of December 1961, the committee was expanded and moved under the 
direction of the Chief of Training and Education. To facilitate experiments in win-
tertime and to provide information on maintenance and medical issues, Lieutenant 
Colonel Olavi Salonen (PE talh-os) and Medical Lieutenant Colonel Ahti Poiko-
lainen (PE lääk-os) were appointed as new members to the committee, representing 
expertise in their respective fields.621  
 
The Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work in a new composition in the 
winter and spring of 1952, convening six times and arranging experimental exercis-
es, which were already on a good track. Winter exercises began in February when an 
exceptionally daring guerrilla exercise involving unconventional arrangements was 
arranged in Suomunjärvi between 19 and February and 3 March 1962. Theme of the 
exercise was a guerrilla jaeger platoon engaged in a prolonged operation under win-
ter conditions with no direct access to supplies, the other theme being the assess-
ment of the opportunities available to the adversary to destroy the platoon.622 
 
This exercise was arranged in Suomujärvi, North Karelia, approximately 40 kilo-
metres south-east of Lieksa, in collaboration between the Defence Forces and the 
Frontier Guard. What made this exercise special was that guerrilla jaeger patrols in-
cluded conscripts who had been in service for only a few days. Conscripts joined the 
exercise practically immediately after reporting to their unit for service; they were 
provided with equipment and put through a brief crash course in guerrilla tactics. 
Each patrol was led by a senior NCO from the Frontier Guard, the co-leader being 
a border jaeger from the previous age class of conscripts or a reservist. Experiences 
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620 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 
May 2013. 
621 PE:n no. 400/Optsto/11 sal/29.6.1962 (Käsky sissitoimikunnan työn jatkamisesta) (‘Order on the 
continuation of the work by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 27 sal, KA. PE:n no. 
30/Optsto/11 henksal./ .6.1963/Sissitoimikunnan mietinnön 2. luonnos (‘Second draft of the report 
submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), PE (research permit obtained). 
622 PE:n no. 400/Optsto/11 sal/29.6.1962 (Käsky sissitoimikunnan työn jatkamisesta) (‘Order on the 
continuation of the work by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 27 sal, KA. PE:n no. 
32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Com-
mittee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). 3.DE:n no. 30/Koultsto/5 a sal/10.5.1962 (Ko-
keiluharjoitus KarJP:ssa) (‘Experimental exercise at KarJP’), T 26965/F 27 sal, KA. KarJP:n no. 
685/Koul/8 c/17.3.1962 (kokeiluharjoitus 19.2.–2.3.62) (‘Experimental exercise conducted between 
19 February and 2 March 1962’), T 26965/F 27 sal, KA. Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 
2013. Setälä, Erkki: An interview on 13 June 2006. 
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gained from the Suomunjärvi exercise were largely positive, even surprisingly so. 
The report on the exercise found that guerrilla jaegers were able to function for two 
weeks depending solely on their cached supplies, but needed a rest of equal length 
after the exercise. A four-man patrol was found to be too small, as the continuous 
chores to keep the patrol functional, such as warming up the kota –a sort of large 
conical tent, constructed around wooden poles, with an opening at the top for 
smoke extraction –which the patrols used for accommodation, and cooking, took 
up a great deal of time, as did skiing in order to leave behind a network of tracks for 
diversion. It was concluded that a guerrilla jaeger patrol should have the strength of 
a squad. Another conclusion was that kota accommodation could only be used in an 
emergency, the real accommodation being in soil pits, dugouts and tents. This exer-
cise provided invaluable experiences, aiding the Defence Forces to develop guerrilla 
combat tactics for Finnish conditions. Lieutenant General Jorma Järventaus, Com-
mander of the 3rd Division, Lieutenant Colonel Erkki Setälä, commander of the 
Karelia Jaeger Battalion, and the unit that had formed the troops used in the exer-
cise, expressed their opinion that guerrilla-type activities should be developed in a 
more mobile direction. Both officers regarded passivity as a drawback.623 The re-
cords indicate that the arrangements of the exercise were based on Veikko Koppi-
nen’s ideas, something that seems indisputable.624  
 
In spring 1962, the Guerrilla Tactics Committee needed to supplement itself again, 
as the Chair, Colonel Toivo Kytölä, fell ill, Lieutenant Colonel Aatto Salmio re-
signed his commission and the scope of committee’s task was expanded, necessitat-
ing changes in its composition. The new composition, confirmed in spring 1962, 
comprised the following officers: Paavo Ilmola (PE op-os and secretary of the De-
fence Council); secretary Ermei Kanninen (PE op-os); members Major General 
Veikko Koppinen (PE), Lieutenant Colonel Väinö Salmela (PE järj-os), Lieutenant 
Colonel Otto Nuutilainen (PE koul-os), Colonel Vilho Tiainen (PE pion-os), Colo-
nel Risto Kare (PE viesti-os), Lieutenant Colonel Simo Sirkkanen (PE jv-os) and 
expert members, Lieutenant Colonel Olavi Salonen (PE talh-os) and Medical Lieu-
tenant Colonel Ahti Poikolainen (PE lääk-os).625  
 
The appointment of Colonel Paavo Ilmola to chair the committee was justified by 
his extensive familiarity with the entire field of guerrilla-type activities, which he had 
acquired through a scholarship, and by a proposal he had made according to which 
area-based guerrilla-type activities should be integrated into the defensive system 
that was undergoing a change at the time.626   
 
During summer 1962, while the Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work, 
the General Headquarters also had other irons in the fire. One of them was the 
launch of a programme known as the K programme, which referred to the devel-
opment of the materiel of the Defence Forces.627 Although the development of the 
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623 Ibid. See also Setälä, Erkki Vilhelm, an extract from personal details, no 53560, KA. 
624 Setälä, Erkki: An interview on 13 June 2006. 
625 PE:n no. 400/Optsto/11 sal/29.6.1962 (Käsky sissitoimikunnan työn jatkamisesta) (‘Order on the 
continuation of the work by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 27 sal, KA. See also 
Kytölä, Toivo Armas, an extract from personal details, no. 44471, KA. 
626 Ibid. 
627 PE:n no. 291/Optsto/1 sal/7.5.1962, T 24727/Db 1 sal, KA. 
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defensive system had been integrated into the materiel improvements and building 
efforts by the early 1960s, the target-oriented development of various war materiel 
projects continued, and was completed by the mid-1960s. The Commander-in-Chief 
of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelius, had to throw all his prestige on the 
table in order to ensure sufficient resources for the development of the Defence 
Forces, meeting with great difficulties when attempting to carry the issue through 
political decision-making. Among other things, the distribution of a booklet on the 
K programme was banned.628  
 
As a contemporary document, Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The devel-
opment of the Defence Forces in the 1960s’) is a valuable source document, par-
ticularly from the perspective of the art of war. In 1962, the K programme focused 
the army’s materiel and operational development on three major forms of fighting. 
Of these, third in order of priority were guerrilla-type activities, conducted as part of 
regular military operations. Guerrilla-type activities were justified by their cost-
effectiveness in combat and by certain aspects of materiel shortage. ‘As combat has be-
come increasingly mobile in nature, better opportunities have opened to guerrilla-type activities. Our 
insufficient capacity to deliver effective fire at long distances and our poor opportunities for conduct-
ing air reconnaissance can be, in part, compensated by guerrilla-type activities.’629  
 
The fundamental idea behind the territorial defensive system and new trends in the 
Finnish art of war were also justified, in unambiguous terms, by the changes that 
had occurred in the world situation. ‘Although the continued international tension can be at-
tributed, at least in part, to the constant threat created by the nuclear capacity of the alliances 
grouped around great powers, older forms of warfare will also be used to resolve conflicts between 
states by violent means. Furthermore, a technically unsophisticated belligerent may achieve substan-
tial results in combat against an enemy that, while technologically sophisticated, possesses insuffi-
cient means for anti-insurgency operations. The party that emerges victoriously from such a battle 
will win the war. Guerrilla-type activities will be an integral part of all operations carried out by the 
Finnish army. Such activities will be divided into combat that provides direct support to convention-
al operations, and activities that will be carried out deeper in the enemy’s rear. The latter form of 
combat will be resorted to after sections of the Finnish territory have been yielded to the enemy.’630 
Finland’s geographical factors in particular were deemed to provide opportunities to 
guerrilla-type activities, and which are hard to find anywhere else. 
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628 ‘On the same day (4 June 1962), the K programme was published in the form of a booklet edi-
ted by the General Headquarters. The booklet covered the grounds for the development of the na-
tional defence, the factors affecting the development of the Defence Forces, the development of 
the army, maritime defence and the air force, the materiel needs of the functional areas shared by all 
branches of the armed forces, the development of preparedness for production, and the cost of the 
development programme. The booklet was intended to be distributed to members of parliament 
and administrative bodies. Later, the Council of State prohibited the distribution of the booklet. It 
was buried in the archives, to be distributed later to certain people for information in strict confi-
dence. This decision taken by the Karjalainen Government is difficult to understand.’ Simelius 
(1983), pp. 197–213. 
629 Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the Defence Forces in the 
1960s’), Helsinki 1962, pp. 29–31 and 45. 
630 Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the Defence Forces in the 
1960s’) (1962), pp. 12–24 and 47. 
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At a meeting held on 20 September 1962, the committee took a decision to split in-
to two working groups, one of which was tasked with looking into guerrilla methods 
and tactics and preparing a draft for training instructions, while the other was re-
sponsible for examining the requirements for a training organisation. The first work-
ing group comprised Major General Veikko Koppinen, Colonel Vilho Tiainen, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Simo Sirkkanen, Lieutenant Colonel Otto Nuutilainen and Captain 
Stig Roudasmaa from the Engineering Division of the General Headquarters, who 
had been ordered to join the committee as its secretary. The other working group 
consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Väinö Salmela and Major Ermei Kanninen, who 
acted as the secretary of this mini working group.631 
 
 
Keinonen trips up Koppinen 
The last experimental exercise was arranged in late autumn 1962. Between 7 and 10 
November 1962, an experimental exercise was arranged at the training area of the 
Pori Brigade in Raasi, with guerrilla-type activities as its topic. The theme of the 
Raasi exercise was the advancing of a tank platoon and a rifle company through the 
operational area of a guerrilla jaeger platoon, including stops in this area. The guer-
rilla jaeger troop in this exercise was formed, following instructions issued by Veik-
ko Koppinen, of the students of the Pori Brigade NCO School, with one of the Pori 
Brigade rifle companies forming the Red Team and professional officers acting as 
the Red Team company commander and platoon leaders.632  
 
Terho Vallimies633, company commander of the Red Team, informed Stig Rou-
dasmaa decades later that the exercise failed on account of foul play having taken 
part in it. Roudasmaa had witnessed the exercise, and had discussed it after it had 
ended with Veikko Koppinen, who had been completely puzzled by the outcome, 
wondering why the guerrilla jaegeer troop had been detected so easily. 634 What, 
then, happened at Raasi? 
 
Colonel Yrjö Keinonen, who was the commander of the Pori Brigade at the time, 
had actively participated in the planning and instruction phase of the exercise, which 
of course was natural as he was he ‘owner’of the troops committed to the exercise. 
According to Vallimies and Roudasmaa, Yrjö Keinonen had arrived at the barracks 
of the rifle company the evening before the ‘show phase’of the exercise, ordering 
all of the officers and NCOs of the Red Team to assemble. Keinonen had revealed 
the course of the following day’s exercise to the officers of the Red Team, pin-
pointing the locations of the guerrilla jaeger troops which he, while addressing the 
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631 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). 
632 Ibid. Kanninen (2002b), p. 229. Kanninen (2003), p. 15. Roudasmaa, Stig: An interview on 6 
February 2008. Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013. 
633 The compositions of the troops deployed in the exercise can be found in the preparatory docu-
ments, kept in the archive of the Pori Brigade Headquarters under identifier T 23519/F 36, KA. 
See, for example, PorPrE:n no. 2735/Kouljärjtsto/591/1.11.1962, T 23519/F 36, KA. In 1962, 
Captain Terho Vallimies acted as the commander of the 1st Rifle Company of the Pori Brigade. 
Vallimies, Terho Edvin, an extract from personal details, no. 53241, KA. 
634 Roudasmaa, Stig: An interview on 6 February 2008. 
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troops, had copied from the map hanging on the wall of the Raasti training area can-
teen. Furthermore, he had listed the action to be taken in order to ensure that ‘Kop-
pinen’s guerrilla jaegers could be eliminated in a spectacular fashion’. What is truly unpleasant 
about this is the fact that the demonstration on the following day, arranged for the 
benefit of the highest-ranking officers of the General Headquarters – generals and 
senior colonels –followed exactly Keinonen’s manuscript. In no time, the guerrilla 
jaeger troop was brought in as prisoners of war to the prestigious observers, while 
the commander of the Pori Brigade loudly praised the fighting skills of his men and 
their elite soldier’s qualities. The fact that the Pori Brigade NCO School students 
failed and were taken prisoners was not attributable, in Keinonen’s view, to their 
lack of skills; rather, the whole episode reflected the ineffectiveness of the guerrilla 
warfare model and its inapplicability to conventional war. According to Roudasmaa, 
Koppinen was visibly disappointed and greatly puzzled by the outcome of the exer-
cise.635  
 
Veikko Koppinen, who had planned the Raasi exercise and acted as the repre-
sentative of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee at it, suffered a severe blow to his ide-
as, which the exercise had proved as impracticable. Yrjö Keinonen probably wanted 
to emphasise his superiority, skills and leadership in the eyes of the senior officers of 
the General Headquarters by demonstrating that the training level of his units was 
better than expected – in a fraudulent manner.636 If this is a correct conclusion, it 
may have had strategic consequences. Experimental exercises were carried out in 
order to develop the defence of the whole of Finland, rather than highlight the ex-
cellence of an individual officer. Luckily, experimental exercises geared towards 
guerrilla-type activities were continued, despite this episode. However, the incident 
was embarrassing for Koppinen and, for the entire Guerrilla Tactics Committee; af-
ter all, it involved an assignment and extensive research that the committee had 
been ordered to perform by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in 
their capacity as holders of an officer’s commission, and that aimed at developing 
the Finnish art of war. 
 
Ermei Kanninen, secretary of the Guerrilla Commission, provides a description of 
the details and content of the experimental exercises in his later texts that paints a 
different picture to the report submitted by the Commission and the actual events. 
First of all, Kanninen writes that both parties of the exercise arranged by the Pori 
Brigade –guerrilla jaegers and the Red Team –were formed of conscripts who had 
not received any prior training in guerrilla or anti-guerrilla tactics. ‘The results were pos-
itive, and it took a long time, especially for the leaders of the target units, to realise what was going 
on –in other words, figure out the operating methods of the guerrilla jaegers.’Secondly, he says 
that Yrjö Keinonen, commander of the Pori Brigade, gained personal familiarity 
with guerrilla-type activities, helping him later to grasp their significance for the ter-
ritorial defence system, which he approved for adoption in 1968 while functioning 
as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. Kanninen was not able to recall 
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635 Ibid. 
636 Roudasmaa, Stig: An interview on 6 February 2008. Pärssinen, Antero: An interview on 14 Feb-
ruary 2013. For Keinonen’s similar tendencies on other occasions, also see Airio, Pentti: Yrjö 
Keinonen – uudistajaksi asetettu (‘Yrjö Keinonen – appointed Commander to reform’) (diss.), 2007, p. 
46, 49, 51–53 and 55. 
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that anything dishonest had taken place at Raasi. Thirdly, Kanninen says that the re-
ports on both the Suomunjärvi and Raasi exercises had been lost due to cuts to ar-
chives.637 This is not the whole truth, as at least the report on the exercise arranged 
by the Karelia Jaeger Battalion can be found in full –including all attachments –in 
the archives of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.638 However, 
what is conspicuous is that the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee does not 
contain a single word about the Raasi experimental exercise.639 Antero Pärssinen, 
who had also served in the Pori Brigade at the time of the exercise, did not recall it 
or its details when specifically asked about them.640 
 
Who was right and whose view of the train of events is closest to the truth? Kan-
ninen, Roudasmaa, the original documents or other parties? This question will prob-
ably remain a mystery for ever. If anything, this episode paints a bleak picture of the 
impact of human traits on the development of national defence. When seeking a 
historical and truthful interpretation after the fact, the conclusion is that opportuni-
ties for further research remain. 
 
 
The Guerrilla Tactics Committee completes is assignment and submits its 
report 
 
The Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work in accordance with its instruc-
tions, despite the setback at Raasi. In late 1962 and early 1963, the committee con-
vened a total of four times. However, by then, the focus of the Committee’s work 
had shifted to analysing the results and drawing conclusions for inclusion in the 
Committee’s final report. Experimental exercises played a particularly significant 
role in the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’s work as it sought to develop guerrilla-type 
activities and bring clarity to the concepts around the issue. The committee recorded 
a great number of observations and drafted memoranda of varying quality while 
completing its work.  
 
The work of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee was labelled confidential from the 
very beginning641, although its existence became known to the senior officers of the 
troops who participated in experimental exercises. The secret nature of the work is 
reflected by the fact that even extracts from the personal details of the committee 
members contain few or no references to their membership in the Guerrilla Tactics 
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637 Kanninen (2002b), p. 229. Kanninen (2003), p. 15. 
638 3.DE:n no. 30/Koultsto/5 a sal/10.5.1962 (Kokeiluharjoitus KarJP:ssa) (‘Experimental exercise at 
KarJP’), T 26965/F 27 sal, KA. KarJP:n no. 685/Koul/8 c/17.3.1962 (kokeiluharjoitus 19.2.–2.3.62) 
(‘Experimental exercise conducted between 19 February and 2 March 1962’), T 26965/F 27 sal, 
KA. 
639 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). 
640 Pärssinen, Antero: An interview on 14.February 2013. 
641 ‘I ordered the preparations to be made in secrecy, as the coming to light of the fundamental 
principle was undesirable.’ Simelius (1983), p. 256. 
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Committee.642 Yet more proof of the clandestine nature of the committee exists. In 
November 1962, Lieutenant Colonel Ensio Siilasvuo, chief of the General Staff Bu-
reau of Division Headquarters of the 3rd Division (3.DE), drafted a study which 
was in almost perfect accordance with the task assigned to the Guerrilla Tactics 
Committee. The study entitled ‘Sissisota ja sen torjunta suurvaltojen ja meidän näkö-
kulmastamme’ (‘Guerrilla warfare and anti-guerrilla operations from the perspective 
of great powers and Finland’) discussed guerrella war and guerrilla-type activeties in 
line with Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’) in ef-
fect at the time and, obviously with a draft for Kenttäohjesäännön I osa from 1963 (‘the 
1963 Field Regulation Part I’) that was still out for comments.643 In his conclusion, 
Siilasvuo recommends that training in guerrilla-type activities be developed further 
and that research and experimentation in guerrilla tactics be initiated. ‘Research and 
experimentation efforts should be intensified in order to develop new methods and equipment.’644 Si-
ilasvuo proposed conclusions and recommendations for further action clearly with-
out any knowledge of Veikko Koppinen’s Sissisotamenetelmä-ehdotus (‘A proposal for a 
method for waging guerrilla war’), let alone research that by then spanned almost 
two years. While Siilasvuo’s study was well-timed, it was belated considering the 
work that had been carried out by the Operations Division of the General Head-
quarters in all secrecy. 
 
In early January 1963, Ermei Kanninen, who had been posted to the Operations 
Division of the General Headquarters, prepared a memorandum on the develop-
ment of local defence forces and their link to guerrilla-type activities, which, while 
related to the work of the Guerrilla Commission, was not directly connected to it. 
This memorandum, among other things, calculated the increase in the reserves over 
the course of the 1960s, with the ensuing effects on the materiel acquisition pro-
grammes. In connection with this, the first proposal for forming regional guerrilla 
jaeger troops was made, justified primarily by the opportunities brought along by 
the increase in the size of the reserve. In his memorandum, Kanninen proposed, re-
ferring to local defence forces, that ‘the real opportunities for their establishment be clarified, 
broken down by military district and taking account of the fact that the increase in the size of the 
reserve will take place principally in Southern and South-western Finland at the expense of the rest 
of the country.’Furthermore, Kanninen proposed that a principal decision be taken, 
one which would resolve ‘whether the local defence forces would be trained along the lines pro-
posed by Kanninen –in other words, the Defence Forces would train local troops which could take 
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642 See for example Ilmola, Paavo an extract from personal details, no. 45233, KA and Koppinen, 
Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA and Kare, Risto Ilmari, an extract 
from personal details, no. 37799. The only piece of information on the participation in the commit-
tee’s work by its key members can be found in the personal details of the committee’s secretary. 
Kanninen, Ermij (Ermei), an extract from personal details, no. 58557, KA. 
643 3.DE:n no. 363/Optsto/5 sal/29.11.1962 (tutkielma sissisodasta) (‘A study on guerrilla war’), T 
26965/F 27 sal, KA. Cf. Kenttäohjesääntö, yleinen osa (KO yl) (‘Field Regulation, General Section’), 
1958, pp. 94–101 and 215. Kenttäohjesääntö I osa (KO I), yhtymän taistelu, (‘Field Regulation, Part I’, a 
formation on combat) Mikkeli 1963, pp. 103–113 and 266–267. 
644 3.DE:n no. 363/Optsto/5 sal/29.11.1962 (tutkielma sissisodasta) (‘A study on guerrilla war’), T 
26965/F 27 sal, KA. Cf. also RvE:n 333/II/sal/27.11.1962 ja RajaK:n no. 68/II/sal/27.12.1962, 
RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) 
identifier , tunniste F 13 sal (a study permit obtained). 
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up local guerrilla-type activities when necessary – or, alternatively, whether the Defensive Forces 
would train guerrilla troops that could perhaps be committed to other operations only in a very lim-
ited fashion.’645 The memorandum by Kanninen was the first study of its kind, analys-
ing the ratio of manpower to weaponry and attempting to resolve it through the de-
velopment of local defence by establishing local troops capable of engaging in guer-
rilla-type activities.  
 
By the time the Guerrilla Tactics Committee had almost completed its work, a deci-
sion was taken to link its last experiment to winter manoeuvres schedule to be ar-
ranged in Northern Finland between 27 January and 2 February 1963 and to which 
one guerrilla jaeger platoon would be committed, operating in a dispersed manner. 
The committee received a report on the experiences obtained from the manoeuvres 
These manoeuvres, arranged by the 1st Division, provided positive feedback on the 
action of guerrilla jaegers engaged in combat using dispersed tactics in wintry condi-
tions. In particular, the report emphasised the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activi-
ties in the conditions typical of Northern Finland. ‘Especially in Northern Finland, com-
bat operations conducted by a brigade should always be supported by spontaneous guerrilla-type ac-
tivities. The manoeuvres painted a positive picture of the combat of a guerrilla jaeger battalion and 
company, fighting in a dispersed manner, even under wintry conditions.’646 The Guerrilla Tac-
tics Committee continued its work until June 1963, completing, among other things, 
several sub-studies on the various branches of the defence related to guerrilla-type 
activities, as well as experimental exercises. The committee convened a total of 17 
times.647 The military schools also carried out experimentation and development on 
a corresponding level, including exercises and coursework prepared by students, as-
signed to them by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee via the staff of the National 
General Staff College.648 It should be mentioned that at least some members of the 
Guerrilla Tactics Committee had either been involved in issues related to guerrilla 
warfare or guerrilla-type activities, or would be involved in such issues later on their 
careers.  
 
The committee finished its report in early summer 1963. The report provided a 
highly detailed and comprehensive account which, by and large, was in line with the 
task assigned to the committee by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. 
The memorandum emphasised the need to use methods of guerrilla warfare, partic-
ularly when viewed from the perspective of developments that had occurred in the 
art of war in the years following the Second World War and that, by the 1960s, 
clearly showed the significance of guerrilla warfare and insurgency movements, and, 
on the other hand, that of guerrilla-type activities. According to the committee, the 
only effective method to battle guerrilla jaeger troops was to launch anti-guerrilla 
operations – in other words, to commit guerrilla jaeger troops. By way of example 

645 Paikallispuolustusjoukkojen kehittäminen ja liittyminen sissitoimintaan (‘The development of local defen-
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9.1.1963, Ermei Kanninen’s private collection; a copy in the possession of the author of this thesis. 
646 1.DE:n no. 16/Koultsto/5 sal/15.3.1963 (kertomus Pohjois-Suomen talvisotaharjoituksesta) (‘Report 
on the winter manoeuvres arranged in Northern Finland’), T 24075/F 1 sal, KA. 
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Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). 
648 Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013. 
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of the developments that took place during the period, the committee raised the 
training in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla tactics that the United States Army provided 
and that it had intensified. According to the report submitted by the committee, de-
velopments in the art of war favoured great powers, especially by improving the 
mobility of troops and enhancing the reach and effectiveness of fire. Consequently, 
countries such as Finland, considered to be ‘backward ’with regard to the art of war, 
were forced to counterbalance the discrepancy by relying on their national and geo-
graphical conditions. Guerrilla-type activities were regarded as an opportunity, 
something that should be resorted to using all available means.649 Kenttäohjesäännön 
yleinen osa (‘The Field Regulation, General Section’) from 1958, and Sissiohjesääntö, 
(‘The regulation for guerrilla-type activities’), confirmed in 1957, also required this 
operational method to be applied.650 
 
According to the committee, the goals of guerrilla-type activities were wide-ranging. 
They aimed at slowing down the enemy’s movement, everywhere and at any time, as 
the Finnish army would never be as mobile in easy terrain as any potential enemy. 
Insufficient reach of fire could be compensated for by deploying guerrilla troops in 
the enemy’s rear. Tying down the enemy forces was regarded as crucial everywhere, 
even in secondary sectors and in rear areas, as this would weaken the enemy in those 
sectors to which it would commit the bulk of its forces and where it would normally 
be superior in strength compared to the defender. The impact of enemy’s fire need-
ed to be diminished, coupled with the development of a form of fighting impervi-
ous to the effects of nuclear weapons. In line with the objectives set above, the 
committee drew the conclusion that a critical need for guerrilla-type activities exist-
ed, that such activities would decrease the pressure on the troops holding the front 
line, and that they would also balance any possible superiority in strength of the ad-
versary. A guerrilla war also needed be taken into consideration, as it would offer 
the defender their ‘the last means of defence ’ in a situation in which the country or its 
part were occupied.651 In other words, guerrilla-type activities were prioritised over a 
total guerrilla war, which was regarded as the defender’s last stand. 
 
The committee had made a realistic and detailed analysis of the opportunities avail-
able to guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish art of war. The committee’s report di-
vided the guerrilla jaeger force into units that were either part of the local military 
organisation or detachments formed for a specific task, either left behind enemy 
lines or transported to their operational area. Operations were defined as being of-
fensive in nature, carried out using massed troops, or dispersed, conducted in order 
to distract the adversary. The report did not mention actual territorial tasks beyond 
territorial harassment operations, which were intended to be carried out in a dis-
persed manner by deploying guerrilla jaeger platoons or patrols. According to the 
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650 Kenttäohjesääntö´, yleinen osa (KO yl) (‘Field Regulation, General Secton’), 1958, p. 95. Sissiohjesääntö 
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651 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla 
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committee, the regulations in effect provided the necessary theoretical foundati-
on.652  
 
However, the number of guerrilla troops was not in line with the requirements and 
objectives set for guerrilla-type activities. The committee had counted the number 
of guerrilla jaeger troops included in the various guerrilla jaeger organisations and 
listed in the establishment chart (PTL) for 1963, finding them to amount to 3,000 
men, divided into two guerrilla jaeger battalions placed directly under the High 
Command (SissiP 5 and SissiP 15), six guerrilla jaeger companies under the Frontier 
Guard brigades, and 41 separate guerrilla jaeger platoons. The committee found the 
number of the above-mentioned troops to be all too small. The decision taken dur-
ing Finland’s wars to order each formation to hold a section of the front line to 
form a separate guerrilla jaeger unit, at the expense of a reconnaissance company or 
another battalion, was deemed ill-judged. Such temporary troops, disrupting the 
structure of brigade organisations did not, according to the committee, achieve any 
appreciable increase in efficiency, as the performance of temporary troops in guer-
rilla-type activities remained poor, and committing the best men to special duties al-
so lowered standards in the main force.653  
 
The committee took a strong stance on the proposal for a method for guerrilla war-
fare by drafted by Veikko Koppinen. The report noted that Koppinen’s proposal 
for guerrilla warfare could be approached either from the perspective of overall ar-
rangements for guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla warfare or from the viewpoint of 
guerrilla tactics and methods. Increasing the impact of fire by using mines, Clay-
more-type mines and traps as proposed by Koppinen was regarded as feasible. With 
regard to defensive ambush, some members thought that it would be impossible on 
a long-term basis. However, the mental and physical endurance of Finnish soldiers 
when they were operating in a dispersed fashion and depended on supplies that they 
themselves had cached still remained untested. Prolonged operations, pursued by 
the enemy, with insufficient supplies and exposed to the vagaries of the weather, 
would reduce the effectiveness of guerrilla jaeger troops. Although the committee 
commented on active operations by a guerrilla jaeger army alongside the field army 
in positive terms, the committee also considered that transition to a guerrilla war 
should not be the only objective of the method.654 
 
The committee highlighted two fundamental solutions in the proposals put forth by 
Koppinen, which in his solution were merged into one but were a prerequisite for 
the success of both parts. One was territorial guerrilla-type activities; the other was 
defensive ambush using Claymore-type mines, with the guerrilla jaegers operating in 
a dispersed formation. The committee concluded that a transfer to an overall solu-
tion based on a single system was impossible to implement without first having 
thorough preparations in place for training and the development of equipment. Ter-
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ritorial guerrilla-type activities, coupled with mobile and concerted guerrilla opera-
tions in the areas where the weight of the operations would lie, would enable, ac-
cording to the committee, continual harassment of the enemy everywhere. Territori-
al guerrilla-type activities would also lay the foundations for the preparations for a 
full-scale guerrilla war.655 
 
Koppinen’s proposal also included clear strengths that the committee considered 
feasible. The ever increasing costs prevented the building of large and modern 
ground forces; instead, in their place, a guerrilla jaeger army proposed by Koppinen 
could be used, equipped with materiel that was clearly more affordable than that of 
regular formations. The adversary would not be able to break the defence put up by 
the guerrilla jaeger army proposed by Koppinen by directing strikes against Finnish 
industries, power generation and the home front. According to the committee, guer-
rillas would be unbeatable, and the continuation of combat would be guaranteed. A 
guerrilla jaeger army would play the most important role in that it would enable di-
recting the weight of local operations at certain areas. ‘The enemy will be battled, and its 
forces will be tied down everywhere and at any time, thereby enabling the field army to mass troops 
and direct the weight of operations at a certain area.’656 
 
The committee noted that dispersed guerrilla-type activities with associated defen-
sive ambushes, coupled with the use of Claymore-type mines, were a feasible form 
of fighting, constituting one of the methods available to guerrilla jaegers and being 
one which guerrilla jaegers could resort to not only in territorial combat but also in 
other combat activities, depending on the circumstances. Dispersed operations 
meant that guerrilla jaegers operated in patrols of either two or six men –formed of 
pairs or half-squads of men – in designated areas closely linked to each other, in a 
configuration under which the organisational level immediately above the individual 
jaeger –platoon, company or battalion –ensured that nobody was caught by sur-
prise. In the dispersed operation of small units, a unit might either disperse in order 
to hide, avoid casualties, or hold a specific point of terrain, a track suitable for vehi-
cles or a specific length of a road.657 
 
However, the investigations of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee left several ques-
tions unanswered. Most concerns were raised by what is known as mental factors. 
The committee noted that particular attention must be paid to the physical and 
mental endurance of men committed to guerrilla-type activities. While this was 
nothing new as such, the fact that national Finnish traits were taken into account 
was an important indication of the distinctively Finnish nature of the Finnish art of 
war, particularly in discussions regarding the practicability of guerrilla-type activities. 
According to the committee, a task cannot be accomplished in a tactically correct 
way by simply issuing an order for the application of a particular tactic; rather, the 
tactics needed to be understood and rehearsed. Although the Finnish soldier is 
prone to criticise his commanding officer, and even assume a negative attitude, he 
will need support from his commander when the going gets tough. ‘Passive waiting is 
highly taxing and may weaken soldiers’ spirits. Deep down, the Finn is melancholy and with-
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drawn, seeking outlets that are hard to find in solitude.’The Finnish soldier wants to know, 
even when fighting as a guerrilla soldier, the overall situation and the fate of his 
nearest and dearest. Fieldcraft and familiarity with the outdoor life were no longer 
something that characterised Finns, although the committee thought that the Finns’
adaptability to harsh conditions was probably still fairly good.658  
 
The summary of committee’s report provided two important conclusions. On the 
one hand, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities were particularly pronounced for 
a country the national defence of which was based on a simple fact: to defend the 
country’s territory and the living conditions of its population while fighting an ene-
my with vastly superior human and materiel resources. Under such conditions, the 
defender was forced to use its own territory as a support area, depending on the re-
sources available in that area. Thus, the needs were greater than the organisations 
and plans in place that the time enabled. Consequently, the Defence Forces needed 
to increase the number of guerrilla jaegers, to intensify the means available to guer-
rilla-type activities, and to improve preparedness. On the other hand, the organisa-
tions of guerrilla jaeger troops and their operational methods were still practicable, 
and particularly suitable for guerrilla jaeger troops proper in a situation in which 
they were concentrated in a specific area to carry out an operation there. Temporary 
guerrilla jaeger units formed of formations and separate units were also deemed able 
to use such organisations and methods successfully. The Guerrilla Tactics commit-
tee saw no reason to address in detail such methods or the internal organisation of 
guerrilla jaeger troops.659 
 
A comparison of the report submitted by the committee with a bulletin of the K 
programme660 of the Defence Forces, published one year previously, reveals that the 
Committee had been consulted or had at least been requested to specify the content 
of guerrilla war in more detail, as parallels between the two sources are obvious. The 
book entitled Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the 
Defence Forces in the 1960s’) made a clear distinction between guerrilla warfare and 
guerrilla-type activities, when viewed from the perspective of the art of war. ‘Crucial 
to this form of warfare (guerrilla war) is ensuring the support of large sections of the population. 
The party that emerges victoriously from such a conflict will win the war. Guerrilla-type activities 
will be an integral part of all operations carried out by the ground forces. Such activities will be di-
vided into combat that provides direct support to conventional army operations, and activities that 
will be carried out deep in the enemy’s rear.’661  
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Recommendations by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee for further action 
The Guerrilla Tactics Committee completed its work in a presentation held in Sep-
tember 1963; at this meeting, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces ap-
proved the general principles for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, as 
well as their tactical guidelines. ‘It is proposed that on the basis of the report submitted by the 
Guerrilla Commission, taking account of the general principles of guerrilla-type activities and guer-
rilla war…’In the preparatory document for the report’s presentation, the following 
measures were proposed to be taken by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard: 
the number of guerrilla jaeger troops in the establishment chart to be revised; 
measures to be taken to create a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation; the use of a 
dispersed troop disposition and Claymore-type mines to be approved; training in 
guerrilla-type activities to be intensified; and an officer at the General Headquarters 
to be appointed to deal with guerrilla activities on a full-time basis. 662 Simelius add-
ed the following comment to the margin of this list: ‘provided a suitable officer is availa-
ble for such an assignment.’To the bottom of the document, a preliminary plan of a 
suitable officer had been added in the form of the name ‘Lopmeri.’663 The report 
with attachments664 was submitted to the chief of training and education and the 
members of the committee. The materiel generated during the working of the 
committee was delivered to the Operations Division of the General Headquar-
ters.665 
 
In practice, the first item in the list of the methods for further action proposed by 
the committee, the one addressing the revision of the number of guerrilla jaeger 
troops in the establishment chart, translated into the forming of a territorial guerrilla 
jaeger organisation covering the entire country in such a manner that the gradual 
development of the system would be possible as the number of men in the reserve 
gradually increased and more materiel became available. Such an organisation was 
intended to be engaged in anti-guerrilla activities in Finland’s home territory and in 
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from the Frontier Guard, even though training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla-type activities has been their 
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the rear areas of the army’s formations, taking account of the fact that it also might 
have to launch a full-scale guerrilla war. All work on troop composition were sub-
mitted to the Operations and Mobilisation Divisions of the General Headquarters. 
The committee saw that the creation of the organisation and the revision of the 
troops in the establishment chart needed to be followed by the revision of the num-
ber of men trained for various tasks and the materiel acquisition plans.666 
 
Much of this proposal was based on a work plan drafted by the Operations Division 
of the General Headquarters in spring 1963, which stated that, from the perspective 
of operational planning, the most far-reaching work concerned the development of 
local territorial defence troops. ‘In the current decade, our human resources will increase faster 
than the means available to the procurement of materiel for our field army. In this situation, the 
Defence Forces will have an opportunity to and, in a way, must, begin to develop what is known as 
local forces, as the appropriation will not enable the establishment of new formations. This being the 
case, one option would be to create a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation equipped with light 
weapons. Work on this option has progressed to the point where it can soon be presented to the deci-
sion makers for a policy decision.’667 
 
The use of a dispersed troop disposition and Claymore-type mines, and their adop-
tion in training meant in practice that the training instructions drafted by the com-
mittee needed to be approved and distributed, the arrangements for the training of 
instructors needed to be put in place, and the training material had to be planned, 
acquired and distributed. Practical arrangements were proposed to be implemented 
by the Infantry, Training and Engineering Divisions of the General Headquarters.668  
 
The intensification of guerrilla training referred to the intensification of collabora-
tion between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. In practice, this referred 
to experimentation with and training in local guerrilla-type activities with the focus 
being on leadership and supply, while paying attention to the intelligence obtained 
by the local troops. Practice in the use of dispersed troop disposition and Claymore-
type mines was to be extended to all arms and branches and applied to the training 
of leaders, instructors and men. In addition, separately designated units were to pro-
vide special training to conscripts in guerrilla tactics under special conditions, such 
those in as Lapland and the Finnish archipelago, as a supplement to their general 
training.669 In October 1963, based on the report drawn up by the Guerrilla Tactics 
Committee, the General Headquarters issued a standing order on training the main 
theme of which was territorial guerrilla-type activities.670 
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Assigning an officer to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, tasked 
with dealing with issues related to guerrilla-type activities, meant in practice the in-
tensification of guerrilla-related issues and the coordination of the various activities. 
According to the proposition of the committee, this officer was to participate in the 
organisation of territorial guerrilla-type activities as part of the work carried out by 
the Operations and Mobilisation Divisions of the General Headquarters, including 
work related to training and experimentation, ensuring that any experiences gained 
from such activities were to be taken into consideration when drafting operational 
and acquisition plans. Temporary in nature, this work was expected to require ap-
proximately two years’contribution, by which time it was expected that the issue 
would have been set in motion. After that, according to the committee, further 
work would take place in the form of normal staff work, in collaboration between 
the various departments.671  
 
The solid work of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee had been completed, and, by all 
accounts, had played a significant role in the development of guerrilla-type activities 
and their integration into the territorial defence system. Perhaps the most important 
conclusion drawn by the committee was the proposal to integrate guerrilla-type ac-
tivities into territorial combat, there relegating a large-scale guerrilla war to a role of 
the last-ditch effort in Finland’s defence. The dilemma that had bedevilled all at-
tempts during the postwar years to draw a conceptual line between a guerrilla war 
and guerrilla-type activities, including the decision of which one to use in the Finn-
ish art of war, was finally resolved. Guerrilla-type activities were deemed to be a 
method that were best suited for the Finnish art of war and Finnish conditions. A 
guerrilla war, very much like a drowning man clutching at straws and a form of 
honourable suicide, began to give way to guerrilla-type activities, now undergoing a 
development process. However, the committee wanted to retain the possibility of 
resorting to a guerrilla war. 
 
The committee worked systematically, exhibiting an approach to research that can 
be regarded as exemplary, even after decades and providing a testimony to a serious 
attitude towards the development of national defence, operational skills and tactics. 
Exercises, which had been well organised and taken to great lengths, had created 
particular added value, contributed towards the understanding of the impact that 
Finnish guerrilla-type activities could have, and clarified their special characteristics 
in the view of the future. The results obtained from exercises sparked discussion 
among officers and engendered a great number of new ideas regarding the details of 
the art of war and possible problems. Knowledge of the committee’s work and the 
results that it had achieved were kept confidential for decades, something that was 
understandable during the Cold War. Not until 1979 did knowledge of the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee’s work come to the knowledge of a larger audience, as a sig-
nificant portion of it was published in Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’), albeit under 
the classification not to be revealed to outsiders (the Finnish abbreviation for this classifi-
cation being ‘ETS’). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Guerrilla Tactics Com-
mittee accomplished its tasks well, to say the least. However, the committee’s work 
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needed to be continued, which is why the General Headquarters appointed an of-
ficer tasked with looking into guerrilla warfare-related issues on a full-time basis. 
 
 
Further research by Olavi Lopmeri and by the research group for guerrilla 
tactics 
 
According to the decision taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces 
at the presentation held on 23 September 1963, the Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters was ordered to continue their investigations into guerrilla-
type activities, based on the premises and proposals for further action proposed by 
the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’s report. Major Olavi Lopmeri, was transferred to 
the Operations Division of the General Headquarters from the National General 
Staff College in autumn 1963, and was ordered to continue further examination into 
guerrilla-type activities. Lopmeri began his work by familiarising himself with the 
Guerrilla Tactics Commission’s report and by gathering the necessary information, 
including the number of troops and their composition from the various divisions of 
the General Headquarters. In his research, Lopmeri aimed to focus on such grounds 
and opportunities that would enable the setting up a territorial guerrilla organisa-
tion.672  
 
Over the course of spring and summer 1964, based on his investigations, Lopmeri 
drafted three lengthy memoranda, the organisation of which reflected the proposals 
for further action that the Guerrilla Commission had recommended in its report. 
The first memorandum was presented to the chief of the Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters on 26 May 1964.673 In this memorandum, Lopmeri, among 
other things, refined the calculations of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee on the 
number of guerrilla jaeger troop proper in the establishment chart, including troops 
regarded as guerrilla jaeger troops in other contexts. While the report by the Guerril-
la Tactics Committee set the number of wartime guerrilla jaeger troops for 1963 at 
3,000 men, Lopmeri went through the establishment chart on a line-by-line basis in 
order to find the exact numbers. According Lopmeri’s calculations, the two guerrilla 
jaeger battalions placed under direct control of the High Command numbered 1,224 
men, the six reconnaissance companies of the Frontier Brigades 1,014 men, and the 
40 reserve platoons of the frontier guard companies 1,560 men, with the total 
strength amounting to 3,798. On the basis of this, it can be concluded that Lopmeri 
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saw the number of guerrilla jaeger troops to be clearly insufficient for large-scale 
guerrilla-type activities.674 
 
According to Lopmeri, the requirements for a wider application of territorial guerril-
la-type activities were first introduced in the 1958 in a chapter on guerrilla warfare in 
Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of the 1958 Field Regulation’). Accord-
ing to this regulation, territorial application of guerrilla-type activities seek to ensure 
that the preparations for guerrilla warfare –particularly those regarding supply –are 
clear-cut and feasible; that troops scattered after a battle can be brought under con-
trol within a specific area and turned into guerrilla jaeger troops; that no overlaps 
occur in guerrilla-type activities; and that there will be leadership in place capable of 
formulating long-term objectives and issuing instructions.675 
 
When discussing the method for guerrilla warfare proposed by Koppinen, Lopmeri 
treated it largely as a general guideline for guerrilla tactics, one that could be applied 
to guerrilla warfare, consistent with the spirit of the Field Regulation. According to 
Lopmeri, Koppinen’s method not only provided possibilities for a decisive impro-
vement in efficiency, but also enabled guerrilla jaegers to protect themselves so that 
they could not be defeated, while keeping the requirements for the quality of men, 
materiel and their training within reasonable limits. According to Lopmeri, the 
method could not be implemented without sufficiently large guerrilla jaeger 
troops.676 
 
In a way, the territorial defence system, under development at the time, brought its 
own line to the creation of a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation. On the other 
hand, this line could not, according to Lopmeri, provide independent grounds for a 
territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation; rather, it only applied the ground stated 
above.  
 
The preliminary conclusions drawn by Lopmeri were clear-cut. If guerrilla warfare 
was to provide a decisively helpful contribution to the successful conclusion of a 
combat in which the field army with offensive capability were engaged, and if the 
continuity of guerrilla-type activities were to be simultaneously ensured in a situation 
in which Finland was forced to launch a full-scale guerrilla war, the solution based 
on Koppinen’s method would be the only feasible one. This, in turn, would neces-
sarily require the creation of a territorial organisation with the associated troops, in 
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which case the guerrilla jaeger organisation would largely form the basis for the or-
ganisation of territorial defence.  
 
However, if the idea was to ensure that a transfer to guerrilla war could take place 
by replacing regular military operations across the entire country or in one of its 
large –and separate –parts, there was no need to have a separate territorial guerrilla 
jaeger organisation in place, according to Lopmeri’s calculations, although having 
one in place, being a leadership organisation between the High Command and the 
mid-level district levels, would facilitate to the transfer to guerrilla war. Lopmeri saw 
on the other hand that if a guerrilla war, fought alongside operations waged on the 
front line or to support such operations, using troops made available by the local 
forces, a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation had to be established. In principle, a 
local defensive organisation was well suited for this purpose, as long as it was capa-
ble of engaging in continuous guerrilla-type activities and providing leadership for 
them.677 
 
Olavi Lopmeri’s second memorandum was presented to the Operations Division on 
1 June 1964. This memorandum was largely focused on the needs of a territorial 
guerrilla jaeger organisation and on the possibilities of creating one. At the begin-
ning of his memorandum, Lopmeri noted that the heads of the Defence Command 
had deemed the proposal made by the Guerrilla Commission for establishing a terri-
torial guerrilla organisation as unrealistic as such. The required manpower, if well 
equipped with the requisite weaponry, could simply not be detached from the re-
serve for the purposes of territorial guerrilla-type activities without compromising 
the effectiveness of the field army. Lopmeri also argued that there was no sufficient 
evidence for the relevance of dispersed guerrilla-type activities as a basic method.678 
 
Building on this, Lopmeri proposed the setting up of a guerrilla organisation that 
would provide maximum support for combat conducted by the field army without 
compromising the number of its men and the efficiency of its weaponry. Further-
more, a guerrilla jaeger organisation was to ensure transition to a full-scale guerrilla 
war across the entire country or one of its large sections, under varying conditions, 
ensuring that a method of guerrilla tactics most appropriate for each situation would 
be used679 
 
Lopmeri’s third memorandum was completed and presented on 1 July 1964. Ac-
cording to the memorandum, the intensification of guerrilla-type activities and guer-
rilla warfare required additional research by the Mobilisation Division of the Gen-
eral Headquarters and the planning team of the quartermaster. According to Lop-
meri, Koppinen’s method for guerrilla-type activities, based on war experiences and 
encoded in Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for Guerrilla-type Activities’), had by then 
been supplemented in training by ‘territorial guerrilla-type activities based on research on 
methodology.’According to Lopmeri, the application of methods which varied accord-
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ing to circumstances, ‘had set in motion a process that would generate a completely new breed of 
guerrilla tactics.’680  
 
Lopmeri was justifiably concerned, as it was clear that only after careful scrutiny of 
the fundamentals of tactics and the mobility of the troops that a great power could 
field, including a thorough investigation of anti-guerrilla methods, a final decision 
on the adoption of guerrilla organisations and their tasks could be taken. Lopmeri 
also proposed that the needs emerging over the course of the 1960s to revise the 
military regulations on guerrilla warfare could be solved by setting up ‘a Research 
Group on Guerrilla Tactics.’According to Lopmeri’s proposal, such a group should be 
tasked with conducting basic research on guerrilla tactics in order to bring them up 
to date and with drafting a regulation that would meet contemporary requirements. 
Lopmeri proposed that the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics include one or two 
officers from the Frontier Guard Headquarters, one representative from the Infant-
ry Division and one from the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.681 
 
With regard to guerrilla organisations, Lopmeri noted that guerrilla jaeger troops 
proper listed in the establishment chart, including all units formed by the Frontier 
Guard regarded as guerrilla jaeger troops, and all temporary guerrilla jaeger troops 
were intended to be engaged in tactical support tasks directly linked to the combat 
conducted by military formations. Therefore, the setting up of a territorial guerrilla 
organisation required that the need and tasks of guerrilla troops listed in the estab-
lishment chart should be revised only after the territorial principle had been ap-
proved. According to Lopmeri, keeping the civilian population out of anything re-
lated to guerrilla warfare as far as possible was a principle that was of the highest na-
tional interest. Lopmeri ‘If no opportunities to isolate the civilian population from combat –
something that would be inevitable in the course of a lengthy guerrilla war –remained, the people 
should only be enrolled in the role of a provider of supplies and accommodation to the Finnish 
troops, while limiting this kind collaboration to just this. This being the case, it does not seem rele-
vant, even initially, to mix civilian organisations with military ones (formed of uniform-wearing 
fighters).’682 
 
According to Lopmeri’s calculations, the number of territorial troops available for 
local defence duties in 1964, measured in ‘troops comparable to local defence forces ’
amounted to approximately 150,000 men, of which the number that could be placed 
in the basic organisation of local defence amounted only to around 84,000. On the 
basis of this, Lopmeri outlined a territorial defence organisation that was divided in-
to military provinces, military districts and military areas, arguing that such a division 
of responsibility would be ideally suited for territorial guerrilla-type activities. In 
practice, such a system meant that each military province needed to be prepared to 
launch guerrilla war, with military districts being responsible for turning into guerril-
la districts and military areas into guerrilla areas. According to Lopmeri, integrating 

680 Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista ja mahdollisuuksista, jotka liittyvät työhön alueellisen sissiorgani-
saation aikaansaamiseksi (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds and opportuni-
ties related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation’), PE:n no.tta 2 June 1964, 
11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained). 
681 Ibid. 
682 Ibid. 
 
199 
frontier guard troops into the territorial guerrilla organisation was particularly practi-
cal, in view of their nature. Lopmeri proposed that work on organisation be divided 
into different phases, the first one of them addressing the arrangements for available 
troops, their inspections and allocation to rear area defensive tasks within the 
framework of the territorial system. The first phase was completed by 1967. The 
second phase would comprise increasing the number of such local defence troops 
that would be reserved for direct or supportive front-line duties. According to 
Lopmeri’s proposal, this phase would be completed by 1970.683 
 
In autumn 1963, work to put the observations made by the Guerrilla Tactics Com-
mittee and the Operations Department in practice began where applicable. Major 
Ermei Kanninen, who had acted as the secretary of the Guerrilla Tactics Commit-
tee, was appointed deputy battalion commander of the Häme Cavalry Battalion on 1 
April 1963, and was ordered by the General Headquarters to organise a teaching 
event on territorial guerrilla activities in Lahti in November. The event was intended 
for mid-level leaders, principally for officers holding different positions at the head-
quarters of divisions, military districts and army units. This training event was 
chaired by Kanninen, who also gave all the key presentations by virtue of his famili-
arity with the subject matter. The teaching material and lectures of the event pro-
vides a valuable contemporary document, enabling on the one hand the assessment 
of the development phase that territorial guerrilla-type activities were undergoing at 
the time and, on the other hand, the evaluation of the changes that had already tak-
en place in the methods available to guerrilla warfare and their impact on the think-
ing of the art of war.684 
 
Kanninen introduced the training event, giving a broad-based presentation of the is-
sues related to guerrilla warfare. In his presentation, Kanninen discussed the issue 
from the perspective of the opportunities available to the Finnish art of war, pre-
requisites for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, the assessment of the ef-
fectiveness of guerrilla-type activities, mental endurance, and the provision of sup-
plies to guerrilla troops.685 While apparently the only one in its kind, this event 
opened the way to providing information to troops hungry for knowledge and 
tasked with the responsibility of implementing guerrilla-type activities and providing 
training in them. 
 
On 8 July 1964, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Sime-
lius, approved on proposal by Olavi Lopmeri that a research group be set up, 
chaired by Colonel Leevi Välimaa (PE op-os) and having Colonel Otto Ylirisku (PE 
jv-os), Lieutenant Colonel Leo Rantanen (RvE), Lieutenant Colonel Kauko Räsänen 
(HuoltoK) and Major Olavi Lopmeri (PE op-os) as its members. Lopmeri also acted 
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as secretary to the group.686 Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces at the ti-
me, Sakari Simelius, recalls the issue as follows: ‘The committee that I had set up had 
looked into the issue for several years, conducting even practical experiments. Over time, the method 
took proper shape, and was brought into line with the requirements set for it. In a presentation held 
in early July 1964, I approved the principles for territorial guerrilla-type activities.’687 
 
Participation by the Frontier Guard in the development of guerrilla tactics was par-
ticularly welcomed, as it was considered to provide opportunities to link the Coast 
Guard organisation to guerrilla-type activities. With regard to guerrilla-type activities 
in the archipelago and the training of guerrillas for that area, standing orders were 
issued in late 1965, aimed at familiarising the personnel of the Coast Guards with 
guerrilla-type activities, reconnaissance and surveillance in sections of the Finnish 
archipelago and coastal areas that the enemy had occupied.688 
 
The Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics was tasked with preparing a proposal, us-
ing primarily theoretical research as well as map and experimental exercises, for the 
objectives to be set for Finnish guerrilla-type activities, general tasks of guerrilla jae-
ger troops and tactics suitable for local defensive forces. The objective was set at 
drafting a proposal on the basis of which a final and detailed guerrilla organisation 
and its wartime equipment could be defined, training instructions written and a new 
guerrilla regulation formulated. In practice, the key to achieving this objective was to 
look into the methods of guerrilla warfare in effect at the time, as well as methods 
that could be theoretically envisaged, including their applicability to the operations 
of territorial guerrilla troops. The final proposal was to be presented to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in spring 1965.689  
 
The work of the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics was divided into five phases 
scheduled for 1964 and 1965. The first phase consisted of preparatory studies and 
the gathering of information, carried out in October and November 1964. During 
the second phase, spanning the period from November 1964 to February 1965, map 
examinations, including five map exercises, were arranged. The third phase com-
prised two experimental exercises. During the fourth phase, the troops of the De-
fence Forces and the Frontier Guard were assigned various experimental tasks. The 
fifth, and the final, phase of the work comprised combining the results of the work 
and drawing conclusions from them, on the basis of which a proposal for guerrilla 
tactics was drafted in early spring 1965.690 Unfortunately, the final report of the Re-
search Group on Guerrilla Tactics cannot be found in the archives of the General 
Headquarters, as it was evidently scrapped due to cuts to archives. 
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In every case, a characteristically Finnish model for guerrilla-type activities and its 
tactical foundations in broad outline were completed by early 1965. Investigation in-
to the issue continued from 1965 onwards, along the lines proposed by the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee, in the form of normal operational and other headquarters work, 
carried out largely by the various branch and other departments of the General 
Headquarters and the Frontier Guard Headquarters.691 By that point, after the 
foundations for a characteristically Finnish art of war and the arrangements for a de-
fensive system had been formulated, a more solid basis existed for examining and 
developing opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities. In practice, this meant 
that the work needed to be expanded to the other sectors –chiefly the navy –in or-
der to engage them in guerrilla-type activities. 
 
The principles of territorial combat also needed to be fully harmonised and distrib-
uted to the units in a comprehensible form to be used in training. Throughout the 
1950s, defence preparations had been hampered by the fact that collaboration be-
tween the Defence Forces and society at large had been limited to the minimum. 
After Finland’s situation with regard to foreign and domestic affairs had stabilised in 
the late 1950s, it was possible to reninitate attempts to warm up collaboration. One 
indication of this was the establishment of a system of national defence courses in 
1961. Such courses provided individuals in leading positions, representing the dif-
ferent fields of society, making proposals for and taking decisions on issues related 
directly or indirectly to the national defence, with an overall picture of Finland’s na-
tional defence.692  
 
Perhaps the most significant peacetime reform regarding the leadership and man-
agement system of the Defence Forces was implemented in 1966, as the old divi-
sional system was abandoned and the country was divided into seven operational 
military provinces, each with territorial responsibility. Fitting together the civilian 
and military administrative areas was the key argument in the reform of the peace-
time organisation of the Defence Forces.693 Starting from 1966, the military prov-
inces under the High Command were assigned territorial responsibilities regarding 
leadership. A total of 27 military districts and a number of military units and estab-
lishments were brought under the seven military provinces. This arrangement was 
also aimed at serving national defence through a territorial division which was 
aligned with that of the civilian administration. The organisational reform was fol-
lowed by a revision of the establishment chart, including the associated reallocation 
of military equipment.694  
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As the 1966 organisational reform of the Defence Forces created independent mili-
tary provinces, under which the brigades of the general forces and local forces were 
placed, the key term was territorial responsibility. Only such local units that had un-
dergone uniform training and were equipped with sophisticated equipment could be 
expected in a real situation to engage simultaneously in combat, in line with their 
territorial responsibility and tasks. In 1966, the Frontier Guard also carried out a 
thorough assessment of the preparedness of its wartime frontier brigades and other 
units capable of engaging in guerrilla-type activities.695 In the same year, the Frontier 
Guard Headquarters launched, evidently prompted by the organisational reform of 
the Defence Forces, a revision of the wartime frontier guard brigades, including a 
separate investigation into the suitability of troops for guerrilla-type activities. Peace-
time organisational reforms had a direct impact on the arrangements of the con-
scription districts and troop establishment, with the indirect consequences also af-
fecting wartime troop compositions: ‘From the perspective of troop establishment, this means 
that frontier guard battalions –depending on the nature of the decision that the organisation reaches 
–are either disbanded with their personnel and materiel being allocated to reorganised frontier bri-
gades, or are assigned as such and as an integral part to one of the frontier brigades.’696   
 
During the first phase, the Frontier Guards submitted proposals to the Frontier 
Guards Headquarters regarding the wartime troop compositions. After the first 
phase was completed, the issue was negotiated by Frontier Guard com-manders, on 
2 and 3 November 1966, during which the issue of the suitability of the or-
ganisation of a guerrilla jaeger battalion for guerrilla-type activities in particular was 
raised. The second phase comprised the examination of experimental troop compo-
sitions formed on the basis of proposals submitted by the Frontier Guards, princi-
pally in the form of map and operational preparedness exercises. The final date for 
the submittal of drafts for troop compositions was set for 1 April 1967.697 The pre-
liminary studies found that the Frontier Guards must be capable of engaging in 
guerrilla-type activities under all conditions, both in their peacetime and wartime 
compositions. The Frontier Guards Headquarters sent the individual Guards a cov-
ering letter, which was intended to prompt them to begin the revision work, accord-
ing to which: ‘changing the wartime composition of the Frontier Guards aims to enhance the 
safeguarding of Finland’s neutrality when the country is neutral, and improve the fighting capability 
of frontier guard units while they are engaged in combat in the role of a covering force.’698 
 

695 PE:n no. 525/Lkptsto/10 sal/18.10.1967, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confiden-
tial document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 18 sal (research permit obtained). 
696 RvE:n no. 83/III a/sal/1.4.1966, RvE:n no. 282/III sal/26.10.1966, RvE:n no. 283/III sal/ 
26.10.1966, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential 
archive’), identifier F 17 sal (research permit obtained). 
697 RvE:n no. 257/III sal/10.10.1966, RvE:n no. 269/III/sal/20.10.1966, RvE:n no. 309/III 
sal/24.11.1966, RvE:n no. 329/III/sal/10.12.1966, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a 
confidential document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 17 sal (research permit obtained). 
698 RvE:n no. 318/III sal/29.11.1966, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a confidential 
document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 17 sal (research permit obtained). 
 
203 
Between 1966 and 1968, Finnish officers made several visits abroad for the purpose 
of gaining new insights and ideas, with excellent results. Major Maunu Rautonen, 
Finland deputy military attaché in Stockholm, visited the Jaeger School in Kiruna on 
at least three occasions in March 1966. According to his report, Rautonen also visit-
ed the Jaeger School training areas for live ammunition exercises in Rautas and Abis-
ko. While Rautonen’s visit was otherwise fairly ordinary, hepaid special attention to 
the main training objectives of the Swedish troops which were reconnaissance and 
guerrilla warfare.699 Arto Lavento, 1st Lieutenant at the Frontier Guard, attended a 
guerrilla course in Bombås between 15 and 27 August, arranged by the Norwegian 
Home Guard, Heimevernet. Lieutenant Colonel Pauli Kaskeala, Finland’s military at-
taché in Oslo, also visited this course, held in Bombås between 23 and 27 August 
1966, observing its final exercise.700  
 
First Lieutenant Arto Lavento compiled a detailed and exhaustive report on his visit, 
submitting it to the Frontier Guard commanders and the chief of the Frontier 
Guard Academy. Lavento’s report sums up his views and experiences for the bene-
fit of training in Finnish guerrilla-type activities According to Lavento, Norwegian 
guerrilla-type activities were based on broad operational freedom of specially trained 
units and on operations for which arrangements had been made in advance. ‘Contact 
persons’ among the local population had also been trained, tasked with supplying 
guerrilla jaeger units with information and materiel in wartime and, if necessary, ar-
ranging for the care of wounded guerrilla jaegers in civilian accommodation if their 
evacuation from the area proved impossible. The training provided on the course 
comprised classroom lessons, practical exercises in guerrilla tactics and a final exer-
cise. An interesting detail regarding the training material was the fact that the Nor-
wegians used two Finnish training films, ‘Sissitaitoja kesällä ’(‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in 
the summer’) and ‘Sissit iskevät   ’(‘Guerrilla jaegers strike’).701  
 
The focus of training provided by the course was placed on preparing a base, setting 
up lookouts, patrolling, personal camouflage, and the preparation of various explo-
sive charges. Training paid practically no attention to countermeasures that the en-
emy might launch. Lavento was extremely satisfied with the attitude shown by the 
Norwegians and their willingness to collaborate, as well as with the fact that ‘the 
Norwegians harbour absolutely no misconceptions about Finland’s political status.’The report 
submitted by Finland’s military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Pauli Kaskeala, con-
firmed almost all of the observations made by 1st Lieutenant Arto Lavento, while 
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arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 17 sal (re-
search permit obtained). 
701 KR:n no.tta 8.9.1966 (matkakertomus Norjan Heimevernetin sissikurssilta 15.–27.8.1966) (‘Report on 
a guerrilla course arranged by the Norwegian Heimevernet between 15 and 27 August 1966’), KR:n 
no. 37/I/sal/9.9.1966, RvE:n no. 234/II/sal/13.9.1966, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 
(‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 17 sal (research permit ob-
tained). See also Sissitaitoja kesällä (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the summer’), completed on 1 May 
1960, P 513, KAVA. Sissit iskevät (‘Guerrilas jaegers strike’), the date of completion 1 May 1960, P 
514, KAVA. 
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also highlighting the use of ‘civilian contact persons ’as part of territorial guerrilla-type 
activities. Kaskeala regarded this arrangement as interesting and highly important.702 
 
In spring 1968, yet another visit was paid to Sweden by eight officers from the De-
fence Forces and one from the Frontier Guard. Once again, the Finnish officers vis-
ited the Kiruna Jaeger School, located in the Upper Norrland military area, where 
they familiarised themselves with the Swedish training in guerrilla-type activities and 
guerrilla jaegers’ special equipment. Captain Raimo Piiroinen from the Frontier 
Guard Academy, who participated in the visit, drafted a detailed report on it, high-
lighting the importance of Finno-Swedish collaboration and the exchange of infor-
mation and experiences related to guerrilla-type activities. The report was appended 
with detailed curricula and training programmes for the Swedish training in guerrilla-
type activities. In his summary Piiroinen noted that ‘on several occasions the Swedes point-
ed out that it had been the Finnish army that had taught them the most lessons, setting an example 
for how even a small country is worth defending.’703 
 
The visits to Sweden and Norway, conducted for the purpose of obtaining intelli-
gence and for study, indicate that the Finnish Defence Forces retained their interest 
in foreign models and guerrilla-type activities throughout the 1960s. It is also note-
worthy that the Finnish military sought to obtain information on guerrilla-type ac-
tivities and guerrilla warfare from Finland’s neighbours in the West –from countries 
where the conditions and resources were practically identical to those in Finland. 
Corresponding information on Finnish experiences were handed over to Finland’s 
partners, particularly to the Swedes and Norwegians. It can be concluded from the 
above discussion that such visits conducted for the purpose of obtaining intelligence 
in a legal way produced useful information that was put to good use, at least in part, 
in Finnish guerrilla training and in the development of tactical issues related to guer-
rilla warfare.   
 
 
Guerrilla warfare as a topic in the training events of the top leadership be-
tween 1961 and 1965 
 
Training events for the highest-ranking officers were initiated in the Defence Forces 
in 1961. Such training events, arranged at intervals of a few years, consisted of 
courses approximately three weeks in length providing, as their name suggested, the 
highest ranking officers of the Defence Forces with up-to-date information on op-
erational issues and trends in the art of war.704 Course programmes and content 
were prepared in most cases by the Operations Division, with the chief of the Gen-
eral Headquarters acting, with some exceptions, as the leader of the courses. Course 

702 Sotasm:n no.tta 30.8.1966, KR:n no.tta 8.9.1966 (matkakertomus Norjan Heimevernetin sissikurssilta 
15.–27.8.1966) (‘Report on a guerrilla course arranged by the Norwegian Heimevernet between 15 
and 27 August 1966’), RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a 
confidential archive’), identifier F 17 sal (research permit obtained). 
703 RK:n no. 10/sal/2.5.1968 ja RvE:n no. 137/II/sal/20.6.1968, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 
1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 19 sal (research per-
mit obtained). 
704 PE:n no. 33/Koultsto/5 a 1/sal/20.3.1965, T 25086/F 1sal, KA. 
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programmes focused on key issues in the national defence on the level of the top 
leadership. Courses were normally arranged at the premises of the National General 
Staff College.705 In 1961, 1962, 1964 and 1966, training events for the top leadership 
1–4 (YPO:s 1–4) were arranged.706   
 
At the first training event for the top leadership (YPO 1, 1961), Lieutenant Colonel 
Väinö Salmela, then chief of the Staff Duties Office of the General Headquarters, 
gave an introductory presentation on the foundations and wartime arrangements of 
the Finnish Defence Forces. Salmela’s introduction made indirect references to the 
state and quality of training in guerrilla-type activities. ‘The mobility of the reconnaissance, 
guerrilla, coastal and coastal jaeger battalions –all part of our special infantry –has been im-
proved. Reconnaissance and guerrilla jaeger troops are provided with paratrooper training.’707 As 
the role of guerrilla-type activities at the time was still unclear, Salmela discussed the 
issue only cursorily. 
 
The second training event (YPO 2, 1962) touched on guerrilla-type activities by pre-
senting the content of a draft for the new Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regulation’) to the 
course participants. The inspector of the infantry introduced the participants to 
‘Yleistaktiikan suuntaviivoja ’ (‘Guidelines for general tactics’), noting, among other 
things, that ‘…we have been forced to revise our tactical methods in the various forms of fighting. 
This revision has taken place in connection with the revision of the Field Regulation, Part II. We 
have attempted to identify means for eliminating the mobility and superiority in firepower available 
to the enemy.’708 This is a direct reference to Chapter VIII, Sissitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type 
activities’) in the Field Regulation and, with regard to the forms of fighting, to its 
subchapters which discussed guerrilla-type activities under defence and delaying ac-
tion.709 
 
At the third training event (YPO 3, 1964), guerrilla warfare was introduced to the 
participants under its own theme. Major Olavi Lopmeri, who was investigating guer-
rilla warfare related issues on a full-time basis at the Operations Department at the 
time, gave a presentation entitled ‘Guerrilla warfare ’. Lopmeri opened his presen-
tation, with the General Staff of the Defence Forces as his audience, somewhat pro-
vocatively. ‘My presentation, which has an introductory nature, has been deliberately entitled 
‘guerrilla warfare ’, a concept that is undefined in our regulations and that in other respects is rather 
vague. This is because we wanted to ensure sufficiently strong grounds and an objective starting point 

705 Wennström, Finn-Göran: Ylemmän päällystön kurssit (‘Courses for the General Staff’), an article in 
the book Sotakorkeakoulu suomalaisen sotataidon kehittäjänä (‘The National General Staff College as a 
developer of the Finnish art of war’), edited by Arto Kotro, Juva 2009, p. 314. 
706 T 26965/Dk 1 sal – Dk 4 sal, KA. 
707 PE:n no. K11/Lkptsto/Da sal/28.2.1961, T 26965/Dk 1 sal, KA. One of the students on YPO 
1 was Jorma Järventaus, who had worked with guerrilla-related issues. 
708 Yleistaktillisia suuntaviivoja (‘Guidelines for general tactics’), a lecture on YPO 2: on 2 May 1962, 
T 26965/Dk 2 sal, KA. Students of YPO 2 included Veikko Koppinen, Veikko Karhunan and Lee-
vi Välimaa, all of whom had dealt with issues related to guerrilla tactics. Karhunen, Veikko Evert, 
an extract from personal details, no. 37447, KA. Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from per-
sonal details, no. 55645, KA. Välimaa, Leevi Kalervo, an extract from personal details, no. 46511, 
KA. 
709 Cf. the previous Kenttäohjesääntö I (KO I) (‘Field Regualtion Part i’), Mikkeli 1963, pp. 103–113, 
140, 190–191 and 231. 
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for discussing all such issues that everyone understands to be included in guerrilla warfare –without 
any definitions.’Lopmeri also noted that, from the perspective of developments in the 
art of war, new ideas for and foreign trends in guerrilla warfare require extensive re-
search and adaptive measures to be taken, in order for them to fit, ‘particularly, into 
the national defence system undergoing a transformation in a territorial direction ’.710 
 
 Lopmeri introduction was extensive, focusing, above all, on the opportunities avail-
able to a characteristically Finnish art of war and guerrilla warfare, including their 
strengths and weaknesses. Lopmeri presented guerrilla warfare and its applicability 
to Finnish conditions in 1964, giving credit to Veikko Koppinen and ‘his impressive 
command for attention ’ issued in order to draw awareness to issues related to guerrilla 
warfare, thereby helping to arouse considerable interest in guerrilla-type activities 
and guerrilla warfare Finland. Lopmeri ended his introduction by presenting an out-
line of a national system for waging guerrilla warfare, based on his own investiga-
tions. ‘We, if anybody, undoubtedly need one. I believe that just as well as in Algeria, Cuba, Ko-
rea and Indochina, the requisite spirit can be found in our country.’711 A reference to Algeria 
was well in line with the trend of the time, as the General Headquarters kept close 
watch on the training given to the French ground forces during the 1960s, particu-
larly with regard to anti-guerrilla tactics.712 
 
The fourth training event (YPO 4, 1966) touched only cursorily on issues related to 
guerrilla warfare. Chief of the National General Staff College, Major General Mikko 
Soste, noted in his introduction with regard to the importance of reconnaissance 
that ‘advantage must be taken of guerrilla-type activities and preparations for them must be made 
in good time ’.713 Sisto had personal experiences of and views on guerrilla-type acti-
vities, as he reportedly strongly supported the official view of the National General 
Staff College concerning the opportunities available to guerrilla warfare in Lap-
land.714 It should be mentioned that in early 1966 the General Headquarters had 
taken a decision, according to which the training of the reconnaissance troops of the 
wartime Supreme Headquarters – the reconnaissance battalion of the High Com-
mand –should be supplemented with skills in guerrilla-type activities and parachute 
jumping.715  
 

710 Sissisodankäynti (‘Guerrilla warfare’), a lecture given at YPO 3’s on 20 March 1964, T 26965/Dk 
3 sal, KA. Students of YPO 3 included Martti Avela, Björn Kontiopää and Unto Matikainen, all of 
whom had worked on issues related to guerrilla tactics. Avela, Martti, an extract from personal de-
tails, no. 30515, KA. Kontiopää, Björn Harald Wilhelm, an extract from personal details, no. 40903, 
KA. Matikainen, Unto Osvald, an extract from personal details, no. 51481, KA. 
711 Ibid. 
712 See, for example, a memorandum submitted by Finland’s military attaché to France, dated 18 Ju-
ly 1962, T 25991/F 8, KA. Memorandum by Finland’s military attaché no. 57/14/sal/Pariisi/ 
17.11.1965, T 25094/F 13 sal, KA. PE:n no. 386/Tarktsto/14 a/sal/1.12.1965, T 25094/F 13 sal, 
KA. 
713 Näkökohtia suurten joukkojen johtamisesta oloissamme nykyaikaisessa sodassa (‘Aspects of the leadership 
of large troops under Finnish conditions in the modern war’), a lecture given on YPO 4 on 15 Sep-
tember 1966, T 26965/Dk 4 sal, KA. The students on YPO 4 included Erkki Setälä, who had 
worked with issues related to guerrilla war. 
714 Vesterinen (1995), p. 41. 
715 PE:n no. 1/Tarktsto/5 sal/17.1.1966, T 25094/F 14 sal, KA. 
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All in all, the training events for the highest ranking officers in the 1960s provided 
an important forum through which the latest developments in the art of war could 
be relayed via the key decision-makers in the Defence Forces in up-to-date form to 
all troops. In this respect, the transfer of plans related to guerrilla-type activities, in-
cluding general situational awareness, from the Operations Division of the General 
Headquarters to the military provinces and the military units via the army’s highest-
ranking officers was of vital importance. During the training events, many confiden-
tial discussions, including general commentary on the issues covered, took place be-
tween the participants. Such discussion may have played a crucial role in the further 
development of guerrilla-type activities, helping to put them on a permanent footing 
in the Finnish art of war. 
 
  
A summary of investigations, texts and discussions related to guerrilla war 
between 1961 and 1966 
 
According to different sources, the definition of concepts related to guerrilla warfare 
was twofold in nature in the early 1960s. Although attempts were made to distin-
guish guerrilla-type activities from guerrilla warfare, no clear conceptual separation 
was made between the methods of guerrilla-type activities and the operational prin-
ciples of a resistance movement. On the other hand, drawing such a line is still ex-
tremely difficult. Attempts to make a distinction in terms of concepts and content in 
the 1960s were influenced by personal opinions and by the fact that the definitions 
in regulations reflected the thinking of at least two tactical approaches and schools. 
The basic idea and general tactical principles of guerrilla-type activities were defined 
in the regulations written in the 1960s in terms that were considerably more moder-
ate in tone than the texts from the 1950s. It can be said with certainty that behind 
this lay the systematic research and experimentation carried out by the Guerrilla 
Tactics Committee in the early 1960s; the 1950s had been characterised, after all, by 
fragmental discussion conducted by a number of individuals.  
 
Public discussion in the press and magazines, as well as among officers, was divided 
into two groups –pro and con. Discussion by officers on the art of war was mostly 
conducted in the form of opinionated articles on guerrilla related issues, sometime 
with a strong emotional charge. Between 1961 and 1966, a total of eight articles on 
guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla warfare was published in the press and three in 
magazines. During the same period, the issue was addressed in five theses prepared 
at the National General Staff College. In addition to the National General Staff Col-
lege, guerrilla-type activities were examined in 16 studies prepared by the staff of-
ficer courses and infantry captain courses arranged by the Army Combat School.716  
 
The authors that discussed guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare included 
Taisto Olavi Lehti, Aatos Savunen, Veikko Koppinen, Esa Seppänen, and two au-

716 With regard to the number of articles published, Sotilasaikakauslehti (a Finnish trade magazine on 
military issues) published most articles on guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare between 
1961 and 1968. Ruotuväki and Suomen Sotilas – both Finnish trade magazines on military issues – as 
well as several branch papers and magazines published articles that touched on guerrilla-type activi-
ties and guerrilla warfare; these articles have been omitted in the above calculation due to the scant 
space devoted to them. See the bibliography of this thesis. 
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thors who wrote under a pseudonym and remained anonymous. While it is difficult 
to find a uniform definition for guerrilla-type activities in the articles referred to 
above, they generally refer to guerrilla-type activities as combat and harassment op-
erations that guerrilla troops carry out in the enemy’s rear or in areas that the enemy 
has occupied. The articles also often referred to tactical experiences gained of guer-
rilla-type activities during the Winter War and the Continuation War. 
 
In 1961, Lieutenant Colonel Taisto Olavi Lehti published an article on revolutionary 
warfare in Sotilasaikakauslehti, discussing it laudably from an international perspec-
tive. In his article, Lehti focused mostly on revolutionary wars in which guerrilla 
warfare had been used, according to him, to great effect throughout the entire 20th 
century. ‘The 20th century has given rise to a new type of war, the revolutionary war, which may 
be called semi-military, because in it the political means of warfare play an equally important role 
as military power with its tanks, artillery and aircraft.’717 It should be mentioned that the 
article authored by Taisto Olavi Lehti exhibits a remarkable conformity with the 
background material that had been at the disposal of the Guerrilla Tactics Commit-
tee, and with the articles published by the pseudonym ‘Tarkkailija ’ (‘Observer’) in 
Helsingin Sanomat in September 1958.718  
 
In 1961 Sotilasaikakauslehti published an offprint of the magazine entitled Maan-
puolustuksemme (‘Our national defence’). Lieutenant General Aatos Maunula au-
thored and article on the military aspects of the national defence for the offprint. In 
his article, Maunula discussed Finland’s response to possible hostilities from the 
viewpoint of the art of war. ‘The Second World War and many of the smaller wars that have 
erupted after it have also convincingly demonstrated the importance of being prepared for guerrilla 
warfare waged under special conditions. After all, guerrilla war represents a fairly rudimentary but, 
by the same token, a modern form of warfare.’719 
 
Authors who developed theme of guerrilla warfare along international lines in their 
articles published between 1963 and 1966 included Lieutenant Colonel Aatos 
Savunen, Lieutenant Touko Rissanen and two authors who wrote under a pseu-

717 Lehti, T. O.: Tietoja kumouksellisesta sodankäynnistä (‘Information on revolutionary warfare’), Soti-
lasaikakauslehti 8/1961, pp. 365–373. 
718 Cf. for example, the pseudonym Tarkkailija (‘Observer’): Kapinantekotaito – havaintoja aikamme si-
irtomaavallankumouksista (‘The art of launching an insurgency – observations on revolutions in colo-
nies’), Helsingin Sanomat 1 September 1958, and Esimerkkejä vallankumoussodista (‘Examples of rev-
olutionary wars’), Helsingin Sanomat 3 September 1958. See also Vallankumoussota ja sen perusteet 
(‘Revolutionary war and its grounds’), an undated memorandum from 1961, and Vallankumoussota 
(‘Revolutonary war’), an abridged translation of a special issue entitled ‘La Guerre Revolutionaire’ 
of the magazine ‘Revue Militaire d’Information 281/1957’; translated into Finnish by Captain E. 
Kanninen; background material for the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, Ermei Kanninen’s private col-
lection; the original documents in the possession of the author of this thesis.  
719 Maunula, Aatos: Maanpuolustuksen sotilassektori, (‘The military sector of national defence’), an off-
set of Sotilasaikakauslehti, 1961, pp. 21–25. 
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donym.720 Above all, these articles were an indication that the officer corps kept an 
eye on guerrilla warfare by examining foreign examples and developments. On the 
one hand, two of the authors who wrote under a pseudonym, noted that anything 
touching on guerrilla warfare was still so sensitive in the 1960s that the authors did 
not wish to be labelled as advocates of revolutionary ideas, although the issues 
mostly concerned the discussion of various theorises within the scope of the art of 
war.  
 
With regard to addressing the purely Finnish art of war, one magazine article was 
published in 1965 and three press articles in 1966. In 1965, Major General Veikko 
Koppinen published a long article in Jalkaväen vuosikirja (an annual trade publication 
dedicated to infantry-related issues), in which he discussed the opportunities availa-
ble to guerrilla-type activities in support of territorial national defence. In his article, 
Koppinen approached his topic by dividing guerrilla-type activities into operations 
carried out by local guerrilla jaeger and elite troops, and guerrilla-type activities con-
ducted by the guerrilla jaeger troops of the field army itself. According to Koppinen, 
‘the chances of a small nation waging a successful defensive battle are based on heavy reliance on 
guerrilla jaeger troops, and the support that guerrilla-type activities can lend to the armed national 
defence is directly proportional to the number of guerrilla jaegers ’.721 This bold and fairly open 
article provides, in a way, a synthesis of his Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging 
a guerrilla war’), published in 1960, and the conclusions drawn by the Guerrilla Tactics 
Commission.722 The article published by Koppinen prompted Lieutenant Colonel Aa-
tos Savunen to comment on the issues presented by Koppinen in issue 5/1966 of 
Sotilasaikakauslehti. In particular, Savunen was critical of the possibilities of estab-
lishing the guerrilla jaeger organisations described by Koppinen and of the arrange-
ments that they would require. Savunen notes, among other things that ‘if we really in-
tend to resort to large-scale guerrilla activities, considerably more time must be allocated to 
training.’723 
 
Natually enough, Koppinen wrote a rejoinder to Savunen’s constructive criticism, 
publishing it in issue 8/1966 of Sotilasaikakauslehti. In his article, Koppinen re-
sponded to the issues raised by Savunen, noting that his article was purely theo-
retical in nature. ‘My article sought only to present theory of a method of national defence, with-

720 Savunen, Aatos: Amerikkalaista sissitoimintaa, (‘Examples of American guerrilla-type activities’), 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 5/1963, pp. 227–228. Rissanen, Touko: Sissisodankäynti Etelä-Vietnamissa ja Lao-
sissa (‘Guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam and Laos’) Sotilasaikakauslehti 11/1964, pp. 486–494. N. 
S. (a pseudonym): Sissisodasta ja sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities’), 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 5/1965, pp. 295–297. V. (a pseudonym): Sissisodan ja vastasissitoiminnan mahdolli-
suudet Tanskassa (‘Opportunities available to guerrilla warfare and anti-guerrilla operations in Den-
mark’) Sotilasaikakauslehti 2/1966, pp. 109–110. 
721 Koppinen, Veikko: Eräitä sissitoiminnan mahdollisuuksia aseellisen maanpuolustuksen tukena (‘On 
certain opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in support of armed national defence’), 
Jalkaväen vuosikirja V, 1965–1966, pp. 21–33. 
722 Cf. the previous with, among other thins, Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for guerrilla warfare’)(a 
draft), Helsinki 1 June 1960, PE Op-os kirjeistö 1960, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. 
PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tac-
tics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). 
723 Savunen, Aatos: Sissitoiminta maanpuolustuksen tukena (‘Guerrilla-type activities supporting the 
national defence’) Sotilasaikakauslehti 5/1966, pp. 297–281. 
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out making any attempt to apply it to Finnish conditions. Most questions related to it cannot be 
openly discussed, let alone be expected to receive answers to them in a public forum. Any applica-
tions of the method fall within the scope of public documents.’724 This is an indication of the 
fact that Koppinen knew more about the developments in guerrilla-type activities 
and the situation regarding the art of war than he could write about in public. After 
all, the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, Olavi Lopmeri and the Research Group on 
Guerrilla Tactics had already completed their work under the oversight of the Gen-
eral Headquarters, submitting their reports for the purpose of prompt imple-
mentation of the measures proposed in them. 
 
In late 1966, one more article was published in which guerrilla warfare was discussed 
on a strategic level. Captain Esa Seppänen, who had studied the issue in his own 
thesis, opened his article by noting that ‘the Second World War, and the ensuing period of 
Cold War, have brought a new element to the art of war, the guerrilla war.’725 Seppänen was 
definitively right in noting that guerrilla warfare could be regarded as a phenomenon 
in its own right within the art of war, even in the mid-1960s and even in Finland. 
 
While a total of 21 studies on guerrilla-related issues were produced at the different 
course levels at the military schools between 1951 and 1966, only a few of them dis-
cussed the issue from the perspective of the Finnish art of war. Among theses pro-
duced at the National General Staff College, those authored by Captain Klaus Saar-
enheimo, Captain Paavali Turpeenniemi and Captain Jukka Karvinen deserve a 
mentin, all of them critically discussing the role of guerrilla-type activities in national 
defence. The thesis prepared by Captain Saarenheimo, completed in 1962, provides 
an excellent description of the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities 
within the framework of a brigade and army corps, shedding light on the thinking 
prevalent at the time. Saarenheimo noted that if anything, the importance of guerril-
la-type activities has increased. ‘Something of a paradox has taken place in military develop-
ment over the past few decades; alongside the rapid technological and scientific development in mili-
tary equipment, the outdated and rudimentary guerrilla warfare has gained increased 
importance.’726 Saarenheimo’s thesis was reportedly used by the Guerrilla Tactics 
Committee as background material, an indication of its high quality.727 
 
Captain Paavali Turpeenniemi and Captain Jukka Karvinen looked into the oppor-
tunities available to guerrilla-type activities in operations conducted in Lapland and 
in the Finnish archipelago. Turpeenniemi discussed the obscure distinction between 
a guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities, something that was characteristic of the 
period. ‘In Lapland, under certain conditions and during certain phases of combat, it is difficult to 

724 Koppinen, Veikko: Sissitoiminta maanpuolustuksen tukena (‘Guerrilla-type activities supporting the 
national defence’) Sotilasaikakauslehti 8/1966, pp. 382–384. 
725 Seppänen, Esa: Sissisodan strategiset piirteet (‘The strategic characteristics of guerrilla warfare’), So-
tilasaikakauslehti 11/1966, pp. 525–531. 
726 Saarenheimo (1962), SKK 1/785, KA. 
727 Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013. 
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draw a clear line between guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.’728 With regard to its 
subject matter and discussion, thesis prepared by Jukka Karvinen, a coastal artillery 
officer, appears to be linked to a point in time when the Frontier Guard issued 
standing orders on guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago and the train-
ing of guerrilla jaegers for archipelago conditions. The results of Karvinen’s study 
and the conclusions that he drew were apparently one of the inspirations behind the 
establishment of a committee in 1968, known as the Coastal Guerrilla Tactics 
Committee, an indication of the fact that this thesis also contributed to the devel-
opment of Finnish guerrilla tactics.729 
 
However, between 1961 and 1966, the largest number of studies related to guerrilla 
warfare were produced on staff officer courses and on the infantry captain courses 
arranged by the Army Combat School. An examination of the list of studies com-
pleted reveal that the Army Combat School was focused on investigating guerrilla 
tactics, as a total of 16 studies with a guerrilla-related theme were completed at the 
School. As a general rule, theses were brief texts –approximately 20 to 40 pages in 
length, the quality of which varied considerably from one author to another. How-
ever, they include a number of excellent theses, of which those produced by Captain 
Sami Sihvo, 1st Lieutenant Ilpo Hietavalkama, 1st Lieutenant Gustav Hägglund and 
1st Lieutenant Jussi Henttinen deserve a mention.730 
 
Although the views expressed by individual officers and schools clashed, it should 
be noted that the tone of the texts, for all their criticism, was openly constructive. 
By the 2000s, this kind of culture appears to have disappeared altogether from the 
Finnish military community and discussions on the art of war. Open and construc-
tive discussion has always played an important role in the development of the Finn-
ish art of war, provided that care is taken that all details are kept confidential in line 
with the instructions in effect. Therefore, the current tendency is highly deplorable 
and possibly even disastrous from the perspective of tactical thinking. On the basis 
of the above, it can be stated that guerrilla warfare, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type 

728 Turpeenniemi, Paavali: Rauhan ajan valmistelut suurinkin voimin Lapin alueella suoritettavaa sissitoimin-
taa varten (toimittaessa nykyaikaisin välinein varustettua vihollista vastaan) (‘Peacetime preparations for 
guerrilla-type activities in Lapland, possibly involving a large number of troops (while operating 
against an enemy equipped with modern technology)’), a thesis prepared at the National General 
Staff College in 1963, SKK 1/812 KA. 
729 Karvinen, Jukka: Sissitoiminnan mahdollisuudet, menetelmät ja välineet saaristoissamme sekä sen vaatimat 
valmistelut erityisesti merivartiostojemme kannalta katsoen (‘Opportunities available to guerrilla-type activi-
ties in the Finnish archipelago and the methods and preparations of such activities, with special at-
tention paid to the role of the Coast Guards’), a thesis prepared at the National General Staff Col-
lege in 1965, SKK 1/842 KA. See also Kosonen – Pohjonen (1994), pp. 435–437. 
730 Sihvo, Sami: Sissijoukkojen yhteistoimintapyynnöt ilma- ja merivoimille (Kuljetusten valmistelut) (‘Calls to 
the air force and navy by guerrilla troops, requesting collaboration (Preparations for transport)’), a 
thesis prepared on a staff officer course in 1961, T 26077/1/i/55, KA. Hietavalkama, Ilpo: Heli-
koptereittein käyttö sissitoiminnassa (‘The use of helicopters in guerrilla-type activities’), a thesis pre-
pared on an infantry captain course in 1964, T 26077/1/43, KA. Hägglund, Gustav: Kivääripataljoo-
nan varustaminen sissitoimintaa varten (‘Equipping a rifle battalion for guerrilla-type activities’), a thesis 
prepared on an infantry captain course in 1964, T 26077/1/52, KA. Henttinen, Jussi: Viikon kes-
tävän kaksipuolisen sissitoimintaharjoituksen järjestäminen (‘Organising a one week-long war game with 
the focus on guerrilla-type activities’), a thesis prepared on an infantry captain course in 1965, T 
26077/1/92, KA.  
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activities were increasingly studied at Finnish military schools in the early 1960s. 
However, providing definitions for concepts falling under the art of war, let alone 
guerrilla-related concepts, was anything but easy. Although there was general aware-
ness in the 1960s of the problems related to theoretical and conceptual definition of 
guerrilla warfare, including its content, discussions nevertheless played a role in fur-
ther development.  
 
 
A summary of the developments in guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activi-
ties between 1945 and 1966 
 
After the war, Finland’s position was difficult. The demobilisation of the wartime 
field army and the activities of the Control Commission that the Allies had set up 
for Finland greatly hampered the development of the Defence Forces. In materiel 
terms, Finland’s defensive capability was good, but the treaties that Finland had 
signed with the Soviet Union gave rise to significant problems in interpreting the is-
sues related to the defence of the country. Preparations for mobilisation and opera-
tional planning remained in a static state for years, and Finland was forced to await a 
solution to the question of the surplus weapons for years. However, these difficul-
ties were overcome on the strength of a policy of acquiescence –at least ostensibly 
– and plans that the military drafted in all secrecy, enabling the country to pull 
through, somehow, until the early 1950 and the somewhat easier times. The ques-
tion of the surplus weapons was resolved in a way that was advantageous for Fin-
land, but operational planning, preparations for mobilisation, and a whole host of 
other factors such as a change in the nature of war, needs for improved mobility, 
and the structural change affecting the Defence Forces brought about such radical 
changes to the foundations of the national defence that the entire military system 
needed to be reformed in order to make it compatible with the requirements of the 
prevalent situation. In this change, guerrilla-type activities and taking advantage of 
the means available to guerrilla warfare played an important role.  
 
Although the Finnish Defence Forces were aware of guerrilla-type activities as early 
as in the 1920s and 1930s, it was only during the postwar period that new kind of at-
tention was being paid to identifying the opportunities available to guerrilla warfare 
in Finland. During this period, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were in-
corporated into the Finnish art of war, and were encoded in the draft for the 1947 
Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘The General Section of the Field Regulation’). Guerrilla 
warfare was also discussed in the 1950s, and then it was expected to be part of fu-
ture wars. Guerrilla-type activities, that had been regarded as an effective form of 
combat before the Winter War, were increasingly being displaced in theoretical 
thinking during the early stages of the Cold War by a fully-fledged guerrilla war –the 
most extreme way of defending a country –following the experiences gained from 
various wars. Many articles in Sotilasaikakauslehti and officers’discussion events also 
compared experiences gained from the pursuit and annihilation of guerrilla and par-
tisan troops during the Second World War. According to such articles and discus-
sions, combat against guerrillas was extremely difficult, particularly in the summer. 
Theoretical thinking predating the Winter War was supplemented by new aspects 
based on war experiences and novel thinking on the art of war. Although the post-
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war principles governing guerrilla-type activities remained largely unchanged in the 
late 1950s, a clear conceptual difference between practice and theory can be dis-
cerned, one leaning towards a guerrilla war that was more total in nature. 
 
Guerrilla-type activities were generally regarded as having increased in importance, 
with helicopters and air transport enabling the extension of the guerrilla jaegers’op-
erating area to the most important targets, not to mention large rear areas. In Fin-
land, guerrilla warfare was examined largely on the basis of experiences gained from 
Norway, Yugoslavia and China. From a wider perspective, guerrilla war was under-
stood to be a form of warfare that would displace regular military operations in are-
as occupied by the enemy, although the entire country, or substantial portions of its 
territory, had been occupied by the enemy, and all operations by the regular army 
had become impossible. Against such a background, it was understandable that 
guerrilla war was regarded as feasible in Finnish conditions but, simultaneously, as 
something that needed to be linked to other operations by the Finnish ground forc-
es. After all, the wars that Finland had waged had shown that it was perfectly possi-
ble that the entire country or portions of it could come under the threat of occupa-
tion. Fighting an enemy with a superior strength was possible using conventional 
means but, should Finland’s defences collapse, the fight was to be continued using 
the methods of a guerrilla war. 
 
Guerrilla methods began to receive increased appreciation as the military under-
stood that a Finland of the late 1950s and early 1960s, suffering from material 
shortages, would always be inferior in strength compared to the invader. Using un-
conventional methods such as systematic guerrilla war, it was thought possible to 
balance the relative strengths and to create a pre-emptive deterrent what would send 
a message to the invader that Finland would defended itself with all available means. 
The continuous development of guerrilla warfare was regarded as necessary, as it 
would otherwise remain a dead letter and a deterrent on paper only. Great im-
portance was also placed on training, because only through training could all for-
mations transition to guerrilla-type activities in practice, which was the requirement 
set by the Field Regulation. Every soldier needed to be versed in the basic skills of 
the guerrilla jaeger –getting by in the field, taking advantage of the terrain and ap-
plying the requisite engineering skills. All Finnish conscripts needed to be trained in 
such basic guerrilla jaeger skills that would enable them to get by in a guerrilla war 
should the country face a surprise attack. Guerrilla-type activities also needed to be 
linked to other operations conducted by the army. This thinking exhibits clear paral-
lels to experiences gained both from China and Vietnam. The previous notion of as-
sembling and training guerrilla troops and units after the onset of the war had be-
come past history.  
 
The change in the art of war that took place between 1945 and 1966 regarding guer-
rilla-type activities can be viewed from a number of perspectives. The period from 
1945 until around the mid-1960s was characterised, above all, by confusion over the 
principles of the art of war, the arrangement of training in guerrilla-type activities 
and the twofold nature of definitions. Especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
objectives and content of theoretical concept of guerrilla-type activities and their 
functional principles changed considerably. Furthermore, one must bear in mind 
that during the postwar decades, practically the entire Finnish defence system was 
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reformed. Although the first steps of the territorial defence system from its incep-
tion to becoming a recognised defensive doctrine and the keystone of the strategic 
defence are often –and erroneously –associated with articles published in the press 
over the course of the 1960s, the foundation for territorial combat and for the entire 
defensive system in general were largely laid in the 1950s. This development work 
was also interwoven with the utilisation of the methods of guerrilla warfare and 
guerrilla-type activities, including their integration into the national defence system. 
The development of the defence system was related to a large number of problems 
and challenges, the most serious of which culminated in the definition of tactical 
concepts and their content prior to their practical implementation. 
 
From the perspective of the art of war, guerrilla war was defined as a large scale 
popular war, with guerrilla-type activities being defined as harassment directed at the 
enemy’s rear or the territory occupied by the enemy, related to regular military oper-
ations or guerrilla warfare. Both definitions, dating to the 1950s, were quite apt with 
regard to the threat scenarios and other developments prevalent at the time. The 
educational level of the population was seen as playing a major role in a guerrilla 
war. The significance of psychological warfare and the population’s will to defend 
the country were emphasised, based on experiences gained by the Norwegian re-
sistance movement during the Second World War. Technical developments were re-
garded as being a factor that improved opportunities available to guerrilla-type activ-
ities and even guerrilla warfare.  
 
However, the grounds for guerrilla warfare and the operational methods used by 
guerrilla jaegers that Veikko Koppinen presented in the early 1960s gave rise to a 
large number of questions and concerns. The gravest concerns about Koppinen’s 
ideas were related to the ability of small operational groups to fight in isolation, in-
cluding their mental stamina, physical endurance and challenges to their supply. The 
effectiveness of mines was also questioned, as the Defence Forces had insufficient 
experience of Claymore-type mines. The dispersed form of fighting and leadership 
of operations without radio equipment was justifiably regarded as a key problem. 
The practicability of guerrilla methods in an open terrain, particularly in winter, and 
the risk of guerrilla jaegers being discovered, received critical comments. By 1966, 
the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, which had functioned between 1961 and 1963, and 
the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics, which had operated between 1964 and 
1965, had completed their work and submitted their reports on the grounds for ter-
ritorial guerrilla-type activities. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forc-
es had approved the grounds for territorial guerrilla-type activities, adjustments were 
made to the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities, reflecting 
the perspective of the art of war, in summer 1964. By 1966 the Defence Forces had 
adopted an organisation based on military provinces, and the principle of guerrilla-
type activities had more or less been integrated into the territorial defensive think-
ing. This was the beginning of a new period during which the art of war of territorial 
guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were developed towards a true adoption 
of a territorial defence system. While there was a general desire to retain the option 
of guerrilla war, the focus of development efforts began to shift increasingly to-
wards integrating truly Finnish guerrilla-type activities into the Finnish art of war. 
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All in all, it can be seen that by the 1960s, the guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla 
warfare had become an increasingly important part of the planning of national de-
fence, operational skills, tactics and training. However, conflicts in the tactical defi-
nitions and content in the published regulations were a particular source of prob-
lems during these years. Based on contemporary source material, it can be said that 
in the years between 1945 and 1966 and particularly immediately after the wars, at-
tempts were made to separate the content of guerrilla war with all its tactical varia-
tions from guerrilla-type activities. What is noteworthy is that the content of guerril-
la war was given a fairly broad definition which largely referred to warfare in the en-
emy-held territory, conducted alongside regular operations or in their place. Guerril-
la warfare was regarded as a broad umbrella term under which guerrilla-type activi-
ties fell as an essential method. The fact that guerrilla war was chosen, over the 
course of the 1950s, as the ultimate method of war indicates that behind the think-
ing on national operational skills and tactics –even strategic in part –lay the idea to 
continue combat despite the fact that the country or a portion of it had been occu-
pied. 
 
On the other hand, the content of the concepts of the art of war had changed, and 
their definitions were modified, on several occasions particularly in the 1960s. It can 
be concluded that depending on the source and author, thinking on the art of war 
varied, in an often conflicting and confusing manner. The decisions made and 
measures taken between 1945 and 1966 integrated the methods of guerrilla warfare 
into the Finnish art of war. Whether the term used was guerrilla war, guerrilla war-
fare or guerrilla-type activities, the methods of guerrilla warfare were here to stay, 
and were integrated into territorial defensive thinking and the system. 
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5. MAKING GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES PART OF TERRI-
TORIAL COMBAT 
 
 
5.1. From a threat scenario based on an attack designed to capture Finland 
to repelling a surprise invasion 
 
The Guerrilla Tactics Committee, in operation between 1961 and 1963, and the Re-
search Group on Guerrilla Tactics, functioning between 1964 and 1965 and examin-
ing the issue, further had taken a number of initiatives and prepared some proposals 
for the use of local forces in guerrilla-type activities. However, no final decisions on 
the role that local defence would play in the territorial defence system had been tak-
en. This issue was raised in March 1967 when the tasks laid down in a revised opera-
tional basic order, ‘Kymppi ’, issued by the General Headquarters were assessed in the 
military provinces created under the new army composition. (In Finnish military jar-
gon, an operational basic order was referred to as a ‘Kymppi ’ (literally, ‘a tenner ’, 
with no reference to a bank note with a face value of 10). Concerning the prepara-
tions, the operational basic order (opkky 10) commanded the following: ‘Preparations 
for a guerrilla war must be performed alongside other defensive preparations so that a framework for 
territorial guerrilla-type activities, using the various methods of guerrilla-type activities, will be in 
place across the entire territory of the country, based on the local defensive forces in the first phase 
and supplemented by troops of the field army should the situation so require.’The headquarters 
of the Southern Finland Military Province drafted a proposal on the issue for sub-
mittal to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, requesting an order 
on and instructions for the initiation of training in guerrilla-type activities for local 
defence troops.731       
 
At a negotiation event for the Defence Forces mobilisation personnel, commanders 
of wartime army corps and coastal areas, as well as chiefs of the various military dis-
tricts, held in Hämeenlinna between 16 and 17 March 1967, put forth views on the 
peacetime planning of guerrilla-type activities and the training needs of and possibil-
ities available to the personnel. Many of the participants expressed concerns regard-
ing the training in guerrilla-type activities given by the Defence Forces, noting that 
such training was mostly focused on providing professional officers, NCOs and 
conscripts with fieldcraft skills needed in regular military operations. In accordance 
with the guidelines issued by the General Headquarters, the updating of the opera-
tional plans from 1964 onwards required that some parts of the field army and local 
defence troops were used in guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla war under certain 
circumstances. The proposal, signed by Lieutenant General Paavi Ilmola, the Com-
mander of the Southern Finland Military Province, noted that ‘training as a concept 
should be expanded to cover issues related to territorial guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war-

731 The revised ‘operatiivinen peruskäsky no. 10 eli kymppi’ (‘operational basic order no.10, known as 
‘kymppi’) became effective on 25 May 1966, and referred to the fundamentals of military national 
defence laid down in the operational basic order no. 15, which had been revised in the same con-
nection. ESSlE:n no. 111/Optsto/11 sal/19.4.1967, T 25094/F 15 sal, KA. See also Puolus-
tusvalmiutemme (‘Our defence preparedness’), a memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Ermei Kan-
ninen, 23 August, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA. 
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fare.’732 This is an excellent indication of the fact that the internal relationship of 
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in the drafting of defence plans contin-
ued to be unclear, despite the fact that the General Headquarters had, from 1963 
onwards, made attempts to clarify both the concepts of and the operational role of 
guerrilla warfare as part of the territorial defence system by ordering studies and by 
issuing guidelines.733 It should be remembered that the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces had issued an order several years before, in 1963, on the establish-
ment of a territorial guerrilla organisation, on modification of the establishment 
chart and on the guidelines to be applied in guerrilla training.734 
 
The Infantry Office of the General Headquarters responded to the proposal submit-
ted by the Military Province of Southern Finland, stating that the build-up of the 
prerequisites referred to in the proposal would take two to three years. To bring 
training to the requisite level would have required significant measures before the 
level of training at the units would be high enough in to enable the provision of ef-
fective refresher training. Reallocation of key personnel in the establishment chart 
alone would have to be completed before any practical measures, such as refresher 
training or the provision of special training to local defence forces, could be ar-
ranged. However, the General Headquarters promised to draft framework pro-
grammes for guerrilla training over the course of 1968, and to extend training to the 
refresher training of local defence forces during 1969.735 
 
In early 1968, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters clarified the sit-
uation of the defence preparations in order to gain a realistic picture. In March, pre-
paredness was estimated to be on a satisfactory level with regard to the operational 
basic order no. 15, as all military provinces and arms had managed to keep their 
plans and orders up to date. However, a great deal of work still remained to be done 
regarding the planning required by the operational basic order no. 10. These un-
completed plans were particularly related to the preparations of local defence based 
on guerrilla-type activities. The fact that the preparations of territorial guerrilla-type 
activities and local troops lagged behind had nothing to do with incompetence of 
the military provinces or areas but mostly with the General Headquarters drafting 
parallel plans. Over the course of 1968, the General Headquarters drafted plans for 
the reorganisation of local defence forces. Although the military provinces were 

732 Ibid. 
733 Ibid. Cf. Vertaa Sissisodankäynti, Paikallispuolustusjoukkojen kehittäminen ja liittyminen sissitoimintaan 
(‘On guerrilla warfare, the development of local defence forces and linking them to guerrilla-type 
activities’), PE:n no.tta Op-os/sal/9.1.1963 and Kanninen, Ermei: Sissitoiminta ja -sota, niiden tarve, 
mahdollisuudet sekä toimintaedellytykset Suomessa, (‘Guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare, the need 
for them, opportunities available to them and their operational preconditions in Finland’), lecture 
and training material for a training event on territorial guerrilla-type activities, held on 18 November 
1963, and PE:n no.tta /Jvtsto/5 a 3/25.6.1963 (A draft for a training instruction by the inspector of 
the infantry, an appendix to the report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee on 25 June 
1963), Ermei Kanninen private collection, the original documents in the possession of the author 
of this thesis. See also a lecture given on YPO 3 on 30 March 1964, T 26965/Dk 3 sal, KA. 
734 PE:n no. 487/Optsto/11 sal/23.9.1963 (Esittely Puolustusvoimain komentajalle sissitoimikunnan mie-
tinnön pohjalta) (‘Presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on the basis of the 
report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 30 sal, KA. 
735 PE:n no. 47/Jvtsto/5 sal/ 3.5.1967, T 25094/F 15 sal, KA. 
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aware of this simultaneous and parallel planning phase, it resulted in a time lag, 
hampering them from continuing their own preparations.736 
 
With the situation being somewhat disorganised, the General Headquarters empha-
sised that the operational plans drafted by the military provinces also needed to ad-
dress surprise situations. An amendment addressing this would be found, according 
to the General Headquarters, in the final section of operational order no. 10, ‘Käskyn 
asettamat velvoitteet ’ (‘Obligations imposed by this order’). The prerequisite was that 
each military province drafted an independent territorial defence plan for the troops 
to be formed in its territory which, in addition to addressing the troop formation, al-
so included a ‘territorial guerrilla activity plan.’This guerilla activity plan was to be or-
ganised around local defensive troops, supplemented by general forces in certain ar-
eas, to be committed to guerrilla war immediately after they had been formed.737  
 
The strongly felt need to develop local defences in 1967 and 1968 was also closely 
related to mounting tensions in Europe. The dominant and most likely threat sce-
nario taking shape at the time, particularly in the thinking of the military, focused on 
a surprise attack –a limited strategic invasion in fact –aimed at capturing part or all 
of Finnish territory and supported by means of revolutionary warfare by internal el-
ements subversive to Finland’s independence. Aside from terror attacks, a large-
scale surprise invasion, launched on a broad front, was regarded as another, albeit 
unlikely, possibility. Colonel L.K.Välimaa, Chief of the Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters, drafted a memorandum in 1966 in which he discussed in de-
tail the various options for the threat scenario to which Finland was subject. Ac-
cording to Välimaa, a surprise attack would be implemented in the form of what 
was referred to as a limited war, in which the invader would penetrate Finnish ter-
ritory using considerable force in order to capture Finland’s vital areas. Therefore, 
preparation for a quick opening of hostilities by the enemy needed to be made the 
basis of operational planning and preparations.738 Everything suggests that Väli-
maa’s views were based on the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the tightening grip 
of the Soviet Union on its satellites in Europe during the 1960s. 
 
The possibility of a strategic attack aimed at capturing the country came to the fore 
in operational planning and development work in the mid-1960s and later. The na-
ture of an attack seeking to capture the country was presented in more official terms 
in a training package aimed at the Defence Forces personnel, entitled Maan-
puolustuksen perusteet (‘The fundamentals of national defence’). According to the 
dominant, official threat scenario, an attack against Finland would materialise in the 
form of ‘an attack designed to capture the country or a large-scale invasion ’. A surprise attack 
was not specifically defined, but was illustrated with the operations that Germany 
had launched during the Second World War to occupy Norway and Denmark. By 
contrast, as surprise invasion was defined to be ‘a large-scale attack with massed forces 

736 Puolustusvalmiutemme (‘Our defence preparedness’), a memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Ermei 
Kanninen, 23 August 1968, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA. 
737 Ibid. 
738 Katsaus nykyiseen operatiiviseen puolustusvalmiuteemme ja eräitä johtopäätöksiä (‘Survey of our current 
operational defence capability, including certain conclusions drawn from it’), a memorandum by 
Colonel L. K. Välimaa dated 5 October 1966, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA. 
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under a considerable fire support, carried out in order to break a country’s defensive capability and 
to occupy its territory.’739  
 
Juhani Ruutu, who had participated in the development of territorial defence since 
the early 1960s, summed up the change that had taken place in the art of war in the 
late 1960s as follows: ‘The possibility of a surprise attack, known as an attack designed to cap-
ture the country, emerged . The air superiority of a great power enabled a simultaneous attack 
against all major targets in Finland, whether communications or transport connections, state ad-
ministration or the Defence Forces. All vulnerable targets are susceptible to simultaneous attacks –
that is, a surprise attack designed to capture them. For these reasons, we should create a defence sys-
tem that would enable us to be prepared for the worst-case scenario everywhere in Finland.’ In 
practice, this referred to guerrilla warfare, initiated, in part, by local forces at the 
border, aimed at slowing down and causing attrition to the enemy and conducted as 
part of territorial combat.740  
 
Deliberation on the possibility of a capture-style attack continued along similar lines 
at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in the subsequent years. In 
March 1968, Ermei Kanninen, acting deputy division chief, drafted a memorandum 
on Finland’s defence capability, in which he extensively discussed the possibility and 
probability of an attack designed to capture the country. According to Kanninen, an 
attack aimed at capturing Finland might be launched during a global and, particular-
ly, European crisis. Such an attack would be directed against strategic targets in one 
of Finland’s vital areas, using considerable forces. According to Kanninen, military 
intelligence would be able to obtain an early warning of a capture-style attack di-
rected against Finland two days before it was launched, enabling the Defence Forces 
to raise the preparedness of peacetime troops. Such a two-day warning would enable 
the Defence Forces to raise the preparedness of cadre troops and put them on a 
wartime footing.741 
 
It was not until tensions began to mount in Czechoslovakia in spring 1968, leading 
to the country’s occupation in August 1968, that Finland felt that there was suffi-
cient reason to take measures in accordance with the threat scenario. When the 
Czechoslovakian crisis was at its most intense, Finnish military intelligence obtained 
precise and detailed information on the direction in which the situation was devel-
oping. This information enabled intelligence to compile accurate memoranda for the 
president of the republic, the Defence Council and the leadership of the Defence 
Forces. The Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters presented its first 
situational reports on developments in Czechoslovakia to President Urho Kekkonen 
on 22 August, or around one day after the Warsaw Pact occupation operation had 
been launched. The reports put forth a bold assessment on the objectives of Soviet 
policy, the tactics deployed by the occupying force, and on the progress and success 

739 Maanpuolustuksen perusteet, osa (‘The fundamentals of national deference’): Puolustusvoimien tehtävät 
ja mahdollisuudet rauhan ja turvallisuuden ylläpitämiseksi, puolueettomuuden suojaamiseksi ja aseellisen 
hyökkäyksen torjumiseksi (‘The tasks and possibilities of the Defence Forces in the maintenance of 
peace and security and in the repulsion of an armed attack’), Helsinki 1968, p. 10.  
740 Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006.  
741 Puolustusvalmiutemme (‘Our defence preparedness’), a memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Ermei 
Kanninen, 23 August, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA. 
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of the operation. ‘It is quite obvious that we are to live in a world where the law of the jungle 
reigns. The events in Czechoslovakia are yet another reminder of the lessons that the past few dec-
ades have taught us but that are often ignored in rhetoric –the lessons stating that friendship be-
tween small and large nations is just a matter of convenience.’It was concluded from the situ-
ational information obtained that the occupying force was under orders to use min-
imum violence. The occupation operation was regarded as being based on mobility 
and superior numbers. Above all, the Soviet Union had placed great importance on 
media warfare, attempting to present the operation to the international media as a 
justified measure from the very beginning.742  
 
It was not until 2 September, or around 11 days after the intervention was launched, 
that the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters had formed an accurate 
picture of the political developments in Czechoslovakia and the implementation of 
the occupation. This information was also presented to the Defence Council chaired 
by the president. According to the information gathered by military intelligence, the 
Warsaw Pact troops began to prepare for the capture of Czechoslovakia in March, 
possibly earlier. The Intelligence Division was not able to pinpoint the exact date on 
which the decision of the invasion was taken. According to the information received 
by the Intelligence Division, the most surprising aspect of the operation, from the 
perspective of the occupying force, was the fact that they had not been received as 
heroes and liberators, contrary to what they had been told in advance. Instead, ac-
cording to the information, the Czechs had significantly hampered the supply of the 
Soviet troops through unarmed resistance. This was one of the reasons why the So-
viet troops were forced to carry out their task for almost a week without a single hot 
meal.743 
 
It would probably have been impossible to compile such memoranda without the 
help of direct Western contacts and well-informed military attachés posted abroad. 
This notion receives support from the fact that on a memorandum prepared by the 
Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters for the Defence Council, discuss-
ing, among other things, the date on which the decision of the invasion had been 
taken, the words ‘according to the view of the Americans’had been crossed out and re-
placed with ‘perhaps is ’.744 An American assessment of the situation that the General 
Headquarters had received and any knowledge of the contacts of the Finnish mili-

742 See for example Katsaus Tshekkoslovakiaan 22.8.1968 (‘An overview of Czechoslovakia on 22 Au-
gust 1968’), a memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 
22 August 1968, 21/117, UKA. Tshekkoslovakia ja Neuvostoliiton poliittiset päämäärät 22.8.1968 
(‘Czechoslovakia and the political objectives of the Soviet Union’), a memorandum drafted by the 
Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 22 August 1968, 21/117, UKA. Katsaus 
Tshekkoslovakian tapahtumiin (‘An overview of the events in Czechoslovakia’), a memorandum draft-
ed by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 2 September 1968, 21/117, 
UKA. 
743 Katsaus Tshekkoslovakian tapahtumiin (‘An overview of the events in Czechoslovakia’), a memo-
randum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 2 September 1968, 
21/117, UKA. 
744 Tshekkoslovakian kriisi (poliittinen katsaus) (‘The crisis in Czechoslovakia (a political overview)’), a 
memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 2 September 
1968, 21/117, UKA. 
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tary with western military intelligence services were extremely sensitive issues, 
knowledge of which should be limited to as few individuals as possible.  
 
The most senior Finnish decision-makers closely followed the deteriorated situation 
in Europe but, unlike Sweden, for example, no official decision was taken to raise 
the preparedness of the Defence Forces.745 This gave rise to concern and even dan-
gerous situations at some Finnish garrisons. For example, unofficial measures were 
taken to raise preparedness to the degree possible under the territorial defence prin-
ciple.746 It was probably no coincidence that the top military leadership in Finland 
were being trained in repelling an attack designed to capture the country as early as 
May 1968, at the time when the Warsaw Pact had large-scale manoeuvres under way 
in the eastern part of Central Europe. As it was, it was at this time that a course was 
arranged for the top military leadership at the National General Staff College, which 
was concluded by arranging a war game focusing on a threat scenario involving an 
attack aimed at capturing Finland. In the imaginary situation of this war game, the 
enemy launched a surprise attack on Finland, in the course of which it landed troops 
ashore at several locations along the southern coast and brought in airborne troops, 
justifying this by the deteriorated political situation in Europe. The enemy began its 
operations by jamming Finnish air and maritime radars, dropping paratroopers on a 
large scale, bringing in airborne troops by helicopter and landing troops ashore at 
the ports of Helsinki and Hanko and along the coast at Kirkkonummi and Upin-
niemi. Within the context of the war game, Finland received early warning of in-
creased traffic at the Baltic area airfields and seaports three days before the attack 
was launched.747 
 
The military did not waste any time; on 12 July 1968, in other words, only a few 
days after the Warsaw Pact had begun its large headquarters and communications 
exercise, the Military Province of Southern Finland issued an order on the initiation 
of defence preparations in Helsinki. Planning was based on a scenario under which 
the Finnish capital was being defended against an operation that had the character 
of an attack launched in order to capture it. The planners were tasked with identify-
ing the kind of troops that should be deployed for the defence of the capital, includ-
ing the organisation of their chain of command.748 
 
The final version of the memorandum on the defence of Helsinki was completed in 
late October. In a situation in which an attack aimed at capturing Finland was ex-
pected to occur, the Defence Forces were, according to the memorandum, either in 
a state of basic or raised preparedness. The enemy was expected to begin its capture 
operation by bringing in troops amounting to two to four battalions to Helsinki 
ports by cargo ships, being able to carry out this activity undetected. By contrast, the 
enemy was expected to deploy larger forces to capture Helsinki-Vantaa and Malmi 

745 Ibid. 
746 See, for example, Tiilikainen, Heikki: Kylmän sodan kujanjuoksu (‘Running the Cold War Gaunt-
let’), Jyväskylä 2003, p. 7 and pp. 93–117. 
747 An account of Course 1 for the top leadership, dated 11 June 1968, attachment 3d, T 26965/Dk 
6 sal, KA.  
748 PE:n no. 303/Optsto/11 sal/12.7.1968, T 25044/F 3 sal, KA. See also Palokangas, Marko – 
Säämänen, Juuso: Kaappaushyökkäyksestä strategiseen iskuun – osa 1 (‘From an attack designed to cap-
ture Finland to a strategic strike – volume 1’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 9/2007, pp. 25–28. 
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airports. Provided that the enemy succeeded in occupying the two airfields, it was 
expected to bring in two to three airborne divisions during the first 24 hours. The 
invader was expected to support its airborne operations with the aid of ‘tourist 
groups ’, which would move to the vicinity of landing areas only moments before ze-
ro hour in order to provide guidance and communications to the airborne troops. 
At zero hour, the enemy was expected to begin hostilities by launching airborne 
landings simultaneously with the operation that aimed at occupying the Helsinki 
ports. Before bringing in the occupying force proper by sea, the enemy was ex-
pected to make attempts to occupy the coastal artillery installations off Helsinki. 
Surprise operations targeting Santahamina (a military island off Helsinki), the Gen-
eral Headquarters and the National General Staff College were also regarded as 
plausible. Throughout the attack, the enemy’s air activity was expected to be inten-
sive but directed largely at military targets.749 
 
A decision was taken to repel an attack designed to capture Helsinki area by using 
local troops capable of guerrilla-type activities. Such troops were to be formed in 
their planned operational areas.750 A condition for a successful defensive battle was 
a successful repulsion of airborne operations and guerrilla-type activities, for which 
a force amounting to three to four battalions was thought to needed in the first 
phase. By way of other measures designed to slow down the occupation of the air-
ports, the memorandum proposed that weapons be distributed to the air traffic con-
trollers while the army was still in a state of basic preparedness, and that airport per-
sonnel be instructed to block the runways with vehicles and aircraft available at the 
airports. Such measures were expected to at least slow down the occupation of the 
airports.751 
 
According to a threat analysis compiled by the Operations Division of the General 
Headquarters on 2 September, an attack aimed to capture targets along the coast 
would be the most likely threat scenario, targeting principally the shoreline deline-
ated by Porkkala, Helsinki and Porvoo. It was also speculated that an operation 
launched for the occupation of the Finnish capital could be accompanied by a sepa-
rate operation for landing troops either in Hankoniemi or the Åland Islands. Such 
an operation was thought to be aimed at blocking entry to and from he Gulf of Fin-
land, thereby denying the Finnish Navy any operational opportunities. The memo-
randum also speculated that the enemy could attempt to tie up Finnish troops by 
launching a troop-landing operation. The other option proposed by the me-
morandum, a large-scale invasion, was also expected to be accompanied by a troop-
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749 ESSlE:n no. 254/Optsto/11 sal/30.10.1968, T 26965/F 43 sal, KA. 
750 Yleisesikunnan operatiivisen osaston muistio eräistä Helsingin puolustamiseen liittyvistä seikoista (‘A memo-
randum by the General Headquarters on a number of aspects related to the defence of Helsinki’). 
dated 10 December 1968, T 25044/F 3 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. R 3/Optsto/11 henksal/ 
28.6.1968, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
751 ESSlE:n no. 254/Optsto/11 sal/30.10.1968, T 26965/F 43 sal, KA. See also Palokangas, Marko 
– Säämänen, Juuso: Kaappaushyökkäyksestä strategiseen iskuun – osa 2 (‘From an attack designed to cap-
ture Finland to a strategic strike – volume I’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/2007, pp. 43-48. 
 
223 
landing and airborne operation against Helsinki, although the focus of the attack 
was thought to be on Finland’s land border.752 
 
The Czechoslovakian example demonstrated that a surprise attack aimed at captur-
ing the country, when directed at Finland, would most likely begin with airborne 
troops being brought in, initially tasked with occupying the Helsinki airports and 
other key targets. By an order issued on 3 September, the Headquarters of the Mili-
tary Province of Southern Finland tasked the Helsinki Air Defence Regiment with 
the initiation of the planning of the defence of Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, including 
anti-aircraft emplacements, coupled with preparations for guerrilla-type activities to 
be carried out in collaboration with the Military District of Southern Finland. Ac-
cording to the order, defensive positions were to be dimensioned for the anti-
aircraft cannons of the cadre troop of the Air Defence Regiment that was responsi-
ble for forming the unit defending the airport, as well as for the guard company to 
be formed by the military district. The order obligated the Air Defence Regiment to 
draft its plan by 20 September, as the construction of fortifications were to begin 
during the same year.753 
 
After the train of events described above, Ermei Kanninen gave a presentation enti-
tled ‘Puolustusvoimien kehittämisen periaatteet ’ (‘The principles for the development of 
the Defensive Forces’) at a negotiating event for the personnel of the Mobilisation 
Division of the General Headquarters in November 1968. According to the situa-
tional assessment by the General Headquarters, only the Soviet Union and its allies 
possessed a capability to launch surprise operations similar to those seen in Czecho-
slovakia; in other words, capture the entire country. According to the General 
Headquarters, the first significant step towards repelling such a surprise attack 
would be prompt development of Finland’s military preparedness. Cadre troops, 
rapidly deployable for first operational tasks, were seen as a solution. Such tasks 
would include the protection of targets that were of vital importance to the entire 
country –in other words, the key targets of an attack aimed at capturing the coun-
try. Cadre troops were to be in full operational readiness in their frame formation 
within six hours of receiving an order, and within 36 hours after having being rein-
forced with reservists. Furthermore, work needed to be initiated on the develop-
ment of a local defensive system that would be capable of carrying out guerrilla-type 
activities and could not be paralysed by a surprise attack.754 This solution was a poor 
man’s deterrent and as such in line with the Finnish art of war –one against which 
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752 Uhka-analyysi ja tornitykkien tarve (‘A threat analysis and the need for turret guns’), PE:n Op-os:n 
muistio 2.9.1968, T 26513/Hbi 1 sal, KA. Palokangas, Marko – Säämänen, Juuso: Kaappaushyök-
käyksestä strategiseen iskuun – osa 2 (‘From an attack designed to capture Finland to a strategic strike – 
volume’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/2007, pp. 43–48. 
753 ESSlE:n no. 154/Optsto/11 sal/3.9.1968, T 25044/F 3 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. 38/R/10/ 
14.11.1967, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
754 PE:n no. 486/Optsto/1 sal/14.11.1968 (Puolustusvoimien kehittämisen periaatteista) (‘On the prin-
ciples for the development of the Defence Forces’), T 23920/F 2 sal, KA. The capabilities of the 
Soviet Union, and a threat scenario resembling a surprise attack aimed at capturing the country 
were first introduced in late 1960 in a document entitled Operatiiviset olosuhteemme Suomen mahdollisesti 
joutuessa sotaan lähivuosina (‘Finland’s operational circumstances, should the country be drawn in a 
war in the next few years’). PE:n no. 1/Op-os/11.11.1960, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA.  
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the invader would have to commit considerable resources in order to subdue the 
country. 
 
One of conclusions drawn from the Czechoslovakian crisis stated that all European 
nations needed to take into consideration public opinion, both in their political and 
military operations, out of consideration to their international relations and due to 
intensified communications. This had, according to Kanninen, led to a situation in 
which military measures could no longer be launched without efficient and visible 
preparations. Discretion was to be exercised if thereat scenario was to be made pub-
lic. Kanninen also argued that the enemy would not be able to launch a surprise at-
tack designed to capture Finland relying solely on troops in their peacetime disposi-
tion near the Finnish border.755  
 
The autumn of 1968 was a watershed period in the development of the Defence 
Forces and, particularly, the territorial defence system. By autumn 1968, develop-
ment work had been carried out in many sectors. Practical measures had been initi-
ated under the oversight of the General Headquarters, an indication of which was 
the fact that the key solutions for the further development and implementation of 
the territorial defence system were presented to General Yrjö Keinonen, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, on 6 August 1968. On the basis of the op-
erational tasks of the troops, the wartime army was divided into general forces, local 
forces and supportive forces. The wartime field army was to be built around general 
forces, which referred formations and units capable of mobile operations and com-
mitted to operations to achieve a decisive outcome. Local forces were, as their name 
suggests, units principally suited for combat duties – including guerrilla-type activi-
ties – in a specific area. With regard to troop types, this referred to, for example, 
troops intended for repelling the enemy, performing guard duty, or acting as sepa-
rate units. Supportive forces referred to troops that were not directly engaged in com-
bat; rather, they provided support to the general and local forces. Supportive forces 
included construction and supply units.756 
 
The operations and use of the local forces sought to provide the general forces with 
operational freedom by relieving them, wherever possible, from the protection of 
their rear areas and by extending the reach of fire of the general forces through 
guerrilla-type activities, which also sought to provide intelligence on the enemy’s ac-
tivities in its rear area. For the eventuality that local troops were engaged in a guerril-
la war, which of course was part of their combat duties and operational obligations, 
the General Headquarters proposed, related to such tasks, that the compositions of 
local forces be clarified in detail by conducting further investigations, supplemented 
by the organisational survey that had already been initiated. According to the pro-
posal, local battalions were required, with regard to their organisation, to have 
equipment and men capable of maintaining law and order, protecting the forming of 
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755 Ibid. See also PE:n no. R 26/12.4.1969 (Harjoitustilanteista – alustus op-neuvottelupäivillä 28.4.1969) 
(‘On situations used in exercises – an introduction presented at a negotiation event on 28 April 
1969’), T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
756 PE:n no. 30/Optsto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A 
presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit 
obtained). Cf. PE:n no. 444/Lkptsto/10 sal/22.9.1967, T 26842/F 25 sal, KA. 
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troops, acting as a regional reserve for the military district, and conducting anti-
guerrilla and guerrilla-type activities.757 The General Headquarters had previously 
taken the target strength of different troops types under scrutiny and calculation 
under the direction of Olavi Lopmeri and others. For example, the target strength 
of the largest troop type the general forces, was set at 350,000 men in June 1967.758  
 
With regard to infantry troops, the 1968 presentation assigned local battalions, local 
guard companies, block battalions and separate block companies and platoons to 
the local forces. The entire force of the Frontier Guard was also included in local 
troops. While the guiding principle was to form a local battalion in each military dis-
trict, the number of guard troops was based on proposals made by the military 
province and on the maximum strengths ordered by the General Headquarters. The 
reorganisation of the wartime Frontier Guards was reported to be based on trans-
forming frontier companies to frontier jaeger battalions. As an addition to the estab-
lishment chart revised in 1966, the proposal suggested that four guerrilla jaeger bat-
talions be added to the establishment chart to complement the existing two.759 The 
proposal was justified by the generally recognised threat scenario know as ‘a surprise 
attack designed to capture Finland.’More precise grounds and detailed clarifications were 
put forth in an appendix to the memorandum.760  
 
However, not until 1969 was it deemed to be the right time for a more official pub-
lication of this threat scenario. In that year, Ruotuväki (a Finnish trade magazine for 
career officers, NCOs and conscripts) published an article on a surprise attack de-
signed to capture Finland, authored by Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu, accompa-
nied by a cover photo that certainly stopped the readers in their tracks. In his article, 
Ruutu analysed the objectives and implementation of such a surprise attack. Accord-
ing to Ruutu, the invader sought a decisive outcome by resorting primarily to the 
mobility of its troops, airborne operations and landings along the coastline, as well 
as to motorised marches directly to targets. By using cargo ships and commercial 
airliners, the invader sought a surprise outcome. The invader would use firepower 
only if its surprise action failed to paralyse the defender.761 Ruutu’s article at first 
created confusion, as the term ‘a surprise attack designed to capture Finland’was 
thought to refer all too openly to the operation carried out by the Soviet Union in 
Czechoslovakia.762  
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757 PE:n no. 30/Optsto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A 
presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit 
obtained). See also Penttilä (1988), pp. 166–171. 
758 PE:n no. 266/Lkptsto/10 sal/30.6.1967, T 26842/F 25 sal, KA. 
759 PE:n no. 30/Optsto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A 
presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit 
obtained). 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ruutu, Juhani: Kaappaushyökkäys (‘A surprise attack to capture Finland’), Ruotuväki 4/1969(a). 
762 Ruutu, Juhani: Interviews on 1 December 2005 and 8 June 2006. Kanninen, Ermei: Interviews 
on 3 January 2006 and 15 May 2013. 
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The Czechoslovakian crisis was reflected in the teaching at military schools. For ex-
ample, one of the exercises conducted by the National General Staff College, and a 
number of the student assignments addressed a surprise attack launched to capture 
Finland unfolding in the Helsinki metropolitan area and along the southern coastal 
areas. Several war and map exercises also addressed guerrilla warfare and territorial 
guerrilla-type activities.763 This setup is clearly discernible in the observations made 
by the Operations Office of the General Headquarters on a leadership exercise con-
ducted at the National General Staff College between March and April. While ob-
servations indicated that the National General Staff College had taken on board the 
doctrine of territorial combat and territorial defence in effect at the time, applying it 
to its teaching, they also showed that the staff discussed very critically the imple-
mentation of theory in practice.764 
 
The Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard also collaborated when training to re-
pulse a capture attack. Under the direction of the commander of the Northern Fin-
land Military Province, an operational war game with theme of repelling a capture 
attack was arranged between 7 and 21 January 1970, using the troops of the De-
fence Forces and the Frontier Guard. In the context of this war game, the troops of 
the Lapland and Kainuu Frontier Guards transitioned from surveillance of the bor-
der to full-scale scale guerrilla-type activities, aimed at gaining time for the forming 
of the general forces. Several officers from the Frontier Guards Headquarters par-
ticipated in the game, in which they used their expertise in making and implement-
ing preparations for rapid guerrilla-type activities.765 
 
Regarding developments in the art of war, the changes that had occurred and the 
decisions that had been taken during 1968 were significant and a sign of the times. 
The General Headquarters decided to adapt the Finnish art of war to the opera-
tional requirements laid down by the threat scenario of a new era. One of these de-
cisions was to approve the use of unconventional methods in the repulsion of both 
a surprise attack designed to capture the country and a large-scale invasion. Un-
conventional methods referred to ‘tactics that differ from the conventional thinking and con-
ditions under which combat is conducted against an adversary that is almost equal to the defender in 
terms of mobility.’According to the principle guidelines, Finnish troops, in order to 
bring the art of war up to date and to conceal and secure their movements, needed 
to resort to tactics that increasingly took advantage of darkness and terrain, as well 
as ‘deployed guerrilla jaeger and other units sent to the enemy’s rear in order to enhance our own 
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763 See for example Sotakorkeakoulun opetussuunnitelmat (‘Curricula of the National General Staff Col-
lege’) (MSL 30, MeSL 9 ja STL), T 24043/Db 14, KA. Sotakorkeakoulun opetussuunnitelmat (‘Curricula 
of the National General Staff College’) (MSL 31and ISL 9), T 24043/Db 15, KA. Sotakorkeakoulun 
yleisen taktiikan luennot ja harjoitukset no. 1 (‘Lectures and exercises on general tactics at the National 
General Staff College no. 1’), v. 1967–1972, T 24043/Dg 203, KA. 
764 PE:n no. R 25/2.4.1969 (havaintoja SKK:n johtamisharjoituksesta) (‘observations on a leadership ex-
ercise arranged at the National General Staff College’), T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. 
90/Tiedtsto/14 d sal/12.3.1969, T 26890/Hla 10 sal, KA (A decision by the National General Staff 
College regarding research permit obtained). 
765 P-SSlE no. 119/Optsto/5 sal/11.12.1969 ja RvE:n no. 218/III sal/10.11.1969, RVLE, OT-sal- 
ja sal-arkisto (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’), identifier F 20 sal (research per-
mit obtained). 
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firepower (using mines and other forms of anti-tank defence) and to slow down the enemy’s 
advance.’766 
 
Finnish military leaders and troops needed to be trained and made accustomed to 
fight under conditions in which the enemy’s superior mobility, based on a road net-
work and an easily traversed terrain, firepower and air supremacy lead to a situation 
in which the use of unconventional methods must be accepted. The ultimate goal 
was to avoid any disadvantages brought about by the factors listed above. By the 
end of the 1960s, the Finnish art of war had changed from war of attrition, charac-
terised by the repulsion of mass attacks, in a more flexible direction, one in which 
the utilisation of the methods of guerrilla warfare, integrated into territorial combat, 
played a significant role. 
 
 
Developing the local defence and territorial guerrilla-type activities 
 
In autumn 1968, immediately after the events in Czechoslovakia, Captain Ari-Ilmari 
Iisakkala, staff officer at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, 
drafted an extensive memorandum on the implementation of a local defence system. 
The memorandum presented the objectives to be set for local defence within the 
framework of a local defence system and a strategic defence doctrine. In his memo-
randum Iisakkala outlined the guidelines for more detailed plans regarding local de-
fence. Preparations for guerrilla-type activities in an area that had come under ene-
my attack were focused on building a support system under which one of the sub-
units of a local battalion was to be detached to carry out preparations in colla-
boration with the military district or the military area headquarters, while the major 
part of the battalion slowed down the enemy’s advance or was engaged in other 
tasks. The detached unit was to be built around the headquarters and logistics com-
pany of the local battalion, including the supply platoons of individual companies. 
In the case of a large-scale invasion, local forces were to focus on the defence of 
rear areas and, in the areas under immediate threat, on preparing for guerrilla-type 
activities, while engaging in them in those areas that the enemy had already occu-
pied.767 
 
Captain Iisakkala also noted that the basic form of fighting of local forces, ‘combat 
through ambush ’called for a large number of mines. According to the Engineering 
Division of the General Headquarters, countermobility materiel from the existing 
stores and manufacturing plants could be distributed to the troops as follows: teller 
mines, 40,000 pieces, fragmentation mines, 40,000 pieces, and high explosives, 
12,000 kilos.768 Plans for guerrilla-type activities increasingly focused on mine war-
fare, exactly as Veikko Koppinen had proposed in his 1960 memorandum.769 
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766 PE:n (A memorandum by the quartermaster on the development of war exercises to meet the 
operational requirements) no.tta 6.2.1968, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
767 PE:n no. 49/Optsto/D henksal/ 22.9.1969, D/D 1 henksal, PE (research permit obtained). 
Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Cf. Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’) (a draft), Helsinki 1 June 1960, 
SKK:n kirjeistö 1958–60 (‘Correspondence by the National Defence College 1958–60’) T 23101/F 
3 sal, KA (a research permit granted by the National Defence University). 
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Captain Iisakkala’s memorandum set a schedule and targets for the planned measu-
res. According to Iisakkala, this system would be in a acceptable operational state by 
the time the new establishment chart became effective in late 1969, in a satisfactory 
state by the end of 1972, and fully operational by the end of 1974.770 
 
After theoretical foundations of the local defence system and territorial guerrilla-
type activities had been completed, practical measures proceeded with speed in the 
military provinces and the districts under them. Due to the sheer size of the ar-
chived material, it is impracticable to present here all the plans and measures drafted 
by the seven military provinces and 27 military districts for territorial guerrilla-type 
activities and local defence; consequently, only a number of them have been includ-
ed here. 
 
In autumn 1968, the chief of the Staff Duties Office of the Hämeenlinna Military 
District, Major Pentti Lyly, carried out an extensive investigation into the options 
available to an organisation based on military districts in the defence of rear areas 
and territorial guerrilla-type activities. This investigation, spanning more than one 
hundred pages, is an excellent indication of the adoption of the principles of territo-
rial defence by the military provinces and the districts under them. In his study, Lyly 
discussed the defence of rear areas and guerrilla-type activities in light of prevailing 
perceptions and the regulations in effect at the time. In Lyly’s study, territorial guer-
rilla-type activities referred to guerrilla-type activities conducted under a concerted 
leadership, built around troops under a military organisation and a military chain of 
command, and supported by the civilian population and organisations.771 Viewed 
from this perspective, Lyly’s study was more of a discussion on territorial guerrilla 
warfare than guerrilla-type activities. 
 
Lyly drew several conclusions in his study, some of which were clearly different 
from the guidelines for local defence in effect at the time. According to Lyly, guerril-
la jaegers, in order to be successful, needed to possess excellent local knowledge. In 
order to achieve the best possible results, he recommended that local guerrilla jaeger 
troops be formed of local men operating under the leadership of the military dis-
trict. According to Lyly, the guard battalions in the establishment chart were suitable 
for guerrilla-type activities, as for their organisation, but the average age of their 
men was too high. Territorial guerrilla-type activities required younger reservists 
with at least a minimum training in guerrilla-type activities. While the headquarters 
of a military district were ideally suited for providing leadership for local combat 
operations, the support organisation, according to Lyly, needed to be formed of the 
local population. ‘Without a positive attitude of the general population and, in particular, its 
strong support, guerrilla-type activities will be hard pressed to be sustained for months, let alone 
years. Guerrilla-type activities involving a relatively small number of stationary troops, while the 
numerical strength of the civilian organisations supporting such activities is required to be large 
makes for a difficult equation to solve.’772  
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770 PE:n no. 49/Optsto/D henksal/ 22.9.1969, D/D 1 henksal, PE (research permit obtained). 
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(‘Options available to military districts in the defence of rear areas and in territorial guerrilla-type 
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It should be mentioned that Major Olavi Lopmeri, who had worked with issues re-
lated to guerrilla tactics at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters and 
led a research groups focused on such questions, had drawn conclusions in 1964 
that were diametrically opposite to those of Lyly’s.773 Lyly was also conscious of 
this, supplementing his conclusions by noting that there was a moral issue involved 
with engaging the civilian population in combat: ‘From a moral perspective, this does not 
paint a pretty picture but, then, when does war do that in any of its forms? ’.774 
 
While the idea of engaging civilians in guerrilla-type activities was nothing new as 
such, it was all the more controversial. While Lyly’s proposal clearly reflected the 
spirit of the regulations and texts drafted in the 1950s, the explanation behind his 
thinking might have been of a later date. In summer 1966, a booklet on Finland’s 
security policy entitled Maanpuolustuksemme tienviitat (‘Guidelines for out national de-
fence’), presented a very broad perspective on the development of the Defence 
Forces. According to this booklet, the repulsion of a surprise attack required that 
the troops had a high level of peacetime preparedness and that, in particular, they 
were able to spring quickly into action. Any plans and arrangement for defence 
needed to enable automated action to repel the invader. ‘Preparations for a lengthy war 
in turn require that the prerequisites for the forming of a field army and the commitment of all our 
resources for combat, including guerrilla war, are in place.’High level of preparedness, rapid 
commitment of the covering force, the forming of a field army and preparedness for 
guerrilla war were the official objectives for the development of Finland’s armed de-
fence.775 
 
A booklet entitled Puolustuskykymme materiaalinen perusta (‘The materiel foundation of 
our defence capability’), published in late 1968, continued the discussion along the 
same lines, quoting verbatim the above-mentioned publication. However, the per-
spective was made more detailed regarding the development of the Defence Forces. 
The principal targets set for the development of the Defence Forces in 1968 includ-
ed the capability to repel territorial violations, intercept airspace incursions in peace-
time and during a conflict between other states, and to repel a surprise attack carried 
out with limited forces. The secondary target was to develop the capability of the 
Defence Forces to fight a defensive battle with all available resources.776 Against the 
background of such an official policy and the events in Czechoslovakia, Lyly’s pro-
posal to commit all available resources –including the civilian ones –in support of 
military activities and combat was in a way in line with the spirit of the time and the 
prevailing security policy, although, it was naturally unethical from the perspective 
of the Finnish art of war. Looking at the concepts of security policy from various 
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773 Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista ja mahdollisuuksista, jotka liittyvät työhön alueellisen sissiorgani-
saation aikaansaamiseksi (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds and opportu-
nities related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation’), no PE, 2 June 1964, 11/ 
F 12, PE (research permit obtained). 
774 Lyly (1968), T 25044/F 3 sal, KA. 
775 Maanpuolustuksemme tienviitat (‘Signposts for our national defence’), Helsinki 1967 (a book with-
out page numbers). 
776 Puolustuskykymme materiaalinen perusta (‘The materiel foundation of our defence capability’), Hel-
sinki 1968, pp. 4–6.  
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angles and using rhetoric that supported all possible forms of warfare were closely 
related to the military threat scenario of the era.  
 
In addition to the formulation of concepts that were either official or related to se-
curity policy and the reforms that had been carried out in the late 1960s, the estab-
lishment charts and the basic regulations needed to be brought up to date. While the 
establishment chart was to be revised by mid-1970, the General section of the Field 
regulation needed to be made available to the troops before that.777 In 1967, a deci-
sion was taken to renew the General section of the 1958 Field regulation in order to 
make it compatible with the peacetime organisation and training provided by the 
Defence Forces, as well as with wartime operations. In contrast to past practice, the 
responsibility for and oversight of the drafting of the regulation was transferred 
from the National General Staff College to the Operations Division of the General 
Headquarters, as the work involved a great deal of confidential or top secret back-
ground material, access to which was limited to a small number of the Operations 
Division staff.778 The responsibility for the drafting of the regulation was delegated 
to Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu, who at the time was Head of Office at the Op-
erations Division of the General Headquarters.779  
 
In early 1969, a draft for the General Section of the Field Regulation was completed. 
In contrast to the normal practice, it was not distributed to the troops; instead, it 
was principally used in the development of tactics by the highest ranking officers of 
the General Headquarters and the operational officers posted at the headquarters of 
the military provinces.780 Even in its draft stage, the General Section of the Field 
Regulation from 1969 is an interesting contemporary document, providing an excel-
lent snapshot of the change that had taken place in the military threat scenario, the-
ories on local defensive battle and guerrilla warfare. According to the regulation, lo-
cal defence, as part of a territorial defence system, aimed to create prerequisites for 
‘large-scale guerrilla-type activities and, if necessary, guerrilla warfare.’For the purposes of lo-
cal defence, including any associated preparations, all the troops in a responsibility 
area were subordinated the commander of the formation. Principally, local forces 
proper, such as frontier guard troops, guard troops and other special troops, were to 
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778 PE:n no. 1049/Ohjeststo/8 b/22.4.1967, T 24043/F 87, KA. Ruutu, Juhani: Interviews on 1 
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opment of new tactics based on territorial defence’, PE:n no. 20/Jvtsto/D 1 sal/13.2.1970, T 25094/F 18 
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be used for such tasks. In addition to local forces, supportive forces and, if neces-
sary, the reserves of the High Command stationed in the rear area, could be as-
signed to such tasks in special situations. A support system, taking advantage of ci-
vilian establishments and the local population, was required in order to enable the 
local forces to fight battles.781 
 
The response to a surprise attack designed to capture the country, defined as ‘a mili-
tary operation based on a strategic surprise, launched in order to rapidly occupy the entire country, 
certain sections of the country with strategic significance or certain targets, and carried out in a 
manner that leaves the defender with no opportunities to mobilise its troops, concentrate them, or 
conduct any other systematic counter operations ’should be, above all, ‘strategic defence.’Part 
of strategic defence was composed of guerrilla warfare, which constituted a deter-
rent to the invader. Guerrilla warfare was defined as ‘warfare conducted across a large 
swath of enemy-occupied territory (for example, the size of a military province) in place of regular 
military operation, using all available resources permitted by international conventions. Guerrilla 
warfare seeks to wear down the enemy while holding a support area gradually growing in size, with 
the ultimate goal being to commit the entire guerrilla jaeger force to decisive operations in order to 
defeat the enemy. Guerrilla warfare conducted alongside regular military operations lends direct or 
indirect support to front-line operations, and the guerrilla-type activities linked to such operations 
are also closely linked to operations carried out by the troops engaged in guerrilla warfare.’782 
 
Juhani Ruutu, who had participated in the drafting of the regulation, reported that 
the formulation of definitions and descriptions of concepts was a real headache. 
Statements submitted during the drafting process drew attention to the effects of 
guerrilla warfare on the civilian population left behind in areas where guerrilla war-
fare was waged. ‘When discussing guerrilla warfare, special attention should be paid to the situa-
tion of the civilian population that, for varying reasons, has stayed behind or has been left behind 
and the effect of such population on military operations; attention should also be paid to the general 
aspects regarding the treatment of the population, and to the resistance movement that would emerge 
spontaneously among the population, viewed from a national perspective and from the perspective of 
the military provinces.’783 Colonel Niilo Simojoki, who taught tactics at the National 
General Staff College, drafted a statement on guerrilla warfare related to the General 
section of the Field regulation. While Simojoki’s statement was personal in nature, it 
also demonstrated that the staff of the National General Staff College were familiar 
with the problems associated with the concept of guerrilla warfare. In his statement, 
Simojoki noted that the concept of guerrilla war was one of the most fundamental 
questions of the Field Regulation. ‘This issue touches on the civilian population and its fate 
so deeply that, in my opinion, unrealistic exercises in guerrilla-type activities, based on the premise 
that Helsinki, Turku and large sections of Uusimaa (a southern coastal province in Finland) have 
been evacuated, should be discontinued.’In some parts of Finland, such prerequisites were available, 
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781 Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa, luonnos (‘General Section of the Field Regulation, a draft’), (KO yl), 
1969, pp. 82–88. 
782 Ibid. pp. 88–89 and attachment 1, pp. 1–2.  
783 Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. SKK:n no.tta 30.5.1967, Lausunto kenttäohjesäännön 
yleisen osan jäsentelyehdotuksesta (‘Statement on the organisation of the general section of the field reg-
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and advantage needed be taken of them, while in other parts, no such prerequisites existed. The 
field regulation should not fail to address this issue which is highly important.’784  
 
In his memorandum, Simojoki also discussed the problems associated with the ju-
ridical rules governing guerrilla warfare: ‘The question on the status of the guerrilla soldier 
under international law continues to remain open, and a mistake will probably be committed if its 
worst consequences, when fighting alone and in an inferior position with regard to resources, are not 
faced. A small nation will always be treated differently from a big nation. Keeping this in mind, the 
undersigned finds it difficult to take the concepts of ‘guerrilla’and ‘guerrilla warfare’at their face 
value. Could it not be imagined that guerrilla-type activities are always part of regular military op-
erations? They are simply part of the doctrine.’According to Simojoki, it would be suffi-
cient, with regard to concepts, that the field regulation only addressed local defence 
and the troops on varying levels under it, including their operational methods.785  
 
It should be noted that for all confusion regarding the draft of the 1969 
Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), guerrilla war 
did not refer to the guerrilla war as it was defined in the international context. A 
large-scale guerrilla war was not seen as feasible in Finnish conditions. A sparely 
populated country, occupied by a great power, would simply not have chances for a 
prolonged a guerrilla war, considering that any opportunities for supplying the 
population would collapse with the prolongation of the war. A total guerrilla war 
would have required a large country with a large population and a self-sufficient 
administrative structure, which would enable continued functioning of agriculture 
and administration even under occupation. According to assessments made by the 
General Headquarters and, in part, by the country’s political leadership, Finland’s 
continued national existence, in the worst-case scenario, would be best ensured 
through a policy of acquiescence. According to Ruutu, ‘an honourable suicide was out of 
the question.’Certain international principles of a guerrilla warfare were regarded as 
inapplicable to Finnish conditions. Although Finland kept close tabs on the wars be-
ing waged outside Finland, the events in Indochina and Vietnam, viewed from the 
perspective of guerrilla warfare, could not be used as a model if such a war was to 
be waged under Finnish conditions. On the one hand, Finland needed to fight for 
some areas of its territory ‘by tooth and nail ’, but, on the other hand, there were areas 
that could have been yielded in order to ensure its sovereignty and in which the in-
vader would face continuous guerrilla-type activities by local forces.786 
 
After the draft for the regulation was completed, the work continued in two direc-
tions: The National General Staff College was tasked with the updating of 
Kenttäohjesäännön I osa (‘The I Section of the Field Regulation’) and Jalkaväen taiste-
luohjesääntö (‘Combat Regulation for the Infantry’) to comply with the doctrine spe-
cified in the General Section of the Field Regulation.787 With regard to the updating 
of other regulations, a memorandum drafted at the National General Staff College 
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786 Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. See also SKK:n no. 620/8/12.6.1967, KO yleisen 
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noted that the draft of the General Section of the Field Regulation still needed 
work. The views presented by the inspection work group, formed of the staff of the 
National General Staff College, deviated in any significant way only from the con-
tent of Chapter V, which addressed military operations. ‘Therefore, the inspection work 
group proposes that the most important point of inspection is the fifth chapter of the regulation, 
which will decisively impact the other field regulations.’It is noteworthy that section F of the 
very same chapter addressed guerrilla warfare, commenting on the concept of guer-
rilla warfare ‘In the handout, guerrilla warfare is only discussed as a form of warfare in which 
soldiers fight soldiers. When attempting to achieve real results, the total nature of the guerrilla war 
should be understood from the very beginning; in other words, it should be understood that such war 
would involve the entire nation and that even in the most lenient of cases, a resistance movement 
emerging among the civilian population would be necessary, including support by civilians who 
would provide intelligence and supplies. This requires that the definition of guerrilla war and the 
section addressing it in the regulation needs to be revised. At the same time, the borderline between 
guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities should be clarified.’788  
 
The National General Staff College proposed that the General Headquarters obtain 
extensive statements on the memorandum prepared by the Army Combat School 
from the representatives of the arms and branches and from the commander who 
held real operational responsibility in the field, in order to enable its further pro-
cessing. After receiving the statements, the National General Staff College and the 
Army Combat School would be able to take advantage of tactical exercises and sem-
inars in order to clarify problems related to regulation work. The target date was set 
at 1973, by which time it would be possible to formulate the general section of the 
field regulation to match the threat scenario of the era, Finland’s real defensive ca-
pacity and the art of war, by taking advantage of the work of the inspection group 
and experiments carried out in connection with exercises.789 This statement appears 
to be the fundamental reason behind the fact that the drafts from 1969 and 1971 for the 
General Section of the Field Regulation resulted in the General Section of the Field Regulation, 
confirmed in 1973.  
 
In addition to bringing regulations up to date and revising them, other measures 
were taken. Under the direction of the General Headquarters, work was initiated to 
update the establishment chart and train troops for placement in the reserves. At the 
Infantry Office of the General Headquarters, a plan was drafted to implement an 
order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in 1968 on the re-
vision of the establishment chart to make it compatible with the requirements set 
for local defence and the reserves of the High Command790 The 1966 establishment 
chart stated that the Military Province of Southern Finland and the Frontier Guard 
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were to establish two guerrilla jaeger battalions to form a reserve for the High 
Command. According to the plan, a new establishment chart entered force in 
1970791, with four new battalions being added to it in addition to the existing two. 
Responsibility for the forming of all six battalions was transformed from the Fron-
tier Guard to designated military provinces under the Defence Forces. The Military 
Province of Southern Finland (E-SSl) was tasked with forming Guerrilla Jaeger Bat-
talions 1 and 5; the Military Province of Northern Finland (P-SSl), Guerrilla Jaeger 
Battalions 7 and 15; the Military Province of Savo-Karelia (S-KSl), Guerrilla Jaeger 
Battalion 4; and the Military Province of Inner Finland (S-SSl), Guerrilla Jaeger Bat-
talion 2.792 
 
In January 1969, the Frontier Guard Headquarters also issued an order to the indi-
vidual Guards on the reorganisation of troop establishment. According to inves-
tigations carried out and accounts produced in 1968, related to the overall revision 
of the establishment chart of the Frontier Guard, the revision sought to bring the 
tasks and operational principles of the Frontier Guards into line with the establish-
ment tasks. The key change was the replacement of the wartime frontier brigades in 
the establishment chart with frontier guards; in the establishment chart, the frontier 
guard were referred to using their peacetime names. From four to six frontier jaeger 
battalions were added to the wartime frontier guards, in addition to the existing 
headquarters and special units. Orders on the new establishment chart entered into 
force over the course of 1970.793 According to the revised establishment chart, the 
headquarters and reconnaissance companies of the frontier guards belonged to ca-
dre troops while the reminder of the troops to be formed were part of the covering 
force. Frontier guard troops were part of the covering force – part of the local forc-
es –which meant that their establishment probably needed to be made possible 
even in a situation under which Finland was subjected to a surprise attack.794 
 
These reforms and detailed arrangements for troop establishment also influenced 
the content of training provided by the frontier guards – refresher training in partic-
ular. The Frontier Guard leadership made a decision to arrange four to seven re-
fresher training exercises in the area of responsibility of each individual Frontier 
Guard in collaboration with the military provinces of the Defence Forces between 
1971 and 1977. Refresher training sought to train professional officers and NCOs 
placed in frontier jaeger battalions and special units, as well as reservists, in their var-
ious duties as leaders of troop establishment and ‘to teach tactical leadership of guerrilla 
warfare, including its conduct using the materiel available to such combat.’Such teaching aimed to 
refresh the guerrilla skills that reservists had learned while doing their military service and to teach 
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them the methods of guerrilla-type activities as applied by frontier guard troops and the principles for 
use of such troops, thereby ensuring that each individual unit will be capable of long-term, independ-
ent guerrilla-style combat, can plan such combat and provide leadership.’The duration of re-
fresher training in guerrilla-type activities for officers and NCOs was set at 47 hours. 
Training in guerrilla-type activities for men and specially trained personnel focused, 
on the use of improvised equipment and Claymore-type mines, on storing and cach-
ing materiel and on dispersed and concerted operation by a guerrilla jaeger platoon 
and squad, among other things.795 
 
Guerrilla jaeger battalions intended to be placed under direct control of the wartime 
High Command – the Supreme Headquarters – (‘General Headquarters’) imposed 
stricter requirements for their personnel. According to the view held by the General 
Headquarters, training in guerrilla-type activities that had found an established form 
in the 1960s did not provide sufficient skills, particularly with regard to conscripts, 
for their placement in guerrilla jaeger battalions that were intended for special opera-
tions. Based on this calculation, the General Headquarters concluded that by train-
ing one guerrilla jaeger battalion from the conscripts of each age class over six years, 
the need would be satisfied. The proposed solution was that the training of wartime 
battalions be concentrated on the Defence Forces. The units providing training 
needed to be located in areas where the terrain enabled training in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities and exercises in a way that corresponded to the wartime duties of guerrilla 
jaeger battalions. The battalions under direct control of the High Command were 
not intended to be used as local forces or guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish ar-
chipelago or on the coast; rather, they were troops of the second priority class in 
mobilisation. The Coastal Guerrilla Tactics Committee was tasked with looking into 
the need for such troops, submitting its proposal for measures to be taken to the 
General Headquarters.796  
 
According to the proposal, the units providing training for the personnel of guerrilla 
jaeger battalions would be the Lapland Jaeger Battalion (LapJP), the Kainuu Brigade 
(KaiPr), the Karelia Jaeger Battalion (KarJP), the Karelia Brigade (KarPr), and, as a 
backup, the Savo Brigade (SavPr). This proposal was justified by terrain suitable for 
guerrilla training and the preparedness of the units to provide such training. Another 
option put forth by the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters proposed that 
a separate centre for the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities be estab-
lished at one of the units listed above or at the Parachute Jaeger School. The easiest 
and least expensive solution would be to train guerrilla jaeger battalions for the re-
serves in several units. In the nominal strength ledger of the wartime troops, the 
strength of a guerrilla jaeger battalion was 43 + 156 + 413 = 612 men, with an esti-
mated need for training being 6,486 men when a compensation for an expected loss 
of 30 per cent during training was included.797 
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Requirements for training set for guerrilla jaeger battalions specified that the per-
sonnel must be carefully selected from among volunteers, using tests if necessary. 
As the training in guerrilla-type activities provided by the Frontier Guard (RvL) had 
for years had a higher standard than that given by the Defence Forces, a decision 
was taken to use the training programmes and targets drafted by Rvl. Training for 
men, NCOs and officers needed to be such that it improved the personnel’s physi-
cal condition, map reading skills and initiative, and accustomed them to challenging 
conditions. Conscripts undergoing training in guerrilla-type activities should only be 
used for such activities in combat training and war exercises. The Defence Forces 
made reservists with guerrilla training eligible for placement in guerrilla jaeger battal-
ions until they were 26 or 27 years old, after which they were to be placed in local 
forces or in the reconnaissance units of general forces. Guerrilla jaeger battalions 
were to be called up for refresher training every three or four years.798 
 
On the basis of a memorandum drafted by the Infantry Division, a presentation was 
prepared for the chief of training and education in which the principles described 
above, with some modifications, were presented for approval and implementation 
starting from 1970. A decision was made to include training in guerrilla-type activi-
ties in the training programme of one of the units of the Reserve Officers School, as 
well as training the officer candidates of the Frontier Guard in the same unit. The 
Savo Brigade, one of the units originally planned to provide training in guerrilla-type 
activities, was dropped from the plan, and the others were equipped with materiel 
required by such training –mines and radio equipment –as well as extra financial 
resources for the implementation of training.799 On the basis of the presentation, 
the inspector of the infantry requested statements and proposals for the practical ar-
rangement of training to be submitted by 14 June 1969.800  
 
The first statement on this issue was submitted by the War Economy Division of 
the General Headquarters, which immediately announced that no appropriation 
dedicated to guerrilla jaeger training was available. Neither were any opportunities 
available for procuring additional materiel in 1970.801 The statements submitted by 
the other Divisions of the General Headquarters did not deviate from the presenta-
tion, with the exception of a number of minor practical points.802 Among other 
things, the Operations Division reported that, despite the plans to the contrary, two 
guerrilla jaeger battalions possibly needed to be dropped from the establishment 
chart.803 The statements submitted by the headquarters of the military provinces, the 
Frontier Guard and the Reserve Officer School ran along similar lines.804 
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798 PE:n kirjelmä no.tta 25.2.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
799 PE:n no. 41/Jvtsto/5 sal/12.4.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
800 PE:n no. 42/Jvtsto/5 sal/14.4.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
801 PE:n no. 46/Staltsto/5 sal/30.4.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
802 PE:n no. 133/Tiedtsto/5 sal/3.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. PE:n no. 82/Piontsto/5 sal/ 
6.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. PE:n no. 126/Vtsto/5 sal/6.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. See al-
so PE:n no. 143/Htsto/sal/11.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. PE:n no. 60/Ellääktsto/ sal/ 
16.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
803 YE:n 192/Optsto/5 sal/11.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
804 SKSlE:n no. 272/Yetsto/5 sal/6.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. PSSlE:n no. 22/Koul/5 sal/ 
12.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. RUK:n no. 73/Koul- ja järjtsto/sal/13.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, 
KA. RvE:n no. 83/III/sal/30.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. 
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This was an indication of the fact that the provision of training in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities by the Defence Forces and the troop establishment plans both for the guer-
rilla jaeger battalions under the High Command and those included in the local 
forces urgently needed to be brought to order. This would ensure that the art of 
war, resting on an increasingly strong theoretical foundation, could be extended to 
practical training. The Defence Forces had set an ambitious target for themselves to 
create a reserve for the general forces and the guerrilla troops of the Frontier 
Guards of conscripts that had undergone efficient training while doing their military 
service, and this was a target that the army evidently wanted to achieve. While the 
training in guerrilla-type activities to be given to the local forces was still under de-
velopment in the Defence Forces over the course of the 1960s, the training of the 
separate battalions needed to be limited to minimum training supported by refresher 
training. Opinions even differed regarding the composition of separate battalions. 
For example, the Frontier Guard proposed that the companies making up a separate 
battalion should comprise four platoons, in order to improve the prerequisites for 
guerrilla-type activities.805 Despite their best efforts, the introduction of local de-
fence lagged behind, remaining still to be implemented in the 1970s. 
 
 
Opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago 
in the repulsion of an attack aimed at capturing the country 
 
Positive experiences gained from the work of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, in 
operation between 1961 and 1963, coupled with a need to look into guerrilla-type 
activities in the archipelago and along the coast in more detail, prompted the chief 
of the General Headquarters to issue an order on the setting up of a committee un-
der the name of Committee for the investigation of guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago. 
The idea of carrying out guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago was not a novel 
one – after all, delaying action and guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago had 
been part of the training programme of the Coastal Jaeger Battalion in the mid-
1950s and early 1960s.806 The Coast Guards of the Frontier Guard had also experi-
mented and investigated guerrilla-type activities under wintry condition in the archi-
pelago in late winter 1966.807 
 
The committee was tasked with looking into and investigating the opportunities 
available to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago as part of local combat opera-
tions, including their organisation, operational areas, troops and their composition, 
leadership, equipment, as well as requisite preparations and the associated training 
issues. Efforts were made to ensure a broad-based representation in the committee. 
Lieutenant Colonel Jukka Pajula (PE jvtsto) was ordered to chair the committee, 
with the members being Majors Lauri Autti (PE op-os), Jorma Pullinen (PE järj-os), 
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805 Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010. See also PE:n no. R 42/Optsto/10 sal/ 
5.12.1969 (muistio paikallispataljoonan kokoonpanosta) (‘Memorandum on the composition of a local 
force battalion’), T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
806 See, for example, 2.DE:n no. 2/Optsto/OT/H sal/8.1.1954, T 26862/Hh 1 sal, KA. PE:n no. 
111/Meriptsto/OT/10 sal/9.5.1960, T 26862/D 4 OT-sal, KA. Kuivala, Martti: Rannikkojääkäri-
koulutus (‘Coastal jaeger training’), Rannikon Puolustaja 4/1989, p. 13. 
807 RvE:n no. 21/II/sal/28.4.1966, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘confidential archive’) 
identifier F 17 sal (research permit obtained). 
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Pentti Aulaskari (PE rttsto), and Captain Reijo Kuusisto (PE koul-os). Lieutenant 
Commander Frans Bergholm (MerivE) was assigned to the committee to represent 
the navy, and Lieutenant SG Paavo Hiltula to provide the viewpoint of the Fronteer 
Guard (RVE). Thereby, all the significant stakeholders from the General Headquar-
ters, as well as from the Navy and the Frontier Guard had representation on the 
committee.808  
 
The composition of the committee changed on two occasions: Major Lauri Autti 
was transferred from the General Headquarters in November 1968 and Lieutenant 
Commander Frans Berholm died unexpectedly in February 1969. Their replace-
ments in the committee were Captain Ari-Ilmari Iisakala (PE op-os), who replaced 
Autti, and Lieutenant Commander Aarno Koivisto (MerivE), who substituted Berg-
holm.809  
 
The committee convened a total of eight times at the General Headquarters over 
the course of summer 1968 and spring 1969, making several excursions to the 
coastal military provinces and strategic industrial plants. The work of the committee 
was based on the general guidelines for local defence issued in 1968, as well as on 
the details on local defence approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces.810 In practical terms, this referred to the capability of the Defence Forces to 
repel landings in coastal areas should Finland be subjected to a surprise attack seek-
ing to capture the country, including the capability to contain landings by enemy 
airborne troops and the maintenance of high preparedness for combat in coastal ar-
eas through means of guerrilla-type activities. 
 
In its final report, the committee provided justification for the opportunities availa-
ble to guerrilla-type activities, taking the perspective of the Finnish art of war and 
the prevailing image of war. The most important objective of guerrilla-type activities 
was defined to be the obtaining of information on the enemy, in other words, intel-
ligence, and ‘the instilling of fear for guerrila jaegers and any form of harassment directed at the 
enemy ’, including tying up enemy forces and inflicting casualties on the enemy In 
other words, the objectives set for guerrilla-type activities were best met by carrying 
out reconnaissance, harassment and demolition operations. With regard to terrain, 
the Finnish outer archipelago was best suited for reconnaissance; for harassment 
and demolition, in the inner archipelago. For such tasks, combat divers with special 
Navy-provided training were proposed. With regard to conditions, summer was 
considered to best season for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago and in the 
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808 Saaristossa suoritettavan sissitoiminnan mahdollisuuksia, organisointia, valmisteluita ja koulutusta koskeva 
mietintö (‘Memorandum on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, 
including their organisation, preparations and the required training’), dated 20 May 1969, T 
26965/F 44 sal, KA. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. See also PE:n no. R 3/Optsto/11 henksal/28.6.1968, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. PE:n no. 
30/Optsto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A presentation 
on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit obtained). 
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coastal areas, as accommodation, camouflage and covering one’s tracks would be 
easiest.811   
 
Guerrilla-type activities were regarded to be part of a defensive battle, in which the 
planning of operations was understood to be the responsibility of the headquarters 
of the military province, in line with the territorial defence principle. In its detailed 
final report, the committee put forth a multi-point list of measures, the imple-
mentation of which was proposed to be initiated in 1970 with the purpose of having 
operational arrangements for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago and coastal 
areas in place by 1973. Coastal areas were to be defined as areas for guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, with the principal implementation organisation being guerrilla jaeger pla-
toons and maritime surveillance companies reinforced with requisite materiel. The 
military provinces under direct control of the Defence Forces and the individual 
Coast Guards under the command of the Frontier Guards were expected to engage 
in even closer collaboration. The purpose was to raise the bar for preparedness in 
order to enable the initiation of battles by maritime surveillance companies which 
were still in their peacetime composition. Principal responsibility for the provision 
of training in guerrilla-type activities was proposed to be transferred to the Frontier 
Guard. The report prepared by the committee was initially submitted to the chief of 
the General Headquarters and the members of the committee.812  
 
A lengthy article on guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago was also published in 
Sotilasaikauslehti ’s issue 10/1969. An article authored by Captain Reino Laajaniemi 
was based solely on the report drafted by the committee for the investigation of 
guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, although the biography of the article made 
no reference to it.813 The fact that the article was published before the committee 
submitted its report was extraordinary. However, this allows one to conclude that 
the fact that a landing in the Finnish archipelago or in the coastal areas –part of the 
threat scenario of the era –prepared to be repelled through guerrilla-type activities, 
was something that the Defence Forces wanted to communicate to the potential 
‘enemy,’On the other hand, any discussion in this era on the variations that ter-
ritorial combat could take was prone to arouse discussion and gave rise to headlines. 
 
The conclusion drawn from the objectives set for the committee state that the 
measures to reorganise and arrange guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago sought 
to increase preparedness of the army to repel a landing under a threat scenario of a 
sudden attack launched in order to capture the country. Improving preparedness 
was one of the changes in the Finnish art of war. Efforts were taken to meet the 
threat scenario with the deterrent constituted by guerrilla-type activities. 
 

811 Saaristossa suoritettavan sissitoiminnan mahdollisuuksia, organisointia, valmisteluita ja koulutusta koskeva 
mietintö (‘Memorandum on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, 
including their organisation, preparations and the required training’), dated 20 May 1969, T 
26965/F 44 sal, KA. 
812 Ibid. See also PE:n no. 159/Meriptsto/Daa sal/7.4.1970, T 26965/D 1 sal, KA. 
813 Laajaniemi, Reino: Sissijoukkojen toimintaolosuhteista meren saaristossa ja rannikolla (‘On the condi-
tions under which guerrilla troops would have to operate in the archipelago and the coastal area’), 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/1969, pp. 458–464. 
 
240 
In November 1969, after having spent a number of months perusing the report, the 
Maritime Defence Office of the General Headquarters sent the committee’s report 
for a review round to the headquarters of the various coastal military provinces (K-
SSlE, E-SSlE, L-SSlE ja PohmSlE), the Navy Headquarters (MerivE), the Frontier 
Guards Headquarters (RvE), the National General Staff College (SKK), and the var-
ious Divisions of the General Headquarters. All statements on the report and the 
proposals for further action were to be submitted by 1 February 1970, with special 
attention being paid to the needs of guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, the 
viability of implementation of such activities, and training issues.814 
 
While the statements were mostly in line with each other, the one submitted by the 
Frontier Guard clearly deviated from the others. While all military provinces agreed 
with the need expressed by the committee’s report for guerrilla-type activities in the 
archipelago, all statements also expressed concerns about the equipment and train-
ing required by guerrilla-type activities. In particular, the statements called for com-
munications equipment, much in need in the wide and rugged archipelago.815  
 
The statement of the Navy Headquarters echoed those of the military provinces 
while emphasising the importance of training combat divers for guerrilla-type activi-
ties in the archipelago. The navy was also concerned about the adequacy of re-
sources available to special training which needed to be increased if responsibility 
for the training of guerrillas was to be assigned to all units responsible for the de-
fence of the coast.816 The statement submitted by the National General Staff Col-
lege was analytical, focusing on operational skills. The National General Staff Col-
lege proposed that the arrangements for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago 
be implemented gradually and on a smaller scale compared with those proposed by 
the committee. Although the proposed activities were regarded as necessary in light 
of the threat scenario, the training of instructors alone would, according to the Na-
tional General Staff College, require so much time that it, if implemented, would no 
longer meet the requirements set for repelling a modern invader.817  
 
While the Frontier Guard Headquarters endorsed the ideas proposed for guerrilla-
type activities in the archipelago, it also regarded the assessments put forth in the 
committee’s report on the chances both of the enemy and the defender as being 
founded on shaky grounds. According to the Frontier Guard, a great deal more in-
vestigation and detailed research would be required in order to uncover all the 
strengths and weaknesses related to defensive battles. The Frontier Guard regarded 
the concentration of training in the Coast Guards –which were directly under the 
control of the Frontier Guard –as unrealistic, as well as the use of maritime surveil-
lance companies for guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago. On these 
grounds, the Frontier Guard in effect shot down the committee's proposal, while at 
the same time welcoming its ideas.818  
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The major reason for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago remaining on theo-
retical level, as late as 1970, were concerns regarding the speed at which coastal jae-
ger battalions could be formed and the problems with equipping them. The Navy 
and Frontier Guard in particular believed that no time would be available during 
mobilisation to form coastal jaeger battalions capable of guerrilla-type activities 
should Finland be subjected to a surprise attack seeking to capture the country. In 
practice, the archipelago would be vacant, although maritime surveillance companies 
with a high level of preparedness would be stationed there, as proposed by the com-
mittee.819 The Coastal Jaeger Battalion as a wartime unit was dropped from the es-
tablishment chart of the Defence Forces in early spring 1970.820 
 
A very interesting aspect regarding guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago was the 
fact that as late as late 1971 it was publicly claimed that coastal jaeger battalions 
would form the nucleus of the defence of the archipelago and coastal areas, alt-
hough the Coastal Jaeger Battalion as a unit had already been dropped from the es-
tablishment chart. In 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Niilo Lappalainen published an arti-
cle on collaboration between coastal jaeger battalions and the coastal artillery Ranni-
kon Puolustaja (‘Defender of the Coast’). According to Lappalainen ‘in wartime, coastal 
jaeger battalions will be principally intended for combat in the focal points of defence in the archipel-
ago and coastal areas. Requirements set for training specified that a coastal jaeger battalion operat-
ing on the coast is capable of successfully participating in defensive battles and in guerrilla-type activ-
ities in the archipelago.’821 The release of a wrong or false piece of information made 
public was possibly related to the rhetoric on defence policy prevalent at the time, 
according to which a potential invader was to be presented with an image of the 
strength and credibility of Finland’s defensive capability by emphasising, among 
other things, the role of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare in all areas.  
 
Despite critical statements, the investigations into guerrilla-type activities in the ar-
chipelago were not a wasted effort as they produced a wealth of information and 
views that could be put to good use in the development of local defence arrange-
ments and territorial combat. From 1970 onwards, systematic work on the issue was 
continued under the direction of the Operations Division of the General Headquar-
ters.822 After all, the target was to introduce a credible territorial defence system with 
versatile content for use as quickly as possible. 
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(‘Presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of the changes made to the es-
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Conflicts regarding the meaning of concepts and modifications to the threat 
scenario  
 
As stated above, the 1968 events in Europe on the one hand played a role in chang-
ing the threat scenario in the thinking of Finnish officers and, on the other hand, 
modified the Finnish art of war in the face of prevalent military threats. While the 
events of 1968 were still unfolding, a small group of officers at the National General 
Staff College drafted a memorandum which discussed the development of the Finn-
ish organisation and tactics in almost sickeningly realistic –even pessimistic –terms. 
This memorandum with the related documents comprised what was to become sar-
castically referred to as ‘the holy script of pessimism  ’at the National General Staff Col-
lege. According to the drafters of this memorandum, it was based on a great number 
of observations gained from map and terrain exercises focusing on the chances of 
Finnish formations fighting against a modern enemy.823 
 
This highly analytical memorandum in excess of 170 pages makes for grim reading. 
The officers at the National General Staff College concluded, providing a wealth of 
evidence, that ‘we will not stand a chance on the battlefield if we adhere to our current tactical 
principles and use the troops that our current organisation expects us to use.’The discrepancy with 
regard to mobility, firepower and the protection of troops has such proportions that it cannot be 
caught up. Therefore, other means need to be found.’824 
 
The staff at the National General Staff College quite evidently wanted to shake up 
prevalent thinking and direct the development of the territorial defence system in a 
more credible direction. It was not a question of political credibility but, rather, 
credibility regarding battles and their successful outcome. In addition to strong real-
ism and pessimistic conclusions, the memorandum also provided a great deal of 
analysis on the strengths of the Finnish defence. However, the memorandum was 
founded on a justified concern about the capability that a great power enemy –the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact –had demonstrated in carrying out a surprise at-
tack designed to capture an entire country, Finland not excluded. In a memoran-
dum, Colonel Paavo Junttila, the Chief of the General Staff Division of the National 
General Staff College, discusses the difficulty of the problem. ‘After all, it is a question 
of changing the method of waging war, including the related attitudes. Therefore, changes may ap-
pear difficult and even impossible to implement. The counter-question to be asked is what the out-
come will be if we continue along our present path, retaining our present attitudes ’. Judging by 
the comments added to the margins of the original memoranda by Colonel Ermei 
Kanninen, Chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, he had 
familiarised himself with the conclusions drawn by the memoranda.825 
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the Department of Military History at the National Defence University. 
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Approximately one month after the date of the memorandum, Colonel Kanninen 
introduced the top leadership of the General Headquarters to the factors affecting 
Finland’s defence capability, using sharp language. In the first part of his introduc-
tion, Kanninen outlined the background of his presentation, making direct refer-
ences both to publicly expressed misgivings and indirect allusions to pessimism that 
had set in in some quarters. According to Kanninen, while the most pessimistic 
views could be ignored, he was worried about people’s trust in Finland’s defence 
capabilities. By way of evidence for this, he referred to assertions according to 
which Finland would not be able to defend itself against a great power. In the mar-
gin of the original memorandum, Kanninen had added ‘the notion of guerrilla war –the 
leadership of the Defence Forces and the government under fire.’826 Judging by the sharp tone 
of his presentation, Kanninen wanted to respond both to publicly expressed asser-
tions and the criticism put forth by the officers at the National General Staff College 
regarding the credibility of Finland’s defence, while the issue was still fresh. 
 
The conclusions drawn at the National General Staff College were presented to a 
small circle at a seminar on tactics held in June 1969. The key theme of the seminar 
realistically addressed the grounds for the territorial defence system from the per-
spectives of its appropriateness, troop foundation, the method of waging war, tac-
tics and striking force. General staff officers with familiarity with the above-
mentioned issues had been appointed to act as introducers at the seminar. Captain 
Teo Haapajärvi gave an extensive introduction to the tactics of local forces and their 
method of waging war, in which he focused on the realistic opportunities available 
to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and their effectiveness as a deterrent 
in local defence.827  
 
In his introduction, Lieutenant Colonel Raimo Viita also took a highly critical view 
on the role of guerrilla warfare in strategic defence. ‘The method of fighting includes large-
scale guerrilla-type activities, which the army must be prepared to continue for an undefined length of 
time in the form of guerrilla war in the case the combat-effective parts of the local forces are no longer 
capable of performing the tasks assigned to them. In other words, in the worst-case scenario, the ul-
timate goal –the restoration of Finland’s independence and sovereignty –will be achieved through 

826 PE:n no.tta 21.4.1969 (Eversti Ermei Kannisen alustus Pääesikunnan sotilasjohdon informaatiotilaisuudessa 
(‘An introduction by Colonel Ermei Kanninen at an information meeting of the military leader-
ship’): Suomen puolustuskykyyn vaikuttavia tekijöitä (‘Factors affecting Finland’s defence capability’), 
Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession of the author of this 
thesis. 
827 SKK:n no.tta 2.5.1969 (Taktiikkamme ja organisaatiomme kehittäminen, II osa, 1. lisäys) (‘The deve-
lopment of our tactics and organisation, Part II, 1st amendment’), Document collection: ‘Pessi-
mismin pyhä kirja m/1969, SKK’ (‘The holy script of pessimism’), a folder with no identifier, the re-
search database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, The 
teaching staff at the National General Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Raimo Viita and Lieutenant 
Colonel Ilkka Seppälä, Major Ilkka Halonen and Captain Teo Haapajärvi gave introductory presen-
tations at the seminar on tactics held between 6 and 9 June 1969. Of these officers, Haapajärvi in 
particular had familiarised himself with guerrilla-type activities in his studies. See Haapajärvi, Teo: 
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isation’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1967, SKK 1/886 KA.  
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guerrilla war. The ultimate means for achieving the goals is a total guerrilla war.’According to 
Viita, this model could only be approved in use if Finland could deploy tactics suit-
able for territorial warfare, had reserves with a proper striking and operational capa-
bility trained for guerrilla warfare and equipped with proper materiel and had in 
place an organisation that was thoroughly prepared for such warfare. It was exactly 
such shortcomings that the seminar on tactics arranged at the National General 
Staff College addressed.828 Such misgivings and arguments were understandable 
considering the era in which they were expressed. After all, the tactics of territorial 
combat, the implementation of the arrangements for local defence, and the updating 
the Field Regulation were still very much uncompleted, not to mention the estab-
lishment chart and the allocation of equipment to troops. 
 
At the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, a clandestine meeting was 
held in July 1970, the participants of which were Lieutenant GeneralPaavo Ilmola 
(Chief of the General Headquarters), Lieutenant General Lauri Sutela (Chief or the 
General Staff), Lieutenant General Paavo Junttila (Quartermaster) and Colonel Er-
mei Kanninen (Chief of the Operations Department.) The meeting focused on ‘fun-
damental strategic and operational questions.’Colonel Kanninen, who had had taken the 
initiative for the negotiation, drafted a memorandum in which he included topics for 
discussion and proposals for various issues.829 Behind Kanninen’s initiative was the 
fact that a draft for the 1969 Field Regulation had been distributed for comments 
and that the operational orders and plans under revision needed to be confirmed. 
Kanninen wanted to obtain the approval by key decision-makers and top leadership 
regarding the fundamental strategic and operational questions and, above all, the 
concepts to be used. Kanninen sought to obtain policy statements that would be 
credible both from the internal perspective of defence policy and from the external 
viewpoint of military credibility.830  
 
The first point that Kanninen raised in the discussion was the various options con-
cerning war and their discussion in public life and public documents. According to 
him, the division of war into ‘a phase of neutrality ’and ‘a surprise attack’in the reports 
drafted for the political leadership of the country required a more detailed discus-
sion. In his memorandum Kanninen also noted that ‘an attack by NATO (West Ger-

828 SKK:n no.tta 31.5.1969 (Alueellisen puolustuksen joukkoihin ja iskukykyisiin joukkoihin suoritetun jaon 
tarkoituksenmukaisuus ja siinä erityisesti huomioon otettavia näkökohtia) (‘The appropriateness of the divi-
sion of troops in local forces and combat-effective troops, including any relevant aspects’), an in-
troduction no. 1 by Lieutenant Colonel Raimo Viita at the seminar on tactics and organisation ar-
ranged by the teaching staff of the National General Staff College between 6 and 9 June 1969, 
Document collection: ‘Pessimismin pyhä kirja m/1969, SKK’ (‘The holy script of pessimism’), a fold-
er with no identifier, the research database of the Department of Military History at the National 
Defence University. 
829 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
830 Kanninen, Ermei: An interview, 3 January 2006. PE:n no.tta 18.9.1969/sal (Eversti Ermei Kannisen 
esitys ylimmän päällystön informaatiotilaisuudessa 18.9.1969 Pääesikunnassa (‘Proposal by Colonel Ermei 
Kanninen at an information event for the top leadership, arranged on 18 September 1969 at the 
General Headquarters’): PTL:n uudistamistyö ja paikallispuolustus) (‘Update of the establishment chart 
and local defence’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession 
of the author of this thesis. SKK:n no. 88/7/28.1.1970, Muistio prikaatin ja sitä suuremman yhtymän 
taistelua käsittelevän kenttäohjesäännön uusimisesta, (‘Memorandum on the updating of the field regula-
tion on battle by a brigade and larger formations’) T 24043/F 97, KA. 
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many) could not be a surprise attack in the sense that it would involve the concept of the capture of 
the country’and that ‘a surprise could only be launched by the Warsaw Pact, but the direction 
from which such an attack would be launched is always left open in public discussion.’What had 
developed into a problem was a discrepancy between the draft for the General Sec-
tion of the Field Regulation and the concepts used in public life, as an attack de-
signed to capture a country, for all its descriptive power, was too incorrect politically 
to be applied to the prevailing conditions.831 If a surprise attack launched to capture 
Finland failed, the Warsaw Pact was expected to launch a large-scale invasion in or-
der to achieve its targets. Therefore, Kanninen proposed that the concepts of ‘a sur-
prise attack’and ´a full-scale invasion ’be retained in the Field Regulation, accompanied 
with detailed explanations, as well as in the operational order. In line with this, the 
term ‘attack designed to capture the country ’as a concept was abandoned and replaced 
with the more neutral term ‘surprise attack.’Kanninen also proposed that the opera-
tional order under drafting be rewritten to take account of a surprise attack, with 
due attention being paid to the protection of neutrality.832  
 
As a second issue, Kanninen took up military operations and their implementation. 
According to Kanninen, strategic defence was based on territorial combat, the plan-
ning, arrangements and training of which were based on local forces assigned to car-
ried out local combat, and on mobile warfare conducted by general forces. Planning 
was based on the notion that both troops types would constitute a coherent frame-
work under which the commander responsible for the situation or the area could 
use certain local troops as if they were troops of the general forces, and vice versa. 
As such, arrangements were finally being resolved, and Kanninen saw no reason for 
making changes to the principles already confirmed. Kanninen proposed to the top 
military leadership that the two complementary operating principles of local and 
general forces should be retained within the framework of a local defensive plan. As 
a decision had already been taken to retain the concept of ‘covering force’, Kan-
ninen also proposed that ‘covering force battles ’should be retained in the plans although 
the National General Staff College had proposed in their statement that they be 
changed to ‘initiation of battle ’.833  
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831 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. Cf. also Maanpuolustuksemme 
tienviitat (‘Guidelines for the national defence’), Helsinki 1967 (a book without page numbers). 
Puolustuskykymme materiaalinen perusta (‘The materiel foundation of our defence capability’), Helsinki 
1968, pp. 4–6. Ruutu (1969a). Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa, luonnos (‘General Section of the Field 
Regulation, a draft’), (KO yl), 1969, p. 10. 
832 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. See also PE:n no.tta 
18.9.1969/sal (Eversti Ermei Kannisen esitys ylimmän päällystön informaatiotilaisuudessa 18.9.1969 Pääesi-
kunnassa (´A presentation by Colonel Ermei Kanninen at the information for the top leadership 
held on 18 September 1969 at the General Headquarters): PTL:n uudistamistyö ja paikallispuolustus) 
(‘Update of the establishment chart and local defence’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the 
original document in the possession of the author of this thesis. 
833 Ibid. For additional information on the concept of ‘covering force’, see PE:n no.tta 30.4.1961 
(Operatiiviset olosuhteet ja niiden asettamat vaatimukset maavoimien eri puolustushaarojen ja aselajien (vast) tak-
tiikan, kaluston ja menettelytapojen kehittämiseksi) (‘Operational conditions and the requirements that 
they set for the development of tactics, equipment and operational procedures of the arms and 
branches of the army (equivalent)’), T 26965/F 22 sal, KA.  
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According to Kanninen, one critical issue was related to situations in which the war 
had continued for some time along with the concept of guerrilla war.834 Conceptual 
confusion clouding the thinking in the Finnish art of war also caused trouble, and 
not only at the General Headquarters. The significance of guerrilla war and, above 
all, the real opportunities available to waging guerrilla war in Finland had been dis-
cussed throughout the 1960s. An example of this was provided by an article by Ma-
jor Esa Seppänen, published in Sotilasaikakauslehti in 1969. Being the first of its 
kind, Seppänen’s article publicly criticised the confusion characterising concepts and 
the potential for misunderstanding. Seppänen noted in his articles that ‘as only scant 
material is available in Finnish, and as its content is limited, information is largely obtained from 
foreign sources. This requires a good command of foreign terminology and an ability to translate 
such terminology into one’s native language. The key is that the basic idea of a foreign term is iden-
tified and translated. A verbatim translation is not always sufficient. Otherwise, misunderstanding 
the meaning of a foreign term could lead the reader to form an incorrect understanding of the issue, 
and incorrect understanding of the meaning of words could lead to incorrect theories and, worst of 
all, to incorrect practical applications. Such repercussions might then be reflected in the teaching of 
military schools, research and general discussion. ’835 Seppänen’s concerns were justified and 
correct in the sense that in the research conducted by military schools in particular 
the concept of guerrilla war was understood in several ways.  
 
While several orders and instructions issued by the General Headquarters had at-
tempted to address this conflict, the concept of guerrilla war was still included in the 
operational basic order from 1966 (opkky 10) and in the draft for the General Sec-
tion of the Field Regulation from 1969. However, all directives regarding training 
and practice referred to guerrilla-type activities. According to Kanninen, the crucial 
issue was to approach the basic question from the perspective of two options. ‘Ei-
ther the country is occupied so rapidly that only sporadic resistance can be organised, or armed re-
sistance by regular troops is broken after the materiel resources are exhausted (over a course of one 
month).’This fundamental question regarding the art of war could be addressed in 
two ways under the prevailing view: ‘either well-prepared resistance under unified leadership 
is abandoned, or the war will be continued in the form of guerrilla war.’Kanninen emphasised 
in his memorandum that the current operational plans followed the latter scenario, 
regarding it as the only option both from the perspective of Finns’willingness to de-
fend their country and the prevention of war.836  
 
Although the military leadership would have to consent to giving up resistance in 
the interest of the nation, this could not, according to Kanninen, constitute the basis 
for planning; rather, it should be a decision to be taken should the situation so re-
quire. Therefore, continuing to procure materiel for consumption for a period in ex-
cess of one month was a prerequisite for the continuation of combat. Because the 
strength of the troops that would continue fighting was difficult to assess, the previ-
ous operational plans had set the figure at approximately half the strength of the 
ground forces.837 The issue had been brought up at the beginning of the 1960s, 
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834 Ibid. 
835 Seppänen, Esa: Aikakautemme sodan terminologiasta ja teoriasta, (‘On the terminology and theory of 
war in our era’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 9/1969, p. 413. 
836 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
837 Ibid. 
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when the following note was made of the deployment of the covering force for de-
laying battles. ‘The covering force is tasked with gaining time for the initiation of counter 
measures ... the delaying action must be supported by guerrilla-type activities. However, the superior 
strength of the enemy may prevent our troops from engaging in regular delaying action in certain ar-
eas. Should this be the case, the defender must resort to guerrilla warfare, conducted possibly across 
a very large area, thereby enabling the defender to carry out its tasks that would otherwise be impos-
sible to accomplish.’838 In line with this view, Kanninen proposed that ‘the option of guer-
rilla war be retained, and its significance be emphasised both in planning and training.’839 In oth-
er words, the calculations on attrition carried out in the 1960s and a secret opera-
tional decision taken at the same time indicated that Finland had prepared to wage 
guerrilla war engaging as many as 250,000 men.840 
 
A similar model of guerrilla warfare had been presented to the students of the Na-
tional General Staff College –future general staff officers –in 1968. The section on 
university-level education in the book entitled Maanpuolustuksen perusteet (‘The fun-
damentals of national defence’) justifies the issue with similar grounds. ‘Training hu-
man resources on the basis of universal conscription continues to be necessary if we want to show 
that our nation cannot be conquered by simply defeating our limited covering force and that we will 
be capable of more extensive military operations, with guerrilla war waged by very large forces as our 
last resort. Recent experiences gained from guerrilla war are obviously a deterrent even to a strong 
invader.’841 
 
In addition to the fundamental issues mentioned above, the leadership of the navy 
and the issue regarding the commander of the air defence were also discussed at the 
meeting. On the front page of an original memorandum on the event, the following 
hand-written note had been added: ‘all proposals were unanimously supported.’842 Judging 
from the handwriting, the note had been entered by Ermei Kanninen himself. This 
event can be regarded as highly important from the perspective of Finland’s defen-
sive strategy. Kanninen’s principal goal was apparently to obtain the approval of the 
top leadership of the Defence Forces for the credibility of the defence policy and 
military credibility presented outside. Kanninen’s model was heavily based on his 
own ideas about the direction that the development of the territorial defence system 
should take and his own role in this work. According to him, the extremely difficult 
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838 PE:n no.tta 30.4.1961 Operatiiviset olosuhteet ja niiden asettamat vaatimukset maavoimien eri puolustus-
haarojen ja aselajien (vast) taktiikan, kaluston ja menettelytapojen kehittämiseksi, (‘Operational conditions 
and the requirements that they set for the development of tactics, equipment and operational pro-
cedures of the arms and branches of the army (equivalent)’) T 26965/F 22 sal, KA. 
839 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
840 The strength of the wartime army at the beginning of the 1970s was calculated to be around 
500,000 men, comprising general, local and supportive forces, including reserve and replacement 
troops. PE:n no.tta 18.1.1971 (‘A memorandum drafted by Ermei Kanninen’): Puolustusvoimille 
asetettavat suorituskykyvaatimukset, jotka koskevat kykyä torjua Suomen alueelle kohdistuvia hyökkäyksiä) 
(‘Requirements set for the Defence Forces, regarding their capability to repel attacks against the 
Finnish territory.’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection; the original document in the possession 
of the author of this thesis. 
841 Maanpuolustuksen perusteet (‘The fundamentals of national defence’), Helsinki 1968, Osa: Sotilaal-
lisen voiman osuus kokonaismaanpuolustuksessa (‘Part: The role of military force in the total national de-
fence’), p. 3 
842 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. 
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problems following a large-scale invasion should be acknowledged without giving 
up hope ‘as long as we adhere to the principles of territorial defence that we have recently adopted.’
Since the late 1960s, Kanninen had asserted on several occasions that the objective 
of the revised territorial doctrine was to defend Finland’s vital areas even if they 
fought in isolation, to slow down the enemy’s advance, and to hamper its possibili-
ties to use fire through guerrilla-type activities and by taking advantage of Finnish 
terrain and climate.843  
 
Similar rhetoric on territorial defence was used on national defence courses. For ex-
ample, the content of lectures for the 1969 course is unambiguous. ‘The preventive ef-
fect of sufficiently strong and readily operational troops is of paramount importance in the safeguard-
ing of Finland’s neutrality and territorial integrity. Already in peacetime and especially during a 
conflict between outside powers we must be prepared to demonstrate that we are capable of prevent-
ing the violations of our territorial integrity.’844 This rhetoric was two-pronged as it sought 
to demonstrate, especially to the Soviet Union, that Finland possessed a strong de-
fensive capability, the extension of which to costly guerrilla war if necessary provid-
ed a strong demonstration of Finland’s credible defensive capability. 
 
On the basis of the discussion event held at the General Headquarters, a fundamen-
tal conclusion on the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities can be drawn. 
For reasons related to defence policy, the military leadership wanted to retain guer-
rilla war in the concepts of national defence although all practical measures in the 
Defence Forces starting from the late 1960s –such as the introduction of local de-
fence and training –had put the emphasis on guerrilla-type activities and tactics. Re-
ferred to as a last-ditch effort in documents, guerrilla war was retained as a concept 
in the General section of the Field regulation which at the time was undergoing up-
dating, and in a similar document, for its possible deterrent effect. The decision to 
retain guerrilla war as the last theoretical option to defend Finland was peculiar from 
the perspective of the Finnish art of war –after all, even the teaching staff at the 
National General Staff College had questioned the deterrent effect of theoretical 
guerrilla war when presenting their conclusions at a seminar on tactics held in1969, 
assessing it to be practically non-existent. Therefore, the question can be raised as to 
whether the option of guerrilla war was only a political factor related to the credibil-
ity of defence, or whether it truly reflected the general realism of the military with 
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843 See, for example, PE:n no.tta 18.9.1969/sal (Eversti Ermei Kannisen esitys ylimmän päällystön in-
formaatiotilaisuudessa 18.9.1969 Pääesikunnassa (´A presentation by Colonel Ermei Kanninen at the in-
formation for the top leadership held on 18 September 1969 at the General Headquarters): PTL:n 
uudistamistyö ja paikallispuolustus) (‘Update of the establishment chart and local defence’), PE:n no.tta 
21.4.1969 (Eversti Ermei Kannisen alustus: Suomen puolustuskykyyn vaikuttavia tekijöitä) (‘An introduction 
by Colonel Ermei Kanninen: Factors affecting Finland ’s defence’), PE:n no.tta 26.4.1970 (Eversti 
Ermei Kannisen esitelmä: Alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän perusteista) (‘A presentation by Colonel Ermei 
Kannien: On the foundations of the territorial defence system’), PE:n no.tta 9.2.1970/sal (Eversti 
Ermei Kannisen alustus: Sotilaallisen maanpuolustuksen perusteet) (‘An introduction by Colonel Ermei 
Kanninen: The foundations of military national defence’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the 
original documents in the possession of the author of this thesis. 
844 Ruutu, Juhani: Sotilaalliset toimenpiteet puolueettomuuden ja erityisesti maarajan suojaamiseksi, Tietoja maan-
puolustuksesta (‘Military measures for the protection of neutrality and, especially, land border, Infor-
mation on national defence’), Helsinki 1969(b), p. 185. 
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regard to the art of war. In any event, the concept of guerrilla war and the option of 
resorting to it remained in official regulations and operational plans. 
 
By the early 1970s, the key issue was that a consensus of sorts had been reached on 
the fact that confusion over concepts did exist, and an important conclusion from 
this state of affairs had been drawn. A clearer distinction between guerrilla war, 
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities needed to be made in the concepts and 
content of the Finnish art war, and comprehensible and unambiguous general defi-
nitions of them needed to be included in regulations. Although the public rhetoric 
on defence policy was another thing, the concepts needed to be in line with each 
other. In any event, the confusion regarding concepts in the late 1960s hampered 
development which needed to be addressed. Otherwise, reform encompassing the 
entire defence system and its implementation, especially in the planning regarding 
the operational level, would have faced grave problems. 
 
 
Tactical guidelines for local defence 
 
Despite the many controversies, the implementation of the territorial defence sys-
tem was in full swing. However, in late 1970, feedback of the lack on tactical gui-
delines began to mount. In particular, this lack revolved around local defence and 
the tactics of local defence forces.845 As an example of this, notes recorded and ob-
servations made by Major Ari-Ilmari Iisakkala on a war game arranged by the Mili-
tary Province of Savo-Karelia between 24 and 25 November 1970 can be con-
sidered. ‘Regarding local defence, one cannot help noticing that the troops still do not fully under-
stand what the control of an entire area of responsibility entails within the framework of modern 
combat. While the focus is on battles on the front line, the biggest surprises will take place in the 
rear.’Iisakkala considered that a sufficient number of war games should be arranged 
in peacetime in each operational area in order to ensure that the basic principles of 
the art of war and military operations could be developed in a realistic direction with 
regard to the prevailing threat scenarios. Iisakkala also put forth the urgent need for 
operational guidelines addressing collaboration between the local and general forc-
es.846 The use of local forces in a situation involving a surprise attack was also dis-
cussed in a war game arranged at a training event for the top leadership (YPO 6) in 
November 1970.847 
 
When presenting his observations to the chief of the Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters, Iisakkala received a personal order from him to compile a 
clarifying directive covering the tactics to be used in local defence, seeking to avoid 
any misunderstandings.848 By March 1971, Iisakkala had completed his directive, 
which was distributed to the troops under the title Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa 
puolustuksessa (‘A tactical directive for local defence.’) This detailed directive in ex-
cess of one hundred pages provided grounds for the development and preparations 
of the revised defence system, including training to be provided under it. It was 
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845 Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010. 
846 PE:n no. R 56/Optsto/11 henksal/1.12.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9, sal, KA. 
847 PE:n no. 36/Optsto/Da sal/25.1.1971, T 26965/D 1 sal, KA. 
848 Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010. 
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clearly intended to be used alongside the Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Sec-
tion of the Field Regulation’) which had been completed in spring 1971. However, 
by the time it was completed, the Tactical directive was already partly insufficient in 
light of the whole field of local defence. It focused on the battle conducted by the 
various command echelons of the local defence and the local forces, while, in the 
case of combat conducted by the general forces and their command echelons, the 
regulations in effect at the time were applied.849  
 
The document noted that the tactical viewpoints and solutions put forward in it 
were only indicative, and were to be developed and applied as the situation, area and 
current conditions demanded. While the concepts related to guerilla activities were 
presented in a way that was in line with the revised field regulation, the tactical de-
scriptions and definitions continued to be confusing in part. This was liable to cause 
confusion in the training, teaching and understanding of tactical issues throughout 
the Defence Forces. The military schools in particular found this embarrassing.850 
Plans for local defence drafted by the military districts also exhibited clear concep-
tual confusion.851 
 
Initially, Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa (‘A tactical directive for local 
defence’), provided the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard with sufficient gen-
eral tactical principles both in local combat and guerrilla-type activities. According 
to this directive, the local defence system was based on independent battles con-
ducted by the military provinces in accordance with their tasks, on the local defence 
covering the entire country in close collaboration with the military provinces, and 
on the general forces committed to decisive military operations. From the perspec-
tive of tactics, the directive described the nature of territorial combat as a form of 
warfare which sought to slow down and cause attrition to enemy forces, to cut en-
emy attack formations into smaller sections, to halt and prevent their advance, to 
defeat them, and to maintain control over vital areas of the country using a variety 
of means. ‘Territorial combat begins at the border, and involves operations that slow down and 
cause attrition to the enemy using even small troops which rely on guerrilla-type activities if neces-
sary.’Troops engaged in territorial combat were divided into general, local and sup-
port forces, reflecting their operational use in the territorial defence system. Local 
forces, responsible for local defence, were principally tasked with immediate combat 
using the methods of guerrilla warfare, particularly in surprise situations. A particu-
larly interesting aspect of the directive was its sixth main chapter, entitled ‘Guerrilla 
war.’The way the directive referred to the concept of guerrilla war was perfectly in 
line with the 1971 draft for Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of the Field 
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849 PE:n no. 861/Ohjessto/8 B ets/30.3.1971 (Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa) (‘A tactical 
directive for local defence’), T 23204/F 291, KA. See also Kenttäohjesääntö yleinen osa (KO yl), luonnos 
(‘General Section of the Field Regulation, a draft’) 1971. 
850 Ibid. Juhani Ruutu noted that the confusion regarding tactical concepts caused trouble for teach-
ing given by the National General Staff College. Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. See 
also Visuri (1989), pp. 213–214. 
851 See, for example, HämSpE:n no.tta /Lkp D I sal/  .10.1971 (4. Sotilasalueen paikallispuolustus-
suunnitelma) (‘Local defence plan of the military area’), T 24195/H 1 sal, KA. HämSpE:n no. 
4/Järjtsto/Lkp D III sal/8.9.1972, (3./ErP 63:n maahanlaskun torjunta- ja sissitoimintasuunnitelma) 
(‘The plan of 3./ErP 63 for repelling airborne landings and guerrilla-type activities’), T 24195/H 4 
sal, KA. 
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Regulation’) and the conceptual hierarchy of the 1973 Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa 
(‘General Section of the Field Regulation’) which was confirmed later.852  
 
To continue military operations in the form of guerrilla warfare was a viable solution 
in situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military operations had 
been lost in some part or a major section of Finnish territory. A military province 
was to continue combat in the form of guerrilla war in a situation where the task as-
signed to it using regular operations was impossible considering the number of 
available troops. In the initial phase, the target of guerrilla war was to support the 
military provinces engaged in regular operations, with the ultimate target being the 
defeat of the enemy through guerrilla-type activities. Troops engaged in guerrilla war 
were to use areas designated by the military province as their support areas.853  
 
The spirit of the 1971 draft for the Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of 
the Field Regulation’), updated by Colonel Ermei Kanninen, was discernible in the 
1971 tactical directive for territorial defence. In the 1971 draft for the Kent-
täohjesäännön yleinen osa, guerrilla warfare was defined to be, from the tactical perspec-
tive, ‘warfare conducted in order to continue regular military operations, or carried out alongside 
such operations, in the enemy-held territory.’To continue military operations in the form of guerrilla 
warfare is a viable solution in situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military opera-
tions have been lost in some part or a major section of the Finnish territory.’In the chapter on 
definitions in the 1973 Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa, guerrilla war was defined in al-
most equal terms to the previous draft. Only the word order was changed slightly.854 
 
With regard to guerrilla-type activities, the first clear definitions for territorial com-
bat from the 1970s that agreed with each other can be found in the 1971 Jalkaväen 
taisteluohjesääntö (‘Combat Regulation for the Infantry’) and in Ohje perusyhtymän 
taistelua varten ‘Guidelines for combat conducted by a basic formation’). The first 
one defines guerrilla-type activities as ‘combat operations conducted in the enemy’s rear or in 
enemy-held territory, relying on preparations made in advance and continuing them normally over 
long periods of time, aimed at slowing down and causing attrition to the enemy, harassing it and ty-
ing its forces in combat.’While the combat guidelines defined guerrilla-type activities in 
almost equal terms, they added further detail. ‘Guerrilla-type activities refer to combat op-
erations conducted in the enemy’s rear or in enemy-held territory, relying on preparations made in 
advance and continuing them over long periods of time, aimed at slowing down and causing attrition 
to the enemy, harassing it and tying its forces in combat. Guerrilla-type activities conducted across 
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directive for local defence’), pp. 10, 96–102, T 23204/F 291, KA. See also Kenttäohjesääntö yleinen osa 
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854 Ibid. Kenttäohjesääntö yleinen osa (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), (KO yl), Mikkeli 1973, 
pp. 74–79 and 168. Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 3 January 2006. 
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an area that is large both in width and depth and directed in a manner that seeks to make them 
the most effective in the decisive phase of the operations.’855 
 
Perusyhtymän taisteluohje (‘Guidelines for combat conducted by a basic formation’) 
from 1977 summed up the principles of combat conducted by a brigade, including 
its collaboration with local forces. The most significant tactical change to the 1963 
regulation was the fact that the regulation no longer made a reference to a brigade’s 
second defensive position further back, for which a sufficient number of troops 
were not considered to be available. Responsibility was increasingly being trans-
ferred to local forces, the defensive principles of a brigade were reinforced in other 
ways, and the focus of its operations within a framework of the various methods of 
combat were given a more precise focus, all of which was based on the decreasing 
probability that nuclear weapons would be used. Starting from the 1970s, the defen-
sive combat and tactics of a brigade increasingly took on features of local defence. 
Areas that battalions were ordered to defend, and the points of terrain that they 
were ordered to hold, including other areas that were to be held even when encir-
cled, were part of the development of tactics. Commanders had a considerable de-
gree of liberty to choose a method of combat that best suited a particular situation, 
including the repertoire of guerrilla-type activities. However, active offensive tactics 
played a key role in the battle doctrine, as passive defensive combat was not ex-
pected to produce the desired results.856  
 
All of the above-mentioned documents and handbooks define guerrilla war as com-
bat conducted in order to continue regular military operations, or carried out along-
side such operations, in enemy-held territory. To continue combat in the form of 
guerrilla warfare was a viable solution in situations where the prerequisites to carry 
out regular military operations had been lost in some parts or a major section of 
Finnish territory. While the general principles of guerrilla tactics such as the descrip-
tion of contents, variations, territorial division, the use of troops and the chain of 
command were logically defined in the guidelines, the concepts were in some cases 
highly misleading or even conflicting. With regard to the art of war, the definition 
given to the method of war reflected the nature of guerilla war, current objectives 
for such a war, and the situation, task and operational opportunities. Guerrilla-type 
activities were divided into dispersed and concerted operations. No clear borderline 
between the various modes of operations was drawn as the guidelines stated that 
both dispersed and concerted tactics were to be carried out simultaneously, with the 
focus between them varying according to the situation. 
 
All in all, it can be said that with regard to its doctrine and strategy, the territorial de-
fence system was sufficiently complete by the early 1970s, but work remained to be 
done, particularly regarding local combat operations and the related guerrilla-type 
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855 Jalkaväen taisteluohjesääntö, I osa (JvO I) (‘Combat regulation for the infantry Part I, A battalion in 
combat’), Helsinki 1977. Ohje perusyhtymän taistelua varten (‘Guidelines for combat conducted by a 
basic formation’), Helsinki 1977, p. V/1. 
856 Visuri, Pekka: Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys Keski-Euroopassa toisen maailmansodan jälkeen vertailuna vas-
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activities. While the training of career officers, NCOs and conscripts had at least sat-
isfactorily been set in motion on these grounds, training in guerrilla-type activities in 
particular would have required more detailed instructions in the early 1970s. After 
all, the only regulations in effect directly addressing guerrilla-type activities and relat-
ed training dated back to 1956 and 1957. Clearly, something needed to be done. Ev-
idently as early as 1972, the General Headquarters decided to start work on drafting 
a separate guidebook in the tactics of guerrilla-type activities. While it certainly was 
possibly to begin this process at a short notice, the necessary background work re-
quired a great deal of effort, particularly from the military schools of the Defence 
Forces and the Frontier Guard, which were assigned objectives and tied to the 
work. The commitment of the political leadership and decision-makers of the coun-
try to the set targets and the means of guerrilla war in the territorial defence system 
was also considered important.857 
 
 
Texts, research and reflections on guerrilla-type activities between 1967 and 
1983 
 
Between 1967 and 1983, a total of 25 articles on guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla 
warfare were published in the press and six in books. In the same period, 19 theses 
produced at the National General Staff College addressed this topic. In addition to 
the National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities were examined in 72 
studies prepared by the staff officer courses and infantry captain courses arranged 
by the Army Combat School.858 From the perspective of guerrilla-type activities, 
these years of the research period were clearly the most prolific. 
 
Among others, Esa Seppänen, Jurkka Viljamaa, Juhani Paakkinen, Veikko Koppi-
nen, Reino Laajaniemi and Helge Seppälä discussed guerrilla-type activities and 
guerrilla warfare and the associated concepts in their press articles. However, the 
culmination of such texts was an exchange of words between only two authors. 
Juhani Paakkinen and Veikko Koppinen dominated Sotilasaikakauslehti in particular, 
contributing articles which discussed guerrilla-type activities not only from the prac-
tical point of view but also put forth theoretical aspects. 
 
In autumn 1967, Captain Esa Seppänen published an extensive three-piece article on 
the changing nature of war. In his Yhteiskunnallinen sota – totaalisen sodan laajentunut 
sisältö(‘Social war –the expanded content of total war’), he discusses the changing 
nature of the art of war and war itself, not only in Finland but around the world. 
Seppänen’s perspective was twofold: political –that is, revolutionary –and military, 
in other words, guerrilla warfare. Seppänen’s focus was on revolutionary war, which 
he regarded as a manifestation of the change, and on guerrilla war, which he also 
thought was applicable to Finnish conditions. Seppänen sums up the issue as fol-
lows: ‘In Finland, total guerrilla war may constitute the last resort for our defence. Under disad-
vantageous conditions, it may also be the first and last means available to us to repel the enemy.’
According to Seppänen, guerrilla war required that both military and civilian re-
search resources be concentrated to the planning and preparation work in all sectors 
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857 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013. 
858 See the bibliography of this thesis. 
 
254 
of total national defence.859 As Esa Seppänen’s article was awarded first place in Se-
ries A860 of the magazine’s writing competition, it can be said to have influenced the 
thinking of the Finnish military.  
 
In an article published in autumn 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Jurkka Viljamaa dis-
cussed the actual possibilities available to troops to make the transition to guerrilla 
tactics. According to Viljamaa, prerequisites for successful guerrilla-type activities 
are created by changing attitudes, making organisations more functional, providing 
appropriate equipment, and arranging training and exercises that simulate real condi-
tions.861 While Viljamaa did not present anything new as such in his article, he evi-
dently wanted to stir discussion on the various forms of territorial combat. 
 
Starting in 1970, as a series of provocative articles on guerrilla-type activities written 
by a young 1st Lieutenant were published in Sotilasaikakausilehti. The author was 
Juhani Paakkinen, an officer at the Frontier Guard, whose articles challenged the 
prevailing thinking regarding both guerrilla-type activities and the changes that the 
Finnish art of war was undergoing in the era of the Cold War. Paakkinen’s first arti-
cle addressed the state of guerrilla-type training in 1970. Paakkinen considered the 
regulations for guerrilla-type activities in use at the time to be outdated, which had 
led to a whole host of problems in training. ‘Where can our instructors for guerrilla train-
ing acquire their information if our regulations are insufficient or in part outdated? Wilderness ro-
mance, lore that is passed on from one instructor to another, continues to be the essence of Finnish 
training in guerrilla-type activities; that this is so was clearly demonstrated when the author of this 
article sampled the student officers on JvKaptK 42 for their opinions on the training provided by our 
infantry units.’Paakkinen criticised with harsh words the erroneous image of the en-
emy prevalent at the time and the overestimation of the performance of the Finnish 
soldier. ‘This is the last moment to give up the notion according to which a Finnish man is a nat-
ural born guerrilla fighter and, by virtue of this fact, needs no training.’862 While Paakkinen’s 
article was topical, tackled real problems, and the views put forth were based on 
strong arguments, it nevertheless ruffled the feathers of many, especially at the Gen-
eral Headquarters. 
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Paakkinen continued his writing on guerrilla-type activities in 1971, inspiring Lieu-
tenant Colonel Helge Seppälä, who taught military history at the National General 
Staff College, to write about the same issue.863 Seppälä discussed the opportunities 
open to guerrilla war in Finland mostly against the background of Soviet partisan 
warfare during the Second World War. Like Paakkinen, Seppälä strongly questioned 
the thinking and the art of war that characterised the era. Although Seppälä defend-
ed guerrilla war, he also argued that Finland had chosen a slippery course by prepar-
ing for guerrilla war at the expense of regular warfare. ‘A small nation must develop side 
by side general preparedness for national defence and readiness to adopt guerrilla tactics. It cannot 
be assumed that an expensive defence capability, albeit a good one, would automatically require the 
capability to launch effective querrilla war, should the situation so require.864 
 
Seppälä’s article woke up the sleeping bear; publicly questioning the established 
principles of national defence using such strong language was definitively not ap-
propriate, least of all for a general staff officer. Lieutenant General Veikko Koppi-
nen, who had already retired, felt compelled to respond both to Juhani Paakkinen’s 
and Helge Seppälä’s views, defending the solutions taken in the Finnish art of war. 
In spring 1972, Koppinen wrote a rejoinder to Paakkinen and Seppälä, publishing it 
in Sotilasaikakauslehti under the title of Sissit – julmureitako! (‘Guerrilla jaegers –
brutes? Really!’), in which he corrected the erroneous public image that the readers 
of the magazine might have formed of Finnish guerrilla-type activities. Koppinen 
was particularly indignant about Seppälä drawing a parallel between the methods of 
Finnish guerrilla-type activities and brutish guerrillas who broke the rules of war.865  
 
The texts analysing guerrilla-type activities in the mid-1970s underwent a temporary 
phase during which particularly Juhani Paakkinen criticised the various forms of 
guerrilla-type activities without drawing major criticism.866 However, one article by 
Paakkinen from 1977 inspired Veikko Koppinen to put pen to paper again and re-
spond to the views put forth in the article. Paakkinen expressed his concerns about 
the meaning of concepts of the Finnish art of war and the relationship between 
concerted and dispersed guerrilla-type activities. ‘Depending on the country, a variety of 
definitions for guerrilla-type activities are put forth. The definition generally accepted in Finland 
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emphasises the significance of advance preparations, which is a justified view against the background 
of modern war. Coordinated collaboration between general and local forces is regarded as vital.’867 
 
Paakkinen thought that dispersed guerrilla-type activities had come to play a dispro-
portionately large role in the 1960s and 1970s in territorial combat. He argued that 
concerted guerrilla operations would be equally effective and would warrant more 
attention. ‘The relationship between dispersed and concerted operations is essentially dependent on 
the adopted concept of war. Guerrilla-type activities need to be linked to the different phases of terri-
torial battle. However, the defence has always been the most vulnerable aspect of guerrilla 
warfare.’868 In other words, Paakkinen questioned the dispersed defensive battle by 
means of guerrilla-type activities, as advocated by Veikko Koppinen.  
 
As mentioned above, Veikko Koppinen felt compelled to respond to the views put 
forth by Paakkinen, as Paakkinen was advocating an almost diametrically opposite 
form of operations compared to what Koppinen’s exploding wilderness was under-
stood to mean. Koppinen was clearly annoyed at Paakkinen’s assertions, noting that 
‘this kind of text really forces the reader to ask himself a fundamental question –what has hap-
pened to guerrilla-type activities? ’Koppinen gave Paakkinen both barrels, shooting down 
his arguments item by item, showing that Paakkinen had fallen into false interpreta-
tions by merely referring to military history.869 Koppinen’s article was very interest-
ing and provides an excellent contemporary testimony to a clash between two gen-
erations and the opinions put forth regarding the broad field of territorial combat. 
 
This heated exchange of opinions quite evidently affected the editorial staff of Soti-
lasaikakauslehti, as Juha Paakkinen was given an exceptional opportunity to respond 
to Koppinen’s rejoinder in the very same issue of the magazine. Paakkinen struck 
back verbally, noting that ‘Koppinen’s thinking is based on the notion that a Claymore-type 
mine is everything and nothing else matters. Without getting involved in a prolonged discussion on 
the effectiveness of guerrilla troops, I just want to point out that battles fought by guerrillas will 
probably never surpass in effectiveness those fought by regular forces. After having built up the cour-
age to give up wilderness romance in our training, we also need the courage to discuss guerrilla-type 
activities without emotions and prejudices.’Paakkinen was also concerned about the con-
ceptual inconsistencies that continued to plague guerrilla-type activities. ‘Concepts –
including those of guerrilla-type activities –take centre stage in the teaching of the art of war. It is 
inconceivable that the concepts of tactics and operational skills are chosen on the basis of terms that 
men are willing to use.’870 Predictably, Veikko Koppinen felt compelled to respond to 
the verbal fireworks of Paakkinen.871 Koppinen used the authority of his advanced 
age and experience, exercising his seniority, but he failed to silence Paakkinen, alt-
hough the debate between the two experts on guerrilla tactics ended. Both authors 
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continued to publish articles on guerrilla-related issues, without taking confronta-
tional positions.872 
 
Like trade magazines, guerrilla-type activities were discussed in several articles in lit-
erature. In addition to many creditable contributions, for example, by Major Niilo 
Palmén and Lieutenant General Ermei Kanninen, articles published by Major Teo 
Haapajärvi, Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu, Major Ilkka Ilmola and Major Heikki 
Kalpamaa deserve a special mention.873  
 
In 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu published an article on territorial defence 
in Jalkaväen vuosikirja, which was written in plain language and was very fundamental 
in tone. In a sub-chapter entitled Sissisodankäynnistä alueellisen puolustuksen osana (‘On 
the role of guerrilla war in local defence’), Ruutu provided an excellent account of 
the Finnish view of the nature and targets of guerrilla war. Ruutu referred to an arti-
cle entitled Sissitoiminnasta ja sissikoulutuksesta (‘On guerrilla-type activities and train-
ing’), published by Major Teo Haapajärvi a year before in the same publication, with 
a focus on guerrilla tactics. Both articles sought to clarify the means available to 
guerrilla-type activities from the perspective of the art of war. However, the key ob-
servation and message made by the authors were directed not only at the general 
public but also the leadership of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. While 
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were playing an increasingly important 
role in local defence, their development and the necessary skills required that sub-
stantial resources were channelled to the training of the reserves. The focus in train-
ing needed to be immediately shifted from fieldcraft to tactics, the method of 
fighting and the use of available equipment.874 Major lkka Ilmola addressed the same 
issue in an article that was published in 1977 in a book. ‘When assessing (the capacity of 
the Finnish defence system), the effect of local force guarrilla activities on the combat of a brigade 
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should not be forgotten. A strong local defence supported by guerrilla troops would open up opportu-
nities to even insufficiently equipped general forces.’875 
 
Published in 1977, the 50-year history of the Army Combat School was the first 
publication to introduce the content of the Sissitoimintaopas (‘Guidebook on guerril-
la-type activities’), published in 1979, to a wider audience. The author of the article, 
Major Heikki Kalpamaa, had acquainted himself with the guerrilla-type activities 
conducted by a company and a platoon over a period of several years, and had led 
the background research into and the writing of the guerrilla handbook while serv-
ing in the Karelia Brigade and the Army Combat School.876 Kalpamaa’s article miti-
gates the conflict between Paakkinen and Koppinen regarding the relationship be-
tween the dispersed and concerted method of fighting. ‘In line with the principles of ter-
ritorial combat, the guerrilla-type activities of general and local forces are closely linked to all the 
phases of a battle. The dispersed and concerted method of fighting are not mutually exclusive; ra-
ther, using both appropriately, the maximum benefit can be reaped out of the combat of a platoon 
or a company.’877 Being the officer responsible for the compilation of the Guidebook 
for guerrilla-type activities, Kalpamaa played an important role in dispelling and re-
moving misunderstanding about guerrilla-type activities and territorial combat. 
 
Dozens of studies produced at the military schools also addressed the problems as-
sociated with guerrilla-type activities in guerrilla warfare and territorial combat. Per-
haps the most analytical synthesis of the many and diverse strategic aspects of guer-
rilla warfare was thesis prepared by Captain Esa Seppänen at the National General 
Staff College, which he expanded to a book and published under the title of Sissisota 
–aikamme sota (‘Guerrilla war –the war of our time’) in 1971.878 Another study that 
critically analysed the suitability of guerrilla warfare for Finnish conditions was im-
portant from a Finnish perspective. Captain Arto Eronen argued in his study, pre-
pared on a staff officer course, that the experiences from guerrilla wars across the 
globe in the 1960s and 1970s were important forFinns, even though no plans were 
made to engage civilians in resistance. ‘In the wars under investigation, the situation was di-
ametrically opposite, as a situation in which insurgents relied on the civilian population was the 
rule, and support systems normally used by regular forces were relegated to a status in which they 
provided combat materiel and other munitions.879  
 
Eronen focused on those aspects of guerrilla-type activities that addressed the prac-
ticability of the art of war from the Finnish perspective. ‘Under our territorial defence 
system, we will be prepared to slow down and cause attrition to the enemy through guerrilla opera-
tions carried out by the local forces left behind in the enemy’s rear, to stabilise the situation, defeat 
the enemy and annihilate the invader through the delaying, defensive and offensive operations of the 
general forces. The supply of local forces engaged in guerrilla-type activities will need to be initially 
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based on caches created during the preparatory phase. The role of civilians in the support system, as 
I see it, remains undefined.’In other words, Eronen directed bold criticism at the practi-
cal implementation of the concept, which was undoubtedly one of the fundamental 
questions of guerrilla war – the status of the civilian population both in guerrilla 
warfare and in guerrilla-type activities.880 Aside from the studies published by Sep-
pänen and Eronen, very few of the studies representing the different course levels 
of the military schools addressed total guerrilla war over the course of the 1970s; in-
stead, they largely focused on guerrilla-type activities. 
 
Confusion regarding tactical concepts typical of the era may explain in part why the 
military schools made their students increasingly prepare studies focused on guerril-
la-type activities. Thus, research led by the military schools from the late 1960s until 
the early 1980s can be said to have had a clear effect on the concepts of and descrip-
tions regarding guerrilla-type activities. Especially students on the courses of the 
Army Combat School prepared a great number of studies on guerrilla-type activities. 
What was interesting was that most study subjects related to guerrilla-type activities 
between 1966 and 1970 were directly assigned to the military schools by then chief 
of the Frontier Guard, Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen. He also participated 
in the direction and assessment of several studies. Timewise, most studies address-
ing the issue were prepared between 1967 and 1979, which was a period when prac-
tically all staff officer or infantry captain courses produced studies related to guerril-
la-type activities. It can also be assumed that theses produced by students during 
those years were used in the updating process of the guidebook on guerrilla-type ac-
tivities.881 
 
As the number of studies on guerrilla-type activities produced was strikingly large 
compared with the previous years, from the mid-1970s onwards in particular, the 
question can be raised as to who proposed such topics to the Army Combat School. 
The colourful metaphors and headings used also raise a similar question. It would 
appear that the ideas and research topics that were hidden in a drawer which were 
proposed by Veikko Koppinen, who had served at the school in the 1950s, had seen 
the light of day and had been assigned to student officers. As the connection is ra-
ther obvious, this riddle was possible to solve by studying the list of teachers who 
had served the Army Combat School. Major Risto Koppinen, Veikko Koppinen’s 
son, served at the school between 1974 and 1978. After Veikko Koppinen had re-
tired from the chief’s post at the Frontier Guard in 1970, systematic research on 
guerrilla-type activities was continued in part by his son Risto Koppinen, particularly 
between 1974 and 1978. Once again, although indirectly, Veikko Koppinen exerted 
influence on research and development on guerrilla-type activities. What is par-
ticularly striking is that on captain course 49, arranged in 1976, guerrilla-type acti-
vities were an independent topic alongside tactics, leadership and history. This can 
also be explained in part by the fact that Risto Koppinen served at the Army Com-
bat School. Risto Koppinen also confirmed in a telephone interview that his father 
had suggested a number of ideas and topics for student work. All of this confirms 
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that Veikko Koppinen played a major role in the development of Finnish guerrilla 
tactics as late as the 1970s and 1980s.882 
 
Judged by the studies produced by the above mentioned student officers, operations 
by special troops were included in guerrilla-type activities and large-scale guerrilla 
warfare. Paralysing utilities vital to belligerents, such as electricity and tap water us-
ing the means of guerrilla tactics was one of the key objectives of special troops. 
Propaganda and psychological operations were considered to be a time-honoured 
part of guerrilla-type activities and special troops alike. Partly for these reasons, op-
erations targeting special troops were defined in Finland to be the foundation of an-
ti-guerrilla operations.883 The use of helicopters as a basic requirement for successful 
guerrilla-type activities was also discussed. For Finland, this meant that there was a 
concrete need for creating sufficient airborne capacity for special troops.884   
 
According to student officers and others who had familiarised themselves with the 
issue, Finland prepared both for guerrilla warfare waged alongside regular opera-
tions and for real guerrilla war in the 1950s and 1960s. The conclusions drawn over 
the course of the 1970s, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities waged in support 
of conventional operations were regarded to have an indisputable significance, one 
whose deterrent effect could not or would not be denied even in the face of techno-
logical development. Studies carried out at the military schools did not accept a full-
blown guerrilla war to be the Finnish solution to the defence problem; rather, there 
was an understanding, slowly gaining ground at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, 
stating that guerrilla-type activities were the preferred solution that guided decision-
making towards integrating guerrilla-type activities into territorial combat.885 Al-
though such a decision referred, realistically speaking, to what was termed a poor 
man’s doctrine, studies also found that guerrilla-type activities were practically the 
only way to respond to the prevalent threat scenarios using the resources available 
to defending Finland. The Finns hoped that this conclusion –which resembled a 
decision –would be noticed on a general level, particularly in the Soviet Union, 
conveying a message that Finland possessed a capacity, albeit a limited one because 
the country was inferior in technology and materiel, to defend itself against an in-
vader using all available means. 
 
Studies prepared at the National General Staff College argued that any potential in-
vader would avoid being tied up by guerrilla-type activities launched by the defend-
er. Thus, guerrilla-type activities were seen to be practically the only means available 
to Finland to ensure continued dogged resistance, even if vital areas of the country 
had been lost due to the country having been subjected to a large- scale invasion or 
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a capture attack. By the 1970s, mechanised troops of great powers, small in numeri-
cal strength and undergoing constant modernisation, possessed limited opportuni-
ties to launch large-scale counter measures or anti-guerrilla operations. On the other 
hand, excellent protection, mobility, firepower including that provided by helicop-
ters, and a night-vision capability were assets against guerrilla-type activeties.886 
 
 
Guerrilla troops and practical training in guerrilla tactics at units in the late 
1970s 
 
By the late 1970s, it was evident that the Defence Forces needed to react on the 
problems brought about by continuous development. The size of the age classes of 
conscripts, each smaller than the previous one, caused problems in the maintenance 
of the establishment chart and wartime placement of men. Following changes in the 
military capability of great powers, the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe, Finland needed to draw its 
own conclusions. The accelerated development of military technology in particular 
was understood to cause unavoidable changes to Finnish the art of war and, through 
it, operational skills tactics. Keeping pace with the changes was an issue that needed 
urgent attention in order to avoid problems related to the maintenance of defensive 
capability from becoming untenable. Impacts extended in real time to the delicate 
equilibrium between national sovereignty and credible defence.887  
 
The altered situation had a direct impact on the peacetime training of guerrilla jaeger 
troops and the principles of the use of such troops at war. According to a policy 
definition issued by the General Headquarters, guerrilla troops were divided into 
guerrilla jaeger battalions of the general forces and into special units with a guerrilla 
training that were part of the local forces. Guerrilla jaeger battalions were to be used 
in wartime along the enemy’s principle routes of advance, as well as deep in the en-
emy’s rear –dozens of kilometres behind enemy lines. In normal cases, guerrilla jae-
ger battalions in the reserve of the High Command were to be used under direct 
control of the military province or, alternatively, under the command of an army 
corps for concerted guerrilla-type activities aimed at destroying important targets in 
the enemy’s rear and for occupying a certain road or a point of terrain for a specific 
period of time to provide support to battles conducted on the ‘front line ’. In more 
unusual situations, a guerrilla jaeger battalion could be split into smaller units which 
were then to operate under the headquarters of the military district in the enemy’s 
rear.888 
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Gerrilla jaeger troops that were part of the local forces –guerrilla jaeger battalions 
and the companies of special battalions –were to be used principally for dispersed 
guerrilla operations along the enemy’s routes of advance, ensuring that such opera-
tions would cover the entire country. In practice, large areas in sparsely populated 
regions remained in which only an insufficient number of guerrilla jaeger troops 
could be formed. When the planners considered the fact that at certain stages of 
guerrilla-type activities specific points of terrain needed to be designated at which 
the weight of the operations would be directed, it became clear that some troops in-
tended for guerrilla operations were unsuitable for inclusion in the local forces. 
Troops that could be transported when necessary from one area to another were al-
so needed. The average age of the local troops, even in units with the best perfor-
mance, was approximately 30 to 35 years, which was considered too high for guerril-
la-type activities. By the 1980s, calculations showed, according to the General 
Headquarters, that the decreasing proportion of the younger age classes in the re-
serve also decreased the proportion of troops with the best performance. Therefore, 
lowering the average age of the local forces, or even some portions of their reserve, 
was impossible in practice.889  
 
As there was no direct way to affect the decreasing trend in the size of the age clas-
ses, the General Headquarters proposed that the Defence Forces needed to improve 
the materiel performance and preparedness for forming troops. In September 1975, 
Major General Aapo Savolainen, the quartermaster, drafted an expert opinion on 
the current situation for the second Parliamentary Defence Committee (PPK II), 
summing up the wide-reaching recuperations of the issue. ‘Our performance will be 
gauged by the number of troops that we are able to form and their level of equipment, but even more 
than that, it will be gauged by the assessments that exist of our defensive capability. Our conditions 
and our defence system do not require us to have the most expensive military technology; the Defence 
Forces will be able to fulfil their duties using moderately priced equipment. Our problem is to lead 
outside powers to believe that our capability to defend our territory is an economic problem, not a 
military one. However, being economic, this problem can be solved. The Defence Forces believe that 
this problem can be solved, thereby making our capability to prevent war an increasingly realistic 
factor. ’890 
 
By the 1970s, the peacetime training of troops suitable for guerrilla-type activities 
was at a satisfactory or better level both at the Defence Forces and the Frontier 
Guard. By the early 1970s, the Frontier Guards had a well-established training sys-
tem which produced around 900 men each year for placement in the reserve of 
guerrilla jaeger battalions. The number of conscripts annually trained by the Frontier 
Guards had settled at somewhat less than 1,000 men by the early 1970s. The num-
ber trained by the Defence Forces was approximately at the same level, around 
1,000 men. The General Headquarters calculated that the guerrilla jaeger battalions 
in the reserve would achieve their nominal strengths by 1975. However, what 
caused problems was the training of reservists for the special troops in the organisa-
tion of the local forces, as their number in the establishment chart was considerably 
larger. ‘The guiding principle is that men trained for placement in certain units should be called up 
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for service from the area of the military province that will form the unit in question. ‘This, however, 
has proved to be a difficult requirement to meet at the units providing training.’891 
 
In the 1970s, the Lapland Jaeger Battalion (LapJP), the Kainuu Brigade (KaiPr), the 
Karelia Jaeger Battalion (KarJP) and the Karelia Brigade (KarPr) provided basic 
training in guerrilla-type activities. All of the above-mentioned units had one com-
pany specialising in training in guerrilla-type activities, and at least the reserve NCO 
schools at KaiPr, KarPr: and KarJP had one similar platoon. Furthermore, one of 
the units at the Reserve Officer School trained guerrilla officers, including officer 
candidates from the Frontier Guard.892 Matti Mikkonen, who served at the Karelia 
Brigade between 1971 and 1984, recalled the training provided in guerrilla-type ac-
tivities in the 1970s. Mikkonen reported that such training at the Karelia Brigade be-
gan in 1970. Training principles for guerrilla-type activities were created under the 
direction of 1st Lieutenant Heikki Kalpamaa, commander of the 3rd company, who 
had joined the brigade after having served at the Parachute Jaeger School. Kalpa-
maa, who was promoted to captain in 1971, drafted customised training instructions 
for guerrilla-type activities in collaboration with the instructors of his company. 
Kalpamaa and his staff used the 1956 Sissikoulutusopas (‘Handbook in guerrilla train-
ing’), but as its content was already outdated, the foundations of guerrilla training 
were largely based on the training plans that Heikki Kalpamaa had taken with him 
from the Parachute Jaeger School.893 
 
Mikkonen recalls that training in the skills necessary for a guerrilla jaeger was initiat-
ed by providing individual fighters with personal skills. During the special training 
period, the skills of the trainees were provided with personal survival skills in nature, 
special equipment, working with mines, traversing the terrain in summer and winter, 
and deception. During the troop training period, the focus was on training guerrilla 
jaegers to operate as a squad, providing them with skills in traversing terrain as a 
squad under different conditions, preparing a battle position, using Claymore-type 
mines, acting properly in a battle position and in an area designated for deception 
operations, and acting appropriately in the area designated for accommodation and 
resupply. In other words, approximately 60 per cent of guerrilla training was focused 
on dispersed activities, and 40 per cent on concerted operations. Mikkonen’s unit 
voluntarily developed training, without any direction from the outside. All in all, the 
training provided was efficient and held in high esteem, not only at the Karelia Bri-
gade but also outside. Between 1971 and 1983, a large number of delegations visited 
the Karelia Brigade, where guerrilla-type activities and the special training of guerril-
la jaegers was demonstrated to both Finnish and foreign visitors.894 In the 1970s, 
peacetime training in guerrilla-type activities were provided along similar lines at the 
Kainuu Brigade, where the level of training was brought to a high level between 
1971 and 1976.895  
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The training system of the Defence Forces in the mid-1970s enabled the training of 
practically all guerrilla jaeger troops. Only the training of guerrilla jaegers for the ar-
chipelago was considered a problem. The number of conscripts trained each year 
was considered sufficient in principle, as it covered the need for the reserve of the 
local troops to be trained for guerrilla-type activities. By contrast, the calculations 
indicated that the annual number of conscripts trained by the Frontier Guard was 
insufficient to enable the forming of the troops in the establishment chart, necessi-
tating the covering of the shortfall with the reservists trained by the Defence Forces. 
Therefore, it was concluded in 1975 that there were no grounds for changing the 
guerrilla jaeger training system of the Defence Forces to produce reservists solely 
for guerrilla jaeger battalions or to train troops for guerrilla-type activities in the ar-
chipelago. For this reason, the development efforts were directed at stepping up the 
effectiveness of the existing system. In practical terms this translated into making 
the selection process of conscripts assigned to guerrilla training more effective, as-
signing the Parachute Jaeger School a role of a unifier of practices in guerrilla train-
ing, and increasing collaboration between the guerrilla jaeger companies and eche-
lons of command at the Frontier Guard. This was accompanied by the drafting of 
the guidebooks and regulations on which guerrilla jaeger training was based and 
regulations and delivering them to the units.896 
 
Surveys indicated that the regulations on which training at the guerrilla jaeger units 
of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard was based did not exist or had be-
come outdated by the mid-1970s. Captain Heikki Kalpamaa, who had gained a pro-
found familiarity with this issue, wrote as follows in his thesis regarding the lack of 
manuals and regulations: ‘A guerrilla training manual that covers the basic skills and combat 
techniques of an individual guerrilla jaeger, a squad and a platoon is seen as the most important 
handbook. In addition, a regulation or tactical guidelines covering the operating principles and tac-
tics of a guerrilla jaeger battalion and company engaged in combat within the framework of a mili-
tary province and formations are probably also needed.’897 
 
Matti Mikkonen, who served at the Karelia Brigade, also considered the require-
ments set for guerrilla training to be relatively exacting, as a great number of con-
scripts did not meet the requirements for being placed in guerrilla jaeger troops of 
the army reserve. The biggest problem was the poor physical condition of many 
conscripts, which necessitated separate selection of conscripts from each age group 
for guerrilla training. With regard to the attrition during training and the continued 
decrease in the size of the age groups, the focus needed to be shifted from quantity 
to quality. According to Mikkonen, not even the commander of the 3rd company 
participated in the placement of conscripts in their wartime units; instead, this was 
performed by the mobilisation staff at the brigade headquarters. Therefore, the staff 
of the training unit dis not know with full certainty the percentage of conscripts that 
were ultimately placed in wartime units or their units, although there was a great deal 
of guessing going on among the instructors.898 
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Although the equipment of the units providing training in guerrilla-type activities 
was generally good, that of the wartime troops had serious shortcomings. In practi-
cal terms this meant that many guerrilla jaeger battalions or special companies of the 
local forces lacked radio equipment, ammunition, disposable grenade launchers and 
means of transport. Attack rifles, Claymore-type mines, skis and pulks alone did not 
provide the defensive capability required by long-term guerrilla-type activities.899 
The General Headquarters recognised the extent of the problem in 1975, attempting 
to make the political decision-makers understand the gravity of the issue. ‘In repelling 
an attack, the ground forces play a major role. Despite materiel shortages, the ground forces have 
the prerequisites for repelling a surprise attack, as concentrating materiel and operations enable 
combat within a limited period of time. However, our current defence capacity does not enable defen-
sive battles of several months in duration, which would be necessary should a surprise attack develop 
into a large-scale invasion. In such situations we might be caught in a guerrilla war for which we 
have limited resources and which, by virtue of its very nature, would cause untold suffering to the en-
tire population.’900 
 
One attempt to solve the problem of increasingly smaller age groups and the short-
age of wartime materiel was a programme drafted by the General Headquarters be-
tween 1976 and 1977, entitled the programme for the development of the army peacetime or-
ganisation, better known by its abbreviation MARO in Finnish military jargon. While 
the most significant changes brought about by MARO touched on the organisation 
of the Defence Forces, it was also affected by many other aspects of the defence, 
including training and operational and tactical issues. In particular, continuous de-
velopment and the renewal of war equipment required changes to be made to guide-
lines covering tactics and combat techniques. According to MARO, the need for re-
forms was also driven by the increase in the number of refresher exercises, the need 
to strengthen the defence of Lapland, reforms affecting the civilian educational sys-
tem, the need to train conscripts instead of assigning them to various details, chang-
es to legislation governing working hours at the Defence Forces, the increased train-
ing needs of the professional officers and NCOs, the shortage of personnel in Fin-
land partially caused by UN peacekeeping missions, and arrangements for barracks 
premises and exercise areas at garrisons. The order to implement MARO at the De-
fence Forces was issued on 23 November 1977.901 In practice, this order became ef-
fective on 1 October 1979, after a delay of two years, at which date the names of in-
fantry and jaeger companies at units were changed to guerrilla jaeger companies.902 
 
It was hardly a coincidence that Major Ilkka Ilmola published a highly analytical arti-
cle in the annual book entitled Tiede ja Ase at a time when MARO was published. 
Ilmola’s article, entitled Operaatiotaidon ja taktiikan kehitysnäkymät 1980-luvulle (‘The 
trends in the operational skills and tactics in the 1980s’) provided several guidelines 
and ideas for development regarding the above-mentioned issues, without ignoring 
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guerrilla-type activities. The proper order of priority in all development work, and 
particularly in changes that pervade the entire defence system, must always be ob-
served to prevent any any ill-advised decisions to be taken. In the first phase, a doc-
trine is developed, followed by tactics and the organisation as the last piece of the 
puzzle. Rapid technical development at a time when MARO was being implemented 
created a risk of ruining the tried and tested order in which development was being 
carried out. With regard to the prospects of guerrilla-type activities, Ilmola had the 
following to say: ‘No country has designated guerrilla-type activities as the primary means of 
combat for their local forces. The direction in which our operational skills and tactics should be de-
veloped within the scope of the territorial defence system is largely based on the performance of our 
brigades. When assessing the performance, the impact of guerrilla-type activities on the combat car-
ried out by the brigade should not be forgotten.’903   
 
While all of this was clear in theory, the practical implementation of the measures 
required sizeable action. Changing the instructions for conscripts’ tactical training 
and the content of the operational skills of the military schools alone required large-
scale and long-term projects. In addition, any changes would have required exten-
sive modifications to regulations and guidebooks or, at least, necessitated their par-
tial renewal. The concepts and the basic principals of guerrilla-type activities evolved 
slowly, gaining an established position in the Finnish defensive principles, at a theo-
retical level at least, over the course of the 1970s. Thus, the prevalent thinking dur-
ing the Cold War on the use of guerrilla-type activities served the most important 
purpose of such activities; that is, to create a deterrent to a possible invader.904 
 
 
5.2. Guidebook clarifies theory and practice of guerrilla-type activities 
 
For the reasons listed above, Sissitoimintaopas (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type acti-
vities’), completed in 1979, can be regarded as the definite breakthrough or, rather, a 
culmination of the Finnish guerrilla tactics and method of fighting. Originally, the 
drafting of the guidebook was intended to begin in the early 1970s, as the first indi-
cations of this date back to 1972 and 1973.905 For reasons that remain unclear, the 
writing and compilation of this handbook was protracted over several years. Due to 
regulations and limitations governing confidentiality, some of the details relating to 
the delay are as yet unclear. Some explanations behind this were perhaps partial or 
large shortcomings in the principles of territorial combat, and the impact of Brigade 
80 and other experimental compositions under development at the time on the 
regulations being rewritten. On the other hand, the writing process itself, problems 
associated with guerrilla-type activities and Finland’s difficult political position may 
have had an impact on the drawn-out process and the prudent content content of 
the guidebook. After all, this guidebook was to replace the 1956 Sissikoulutusopas.906 
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Following an order issued by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, 
a writing work group for Sissitoimintaopas was set up in early 1976. Major Heikki 
Kalpamaa, who at the time served as the mobilisation officer at the Karelia Brigade, 
was ordered to assume responsibility for the writing and compilation of the guide-
book. Kalpamaa was well-suited for the task, as he had gained profound familiarity 
with guerrilla-style activities having served at the Parachute Jaeger School between 
1965 and 1970 and at the Karelia Brigade as the commander of the 3rd company 
between 1970 and 1972. At the National General Staff College he had written his 
thesis on guerrilla-type activities.907 Major Kalpamaa (KarPr and TaistK) invited 
Captain Eero Hattunen (KaiPr), Captain Pertti Keränen (KarJP) and 1st Lieutenant 
Matti Mikkonen (KarPr) to join the work groups as its other members. All members 
of the groups had either served or were serving at at the time of the writing of the 
guidebook at their units in tasks related to training in guerrilla-type activities.908  
 
In addition to training instructions used by army units, material for the guidebook 
was obtained from the Frontier Guard, the National General Staff College, the Ar-
my Combat School and the Parachute Jaeger School. The work group worked on 
the guidebook alongside their regular duties between 1976 and 1978. The group 
convened at review and writing meetings which were normally normally held in Hel-
sinki every two months or so. At the meetings of the work group, its chair Major 
Kalpamaa assigned group members tasks to experiment with the guerrilla activity 
plans that the group had drafted in connection with conscript training and combat 
exercises in the group members’units. This enabled the practical testing of the tacti-
cal solutions to be included in the guidebook, regarding both dispersed and concert-
ed guerrilla operations, before the guidebook was published.909 The troops of the 
Kainuu Brigade conducted experimental exercises in 1976 and 1977 at the Vuosanka 
training area. The themes of the exercises, approximately 8 to 10 days in duration, 
were ‘combat techniques in dispersed and concerted operations and shooting exercises with live 
ammunition in a situation that simulated a guerrilla operation.’910 
 

907 Kalpamaa (1975), SKK 1/1186/sal, KA. See also the query related to thesis, including the an-
swers drafted for it by the General Headquarters: SKK:n no.tta 20.1.1974, T 25767/Da 1 sal, KA. 
PE:n no. 169/Optsto/Daa sal/1.3.1974 liitteineen, T 25767/Da 1 sal, KA. SKK:n no.tta 26.7.1974, 
T 25767/Dc 1 sal, KA. PE:n no. 656/Optsto/Dca 1/22.10.1974, T 25767/Dc 1 sal, KA. thesis was 
graded ‘good’. SKK:n no.tta 7.10.1975, grading of thesis by Captain H Kalpamaa, T 25767/Hj 2 
sal, KA. 
908 Kalpamaa, Jarmo Heikki Artturi, an extract from personal details, no. 67474, KA. Mikkonen, 
Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013. Sihvo, Sami: An interview conducted on 23 October 
2013. See also Kalpamaa (1977), pp. 261–274. 
909 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013. 
910 PE:n no. 12/Optsto/Daa sal/15.1.1979, T 25767/Da 2 sal, KA. 
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Parallel to the compilation of the guidebook, an extensive survey on the require-
ments to be set for medical care in guerrilla operations was carried out. On 13 Feb-
ruary 1978, the chief of the General Headquarters had set up a separate work group 
tasked with defining the need for medical care in guerrilla-type activities, principles 
for its use and the way medical personnel should be within the framework of a fron-
tier guard battalion or a battalion assigned to a guerrilla operation. The work group 
was also to prepare a proposal for medical equipment and material for use by guer-
rilla troops. This work group was chaired by Medical Lieutenant Colonel Seppo 
Tikka (PE), its secretary was Major Kari Suvanto (HKoulK), and members Major 
Heikki Kalpamaa (PE Op-os), Medical major Matti Aro (PE), 1st Lieutenant Matti 
Mikkonen (KarPr), with Major Juhani Paakkinen (RvLE) serving as an external ex-
pert. The work groups completed its report on 7 June 1979, in other words, after 
Sissiopas has already been published. The survey found that ‘the most important troops 
under the control of a military province must include hidden military hospitals that are used as hos-
pital-like medical care units by those military districts that are immediately engaged in combat.’
The work group proposed that medical platoons be included in the organisation of 
military districts. Another proposal by the work group recommended that the pre-
paredness of separate battalions and frontier guard troops to provide first aid should 
be enhanced by introducing extra medical NCOs and by providing men with addi-
tional first-aid training.911 In practice, the draft for the survey translated into chapter 
IV, entitled ‘Sissitoiminnan lääkintähuolto’(‘Medical care in guerrilla-type activities’), in 
the Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities.912 
 
After the work group for the guidebook on guerrilla-type activities had completed 
its work in summer 1978, it fell on Kalpamaa to compile and write the final version 
of the guidebook. Sissitoimintaopas was completed in November 1978, and was ap-
proved, after a review round, by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces 
for use by the troops on 2 May 1979.913 The key objective of Sissitoimintaopas was to 
link theory of guerrilla tactics to practical training and strengthen the position and 
significance of guerrilla-type activities in territorial combat. While the foreword of 
this guidebook stated that local forces are principally used for guerrilla-type activi-
ties, general forces must also be capable of engaging in this method of fighting. Ac-
cording to this guidebook, the various methods and techniques of fighting used in 
guerrilla-type activities aimed to inflict casualties to the enemy forces, destroy their 
materiel and hamper their opportunities to use specific areas. Training in guerrilla 
tactics was to be provided to all conscripts so that they would be able to handle 
themselves in basic situations, both as individual fighters and as members of a 
squad.914 Thus, Sissitoimintaopas can be said to have influenced Finland’s entire de-
fence system, permeating the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard irrespective of 
the branch. 

911 PE:n no. 12/Optsto/Daa sal/15.1.1979, liite 1, T 25767/Da 2 sal, KA. PE:n no. 79/Lääkos/10 
sal/7.6.1979, T 25767/F 6–7 sal, KA. PE:n no. 730/Daa sal/22.10.1979, T 25767/Da 2 sal, KA. 
912 PE:n no. 79/Lääkos/10 sal/7.6.1979, T 25767/F 6–7 sal, KA. Cf. Sissitoimintaopas, (Sissit-opas) 
(‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’) (‘Guerrilla jaegers guidebook’), Helsinki 1979, pp. 193–
209. 
913 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013. Sissitoimintaopas, (Sissit-opas) (‘Guidebook 
on guerrilla-type activities’) (‘Guerrilla jaegers guidebook’), Helsinki 1979, p. 5. 
914 Sissitoimintaopas, (Sissit-opas) (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’) (‘Guerrilla jaegers guide-
book’), Helsinki 1979, p. 11. 
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As Sissitoimintaopas was organised in a manner that enabled detailed discussion of 
tactics and as it was very thorough –as most regulations are – it also consolidated 
the concepts related to guerrilla-type activities. It clearly described all tactical and 
other details related to combat techniques, including any interfaces to the broad 
field of warfare. The language that the book used to explain tactics, the concepts it 
employed and the definitions that it drew from such concepts were exceptionally 
detailed. Thus, it can be concluded that a great number of hours had been spent on 
the book. The key concept, naturally, was guerrilla-type activities, which this guide-
book defined as follows: ‘Guerrilla-type activities play a key role in and they have a vital sig-
nificance for territorial combat. While local forces are principally committed to guerrilla-type activi-
ties, the units, or parts of units, of the general forces must also be capable of engaging in such opera-
tions. Often based on preparations made in advance, guerrilla-type activities largely comprise dis-
persed operations or combat operations carried out by small units of the local forces in areas pene-
trated by the enemy. In such areas, other units of the local and general forces also operate, tasked 
with continuing fighting in specified locations or holding certain points of terrain. Supporting this 
kind of fighting, guerrilla-type activities are linked to the various phases of territorial combat and 
the duration and scope of battle. The various methods and techniques of fighting used in guerrilla-
type activities inflict casualties on the enemy forces, destroy their materiel and hamper their opportu-
nities to use specific areas. The methods used must be varied and an unexpected, cunning and active 
approach must be emphasised.’915 Sissitoimintaopas clarified the concepts related to tactics 
and the method of fighting, while making a clear distinction between concerted and 
dispersed combat. 
 
Putting the territorial guerrilla-type activities and their methods of fighting to use as 
prescribed by Sissitoimintaopas was a long-term process and presented challenges in 
many fields. The decisions in principle regarding the defence system, the revised 
family of regulations and the training instructions sought to ensure that the training 
system would give every conscript at least the basic knowledge and skills in guerrilla-
type activities. According to plans, the actual training for reservists’duties in their 
wartime units, including further training in guerrilla tactics, was intended to be given 
at refresher training. This approach engendered wide-spread enthusiasm for guerril-
la-type activities among many peacetime troops. Ermei Kanninen has noted that it 
was easy to motivate men for guerrilla training as it aroused interest especially 
among reservists, including further development, based on imagination, on the tac-
tical level and in combat techniques. Among reservists, this wide-spread enthusiasm 
led to voluntary training, which, before the annulment of the chapters of the 1947 
peace treaty which limited Finland’s armament, was illegal. This indicates that guer-
rilla-type activities had become generally accepted and that engaging in activities 
with a link to guerrilla tactics had even become a hobby of sorts among reservists of 
the field army.916 
 
 

915 Ibid. 
916 Kanninen (2003), p. 19. See also PlM:n no. 11/Sot/77 sal/31.1.1977, T 25767/Da 2 sal. PE:n 
no. 58/Optsto/Daa sal/26.1.1977, T 25767/Da 2 sal. 
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Experimental exercises in guerrilla-type activities within the scope of military 
areas in the early 1980s 
 
An interesting, a highly significant and, at the same time, the last experiment during 
Finland’s independence regarding the suitability of guerrilla-type activities for terri-
torial combat was carried out in 1980 and 1982 when two exercises intertwined with 
each other were arranged. The Infantry Division and Operations Division of the 
General Headquarters had been planning experimental exercised within the frame-
work of a military area since January 1979. According to the proposal put forth by 
the General Headquarters, the focus of experimental exercises were to be shifted to 
one major exercise scheduled for late summer 1980.917 One of the reasons for the 
rescheduling of the experimental exercise for 1980 was the study on medical care in 
guerrilla-type activities, unfinished at the time, which had been assigned to a specific 
work group.918 
 
The chief of the General Headquarters approved the general outline of the first ex-
ercise and its principal objectives on 16 January 1979. After this, the chief of Gen-
eral Headquarters approved the exercise, following the proposal of the chief of 
training and education the exercise, which was to be arranged in August 1980. The 
exercise was primarily justified by the need to test the tactics prescribed by the 1979 
Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities in practice.919 According to the order issued 
for the implementation of the exercise named Elokuu-80 (‘August 80’), this exercise 
sought to examine the tactics and combat techniques of guerrilla-type activities used 
in local defence within the framework of a military area. This was achieved by test-
ing ‘the functionality of the Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities, and the principles, orders and 
instructions prescribed by the draft for the Local Defence Instruction in practice.’The principal 
target of experimentation was to examine the provision of supplies to the military 
area, with the secondary target being the use of horses and improvised means of 
transport for transporting materiel and for evacuating the wounded and the overall 
arrangements for medical care from the point of wounding to a concealed hospital. 
The exercises also sought to test the functioning of concealed hospitals and medical 
equipment intended for guerrilla-type activities in practice. A draft for a guidebook 
entitled Luonnonmuonaohjeen luonnos (‘Draft for a guidebook on foods available in na-
ture’) and its methods for survival in nature on wild plants and game. Behind all of 
this there was also a need to familiarise professional officers, NCOs and conscripts 

917 PE:n no. 12/Optsto/Daa sal/15.1.1979, T 25767/Da 2 sal, KA. Koskelo, Heikki: An interview 
on 21 March 2013. See also Hyötyläinen (1992), pp. 84–110. 
918 PE:n no. 12/Optsto/Daa sal/15.1.1979, liite 1, T 25767/Da 2 sal, KA. PE:n no. 730/Daa 
sal/22.10.1979, T 25767/Da 2 sal, KA. 
919 PE:n no. 32/Koultsto/5 sal/21.1.1980, T 25722/Da 2 sal, KA. PE:n no. 3000/Koul-
os/Dbc/22.10.1979, T 25993/Hn 2, KA. PE:n no. 780/Jvtsto/ETS/26.5.1980 (Sotilasalueen 
sissitoimintaharjoitus, toimeenpanon esikäsky) (‘An exercise in guerrilla-type activities arranged by military 
area, a preliminary order’), T 25993/Hn 2, KA. PE:n no. 1010/Hn/ETS/28.7.1980 (Sotilasalueen sis-
sitoimintaharjoitus Elokuu -80, toimeenpanokäsky) (‘Elokuu -80, an exercise in guerrilla-type activities 
within the framework of a military area, an order for the implementation of the exercise’) , T 
25993/Hn 2, KA. PE:n no. 186/Daa sal/31.10.1980 (Raportti sotilasalueen sissitoimintaharjoituksesta 
elokuu -80 (‘A report on an exercise in guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a military ar-
ea, named Elokuu -80’), T 25722/Da 2 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by MAAVE). 
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with guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations.920 It should be mentioned that Sotilaspii-
rin paikallispuolustusohje (‘Instruction for local defence by a military area’) had been 
sent in a draft stage for a review round in February 1980; consequently, the General 
Headquarters wanted to include its principles in the test objectives of the exercise.921 
Within the scope of the exercise, operations launched by a military area were divided 
into three methods of combat: battle against the enemy’s spearhead, harassment of 
traffic on roads, and ambushes and attacks. Major General Reimo Viita, the inspec-
tor of the infantry, was appointed the leader of the Elokuu-80 exercise. He was also 
tasked with producing comprehensive reports and analysing the results. Lieutenant 
Colonel Heikki Koskelo, the chief of the Infantry Division of the General Head-
quarters, acted as the deputy of the exerciser's leader. Furthermore, the deputy 
commander and logistics commander of the Karelia Jaeger Battalion, as well as of-
ficers from the Central Finland Signal Battalion and the Karelia Air Command, were 
appointed as leaders of the exercise. The troops proper in the exercise were gath-
ered from the Savo-Karelia Military Province, the Logistics School, the Central Fin-
land Signal Battalion, the Reconnaissance Air Squadron, the Transport Squadron, 
and the North Karelia Frontier Guard. The total strength of the troops participating 
in the exercise was 827, along with 107 vehicles and other equipment. The exercise 
itself was arranged following considerable preparations between 11 and 23 August 
1980 in North Karelia, in an area limited by Rautavaara–Hankamäki–Säyneinen–
Luikonlahti–Juua–Valtimo.922  
 
According to the report drafted on Elokuu-80, an exercise conducted under summer 
conditions, it progressed by and large as planned. The basic arrangements for guer-
rilla-type activities within the framework of a military area were found to be up to 
date, functional, well-suited for Finnish conditions and generally accepted by the 
personnel. However, the report found that guerrilla-type activities conducted under 
the command of a military area were not efficient enough, even under the most fa-
vourable of conditions – this was the key problem. In this context, efficiency re-
ferred to a capability to inflict losses on the enemy’s personnel and materiel that 
were substantial enough in order to force it to slow down its advance significantly, 
tie up its troops in the rear areas and, possibly, change its method of fighting. An-
other key problem identified by the report was the fact that the number of troops 
available compared to the tasks of the military area, as prescribed by regulations, was 
insufficient, particularly in view of the sheer size of the operational area. The con-
certed use of the troops under the control of a military area even using units the size 
of a platoon also proved non-functional.923  

920 PE:n no. 1010/Hn/ETS/28.7.1980 (Sotilasalueen sissitoimintaharjoitus Elokuu -80, toimeenpanokäsky) 
(‘Elokuu -80, an exercise in guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a military area, an order 
for the implementation of the exercise’), T 25993/Hn 2, KA. See also Sotilaspiirin paikallispuo-
lustusohjeen luonnos (‘A draft for the instruction for local defence by a military area’), 1980. Luonnon-
muonaohjeen luonnos (‘Guidebook on foods available in nature’), 1980. 
921 PE:n no. 725/Ddc/21.2.1980 (A request for statements: Sotilaspiirin paikallispuolustusohjeen luonnos 
(‘A draft for the instruction for local defence by a military area’)), T 25993/Hn 2 ets, KA. 
922 PE:n no. 186/Daa sal/31.10.1980 (Raportti sotilasalueen sissitoimintaharjoituksesta elokuu -80) (‘A re-
port on an exercise in guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a military area, named 
Elokuu -80’), T 25722/Da 2 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by MAAVE). Koskelo, Heikki: An 
interview on 21 March 2013.  
923 Ibid. 
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The summary of the guerrilla-type activities conducted under the leadership of a 
military area presented the challenges and strengths of the era. The impact on the 
invader of guerrilla-type activities employed in the exercise did not meet all the re-
quirements set for them. This problem was particularly pronounced in combat 
against the invader’s spearhead. Using a dispersed method of fighting, the exercise 
troops of the military area managed to slow down the advance of the enemy’s for-
ward elements along major roads only to a degree. By contrast, the basic arrange-
ments of the military area provided fairly good opportunities for harassing traffic on 
roads. Yet another problem was the fact that the arrangements available at the time 
did not provide adequate opportunities for repelling counter-guerrilla activities 
launched by the enemy. A general observation was that the operational principles, 
including various measurements and timelines prescribed by the guidebook on guer-
rilla-type activities, held true in most cases. These very same principles were repli-
cated in a draft for the instruction for local defence, which was proposed to become 
a tactical overall regulation for the military areas.924  
 
After the first experimental exercise in late 1980, all the material on the exercise was 
submitted to the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters. A very thorough ac-
count of the exercise was compiled and presented not only to the Operations Divi-
sion of the General Headquarters but also the top military leadership, including the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. He also visited the Elokuu-80 exercise, 
taking a decision during his visit that a corresponding exercise needed to be ar-
ranged under winter conditions. The experiences gained from this large-scale exper-
imental exercise were positive, providing more results than originally expected and 
leading to a decision to begin without delay preparations for a similar exercise under 
winter conditions.925 On 4 March 1981, the chief of the General Headquarters ap-
proved, on proposal by the chief of training and education, a plan to rearrange the 
exercise using identical targets, arrangements and operational areas. This exercise 
was scheduled for the period 1 to 13 March 1982.926 
 
On the basis of the Elokuu-80 exercise and on other experiences gained from the 
operations of local forces, research was launched by the General Staff for develop-
ing grounds for the Maaliskuu-82 (‘March 82’) exercise. In connection with the de-
velopment of local forces, conducted under the leadership of the General Staff, an 
order was issued in 1981 on additional grounds for the forthcoming experimental 
exercise, the most important of which were experimental troop compositions and 
new training situations. In the same connection, the first phase of the exercise was 
prolonged by one day.927 A preliminary order regarding the exercise was issued in 
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924 Ibid. See also PE:n no. 1699/Daa/ETS/19.12.1980 (Lausunto Sotilaspiirin paikallispuolustusohjeen 
luonnoksesta) (‘A statement regarding the draft for the instruction for local defence by a military 
area’), T 25993/Hn 2, KA. 
925 PE:n no. 151/Optsto/Daa sal/13.2.1981, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. 
926 PE:n no. 114/Maavtsto/5 sal/4.3.1981, T 25722/Da 3 sal, KA, (A decision by the National 
General Staff College regarding a research permit obtained). PE:n no. 8/Jvtsto/5 sal/30.3.1981, T 
25767/Da 3 sal, KA. PE:n no. 155/Daa sal/31.5.1982 (Raportti sotilasalueen sissitoimintaharjoituksesta 
maaliskuu -82) (‘A report on an exercise in guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a military 
area, named March -82’), T 25722/Da 3 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by MAAVE). Koskelo, 
Heikki: An interview on 21 March 2013. 
927 PE:n no. 629/Optsto/Daa sal/3.9.1981, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. 
 
273 
March 1981.928 Major General Raimo Katona, the new inspector of the infantry, re-
ceived orders to act as the leader of Maaliskuu-82 (‘March 82’), while Lieutenant 
Colonel Heikki Koskelo, the chief of the Infantry Office of the General Headquar-
ters, acted again as the deputy leader of the exercise. The total strength of the troops 
participating in the exercise was 1,200, with 180 vehicles and other equipment.929 
 
While the experimental objectives of the Maaliskuu-82 exercise, carried out in winter 
conditions, were identical to those of the previous exercise, the special area of inter-
est constituted the challenging weather conditions. The report prepared on the exer-
cise noted that guerrilla-type activities carried out by the military area had developed 
following the experiences gained from the Elokuu-80 exercise. The key development 
areas were the need to simplify and clarify the tasks that guerrilla-type activities in-
volved and to organise the troops of a military area in compositions required by 
their tasks. According to the conclusions drawn, the military area was capable of ful-
filling its guerrilla-type activities. When battling the enemy’s spearhead, the troops 
of the military area managed to inflict substantial casualties on the enemy and slow 
down its advance. Initially, substantial losses were inflicted on the enemy when har-
assing traffic on roads. After the enemy launched anti-guerrilla operations, harass-
ment became less effective. The military area was able to step up its operations 
through ambushes and attacks. Like the Elokuu-80 exercise, the Maaliskuu-82 exer-
cises also confirmed that the operational principles presented by Sissitoimintaopas 
were well suited for winter conditions. Results from experimentation and conclu-
sions drawn from them provided important guidelines for the development for fu-
ture needs. The prerequisites created for the Maaliskuu-82 exercise and experiences 
gained from it provided a solid foundation for the process in which the draft of Soti-
laspiirin paikallispuolustusohjeen luonnos (‘Draft for the Local Defence Instruction’) was 
given its final form as a regulation.930 
 
Thus, it can be said with justification that the exercises described above, coupled 
with research and experimentation, played a major role in the development of guer-
rilla-type activities and guerrilla tactics as late as the first few years of the 1980s. 
While the accounts, research reports conclusions regarding the two exercises found 
a number of development areas, they also noted many strengths. The exercises also 
gave rise to several proposals for further development in tactics, the method of 
fighting, combat techniques, troop compositions, and equipment.931   
 
Research and development around the concept of ‘Battalion 80’, and the revision of 
the organisation of the local forces, related to the revision of the organisation of the 
wartime ground forces scheduled for completion by 1985, lay in part behind the tar-
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928 PE:n no. 1361/Jvtsto/Dbc/ETS/20.11.1981 (Sotilasalueen sissitoimintaharjoitus maaliskuu-82, toi-
meenpanon esikäsky) (‘An exercise in guerrilla-type activities arranged by the military area, a prelimi-
nary order on the implementation’), T 25993/Hn 3, KA. 
929 PE:n no. 164/Jvtsto/Dbc/ETS/29.1.1982, T 25993/Hn 3, KA. PE:n no. 174/Jvtsto/Dbc/ 
ETS/1.2.1982, T 25993/Hn 3, KA. PE:n no. 155/Daa sal/31.5.1982 (Raportti sotilasalueen sissi-
toimintaharjoituksesta maaliskuu -82) (‘A report on an exercise in guerrilla-type activities within the 
framework of a military area, named March -82’), T 25722/Da 3 sal, KA, (a research permit grant-
ed by MAAVE). Koskelo, Heikki: An interviesw on 21 March 2013. 
930 Ibid. 
931 PE:n no. 646/Dbc sal/11.9.1981, T 25767/Dbc 1 sal, KA. See also Hyötyläinen (1992), p. 86. 
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gets set for the Elokuu-80 and Maaliskuu-82 exercises. This background was partly 
inspired by close collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, 
which was related to the maintenance and development of the defence capability, as 
well as the capability of the Frontier Guards to take up large-scale guerrilla-type ac-
tivities when necessary.932 Research and development sought to remove the most 
pressing shortcomings regarding the equipment of Battalion 80 and address any 
flaws detected in the experimental organisation. The major issues regarding tactics 
addressed by R&D were the following: battalion in attack and defence; its capability 
to mount counter-attacks; troops’ resilience under fire; reconnaissance; operations 
under the cover of darkness; ability to traverse terrain; ability to take advantage of 
the cover offered by terrain; ability to conceal operations; anti-tank capability; and 
any needs to revise the organisation and its war materiel. In connections with this, 
the development needs regarding the brigade and Battalion 90 were raised, with spe-
cial attention being paid to delaying tactics.933 In autumn 1981, a memorandum 
drafted by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters noted that ‘Our cur-
rent doctrine had been found to be sound and will remain unchanged in broad outline. However, the 
changing nature of war requires that any developments in combat techniques are taken into consid-
eration. Our troops must be capable of mounting active operations even under changed conditions. 
Our tactics and operational skills are already on a par with this, but our organisation and war 
materiel are not.’934 
 
Most importantly, many of the initiatives for development were implemented –yet 
always in an insufficient or incomplete form due to insufficient resources. Perhaps 
the most important of these were related to the composition of troops, their equip-
ment and tactical principles. Thus, the patten of experimentation established by the 
Guerrilla Tactics Committee was continued along tried and tested lines. Although 
the simulation of combat and war has always been difficult, experimental exercises 
pushed to the limit were regarded as highly important in the Finland of the 1980s.  
 
 
5.3. A summary of the developments in guerrilla war and guerrilla-type ac-
tivities between 1967 and 1983 
 
From the very beginning, the Frontier Guard adopted Sissitoimintaopas (‘Guidebook 
on guerrilla-type activities’), using it as a basic guideline for training. Although the 
training in guerrilla-type activities provided to their regular personnel and conscripts 
by the different Frontier Guards and, particularly, the Frontier Guard Academy, was 
based on several internal directives, they nevertheless followed the concepts, tactics 
and spirit presented by Sissitoimintaopas. After all, the Frontier Guard was charged 
with the task of training 25,000 men for the needs of the wartime cadre troops and 
the covering force. In the 1980s, joint exercises between the Defence Forces and the 
Frontier Guard were continued, albeit on a smaller scale. Being based on wartime 
troop compositions, such exercises also helped to standardise guerrilla-type activities 

932 PE:n no. 158/Dbc sal/11.2.1980, T 25767/Dbc 1 sal, KA. 
933 PE:n no. 429/Optsto/Daa sal/9.6.1981, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. PE:n no. 726/Op-os/Daa 
sal/15.10.1981, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. Koskelo, Heikki: An interview on 21 March 2013. Partanen, 
Tapio: Interviews on 5 February 2008 and 12 May 2008. 
934 PE:n no. 726/Op-os/Daa sal/15.10.1981, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. 
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–after all, the troops trained by the Frontier Guard for the wartime reserve would 
have been committed, in a real situation, to guerrilla-type activities under the com-
mand of the various military areas. Such tactics depended on the fact that guerrilla 
jaegers were well trained and possessed a very good command of local conditions. 
Young men living in the border regions provided natural material for such training, 
and, at least in the early 1980s such men needed no motivation to join up.935 
 
The significance of a territorial defence system in the defence of the entire country 
had become generally understood by the 1980s, following long and systematic work. 
Following experiences gained from many sources and developments in warfare, the 
art of war, military techniques, operational skills and tactics, the Finnish defence sys-
tem achieved national approval. However, the practical implementation of this sys-
tem took a long time. The fundamental principle was to divide the country into are-
as representing varying levels of responsibility, each with their operational tasks and 
plans. This development was driven by the clarity of the Sissitoimintaopas guidebook 
and the training instructions for tactics, which were completely revised. The faith in 
a fighting method based on guerrilla-type activities was increased by the possibility 
of using older war material alongside inexpensive but efficient mines. The additional 
efficiency of guerrilla-type activities was lent by a developmental process, which be-
gan in the 1970s and made light anti-tank weapons and shoulder-to-air missiles an 
everyman’s weapon. The importance of the above-mentioned weapon systems in-
creased in guerrilla-type activities in early 1980s. The opportunities to use light anti-
aircraft weapons, particularly against helicopters and reconnaissance drones, con-
tributed to the relevance of guerrilla-type activities.936 
 
The third Parliamentary Defence Committee, which functioned between 1980 and 
1981, noted in its report that the international situation had deteriorated since the 
1970s and that the threat of nuclear weapons being used had increased somewhat. 
The report of the committee focused on the importance of having arrangements in 
place for a period when the threat of war was imminent, the materiel situation of the 
ground forces, and the fact that the gaps in the preparedness of the Defence Forces 
needed addressing in order to bring the national defence onto a par with the re-
quirements set by modern war. With regard to the military doctrine, the report also 
exhibited interesting trends. The report also took a position in the crisis manage-
ment mechanism of the Defence Forces, long debated and long under developed, 
proposing that the composition of and the principles of use of the covering force be 
altered. Inevitably, such changes brought at least indirect repercussions for guerrilla-
type activities and guerrilla tactics. Particularly the development of territorial defence 
regarding the structure of the ground forces, their equipment and tactics caused 
guerrilla-type activities to adopt an increasingly modern battle doctrine. The empha-
sis on flexible preparedness and fighting capability, prevention of a surprise attack 
and denial of the use of Finnish territory, steadfast defensive battle, and the devel-
opment of combat by operational (mobile) formations were all directly linked to the 
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935 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview via correspondence in March and April 2007. See also Kosonen 
– Pohjonen (1994), pp. 509-510. Kokkonen, Jukka: Puolustusvoimat ja Rajavartiolaitos, Suomen 
puolustusvoimat 1944–1974 (‘The Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, the Finnish Defence 
Forces between 1944 and 1974’), 2006, pp. 563–564. 
936 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview through correspondence in March and April 2007. 
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operational and tactical role of guerrilla-type activities within the framework of terri-
torial defence.937 
 
Following changes to the threat scenario, guerrilla-type activities were increasingly 
viewed from a new kind of angle. Following increasingly determined development 
work, the key issues concerning the kind of guerrilla-type activities to be carried out 
and identifying the areas in Finland where such actions should be carried out were 
brought to the forefront. Would the tactical goals of guerrilla-type activities have 
been better realised in the forests of remote regions, in population centres, or in ar-
eas designated to be the strategically important areas? In a crisis situation, urban 
centres were expected to be devoid of civilian population, which gave rise to recon-
sidering guerrilla war as an option supported by the people. It was also realised that 
as the army would initiate combat at the border, maintaining the fighting capacity of 
the guerrilla troops which slowed down the enemy’s spearhead for later combat 
would present challenges. Where conventional troops had enough time to receive 
the enemy’s assault, guerrilla troops needed to be spared for the harassment of the 
enemy’s supply lines, thereby ensuring the continuity of combat.938 
 
With regard to guerrilla-type activities, developments in the military doctrine and its 
interfaces with the operational skills and tactics were well in accordance with the in-
ternal and external requirements in the early 1980s, but their implementation lagged 
behind due to insufficient appropriation. Increased requirements to have the capa-
bility to prevent limited attacks inevitably led to needs to develop the Defence Forc-
es in a more flexible direction that put the emphasis on the operational ability. As 
the defence of Northern Finland received more importance, several formations ca-
pable of mobile operations were needed, in addition to troops capable of guerrilla-
type activities. Work began to develop the training and equipment of such for-
mations in a direction that brought them closer to modern requirements. Despite 
the increasing importance of technology, a decision was taken to develop the defen-
sive doctrine around continued universal conscription. Only a system based on uni-
versal conscription was judged to be able to produce a sufficient number of troops 
to defend the entire Finnish territory.939 Maintenance of defensive capacity dimen-
sioned for the prevalent situation and preparedness to repel a full-scale invasion us-
ing all available means became the guiding principle of national defence in the early 
1980s. On an operational level, guerrilla-type activities, being an unconventional 

937 Kolmannen parlamentaarisen puolustuskomitean mietintö, Komitean mietintö (‘Report by the third Parlia-
mentary Defence Committee, the Report by the Committee’), 1981:1. See also Visuri (1985), pp. 
198–207. 
938 Partanen, Tapio: interviews on 5 February 2008 and 12 May 2008. Paakkinen, Juhani: An inter-
view via correspondence in March and April 2007.  
939 PE:n no. 438/Op-os/Daa sal/15.5.1980, liitteineen, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. As an example of 
the continued development work, an operational study prepared by the Jaeger Brigade in the early 
1980 can be mentioned. This study was entitled ‘The future war and its nature in Lapland :the operational 
and tactical principles and methods ´to be used in Lapland under the region’s special conditions when applying the 
various methods of fighting (including guerrilla-type activities), broken down by operation, tactics, and the impact of 
Lapland’s special conditions on troop composition and equipment.’ See JPr:n no. 116/Da sal/1.6.1984, T 
25767/Hj 1 sal, KA. 
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method of fighting but part of conventional warfare, continued to be perfectly in 
line with this principal decision.940  
 
Changes in the Finnish model for conducting guerrilla-type activities and their justi-
fications can also be viewed from an international perspective. From a global per-
spective, modern guerrilla-type activities can be said to be a result of a process that 
lasted 150 to 200 years and that transformed to its current form, starting in the 
1800s, largely under the influence of major developments in weapons technology. 
Developments in guerrilla-type activities, including concious efforts to develop it, 
are a sum total of the human self-preservation instinct, imagination and deft use of 
opportunities and the technology available. However, the basic principles of modern 
guerrilla warfare and its methods can be derived, almost without exception, from 
Mao’s thoughts on the war that he waged against the Japanese between 1937 and 
1945. Mao’s principles for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla tactics can be re-
duced to offensive guerrilla tactics, necessary for defensive warfare in which taking 
and holding the initiative was the key. From a Finnish perspective, it is under-
standable that guerrilla-type activities, as they were applied in Finland, began to be 
developed largely in the direction of a dispersed method of fighting in an effort to 
bring them into line with the modern developments. Dispersed across a large area 
and operating in unison, even small units from the local forces had the potential of 
tying up an enemy force larger than their own strength.941 
 
However, the dispersed method of fighting used by the local forces does have, in a 
way, points of contact with the concerted method of using troops. Dispersed guer-
rilla jaeger troops, formed of the local forces, could be concentrated in important 
areas in order to provide support to a battle conducted by the general forces. After a 
concerted attack, guerrilla jaeger troops would have been committed to dispersed 
operations in order to slow down the enemy and to cause attrition. By the 1980s, 
guerrilla-type activities were not thought of as being a foolhardy endeavour by defi-
nition, one in which the defender, without the blink of an eye, engaged in confron-
tations with an enemy that was superior in strength with complete disregard tof cas-
ualties. Finnish guerrilla-type activities began to be increasingly characterised by cau-
tion typical of guerrilla warfare in the international context, in which self-
preservation and caution derived from the realisation that one was inferior in 
strength played a major role. It should be emphasised in this context that this atti-
tude had nothing to do with cowardice; rather, it just took realistic account of the 
unavoidable facts, such as the defender being inferior in strength against mecha-
nised enemy units.942   
 
Colonel Juhani Paakkinen, whose views were more cynical than those of most other 
officers of the era, recalled that while the developments in the 1980s were rich in 
ideas, they were also passive in their implementation. ‘Due to scant appropriation, the 
tactical implementation of guerrilla-type activities became increasingly a dispersed activity in which 
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940 See, for example, Visuri (1985), pp. 226–229. 
941 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview via correspondence in March and April 2007. See also Seppänen 
(1971), pp. 100–105. Mao Zedong: Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan. Peking 
1966, pp. 5–6 and 50–56. 
942 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview conducted via correspondence in March and April 2007. 
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individual fighters were laying in ambush, holding a wire to trigger a Claymore-type mine in their 
hands. While this perhaps represented a versatile theory, its practical representation was rather rigid 
and, often, passive,’Paakkinen argued that that imagination and a struggle for surprise 
effect in Finnish guerrilla-type activities had begun to disappear from Finnish think-
ing in the 1980s, compared to the golden age of the era between the 1950s and 
1970s. Despite well-meant plans, requirements and development programmes, the 
real nature of Finnish guerrilla-type activities were in the process of being ousted by 
other developments in military technology and techniques.943 
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943 Ibid. 
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6. THE WANING OF GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES IN THE 
FINNISH ART OF WAR 
 
 
By the 2000s, guerrilla-type activities had been abandoned 
 
Work on the development of national defence continued over the course of the 
1980s based on the principle of territorial defence, with particular attention being 
paid to the capability to repel a surprise attack directed at Southern Finland. By the 
1980s, the territorial defence system, being based on long and systematic work, had 
become regarded as generally well-functioning. Following experiences gained from 
many sources and developments in warfare, the art of war, military techniques, op-
erational skills and tactics, the Finnish defence system achieved national approval. 
However, it took a long time before it was implemented on the level of operational 
plans. Finland’s principles regarding the country’s strategic defence and its operatio-
nal planning had, since the introduction of territorial defence, been based on a 
threat scenario which covered both a surprise attack and a large-scale invasion. 
Starting from the 1980s, the threat scenario in which nuclear weapons were used 
against Finland was gradually phased out, based on reasons that such a scenario was 
regarded as unlikely and, in any event, impossible to ward off by military means.  
 
Starting from the 1980s, requirements to develop the troop composition of the local 
forces, their equipment and tactics contributed to the adoption of a more modern 
battle doctrine. An emphasis placed on flexible preparedness, fighting capacity, pre-
vention of a surprise attack, capability to deny the enemy the use of Finnish territo-
ry, concerted defensive battle, and the development of combat conducted by opera-
tional formations were all reflected in the needs that sought to change the principles 
of territorial defence. For counter-attack operations, an armoured brigade and jaeger 
brigades transported by off-road vehicles were developed; provisions were made to 
use these formations across the entire Finnish territory in areas where the concen-
tration of forces was deemed necessary. However, with military technology becom-
ing increasingly expensive, the Defence Forces only had the resources to equip part 
of the large reserve of the ground forces with means of transport that offered true 
mobility. The lack of mobile troops accentuated the capability to adjust the level of 
preparedness in a flexible manner and to concentrate troops in specific areas if de-
fence preparedness needed to be raised. 
 
In the early 1990s, major changes took place in the world. As the world order of the 
Cold War era began to dissolve, and as the negotiations on German unification 
made progress over the course of spring 1990, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began 
to assess the relevance of the military restrictions stipulated by the Paris Peace Trea-
ty (1947) and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. In 
particular, the restrictions on military national defence, dictated by the Soviet Union, 
and the regulations imposed on Finland in the aftermath of the Second World War 
were no longer in line with the altered situation. When the German Unification 
Agreement was signed, the Finnish national leadership took a bold but necessary 
decision to reassess the military chapters of the Paris Peace Treaty, annulling them 
unilaterally. When Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet Union, resigned 
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on 25 December 1991, announcing that the Soviet Union had been dissolved, a por-
tion of the bilateral agreements and, by extension, their military restrictions imposed 
on Finland, were also annulled. 
 
The dependence of modern warfare on technology had reached such proportions by 
the mid-1990s that armies worldwide needed to make choices regarding perfor-
mance and the development of the art of war. An examination of the approaches to 
foreign and defence policy adopted by Finland in the 1990s, and an investigation in-
to the Finnish security and defence policy reports, the first of which had been pre-
pared in 1995, reveal that adapting Finland’s defence to the new conditions was re-
garded as a key target. When the threat scenario based on a surprise attack was 
abandoned and replaced by a model founded on repelling a strategic strike, clear re-
percussions were felt in the Finnish art of war. At the same time; Finland gained the 
opportunity to take advantage of the surplus materiel of the dissolved Warsaw Pact 
by acquiring a large number of second-hand weapons. The purchase of defence ma-
teriel from the former East Germany significantly enhanced the performance of the 
ground forces, particularly in view of the diminished threat of a military invasion. 
 
Following developments in military technology and changes in the threat scenario, 
theoretical and practical development of guerrilla-type activities were slowly being 
displaced by other developments. The most visible evidence of the waning of guer-
rilla-type activities is the fact that guerrilla-type activities as a concept and a method 
of fighting began to play an increasingly minor role in Finnish tactics at the turn of 
the millennium, to be phased out completely from the regulations between 2003 and 
2006. While the phasing out of guerrilla-type activities and tactics from the Finnish 
art of war was associated with a number of practical factors, justifications that ap-
pear somewhat emotional were also involved. The basic reason behind the aban-
donment of guerrilla-type activities was the gradual removal of guerrilla jaeger 
troops, guerrilla jaeger companies and separate battalions in most cases, from the es-
tablishment chart. By the 2010s, Finland’s altered international status, the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union followed by a drastically changed notion of Finland’s neu-
trality, and some other factors contributed to the emergence of a situation in which 
national defence did not need to be similar to that of the decades from the 1950s to 
the 1970s. Starting from early 1990, the responsibility for training troops in guerrilla-
type activities, as a form of fighting, had been increasingly shifted to the peacetime 
Frontier Guard organisation.  
 
According to the Finnish security and defence policy reports, prepared at three to 
four year intervals starting from 1995, Finland’s national defence continues to be 
based on a territorial defence system, even in the 2010s. It should also be borne in 
mind that Finnish society has radically changed over the past few decades. The de-
crease in the size of certain age groups, working careers becoming longer, increased 
international contacts and the marginalisation of some people, to name just a few 
factors, have also played a role, albeit an indirect one, in national defence. The De-
fence Forces constitute part of society, and they need to reflect the changes and 
adapt to new phenomena.  
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The Defence Revision Committee, Parliamentary Defence Committees, and Finnish 
security and defence policy reports have played a key role in the formulation of Fin-
land’s defence doctrine and the art of war. By issuing policy statements regarding 
the defence policy, the president of the republic has also affected the content Fin-
land’s defence doctrine. The top leadership of the Defence Forces have acted in 
agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. By contrast, the sub-level of the doctrine 
–the combat doctrine of troops –was developed almost solely within the Defence 
Forces. Public debate on its grounds and options has been minimal compared to 
that in Central Europe and Sweden, for example. While the Finnish battle doctrine 
of the ground forces has largely met the requirements set for it by developments 
outside Finland and Finland’s own strategic doctrine, the lack of public discussion 
and political interest may have played a role in the granting of appropriation. 
 
A prerequisite for the development of the defence system and its evolution, includ-
ing the associated art of war, is the fact that the issues are generally recognised as 
being worthy of examination. The Finnish art of war and tactics are known for their 
versatility, dynamism and distinctively Finnish nature. Historically, the predominant 
feature of the Finnish art of war has been its flexibility and capability to meet the 
requirements of the prevailing conditions. The trajectory of the Finnish art of war 
indicates that the operational skills and tactics of each era were adapted to the ap-
proved doctrine on defence policy and the defence system. The same is true of 
guerrilla-type activities and their being part of the Finnish art of war. 
 
The territorial defence system with its special features regarding the art of war has 
proved functional, effective and adaptable. This governing principle continues to be 
valid for the arrangements in place for national defence in the 2010s, although the 
thinking on the nature of territorial defence is undergoing a change. The dispersed 
and concerted method of fighting, part of the tradition of guerrilla-type activities, al-
so continues to play an important role in this reform. The method of fighting of the 
ground forces for the 2010s requires that increased attention be paid to the oppor-
tunities available to coordination in training and the principles of use of operational, 
territorial and local troops. 
 
The extensive development of the territorial defence system that Finland adopted 
during the Cold War includes those features which largely explain the direction in 
which the Defence Forces and the ground forces are being developed. Guerrilla-
type activities and unconventional forms of fighting, as areas of study, continue to 
be highly topical in the 2010s, despite their long historical perspective. For example, 
the recently revised fighting method of the ground forces –which is part of the 
Finnish art of war undergoing constant change – contains a great many elements 
taken from the repertoire of combat methods of guerrilla jaegers. Furthermore, it 
should be borne in mind that the territorial defence system in its full extent is a re-
sult of a long development process and, as such, it will never be fully completed. 
Therefore, the large defence reform and other reforms undertaken in the 2010s can 
be regarded as a natural continuum, an evolutionary phase in the development of 
the territorial defence system. 
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Terrorism, which made its entrance on the international scene over the course of 
the 2000s has increasingly come to be associated with the methods and tactics of 
guerrilla warfare. Although this involves two separate issues, from the perspective of 
the art of war, their set of available resources is identical. As terror strikes have 
grown in strength and sophistication, the imaginative innovations they have ex-
hibited have superseded the rigid thinking patterns of anti-terrorism authorities. As 
a new phenomenon and threat scenario, global cyber warfare – attacks against 
communications and energy networks and the protections in place to counter such 
attacks –have emerged and have been equated with the use of armed force within 
the context of the art of war. Using simple means, cyber warfare can be used to 
cause serious damage to the entire infrastructure of information society, possibly 
leading to substantial economic damage and even loss of human life It appears that 
the modern cyber guerrillas have surpassed the pain threshold of the world. They 
are being attacked on all fronts. The time has come for action rather than words, 
unlike the Cold War era. In this war, the doctrine of traditional anti-guerrilla opera-
tions stands supreme: isolate the enemy, cut his supply lines, relentlessly hunt him 
down, and destroy him. The important goal is to cut funding to guerrillas and block 
their access to weapons of mass destruction. In theory, this is a simple issue, but as 
long as guerrillas, cyber guerrillas and the resistance remain hidden, battling them 
will be difficult. 
 
Although guerrilla-type activities and tactics have disappeared almost completely 
from magazine articles, regulations and the art of war, Finnish guerrilla-type activi-
ties and the experiences gained from them continue to play a certain role. While 
guerrilla-type activities no longer belong to the Finnish military doctrine in the 
2010s, at least research and analytical examination on the issue should continue. Our 
tactics are lacking in activity and should be more unpredictable. The dispersed 
method of fighting continues to be based on a capability to create a sufficient im-
pact and to deliver destructive firepower. The revised dispersed method of fighting 
that the ground forces recently put in place is well-suited for a territorial defence 
system. Geography and the Finnish national character are factors that contribute 
positively to this issue. Therefore, considering Finland’s conditions, research on the 
development of guerrilla-type activities can be presumed to continue to play in a 
role in Finland. As long as the dispersed method of fighting raises the threshold to 
invade Finland, it not only significantly serves Finland’s national defence but also 
the country’s total security. No enemy wants to be bogged down in an unresolvable 
situation resembling that of Afghanistan in the 2010s.  
 
In light of the above, while continued developments in the art of war can be ap-
proached from a number of angles, such research should be carried out exercising 
great care. After all, the means of guerrilla-type activities have been relegated to the 
category of undesirable concepts. When developing the Finnish art of war, careful 
consideration should first be given to the concepts used and the definition of the 
content of tactics encapsulated in such concepts. The key would be to concentrate 
on developing a descriptive content and operational procedures for the concepts 
undergoing a revision. Research on the art of war must, above all, be subject to sys-
tematic research methods. Research and experimentation must be carried out in a 
target-oriented way, and the results thus obtained must be subjected to analyses that 
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are comparable to similar analyses. Wartime organisation must be developed in line 
with the predicted nature of the future war and threat scenario. Training should be 
developed and geared towards forming a systematic whole which will produce a suf-
ficient reserve for those areas where dispersed combat operations are deemed likely 
and possible. Although the work described above, with regard to research, has made 
good progress under the direction of the Land Combat Centre, work remains to be 
done for years to come. 
 
From the perspective of the results and conclusions of this study, the obvious areas 
of further research on Finnish guerrilla-type activities relate to the period after the 
1980s. As the regulations regarding the confidentiality of documents and source ma-
terial dating from the more recent era are lifted, the overall picture formed by re-
search can be complemented in many other respects. As broader research into the 
practical operating methods of guerrilla-type activities would make the synthesis 
provided by this study more accurate, a justified proposal can be made that such re-
search be made the subject of further study at Finnish military schools, carried out 
in the form of thesis preparation by student officers. Another area for further re-
search is the impact that external influences and the exchange of information has 
exerted on the Finnish art of war. In particular, the influences from neighbouring 
Sweden should be scrutinised more carefully. However, this will only be possible af-
ter the archives of the military intelligence become available to broader research use. 
Due to issues related to confidentiality, this may take several decades. Efforts must 
be taken to search for existing information, examine it, use it, and apply it when tak-
ing decisions that adapt the solutions available to national defence to Finnish condi-
tions. If anything, this outlook is vital to the Finnish art of war. In short, research 
indicates that the Finnish art of war and considerable experience provided sufficient 
grounds for developing guerrilla-type activities. 
 
 
The synthesis – guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish art of war 
 
The key research problem of this study –how did guerrilla-type activities develop over time 
as part of the Finnish art of war –cannot be answered with a single word or sentence. 
With regard to the research problem of this study, a multi-faceted field of research is 
involved, the examination and deepening of which will require a great deal of longi-
tudinal, cross-sectional and thematic research. The principal question can be an-
swered by examining the cases that are associated with the review of the issue from 
a broader perspective. In equal measure, the role of guerrilla-type activities and their 
initial association with the Finnish art of war and, later, their development and be-
coming part of it, can be proved through investigation that takes the passage of time 
into account. However, the depth of study will depend on factors other than the 
events and phenomena related to the period under examination. The Finnish art of 
war and, by extension, Finnish guerrilla tactics –the means of guerrilla war –have 
often pivoted on a limited number of individuals, in most cases officers or other 
broad-minded soldiers with strongly-held personal convictions. With regard to the 
Finnish art of war, its developments have undoubtedly been influenced by the inter-
national art of war, threat scenarios, trends in tactics, theories in the art of war, de-
velopments in military technology and firepower, mobility and the human capability 
to learn through training. In addition to the qualitative factors listed above, quantita-
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tive aspects have also played a role. On these grounds, we can attempt to answer the 
principal research problem of this study by forming a synthesis. 
 
What was the history of guerrilla-type activities like before Finland became independent? Fin-
land’s independence in 1917 and the following years and decades constitute the first 
research result of the research period. Over the centuries, guerrillas took a promi-
nent position in Finnish lore. For example, the History of the Northern Peoples, au-
thored by Olaus Magnus in the 16th century, contains many descriptions of the 
fighting methods employed by the Finns, with guerrilla-type activities taking a 
prominent position. Retaliatory raids into White Sea Karelia (‘Viena’ in Finnish), 
carried out by Ostrobothnian parties led by Pekka Antinpoika ‘Juho’ Vesainen in 
the 16th century, and similar stories are etched into Finnish collective memory. For 
centuries, Finland has set the stage for a struggle between East and West, providing 
a wealth of examples of war in which untouched swathes of wilderness have proved, 
almost without exception, advantageous for guerrillas. Thus, by the 20th century, 
there was an awareness in Finland of the Finnish foundations of guerrilla-type acti-
vities, and they were already known methods. 
 
What kind of theories on guerrilla-type activities were formulated and what kind of form did they 
take in the Finnish art of war in the 1920s and 1930s? Research suggests that the War of 
Independence played only a minor role in the Finnish art of war. During the First 
World War, the art of war was heavily based on war of attrition in which artillery 
fire on a massive scale and fortification played a major role. The small size of the 
Finnish nation and its numerical inferiority forced theorists to emphasise mobility. 
Attack in particular was regarded as a means of shifting the balance of power in rela-
tion to the enemy superior in strength. In a way, the issue focused on the art of war 
of the inferior party, something that was ideally supplemented by guerrilla tactics, 
historically well-known in Finland with its many variations. The Finnish art of war 
was created in a situation where practically now indigenous traditions existed. 
Therefore, Finns were compelled to use the existing foundations for the art of war. 
The vacuum regarding the art of war was filled with influences and trends obtained 
from abroad.  
 
The most influential was the strong German orientation, brought to Finland by the 
Jaegers, which contributed to the fact that three major forms of fighting were estab-
lished in Finnish tactics. With the emphasis being based on offensive tactics and 
under the influence of other theories on the art of war, guerrilla-type activities be-
came , in a way, a fourth form of fighting in Finnish tactics over the course of the 
1920s and 1930s. Guerrilla-type activities adapted to Finnish conditions, capable of 
balancing the superiority in strength of the enemy, were regarded, in theory at least, 
equal to the classic forms of fighting. On the basis of this, theorists found it easy to 
base their views on guerrilla-type activities and theoretical opportunities available to 
their use. 
 
Although the art of war regarding guerrilla-type activities was heavily based on theo-
ry, Finnish theorists understood, from the very beginning, that factors other than 
purely theoretical ones also played a role in their credibility. Therefore, the opportu-
nities and practicability of guerrilla-type activities were tested in practice. Experi-
ments involving Finnish conditions and terrain arranged over the course of the 
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1920s were the first steps on the path towards a modern art of war. The varied 
Finnish terrain, large wilderness areas, a landscape dominated by a dense tree and 
shrub cover, interspersed by waterways and swampland, was as if created for the 
various means of guerrilla tactics. Traps, ambushes, sabotage and hiding made Fin-
land a difficult theatre of war for an enemy that was superior in strength. 
 
Following theoretical analysis and practical experimentation during the first decades 
of Finnish independence, guerrilla-type activities in forested areas broken up by 
lakes and rivers and having few roads were developed into a form of fighting worth 
consideration in the art of war founded on Finnish traditions. Theoretical thinking 
on guerrilla-type activities changed over the course of the 1930s, developing along 
increasingly national lines and taking on new aspects. From being focused on de-
stroying individual targets by troops operating in a concerted fashion, tactical think-
ing began to emphasise forms that were more comprehensive in nature and sought 
increased efficiency. By the end of the 1930s, guerrilla-type activities as a method of 
combat, took on –at least in theory –more systematic and established forms as an 
integral part of other operations. The trend was towards integrating guerrilla-type 
activities into operations conducted by an army corps or another formation. 
 
How were guerrilla-type activities used in the wars between 1939 and 1944 and what kind of im-
pact did the experiences gained from the wars have on the development of guerrilla-type activities 
during the postwar years? While theories developed during the first decades of Finland’s 
independence were realised to a varying degree in the Winter War, the considerable 
opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and their place in the art of war be-
came increasingly better understood. The most striking observation related to the 
importance of systematic training and clear instructions. During the war, there was 
no time to give troops a crash course in guerrilla-type activities, let alone form 
troops for demanding guerrilla operations, in particular when the drafting of uni-
form guidelines, despite solid theories, was still in its infancy. However, guerrilla-
style activities carried out in the early phase of the Winter War on a limited scale 
proved the efficiency of such tactics. Where the shortage of troops and weapons 
was at its most severe, guerrilla-type activities provided an opportunity for success. 
Although patrolling and guerrilla-type activities carried out during the Winter War 
were not homogeneous in form, if viewed from the perspective of guidelines, they 
had great local significance. The concepts regarding guerrilla-type activities, with all 
their definitions, also developed along independent lines. Although such definitions 
were based on facts tested in practice, opinions about guerrilla-type activities charac-
terising them as the most efficient method of fighting in Finnish conditions began 
to emerge during the Winter War. With regard to the terrain, guerrilla-type activities 
were found to be best suited to Ladoga Karelia and the areas further north. 
 
However, from the perspective of the Finnish art of war, it should be noted that 
there were practically no examples of the impact of guerrilla-type activities on an 
enemy deploying armoured troops. Partly for this reason, the experiences gained 
from guerrilla-type activities were also very valuable in an international context. 
During the Interim Peace, development in guerrilla-type activities were extended to 
the reorganisation and training of troops. Reflections on guerrilla-type activities 
based on experiences gained from the war stepped up development efforts, direct-
ing them to priority areas. Therefore, experiences gained from the war were given an 
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importance that was at least equal to that of theory on warfare. Thus, development 
efforts in guerrilla-type activities had been given a more systematic foundation on 
which further development work could be built and the results of which were put to 
good use during the Continuation War. 
 
In the early stages of the Continuation War, the Finnish army had no time, capabil-
ity or desire to integrate guerrilla-type activities into its attack operations. As the 
frontal attack progressed at a rapid pace and as the planning of operations aimed at 
defeating the enemy using conventional tactics, guerrilla-type activities, which repre-
sented more defensive methods, were less suited for the field army’s tasks and tar-
gets. According to the assessment made at the time, the strengths of guerrilla-type 
activities were best served by sending long-range patrols to the rear area of the Sovi-
et troops. Although long-range patrolling during the Continuation War was effi-
cient, it cannot be equated with the concept of guerrilla-type activities. Long-range 
patrols were principally tasked with carrying out reconnaissance missions in the en-
emy’s rear and only secondarily with harassment and demolition, using the methods 
of guerrilla warfare. Long-range patrols were also under the direct control of the 
General Headquarters. 
 
Guerrilla-type activities were the responsibility of the divisions. Army corps and 
other formations had free rein to conduct operations and make independent tactical 
decisions, leading to a varied deployment of guerrilla-style activities. For this reason, 
guerrilla-type activities linked to the operations of front-line units never developed 
into a systematic form of fighting during the Continuation War. An attempt by 
General Headquarters to intensify guerrilla-type activities by the divisions and to 
bring them under unified command under the code name Operation Forest Felling 
(‘Operaatio Metsänhakkuut’) failed. In places, the casualties of guerrilla operations 
were all too severe with regard to their objectives. The adversary also learned les-
sons about the Finnish art of war, enabling the Soviets to organise and intensify 
their partisan activities, which in turn forced the Finns to change the principles of 
their guerrilla-type activities. During the final phases of the Continuation War and in 
the Lapland War, guerrilla-type activities played a very minor role as the war opera-
tions progressed rapidly and as the Finnish army had lost initiative to the enemy, 
whereby opportunities for guerrilla tactics were practically nil.  
 
The fact that the Continuation War had ended in late summer 1944 in victorious de-
fensive battles taught the practitioners of the Finnish art of war an important lesson. 
Success factors of warfare include, as an essential part, the active control of the bat-
tlefield, the willingness to fight even when the enemy is superior in strength, and the 
effectiveness of unconventional methods. From the perspective of guerrilla-type ac-
tivities, the key benefit gained from the Continuation War –as from the Winter War 
–was war and combat experience. However, as such, without an analysis, such ex-
perience was useless. This is why the lessons learned from war experiences were put 
to use only after careful analysis. It was only after the war, in discussions and in 
analysis of the war experiences, that efficiency of unconventional methods and op-
portunities available to their use in the Finnish art of war were confirmed. The at-
tention of military experts was focused on the results and methods of guerrilla-type 
activities, including their influence on the combat against the enemy in a situation in 
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which the defender was inferior in strength. The summary of the conclusions is un-
ambiguous. Even before the Winter War, guerrilla-type activities had been regarded 
as an efficient fighting method, and this notion was reinforced during the Continua-
tion War. Success in guerrilla-type activities in both wars was not based on opera-
tions carried out by guerrilla jaeger troops formed of volunteers, put through crash 
training and issued with poor equipment. Experience had shown that successful 
guerrilla-type activities, if they were to be integrated into other combat operations, 
required systematic peacetime training, proper organisation, preparations, planning, 
and unambiguous instructions.  
 
Despite the fact that the war had ended and Finland had signed an interim peace 
treaty, many in Finland, especially among the military leadership, were fearful of a 
possibility of a renewed strategic strike by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, 
measures to prepare for a repulsion of an attack, even hastily taken action, might 
take on strategic aspects and constitute a preventive threat to the enemy. Dispersed 
storage of weapons, carried out after the Continuation War had ended, known as 
the weapons caching operation, demonstrated on the one hand the high level of the 
Finnish art of war and, on the other, preparedness for guerrilla-type activities and 
even guerrilla war if necessary. The weapons caching operation must be seen as a 
preparatory measure for a guerrilla war which, if prolonged, would have instilled at 
least momentary hope in a war-weary nation for avoiding a total occupation. After 
the operation came to light in its full extent, the fast pace at which it had been car-
ried out and its highly systematic nature was widely marvelled at, although not open-
ly at the time. In other words, Finnish guerrilla-type activities were not just dead let-
ters on a piece of paper; they were a harsh reality for a great power enemy. Combin-
ing guerrilla-type activities with a resolute national character and a determination to 
fight with all available means for the country’s independence, even under occupa-
tion, had delivered a strategic warning to the invader. There was a determination to 
fight tooth and nail for Finland using all available means, including a guerrilla war 
and even armed resistance by ordinary citizens. 
 
Why was guerrilla warfare juxtaposed against guerrilla-type activities in the 1950s and why was 
the option of guerrilla war gradually abandoned by the 1970s? After the war, Finland had 
drifted into a difficult situation. The demobilisation of the wartime field army of half 
a million men and the activities of the Control Commission that the Allies had set 
up for Finland greatly hampered the development of the Defence Forces. In materi-
el terms, Finland’s defensive capability was good, but the treaties that Finland had 
signed with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s gave rise to significant problems of 
interpretation concerning the issue of the defence of the country. Preparations for 
mobilisation and operational planning remained in a static state, and Finland was 
forced to await a solution to the question of the surplus weapons for years. Howev-
er, these difficulties were overcome on the strength of a policy of acquiescence – at 
least ostensibly –and plans that the military drafted in all secrecy. The question of 
surplus weapons was resolved in a way that was advantageous for Finland. Opera-
tional planning, preparations for mobilisation and a number of other issues were 
reinitiated in the early 1950s. However, the world had changed as the general notion 
of war had changed, becoming more total in nature. With relations between the 
great powers cooling, with the face of war changing from one fought on front lines 
to something without definite fronts, with the mobility of troops improving at a rap-
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id pace, and with the Finnish Defence Forces facing necessary structural changes, 
there was a definite need to transform the entire military foundation of the Finnish 
defences in order to enable Finnish defences to meet the prevalent conditions. With 
this change, guerrilla-type activities and taking advantage of the means available to 
guerrilla warfare were regarded as playing a major role.  
 
In postwar Finland, a new kind of discussion about the opportunities available to 
guerrilla warfare began, shaking the very foundations of Finnish lore. Although 
guerrilla-type activities had proved to be an effective form of fighting, they were not 
sufficient to create a deterrent to mechanised troops and a great power enemy with 
a considerable firepower. Therefore, guerrilla war began to attract increased serious 
attention as an option for future wars. While guerrilla-type activities, which had been 
found effective, were not abandoned, the emphasis within the art of war was gradu-
ally shifting towards guerrilla war –the extreme form of national defence –over the 
course of the early years of the Cold War. Although the postwar principles govern-
ing guerrilla-type activities remained largely unchanged in the late 1950s, a concep-
tual shift towards guerrilla war that was more total in nature was clearly discernible. 
 
Another reason behind the increased appreciation of guerrilla war was the realisa-
tion that Finland of the late 1950s and early 1960s, suffering from a shortage of ma-
teriel, would always be inferior in strength to the invader. Using unconventional 
methods such as systematic guerrilla war, it was thought possible to balance the rela-
tive strengths and to create a pre-emptive deterrent that would send a message to 
the invader that Finland would be defended with all available means. The ancient 
myth of David and Goliath had been resurrected. Continuous and credible devel-
opment of guerrilla warfare was regarded as necessary, as otherwise it would remain 
a dead letter and a deterrent on paper only. Great importance was also placed on 
training, because it was only through training that the requirement set by the de-
fence principle for all formations to adopt guerrilla-type activities would have been 
possible in practice. Every soldier needed to have the basic skills of the guerrilla jae-
ger –getting by in the field, taking advantage of the terrain and applying the requi-
site engineering skills. All Finnish conscripts needed to be trained in such basic 
guerrilla jaeger skills that would enable them to get by in a guerrilla war should the 
country face a surprise attack. Guerrilla-type activities also needed to be linked to 
other operations conducted by the army. This thinking exhibits clear parallels to ex-
periences gained from China and Vietnam. The previous notion of assembling and 
training guerrilla jaeger troops and units after the onset of the war had finally, fol-
lowing failures, become history. However, the reform of the Finnish defence system 
and territorial defence were not solely based on guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type ac-
tivities. The development of the defence system was associated with a large number 
of challenges, the most notable of which culminated in the definition of tactical 
concepts and their content before their practical implementation. 
 
The confusion regarding concepts, typical of the period, was also extended to draw-
ing an unambiguous line between guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities. Howev-
er, concepts have never won wars, and there were other problems to solve. Alt-
hough many had great faith in guerrilla war as a form of fighting, others were con-
siderably less confident about its implementation. The educational level of the 
population was seen to play a major role in a guerrilla war. The significance of psy-
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chological warfare and the population’s will to defend the country were emphasised, 
based on experiences gained from Norway and its resistance movement during the 
Second World War.  
 
Just like in the 1920s, thinking on guerrilla war was supported by strong personali-
ties in the 1960s. The grounds for guerrilla warfare and an operational model for 
guerrilla jaegers proposed by Colonel Veikko Koppinen in the early 1960s were 
ahead of his time, to a degree that they gave rise more to doubts than approval. The 
gravest concerns about Koppinen’s ideas were related to the ability of small opera-
tional groups to fight in isolation, including their mental stamina, physical endurance 
and challenges to their chain of supply. The effectiveness of mine weaponry was al-
so questioned, as there was only insufficient experience of Claymore-type mines 
available. The dispersed form of fighting and leadership of operations without radio 
equipment was justifiably raised as a key problem. Although Koppinen’s ideas were 
laughed at, they had enough substance to warrant a more detailed analysis.  
 
How did the guerrilla-type activities with a decidedly Finnish character develop as part of a territo-
rial defence solution during the Cold War period? The Guerrilla Tactics Committee, which 
functioned between 1961 and 1963, and the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics, 
which was operational between 1964 and 1965, not forgetting several other 
workgroups that delved into the issue, formulated a solid foundation for territorial 
guerrilla activities, building on ideas put forth by Koppinen and engaging in system-
atic research and experimentation. By 1966 the Defence Forces had adopted an or-
ganisation based on military provinces, and the principle of guerrilla warfare and ter-
ritorial combat had more or less been integrated into territorial defensive thinking. 
Guerrilla-type activities by local forces formed the backbone of territorial combat in 
a situation where guerrilla war was seen as the last resort to be taken up by all 
troops. However, it was only in the 1970s that the option of guerrilla war was aban-
doned and the focus shifted to developing guerrilla-type activities. 
 
If the impact and content of the methods of guerrilla warfare and the Finnish art of 
war are to be summed up, it can be stated that despite the fact that the definitions 
varied, often down to the level of details, the core of guerrilla methods remained 
largely unchanged during the Cold War era. Guerrilla war, using military units, 
aimed to support, supplant or continue conventional military operations in enemy-
held areas. Under the Finnish definition, soldiers, not civilians, were responsible for 
combat and armed operations. If the evacuation of civilians from the war zone 
proved impossible, guerrilla war would be reduced to unarmed resistance, particular-
ly in population centres. Like guerrilla war, guerrilla-type activities aimed to support, 
supplant or continue conventional military operations. Starting from the 1960s, un-
derstanding territorial defence solely as a way of preparing for guerrilla war was also 
increasingly a misunderstanding based on false simplifications. The discrepancy be-
tween Finnish guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war as it was understood in the 
international context was significant.  
 
What was the history of concepts related to guerrilla-type activities and how did the Finnish con-
cepts change during Finland’s independence? During the last millennium, as probably today, 
territorial combat and the principles of guerrilla-type activities in national defence 
referred to operations that cause attrition to the enemy, starting from the border us-
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ing the various forms of guerrilla activities carried out by small guerrilla jaeger 
troops engaged in active combat. In the Finnish territorial defence system, the Finn-
ish art of war would have manifested itself in part in the form of territorial combat 
using, among other things, guerrilla-type activities. This refers to combat conducted 
simultaneously in depth in order to slow down the enemy’s advance, to cause attri-
tion to it, to stop its attack and, ultimately, to defeat or destroy it. The operational 
methods of territorial combat enable the disposition of troops in a relatively dis-
persed manner across most parts of the country taking advantage of prevailing con-
ditions. 
 
How did the development work on guerrilla-type activities influences the training in guerrilla-type 
activities given by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard? The decisions taken by the 
end of the Cold War era integrated the methods of guerrilla warfare into the Finnish 
art of war. Whether termed guerrilla war, guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities, 
the methods of guerrilla warfare were here to stay, and were integrated into the terri-
torial defensive thinking and system. This was evidenced by the training plans draft-
ed over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, training provided by the units of the De-
fence Forces and the Frontier Guard, and, in particular, guerrilla courses arranged 
by the Army Combat School. The role of the Frontier Guard in the development of 
guerrilla-type activities in the 1950s and the 1960s can be regarded as significant, and 
with justification. The culmination of guerrilla-type activities was the large-scale ex-
perimental exercises arranged in the early 1980s, in which guerrilla-type activities 
conducted within the framework of a military area and the arrangements of guerrilla 
training played the key role. The other piece of evidence is more pragmatic in na-
ture. Sissiopas (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’), published in 1979, is still in 
force in the 2010s and is used in day-to-day training by the Defence Forces. This 
manual alone is evidence enough of the significance of guerrilla-type activities in the 
Finnish art of war.  
 
How have theories proposed by individuals affected the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activi-
ties? During the early years of independent Finland, theoretical thinking on guerrilla-
type activities and their development depended on the activity and vision of a hand-
ful of individuals. The first person to step into the shoes of a guerrilla war theoreti-
cian was General Karl Adaridi. A visionary and a trailblazer in theoretical thinking 
on the art of war, Adaridi brought the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activi-
ties to the attention of Finnish officers. While other authors active during the time 
can be singled out, Adaridi’s texts on guerrilla-type activities found a permanent 
place in the history of the Finnish art of war. During Finland’s wars, Colonel Valo 
Nihtilä, the chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, emerged 
as an advocate of guerrilla-type activities. The analysis of war experiences vindicated 
his views and proposals highlighting the efficiency of guerrilla-type activities. Veikko 
Koppinen has often been characterised as a pioneer of Finnish guerrilla warfare dur-
ing the postwar years. He was this, but principally in the role of one who proposed 
new ideas and acted as an innovative developer. Although the role of Finnish theo-
retician on guerrilla warfare during the Cold War years can be given to Veikko Kop-
pinen, with justification, other individuals were also involved. Of them, Juhani Ruu-
tu, Ermei Kanninen, Olavi Lopmeri, Paavo Ilmola, Väinö Volanen, Veikko Kar-
hunen, Georg Ahonen, Juhani Paakkinen, Heikki Kalpamaa and Ari-Ilmari Iisakkala 
deserve a special mention, in equal manner. They, and numerous others, played an 
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important role in the development of the Finnish art of war, particularly in the area 
of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.  
 
How have international trends influenced the development of the Finnish art of war? In the art of 
war, examples gained from outside Finland further accentuated the significance of 
guerrillas. On the one hand, guerrilla operations in Indochina, Korea and Vietnam 
had proved their efficiency. On the other hand, helicopters and other operations by 
air had enabled the expansion of anti-guerrilla activities. However, what is notewor-
thy is that Vietnam appears to have been largely ignored in Finland. The sources 
available to this study suggest that the guerrilla war waged by the Vietnamese Liber-
ation Movement and the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam was 
not publicly noted to any appreciable extent in Finnish military planning. It is rather 
surprising that a popular revolutionary war and guerrilla war waged in the 1960s and 
1970s that is most widely referred to in the international context did not play a more 
prominent role in discussions on guerrilla-type activities by the Defence Forces. 
 
With regard to the pillars of the art of war, both the reach and rapidness of opera-
tions favoured guerrilla-type activities. Against the background described above, it 
was quite understandable that while guerrilla war was viewed as being feasible in 
Finnish conditions, it needed to be linked to other operations conducted by the 
Finnish ground forces. After all, the wars that Finland had waged had shown that it 
was perfectly possible that the entire country or portions of it could come under the 
threat of occupation. Fighting an enemy with a superior strength was possible using 
conventional means but, should Finland’s defences collapse, the fight was to be 
continued using the methods of a guerrilla war. 
 
During the Cold War years, the face of war, the art of war, operational skills and tac-
tics were caught in a turmoil and underwent rapid development. This was probably 
the root cause for guerrilla warfare gaining a foothold and occupying such a pro-
nounced position in the Finnish art of war. However, decision-makers, mostly poli-
ticians and human rights activists, who did not understand the fundamentals of na-
tional defence by military means, argued that guerrilla war involved methods of un-
conventional warfare that were politically questionable and that could even be lik-
ened to the repertoire of methods of terrorism. Sabotage, breaking the rules of war 
and a vague concept of an exploding wilderness did not belong to the methods of 
warfare that a Western nation governed by the rule of law could resort to, not even 
in a situation in which the adversary used such methods. It was exactly for this rea-
son that the Defence Forces sought to analyse the grounds for the Finnish art of 
war and its concepts, to clarify them and to make them unambiguously understand-
able. Finland needed a capacity for defending itself on the basis of plans and a de-
fence system based on facts, not on evocative images which were, apparently, rein-
forced by international events.  
 
During the Cold War years, the nature of the Finnish art of war was heavily based 
on activities tested in practice. The enemy had its own way of acting, and the Finns 
developed their national defence in their own way, adapting it to Finnish conditions. 
Military history had shown that the simulation of the methods of the superior party 
was all too frequently a recipe for disaster. This piece of wisdom also encapsulates 
the core of Finnish guerrilla-type activities and their scope of application. Despite 
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the numerous advantages granted by modern military technology, the guerrilla jaeger 
was required to possess excellent physical and mental stamina and a great deal of 
imagination, cunning and ingenuity. 
 
The relative strengths will affect the duration and phases of a war. Prolongation is 
not an end in itself. Western countries that had been occupied had not fought a 
widespread popular war as the populations had not been prepared for it. In the 
West, war continues to be regarded as the business of the military, with attempts be-
ing made to protect the population from it. With the armed forces becoming in-
creasingly professional, guerrilla war has become –and continues to be –a solution 
that is not an option for an industrialised nation. The Finnish art of war did not 
come to an end when the Cold War ended. Foresighted decision-makers and offic-
ers let the art of war live on by developing it in an innovative and target-oriented 
fashion towards the set objectives. Well-grounded planning based on research was 
preferred over stopgap solutions. 
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ary and 16 September 1940. 
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General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, Training Division 
(Koul.os/PvPE), the Interim Peace from 1940 to 1941 
 
T 17651/6, confidential correspondence covering the period between 
1 January and 21 June 1941. 
T 17651/10, general correspondence covering the period between 1 
January and 21 June 1941. 
T 17651/11, general correspondence covering the period between 1 
January and 21 June 1941. 
 
T 18003/3, confidential correspondence received in 1941. 
 
General Headquarters, Training Division (Koul.os/PM), the Contin-
uation War 1941–1944 
 
T 17654/14, confidential correspondence from 1944. 
 
General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, Training Division 
(Koul.os/PvPE), between 1944 and 1952 
 
T 17655/10, general correspondence 1 December 1944 to 31 Decem-
ber 1945. 
 
T 18002/8, collected war experiences from 1945. 
T 18002/9, collected war experiences from 1945. 
T 18002/10, collected war experiences from 1945. 
T 18002/11, collected war experiences from 1945. 
T 18002/12, collected war experiences from 1945. 
T 18002/13, collected war experiences from1945. 
 
T 19466/F 16, general correspondence from 1947. 
 
T 19467/F 21, general correspondence from 1948. 
T 19467/F 34, general correspondence from 1948. 
 
T 19468/F 37, general correspondence from 1949. 
T 19468/F 47, general correspondence from 1949. 
T 19468/F 52a, general correspondence. from 1950. 
 
T 19469/F 60b, general correspondence from 1950. 
T 19469/F 63, general correspondence from 1950. 
 
T 20169/F 83, general correspondence from 1952. 
T 20169/F 85, general correspondence from 1952. 
T 20169/F 86, general correspondence from 1952. 
T 20169/F 90, general correspondence from 1952. 
 
 
 
297 
General Headquarters, Training Division (Koul.os/PE), as of 1953 
 
T 20170/F 95, general correspondence from 1953. 
 
T 20171/F 106, general correspondence from 1954. 
T 20171/F 109, general correspondence from 1954. 
 
T 20172/F 118, correspondence from 1955. 
T 20172/F 120, correspondence from 1955. 
T 20172/F 129, correspondence from 1956. 
 
T 20173/F 138, correspondence from 1956. 
 
T 21442/F 5–6 sal, confidential correspondence from 1953 to 1955. 
T 21442/F 7 sal, confidential correspondence from 1956. 
T 21442/F 11 sal, confidential correspondence from 1959 to 1960. 
T 21442/F 12 sal, confidential correspondence from 1961. 
T 21442/F 13 sal, confidential correspondence from 1962. 
 
T 23204/F 291, correspondence from 1971. 
 
T 25086/F 1 sal, confidential correspondence from 1962 to 1967. 
T 25086/F 2 sal, confidential correspondence from 1968. 
 
General Headquarters, Training Department, Training Office 
(Koultsto/PE), between 1957 and 1966 
 
T 22780/F 148, correspondence from 1957. 
T 22780/F 149, correspondence from 1957. 
 
General Headquarters, Regulations Office of the Training Division 
(Ohjeststo/PE), 1953–1972 
 
T 21464/F 14 sal, confidential memoranda from 1948 to 1957. 
T 21464/F 15 sal, confidential memoranda from 1958 to 1971. 
 
Staff Duties Office of the General Headquarters (documents on mo-
bilisation, organised by theme) from 1927 to 1952 
 
T 22104/Hh 96, Sissi form 1940. 
 
General Headquarters, the Staff Duties Office of the Mobilisation Di-
vision (Järjtsto/PE) from 1956 to 1959 
 
No entry number /OT 10 b 1 sal, from 1956 to 1959. 
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General Headquarters, the Staff Duties Office of the Mobilisation Di-
vision (Järjtsto/PE), 1970 
 
T 26838/F 32 sal, confidential correspondence 1970. 
 
The General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, Office of the Terri-
torial Organisation (Järj.2/PvPE) from 1944 to 1952 
 
T 22520/Hh 45, correspondence, materiel lists prepared for LVK, 
from 1947. 
T 22520/Hh 47, correspondence, accounts of establishment tasks 
submitted to LVK, from 1945 and 1947. 
 
T 26842/Bb 2 sal, a draft for an establishment chart (PTL), from 
1949. 
 
The General Headquarters, the Staff Duties Office (Lpktsto/PE), 
1952–1960 
 
T 26842/Bb 8 sal, PTL, from 1960. 
T 26842/Ha 2 sal, preparatory documents, from 1948 to 1957. 
T 26842/Ha 3 sal, preparatory documents, from 1958 to 1960. 
T 26842/Ha 4 sal, preparatory documents, from 1961 to 1965. 
 
T 26843/Hh 10 sal, confidental correspondence, from 1960. 
 
The General Headquarters, the Staff Duties Office of the Mobilisa-
tion Division (Järj.2/PE), from 1952 to 1968 
 
T 26842/F 18 sal, confidential correspondence from 1963. 
T 26842/F 25 sal, confidential correspondence from 1967. 
 
T 26843/F 6 OT-sal, correspondence from 1955. 
 
The General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Infantry Office 
(Jvtsto/PvPE), 1944–1952 
 
T 18751/KO, documents related to the drafting of the Field Regula-
tion from 1945 to 1947. 
 
T 20239/F 1 sal, confidential correspondence from 1949-1951. 
T 20239/F 2 sal, confidential correspondence from 1952-1953. 
T 20239/F 3 sal, confidential correspondence from 1954-1955. 
 
General Headquarters , Infantry Office (Jvtsto/PE), 1953–1968 
 
T 25094/E 1 sal, (‘documents received (no record number)’) from 
1953 to 1957. 
T 25094/F 4 sal, confidential correspondence from 1956. 
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T 25094/F 5 sal, confidential correspondence from 1957. 
T 25094/F 8 sal, confidential correspondence from 1960. 
T 25094/F 9 sal, confidential correspondence from 1961. 
T 25094/F 13 sal, confidential correspondence from 1965. 
T 25094/F 14 sal, confidential correspondence from 1966. 
T 25094/F 15 sal, confidential correspondence from 1967. 
T 25094/F 17 sal, confidential correspondence from 1969. 
T 25094/F 18 sal, confidential correspondence from 1970-1971. 
T 25094/H 15 sal, guerrilla warfare and the operations by special 
troops, from 1960. 
T 25094/H 16 sal, The Field Regulation of the Soviet Armed Forces, 
from 1961. 
 
General Headquarters, Infantry Office (Jv-os/PE), from 1960 to 1968 
 
T 25991/Db 1, decisions, orders, instructions from of 1960 to 1966. 
T 25991/Ea 1, documents received, from 1960 to 1965. 
T 25991/F 1, public correspondence, from 1960. 
T 25991/F 2, public correspondence, from 1960. 
T 25991/F 3, public correspondence, from 1961. 
T 25991/F 6, public correspondence, from 1962. 
T 25991/F 8, public correspondence, from 1962. 
T 25991/F 9, public correspondence, from 1963. 
T 25991/F 10, public correspondence, from 1963. 
 
General Headquarters, Infantry Office (Jvtsto/PE), from 1979 to 1983 
(a research permit granted by MAAVT, MG 19995/1532/25.02/ 
2010/3.6.2010, PVAH) 
 
T 25722/Da 2 sal, confidential own documents and preparatory doc-
uments, from 1979 to 1980 (research permit obtained). 
T 25722/Da 3 sal, confidential own documents and preparatory doc-
uments, from 1981 to 1982 (research permit obtained). 
 
T 25993/Hn 2 ets, ETS documents, from 1980 to 1981.  
T 25993/Hn 3 ets, ETS documents, from 1982 to 1983.  
 
The General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the Armaments 
Office (Tväl.2/PvPE), 1944–1952 
 
T 19222/24 b, confidential correspondence, from 1947. 
T 19222/29, confidential correspondence from 1948. 
 
The General Headquarters, the Coastal Artillery Office (Rttsto/PE), 
from 1968 
 
T 26513/Hbi 1 sal, confidential memoranda records, from 1968. 
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The General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, War Economics 
Headquarters and Ordnance Division (Tväl), from 1940 to 1946 
 
T 20207/F 16 sal, confidential correspondence, situation regarding 
weaponry and munitions, from 1941 to 1944. 
 
The General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, Ordnance Division 
(Tväl.os/PvPE), from 1944 to 1952 
 
T 20214/F 9 sal, confidential correspondence, visit at depots by LVK 
in 1947. 
 
General Headquarters, Communications Division, 1944 and The 
General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, Communications Divi-
sion, from 1944 to 1948  
 
T 20362/1, a journal on contact with LVK, lists, memoranda, annual 
reports and correspondence, from 1944 to 1948. 
 
 
HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY PROVINCES AND 
DISTRICTS 
 
Headquarters of the Southern Finland (ESSlE), from 1968 
 
T 25044/F 3 sal, confidential correspondence, from 1968. 
 
Headquarters of the Hämeenlinna Military District (HämlSpE), 
1970–1972 
 
T 24195/H 1 sal, LKP D, from 1970 to 1971. 
T 24195/H 4 sal, LKP D III, from 1972. 
 
Headquarters of the Military Province South-Western Finland 
(LounSuoSlE) from 1948 to 1950 
 
T 20131/F 2 sal, confidential correspondence from 1948-1950. 
 
Headquarters of the Military Province of Western Finland (LSSlE), 
from 1968 
 
T 23920/F 2 sal, confidential correspondence from 1968. 
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES, ARMY CORPS AND GROUPS 
 
Headquarters of the Maaselkä Group Operations Office (tsto 
III/MRE), from 1943 
 
T 9074/4, confidential and general correspondence, from 1943. 
 
Headquarters of Talvela Group (RTE), the Winter War from 1939 to 
1940 
 
P 1719/2, correspondence, from 1940. 
 
Headquarters of the IV Army Groups (IVAKE), the Winter War from 
1939 to 1940 
 
P 494/2, general and confidential correspondence, from 1939 to 1940. 
 
 
HEADQUARTERS OF THE DIVISIONS BRIGADES AND THE 
UNITS BELOW THEM 
 
Headquarters of the Pori Brigade (PorPrE), from 1962 
 
T 23519/F 36, correspondence from 1962. 
 
Coastal Jaeger Battalion (RannJP), from 1961 to 1973 
 
T 24075/F 1 sal, confidential correspondence from 1961 to 1973. 
 
Guerrilla Battalion 1 (SissiP 1), the Winter War from 1939 to 1940 
 
P 2126/3, correspondence, from 1939 to 1940. 
 
Guerrilla Battalion 4 (SissiP 4), the Winter War from 1939 to 1940 
 
P 539/a4, correspondence, from 1939 to 1940. 
 
Staff of 14th Division, the Intelligence Office (Ofice II/14.DE), from 
1944 
 
T 5973/8, Confidential correspondence (the old identifier by the ar-
chival unit is T 5973/11), 1944. 
 
Vaasa Coastal Artillery Battery (VaaRPsto), from 1980 to 1982 
 
T 25981/Hn 3, ETS documents, from 1980 to 1982. 
 
 
302 
MILITARY SCHOOLS AND OTHER INSTITUTES OF 
EDUCATION 
 
The National General Staff College (SKK), from 1945 to 1972 
(Permit to use granted by MPKK, AJ 2890/4424/63/2012/9.2.2013, 
PVAH) 
 
T 21369/Db 5, curricula and annual reports, from 1947 to 1954. 
T 21369/Dg 111, lectures and exercises (Y 16), from 1946. 
 
T 23101/F 3 sal, correspondence, from 1958 to 1960 (research permit 
obtained). 
 
T 24043/Db 14, curricula, from 1963 to 1969. 
T 24043/Db 15, curricula, from 1970 to 1973.  
T 24043/Dg 203, lectures and exercises, from 1967 to 1972. 
T 24043/F 87, correspondence from 1967. 
T 24043/F 97, correspondence from 1970. 
 
T 26890/Hla 5 sal, memoranda, presentations, accounts, from 1945 to 
1959, (research permit obtained) 
T 26890/Hla 6 sal, memoranda, presentations, accounts, from 1952 to 
1953, (research permit obtained) 
T 26890/Hla 10 sal, memoranda, presentations, accounts, from 1968 
to 1972, (research permit obtained) 
T 26890/Hlb 17 sal, accounts of operational terrain reconnaissance 
operations, from 1961 (research permit obtained). 
 
The Army Combat School (TaistK), from 1945 to 1979 
 
T 22755/F 7, correspondence from 1951 to 1960. 
 
T 26077, presentations and introductions by students from 1945 
to1963, and theses prepared on general commander courses, staff of-
ficer courses 19–32 and infantry captain courses 36–52 from 1964–
1979. 
 
 
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (PlM) 
 
The Ministry of Defence (PlM), from 1939 to 1960 
 
T 21402/F 119, correspondence, from 1952. 
 
T 22220/F 254, correspondence from 1959. 
 
T 23828/Fa 12 sal, correspondence, miscellaneous, no numbers, from 
1939 to 1949. 
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The Ministry of Defence, the Defence Revision Committee, from 
1945 to 1949 
 
T 19572/376, the Defence Revision Committee, minutes, from 1945 
to 1946. 
T 19572/377, the Defence Revision Committee, minutes, from 1946 
to 1949. 
 
The Ministry of Defence, the Defence Council, from 1958 
 
T 24727/Da 1 sal, confidential correspondence, from 1958. 
 
 
FRONTIER GUARD (RvL) 
 
The Headquarters of the North Karelia Frontier Guard, (P-KRE), the 
Winter War from 1939 to 1940 
 
P 1727/7, confidential and general correspondence, from 12 October 
1939 to 13 March 1940. 
P 1727/8, confidential and general correspondence, from 12 October 
1939 to 13 March 1940. 
 
The Headquarters of the Kainuu Frontier Guard (K-RE), from 1956 to 
1960 
 
T 24014/F 4 sal, confidential correspondence, from 1956 to 1960. 
 
The Frontier Guard Headquarters (RajavE tai RvE), from 1950 to 
1956 
 
T 22834/F 48, correspondence from 1950. 
T 22834/F 57, correspondence from 1951. 
T 22834/F 66, correspondence from 1952. 
T 22834/F 108, correspondence from 1956. 
 
 
ADVISORY BOARD OF THE MILITARY SCIENCE (StietNK) 
 
StietNK 1/16, study collection. 
StietNK 1/39, study collection. 
StietNK 1/42, study collection. 
StietNK 1/53, study collection. 
StietNK 1/63, study collection. 
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OTHER COLLECTIONS (National Archives, KA) 
 
Extracts from personal details, curricula vitae (KA) 
 
Aaltonen, Reino Olavi, no. 36703. 
Ahonen, Georg Aleksanteri, no. 55635. 
Avela, Martti, no. 30515. 
Huhtala, Vilho Olavi, no. 33380.  
Ilmola, Paavo, no. 45233. 
Järvinen, Y. A., no. 25164, KA. 
Kaakinen, Olavi Aleksander, no. 55644. 
Kalpamaa, Jarmo Heikki Artturi, no. 67474.  
Kanninen, Ermij (Ermei), no. 58557. 
Kare, Risto Ilmari, no. 37799. 
Karhunen, Osmo Eino, no. 46324. 
Karhunen, Veikko Evert, no. 37447. 
Kontiopää, Björn Harald Wilhelm, no. 40903. 
Koppinen, Veikko William, no. 55645. 
Kuismanen, Into Ensio, no. 26447. 
Kytölä, Toivo Armas, no. 44471. 
Lopmeri (former Meri), Arvi Olavi, no. 39725. 
Matikainen, Unto Osvald, no. 51481. 
Naapuri, Eero Johannes, no. 55699. 
Olkkonen, Matti Juho (Hannes), no. 40651. 
Paakkinen, Aarre Juhani, no. 82260. 
Raappana, Erkki Johannes, no. 32877. 
Ruutu, Kaarle Juhani, no. 55857. 
Sauramo, Leo, no. 24328. 
Savunen, Aatos Päiviö, no. 46375. 
Setälä, Erkki Vilhelm, no. 53560. 
Sihvo, Sami Seppo Ilmari, no. 71936. 
Susi, Sulo Vilho, no. 44859. 
Tapola, Kustaa Anders, no. 20739. 
Vallimies, Terho Edvin, no. 53241. 
Viljanen, Tauno Viktor, no. 48713. 
Vinari, Martti Johannes, no. 20679. 
Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, no. 21770. 
Välimaa, Leevi Kalervo, no. 46511. 
 
Series of the orders of the day and the collection of circular orders 
(KA) 
 
Army order no. 1/8.6.1918, KA. 
 
PE:n käskylehti 5/12.12.1956 (‘circular order issued by the General 
Headquarters’), käskylehtikokoelma (‘the collection of circular orders’), 
KA. 
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The General Headquarters, press clips from 1941 to 1989 (KA) 
 
Suomen sotamateriaalin liikamäärän luovuttaminen tai tuhoaminen vielä toimit-
tamatta, voittajavallat eivät ole vielä ilmoittaneet kantaansa (‘The surrender-
ing or destroying of Finland’s surplus war materiel still uncompleted; 
the victorious powers have not yet communicated their view’), an arti-
cle in Aamulehti 19/1948, on 30 August 1948. 
 
Private collections (Collections with a limited scope, KA) 
 
Eino Penttilä’s private collection, Pk 2109/3. 
 
Jorma Järventaus’s private collection, Kansio I: yleisesikuntapalvelu, 
Kansio II: yleistaktiikka, ilman tulonumeroa (‘Folder I: service at the 
general staff, Folder II: general tactics, no entry number’). 
 
Karl Adaridi’s private collection, Pk 534. 
 
K. A. Tapola’s private collection, Pk 1664/29, 30 and 31 (research 
permit obtained). 
 
Olavi Huhtala’s private collection, Pk 1366/3a. 
 
Suomen Sotatieteellinen Seura ry., kuukausikokousten pöytäkirjat 
vuosilta 1948–1957, (‘The Finnish Society of Military Sciences, 
minutes of the monthly meetings from 1948–1957’), Pk 2610/7, 8 and 
13. 
 
Väinö Volanen’s private collection, Pk 1401/2. 
 
Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969/1–4 (research permit ob-
tained). 
 
 
Finnish Legal Corpus and the Statute Book of Finland (KA) 
 
Asetus maan jakamisesta sotilaslääneihin ja sotilaspiireihin (‘Decree on the 
division of Finland into military provinces and districts’), the Statute 
Book of Finland, no. 145/1966, KA 
 
Asetus puolustuslaitoksesta, Suomen Asetuskokoelma (‘Decree on the 
Military System, The Statute Book of Finland’) no. 358/31.10.1952, 
KA. 
 
Geneven yleissopimusten lisäpöytäkirja kansainvälisten aseellisten selkkausten 
uhrien suojelemisesta (‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
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and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts’), KA. 
 
Haagin toisessa rauhankonferenssissa tehtyjä ja siellä 18. päivänä lokakuuta 
1907 allekirjoitettuja kansainvälisiä sopimuksia (‘The international treaties 
drafted at the Hague Second Peace Conference and signed on 18 
October 1907’), KA. 
 
Välirauhansopimus (19.9.1944) liitteineen, Suomen asetuskokoelma (‘The In-
terim Peace Treaty (19 September 1944), with appendices, the Statute 
Book of Finland’) 1944 no. 645a, KA. 
 
 
OTHER ARCHIVES 
 
Tasavallan Presidentin Arkistosäätiö, Urho Kekkosen arkisto, 
(‘Foundation of the President of Finland, the Archives of President 
Urho Kekkonen’), (UKA), Orimattila  
 
UKA 21/15, politics, the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance, from 1948 to 1949. 
 
UKA 21/19, politics, the Defence Forces, from 1958 to 1962. 
 
UKA 21/117, politics, Czechoslovakia, etc. events in 1968, memo-
randa, surveys, reports by embassies, from 1968 to 1970. 
 
UKK annual book 1969, UKA vsk. 1969. 
 
National Audiovisual Archive (KAVA), Helsinki  
 
P 437, a training film Sissikoulutuspäivät Haminassa (‘Guerrilla training 
days in Hamina’), held between 18 February and 2 March 1946. 
 
P 511, a training film Sissitaitoja talvella (‘Guerrilla skills in the winter’), 
the date of completion 11 May 1960. 
 
P 512, a training film Hiihtosissit (‘Guerrillas on skis’), 1960. 
 
P 513, a training film Sissitaitoja kesällä, (‘Guerrilla skills in the winter’), 
the date of completion 1 May 1960. 
 
P 514, a training film Sissit iskevät (‘Guerrillas strike’), the date of 
completion 1 May 1960. 
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The General Headquarters (PE), a top secret and highly confidential 
archive, Helsinki (Research permit granted by the PE, AJ 
15418/13.8.2013, PVAH) 
 
Folder and identifier: 
 
11/F 9, personal and highly confidential operational documents from 
1963, PE (research permit obtained). 
 
11/F 12, personal and highly confidential operational documents 
from 1964–1965, PE (research permit obtained). 
 
11/F 22, personal and highly confidential operational documents 
from 1968, PE (research permit obtained). 
 
D/D 1, personal and highly confidential documents from 1969, PE 
(research permit obtained). 
 
Frontier Guard Headquarters (RvE or RajavE) and (RvLE), confi-
dential due to issues related to operational readiness adn confidenti-
oal, from 1950 to 1970, Helsinki (Research permit obtained from 
RMVK, id0573361/38/RVLDno/2013/4084/24.10.2013, ASDO) 
 
Folder and identifier: 
 
F 2–6, correspondence, OT-salainen (‘confidential due to issues relat-
ed to operational readiness’), from 1951 to 1955 (research permit ob-
tained). 
F 7–8, correspondence, OT-salainen, (‘confidential due to issues relat-
ed to operational readiness’), from 1956 to 1957 (research permit ob-
tained). 
F 10, correspondence, OT-salainen, (‘confidential due to issues related 
to operational readiness’), 1959, (research permit obtained). 
F 11, correspondence, OT-salainen, (‘confidential due to issues related 
to operational readiness’), 1960, (research permit obtained). 
F 1–7, correspondence, sal, from 1950 to 1956 (research permit ob-
tained). 
F 8–9, correspondence, sal, from 1957 to 1958 (research permit ob-
tained). 
F 10, correspondence, sal, from 1959 (research permit obtained). 
F 11, correspondence, sal, from 1960 (research permit obtained). 
F 13, correspondence, sal, from 1962 (research permit obtained). 
F 15, correspondence, sal, from 1964 (research permit obtained). 
F 16, correspondence, sal, from 1965 (research permit obtained). 
F 17, correspondence, sal, from 1966 (research permit obtained). 
F 18, correspondence, sal, from 1967 (research permit obtained). 
F 19, correspondence, sal, from 1968 (research permit obtained). 
F 20, correspondence, sal, from 1969 (research permit obtained). 
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F 21, correspondence, sal, from 1970 (research permit obtained). 
 
Archive for preserving the traditions of the Utti Jaeger Regiment, 
Kouvola 
 
Documents and memoranda, from 1958 to 1969. 
 
Other archives and document collections maintained by authorities 
 
The Internal Case Management System of the Defence Forces (PVAH): 
 
Decision on the permit to use taken by the National Defence Univer-
sity, AJ 2890/4424/63/2012/9.2.2013, PVAH. 
 
Research permit granted by the Staff of the Ground Forces,  
MG 19995/1532/25.02/2010/3.6.2010, PVAH. 
 
Research permit granted by the General Headquarters, AJ 
15418/13.8.2013, PVAH. 
 
The Internal Case Management System of the Frontier Guard (ASDO): 
 
Research permit granted by the Frontier and Coast Guard Academy, 
id0573361/38/RVLDno/2013/4084/24.10.2013, ASDO. 
 
Unarchived private collections 
 
Ermei Kanninen, copies and original documents of the collection in 
the possession of the author of this thesis. 
 
Veikko Koppinen, original documents of the collection in the posses-
sion of the author of this thesis. 
 
Risto Koppinen, original documents of the collection in the posses-
sion of the author of this thesis. 
 
Sami Sihvo, copies of the collection in the possession of the author of 
this thesis. 
 
Eljas-Veli Sovijärvi, copies of the collection in the possession of the 
authreo of this thesis. 
 
Vesa Tynkkynen, copies of the collection in the possession of the au-
thor of this thesis. 
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The National Defence University (MPKK), Helsinki  
 
Reference library of the Department of Military History at the Na-
tional Defence University (MPKK, SotaHL) 
 
Haahti, U. S.: Journal entries from 1944. 
 
Material covering the interview of Colonel V. K. Nihtilä carried ou on 
14 January 1967, related to thesis of Matti Keskitalo. 
 
The war diary of General Headquarters, from 30 November 11 1939 
to 31 January 1940. 
 
The war diary of General Headquarters, from 1 August to 31 Decem-
ber 1942. 
 
Attachments to the war diary of General Headquarters, no. 551–600, 
from 26 September 1942 to 24 March 1943. 
 
The war diary of General Headquarters from 1 January to 30 June 
1943. 
 
Attachments to the war diary of General Headquarters, no 1001–
1025, from 3 September to 15 September 1944. 
 
Sotakokemuksia (‘War experiences’), MaaRE:n Op.os. kirj. no. 
3192/III/7 sal./20.7.1942, a volume compiled of the copies of origi-
nal documents. 
 
The fixed numerical strengths of the Finnish Armed Forces in peace-
time, the Ministry of Defence 24 May 1928. 
 
Rajaseudun nimismiesten kertomukset ja tutkimuspöytäkirjat partisaanien 
toiminnasta piireissään (‘Reports and investigation protocols drafted by 
rural police chiefs on partisan activity in their districts’), a volume 
compiled of the copies of original documents. 
 
Taktillinen opas II, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook II’, General 
Headquarters Training Division). 2/39, 16 December 1939. 
 
Taktillinen opas V, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook V’, General 
Headquarters Training Division). 2/39. 25 December 1939. 
 
Taktillinen opas VI, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook VI’, General 
Headquarters Training Division). 2/39, 31/12/1939. 
 
Taktillinen opas IX, Päämaja koul. (‘Tactical guidebook XI’, General 
Headquarters Training Division.’) 2/40, 16 January 1940. 
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Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta, (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 6, PM:n koul.tsto no.tta/Koul./22.sal./2X.7.1941. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 11, PM:n koul.tsto no. 838/Koul./22.sal./7.8.1941. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 16, PM:n koul.tsto no. 1226/Koul./22.sal./29.8.1941. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 32, PM:n koul.tsto no. 2652/Koul./22.sal./30.11.1941. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 33, PM:n koul.tsto no. 2678/Koul./22.sal./5.12.1941. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 37, PM:n koul.tsto no. 121/Koul./22.sal./12.1.1942. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 52, PM:n koul.tsto no. 3072/Koul./22.sal./1.8.1942. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 57, PM:n koul.os no. 4917/Koul.1/22.sal./19.11.1942. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 71, PM:n koul.os no. 5556/Koul.2/22.sal./8.11.1943. 
 
Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the 
enemy’), no. 78, PM:n koul.os no. 1871/Koul.2/25.sal./17.3.1944. 
 
Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö 
valtioneuvostolle 10.6.1949 (‘The report by the Defence Revision Com-
mittee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council of State on 24 May 
1945’). 
 
 
The research database of the Department of Military History at the 
National Defence University 
 
Folder and identifier: 
 
Document collection: ‘Talvisota 1939–1940 – strategia, operaatiot, tak-
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